Threats affecting pkg:brew/standardebooks

### Summary On Windows, attacker-controlled content in a wheel's `.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt` can cause setuptools' legacy wheel installation path to create an `__init__.py` outside the requested `destination_eggdir`. The attacker can influence the destination path, but not the contents of the created file. ### Details Tested setuptools commit: `6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558` Relevant source: `setuptools/wheel.py` SHA-256: `359b7e0d5dd8c3135653abe08a8ed5dc0352eadfd7df22cb5e2b5303b7c3cafd` The relevant call path is: `Wheel(wheel_path).install_as_egg(destination)` → `_install_as_egg` → `_convert_metadata` → `_fix_namespace_packages` A wheel can provide attacker-controlled content in: `<distribution>.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt` The namespace value is eventually used approximately as: ```python mod_dir = os.path.join(destination_eggdir, *mod.split('.')) mod_init = os.path.join(mod_dir, '__init__.py') If mod is a Windows drive-qualified absolute path containing no dots, mod.split('.') preserves it as a single component. On Windows, os.path.join(destination_eggdir, absolute_component) discards the original base directory and resolves to the attacker-supplied absolute path. The existing wheel filename and ZIP traversal checks do not validate this metadata value before it is subsequently interpreted as a filesystem path. ```markdown ### PoC The reproduction was performed entirely inside a disposable temporary directory. Layout: ```text sandbox/ destination/ outside/ input/ canary.txt ``` A synthetic wheel was created containing: `demo_pkg-1.0.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt` whose content was the absolute path of: `sandbox\outside` The real acquired setuptools implementation was then invoked: ```python setuptools.wheel.Wheel(synthetic_wheel).install_as_egg( sandbox_destination ) ``` The operation completed without exception. Expected metadata was created under: `sandbox\destination\EGG-INFO` but setuptools also created: `sandbox\outside\__init__.py` The file did not exist before execution. Its contents were: ```python __import__('pkg_resources').declare_namespace(__name__) ``` The unrelated canary remained byte-identical. The sandbox was deleted after recording the evidence. ``` ### Impact A crafted wheel can cause setuptools to create a fixed-content `__init__.py` outside the intended installation directory at a filesystem path influenced by the wheel, with the permissions of the process performing the installation. The demonstrated reproduction required the target parent directory to already exist.

## Summary GitPython's public `Submodule.move()` API verifies that its destination is lexically inside the parent repository, but it does not reject symbolic links in the destination's intermediate components before filesystem operations. On systems that check out Git symlinks, an untrusted repository can therefore redirect a fixed, application-selected move destination outside the parent worktree. The reporter reproduced this on the latest release, GitPython 3.1.62, and current `main`. In the strict scenario, the repository commits `vendor -> ../outside`, while the consuming application independently passes the fixed literal `vendor/module`. `Submodule.move()` follows `vendor`, moves the initialized submodule checkout to `outside/module`, rewrites `.gitmodules` and the index to the symlinked path, and leaves the index unable to produce a tree. The same result occurs when the committed symlink contains an absolute path to an external directory. No attacker-controlled API argument, local symlink planting, race, Git hook, unsafe-option flag, or network access during the proof is required. ## Trust boundary and preconditions The attacker controls: - an untrusted Git repository that the application clones; - a mode-`120000` tracked symlink named `vendor`; - the initialized submodule's content. The consuming application controls the call and uses a fixed layout rule: ```python submodule.move("vendor/module") ``` The trigger requires the application to initialize the submodule and later call `Submodule.move()` with a path below the attacker-committed symlink. Ordinary clone or submodule update does not automatically make this call. Windows was not tested. The primitive applies where Git materializes the tracked entry as a real symlink; on Windows that generally requires `core.symlinks=true` with Developer Mode or sufficient privilege. Configurations that materialize it as an ordinary file do not take this path. ## Product and directly verified revisions - Package: `GitPython` (`pip` ecosystem) - Latest release: 3.1.62, tag commit `db47516dac750c5968b8f6d388b18712c355df50` - Current `main`: `b62e91be897f687a622e40cd1e59c33dce45f124` - Relevant `git/objects/submodule/base.py` SHA-256 in both revisions: `a4355d49e0b75c7c7e74d33ac70ff9550f940c977848c99da40eb41e034b189c` - Upstream state rechecked: 2026-09-10 KST Only these two revisions were directly tested. ## Severity and weakness The demonstrated impact is an integrity boundary violation: repository content selects an existing directory outside the worktree, and GitPython moves an attacker-influenced checkout into a missing or empty child path there with the victim process's permissions. It also removes the original checkout and corrupts the parent repository's index/configuration state. For a downstream service that remotely accepts repositories and performs this exact layout operation with user involvement retained, `AV:N` gives a conditional application-level score of 7.1. A fully automatic service may warrant a different `UI` assessment. The library report uses `AV:L` because the vulnerable API call is a separate application action and is not part of GitPython's ordinary clone/update flow. No confidentiality impact, code execution, overwrite of an existing file, or overwrite of a non-empty directory was demonstrated. ## Reproducer The following script creates only temporary local repositories and a self-generated canary. It passes `protocol.file.allow=always` separately with `-c` on each fixture Git invocation; that permission is process-scoped and is not persisted to global or repository configuration. Run it from a fresh source checkout: ```bash git clone --depth 1 --branch 3.1.62 https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython.git python3 poc.py /path/to/GitPython python3 poc.py --absolute-link /path/to/GitPython ``` `--absolute-link` commits the temporary external directory's absolute path instead of `../outside`. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Local-only reproducer for GitPython Submodule.move() symlink traversal.""" from __future__ import annotations import argparse import json import subprocess import sys import tempfile from pathlib import Path from typing import Optional def run_git( *args: str, cwd: Optional[Path] = None, check: bool = True ) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess: command = [ "git", "-c", "user.name=GitPython security fixture", "-c", "user.email=fixture@example.invalid", "-c", "protocol.file.allow=always", *args, ] return subprocess.run(command, cwd=cwd, check=check, text=True, capture_output=True) def read_core_worktree(parent) -> str: module_config = Path(parent.git_dir) / "modules" / "logical-name" / "config" return parent.git.config("--file", str(module_config), "--get", "core.worktree") def read_gitmodules_path(parent) -> str: modules_file = Path(parent.working_tree_dir) / ".gitmodules" return parent.git.

> **A note on the referenced files.** This report was submitted through GitHub's private > vulnerability reporting API, which carries no attachments. Every transcript this report leans > on is reproduced **inline above**, verbatim. The file names it mentions (`poc.sh`, `poc.log`, > per-case transcripts, `evidence.md`, `negative-controls.md`, blob-sweep tables) are the local > evidence bundle those inline excerpts were extracted from, with a checksum manifest. I am happy > to send the bundle by any channel you prefer, or to open a private fork — just say which. The > PoC scripts are self-contained and reproduce the result from a clean environment. --- **Affected:** `<= 3.1.62` — all published releases; also `main` @ `4905b4af` **Verified at runtime:** GitPython `3.1.62` with git `2.55.0` **Date:** 2026-09-10 **Reporter:** MAXI8594 --- ## Threat model | | | |---|---| | **Attacker** | anyone who can get the application to clone a URL they control. No account, no credential, no privilege in the consuming application. | | **Pre-need** | a repository they host, with `HEAD` pointing at a branch whose name is the payload. A `git push` to a plain git server is enough — no filesystem access to a server is required (`raw/06`). | | **Gets** | the contents of any file the application's process can read, returned in band through the exception. `/etc/passwd` recovered 34 of 34 lines. | | **Real-world likelihood** | **High.** The vulnerable consumer is six lines of ordinary code with no unusual configuration: `Repo.clone_from(user_url)` then `repo.active_branch.checkout()`. `allow_unsafe_options=False` is the default. Cloning user-supplied URLs is the library's central use case — CI systems, repository importers, scanners and bots. | **On severity relative to the sibling advisories.** GitHub, as CNA, scored the three prior advisories in this class at 6.5 / `PR:L` (CVE-2026-76217, CVE-2026-78678, CVE-2026-78679). This report asks for 7.5 / `PR:N`, and the difference is one measured fact: in those three, the application had to pass an attacker-influenced value into the API. Here it passes nothing — the clone materialises the hostile branch on its own and `repo.active_branch` returns it (`raw/02`). If that reading is not accepted, the `PR:L` path via `Repo.create_head()` is also real and lands at 6.5, matching the siblings. ## Summary `Head.checkout()` guards its `**kwargs` against unsafe Git options but never inspects its own positional argument — the branch name — which reaches the `git checkout` argv with no `--` separator. A repository whose default branch is named `--pathspec-from-file=/etc/passwd` makes a consumer that merely clones it and checks out the default branch return the entire contents of that file to the caller. This is the exact combination of two advisories the project already fixed: - **CVE-2026-76217** (`GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc`) — *"Arbitrary file read via `--pathspec-from-file` in `IndexFile.remove()` **and `Head.checkout()`**"*. Fixed in 3.1.58 by commit `f2550b65`, which added the guard to this exact method — but only for `**kwargs`. - **CVE-2026-78679** (`GHSA-3wxw-xv34-2frg`) — *"`TagReference.create` positional reference bypasses kwargs-only `--file` guard, enabling arbitrary file read (incomplete fix of 3af0c251)"*. Fixed in 3.1.59 by commit `1b0d2d9b`, which applied the positional check to `git/refs/tag.py`, `git/diff.py`, `git/index/base.py` and `git/repo/base.py` — but not to `git/refs/head.py:286`. `f2550b65` states in its own commit message that the audit found the positional variant and applied it to `HEAD.reset` — 185 lines above `Head.checkout`, in the same file, in the same commit: > "The audit also found that **reset's positional commit could carry the option before its argument > separator**. […] **Check reset's positional commit as well as keyword options**" `HEAD.reset` got the fix. `Head.checkout` did not, and `1b0d2d9b` did not come back for it. ## Affected Asset | | | |---|---| | Package | `GitPython` (PyPI) | | Affected versions | **`<= 3.1.62`** — all published releases | | Latest release tested | `3.1.62` | | Also present on | `main` @ `4905b4af` | | Vulnerable file | `git/refs/head.py` | | Guard | line 286 — `Git._option_candidates([], kwargs)` | | Sink | line 293 — `self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs)` | | CWE | CWE-88 (Argument Injection), CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) | | CVSS 3.1 | `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` → **7.5 High** | The version range was established by **blob hash against every tag**, not by dates: the sink line `self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs)` — with no `--` separator — is present in `git/refs/head.py` in every tag from `0.3.1-beta2` through `3.1.62`. The `3.1.62` blob is byte-identical to `main`: `7f563374ef9e018b3d5f95054498e8591e112ce2`. Full sweep in `raw/07-blob-version-sweep.txt`. The kwargs-only guard first appears in **3.1.58**, so `3.1.58`–`3.1.62` i

## Summary `Remote.pull()` in GitPython forwards its positional `refspec` argument directly to the `git pull` child process while its unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments. An application that passes attacker-influenced data as the `refspec` (for example a user-supplied branch or refspec parameter in a web or CI service) can supply an option-shaped value such as `--upload-pack=<command>`. The value bypasses the `unsafe_git_pull_options` check, is placed after the `--` separator on the `git pull` command line, and is executed as the upload-pack program for local-path or SSH transports. This yields arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the calling process using the documented default arguments (`allow_unsafe_options=False`). ## Root Cause `Remote.pull()` is documented to reject dangerous options unless `allow_unsafe_options=True`, and `--upload-pack` is explicitly listed as such an option. The guard, however, only screens keyword arguments and never the positional `refspec`. The check builds its candidate list with `Git._option_candidates([], kwargs)`, passing an empty list in place of the positionals, so the `refspec` value is never compared against `unsafe_git_pull_options = ["--upload-pack"]`. The normalized `refspec` is then forwarded verbatim to the `git pull` invocation. The leading `--` separator that neutralizes an option-shaped refspec for `git fetch` and `git push` does not protect `git pull`, because `git pull` re-forwards its trailing positionals to an internal `git fetch` without re-inserting a `--` separator, so the positional becomes an option to that internal fetch. ```text Affected function: git.remote.Remote.pull Source: git/remote.py (guard at the check_unsafe_options call using _option_candidates([], kwargs); sink at the self.repo.git.pull("--", self, refspec, ...) invocation) ``` ## Impact An attacker who controls the `refspec` value passed to `Remote.pull()` achieves arbitrary operating-system command execution as the process invoking GitPython, with no additional privileges and no user interaction, on the default code path. Exploitation requires that the pulled remote uses a transport that runs upload-pack on the local side, namely a local filesystem path or SSH; over HTTPS the `--upload-pack` value is inert because the server ignores a client-supplied upload-pack program. This transport requirement narrows the population of vulnerable deployments but does not add work for the attacker once a vulnerable target is reached. Working checkouts commonly use local-path or SSH origins, so the exposed population is substantial. ## Proof of Concept ```text Environment: GitPython from the affected source tree; system git 2.43.0. The pulled origin uses a local filesystem transport (protocol.file.allow=always for git >= 2.38). ``` Reproduction steps: 1. Create an origin repository reachable over a local-path transport. 2. In a consumer repository, register that origin and call `Remote.pull()` with an attacker-controlled refspec. 3. Observe that the injected command executes. ```python import git repo = git.Repo("consumer") # has an origin using a local-path or ssh transport origin = repo.remote("origin") # Attacker-controlled refspec value; default arguments (allow_unsafe_options=False): origin.pull(refspec="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/pwned; git-upload-pack") ``` ```text cmdline: git pull -v -- origin --upload-pack=touch /tmp/pwned; git-upload-pack [attack] marker created (RCE) : True [isolate] upload_pack passed as KWARG blocked : True (only the positional refspec escapes) [sibling] same value via git fetch : safe (pull-specific behavior) [control] benign refspec : safe ``` ## Attack Chain 1. **Exposure:** An application calls `Remote.pull(refspec=<value>)` on the default path, where `<value>` is derived from attacker-influenced input such as a branch or refspec request parameter. 2. **Control:** The attacker supplies the string `--upload-pack=<command>; git-upload-pack`. The value passes through `Git._unpack_args`, which only flattens and stringifies it, preserving the option shape. 3. **Path:** The protocol loop calls `Git.check_unsafe_protocols` on the value, which only matches remote-helper transport URLs (a `<transport>::` form) and does not flag an `--upload-pack=` token. 4. **Guard:** The unsafe-option guard calls `check_unsafe_options(options=Git._option_candidates([], kwargs), ...)`. Because positionals are passed as an empty list, the positional `refspec` is never inspected against `unsafe_git_pull_options`. 5. **Primitive:** The value is forwarded to `git pull -v -- <remote> --upload-pack=<command>; git-upload-pack`; `git pull` re-forwards the positional to an internal `git fetch` without a `--` separator, so it is honored as the upload-pack program. 6. **Result:** For a local-path or SSH transport, git executes `<command>` as the upload-pack program, giving arbitrary command execution as the calling p

### Summary GitPython has spent 2022-2026 rolling out two reusable guards method-by-method: `Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)` (raises `UnsafeProtocolError` for `<transport>::` remote-helper URLs - CVE-2022-24439) and `Git.check_unsafe_options(...)` (raises `UnsafeOptionError` for denylisted option spellings - CVE-2023-40267, CVE-2026-42215, CVE-2026-67323). Three wrapper methods that build a `git` argv from caller-controlled values still have **neither**: 1. **`Git.ls_remote`** (git/cmd.py:1128-1143) - checks options (:1139-1141) but forwards the URL positional unchecked; no `allow_unsafe_protocols` parameter exists. The same URL through `clone_from` raises `UnsafeProtocolError`. 2. **`Repo.merge_base`** (git/repo/base.py:895-936) - forwards `**kwargs`/`*rev` to `self.git.merge_base` with no guard; guarded sibling `iter_commits` sits 12 lines up. Its exception handler additionally swallows every non-128 `GitCommandError` into `[]`, masking the injection. 3. **`IndexFile.move`** (git/index/base.py:1092-1168) - forwards `**kwargs` to `git mv` twice (:1147, :1167); guarded sibling `remove()` is 23 lines above. Verified unfixed on `main @ a54d159` (2026-09-21), post-dating latest release 3.1.62 (2026-09-07) - all three sites re-verified today. ### Impact **Site 1 (`ls_remote`)** - RCE conditional on the victim git transport policy. The common 'probe first, then clone' pattern (`Git(...).ls_remote(attacker_url)`) with an `ext::sh -c ...` URL executes arbitrary commands when the victim git permits the ext transport: dynamically verified with `protocol.ext.allow=always` (marker executed). git >= 2.38.1 stock config refuses the transport (`fatal: transport 'ext' not allowed`, rc 128) - GitPython adds no defense-in-depth and surfaces a bare `GitCommandError`. Environments on git < 2.38.1 are exposed with stock config - the exact population CVE-2022-24439 was scored against. **Sites 2/3** - latent argument-injection surface: caller kwargs flow 1:1 into the `git` argv before operands and `--` (cmd.py:1850 `opt_args + ext_args`), and `execute_kwargs` (incl. `shell=True`/`env` - the CVE-2023-40267 Windows mechanism) passes through unguarded. Today `git merge-base`/`git mv` expose no exec option, so we claim the missing-guard class (vendor-settled by CVE-2026-67323, which bundled archive/ls_remote/iter_commits/blame in one advisory), not direct RCE. ### Dynamic verification (today; GitPython main @ a54d159, git 2.55.0, Linux) | # | Call | Result | |---|---|---| | T1 | `repo.git.ls_remote('ext::/tmp/gp_touch.sh')`, stock config | git refuses (rc 128); **no `UnsafeProtocolError` from GitPython** | | T1b | same + victim config `protocol.ext.allow=always` | **marker created - arbitrary command executed** | | T2 | `repo.git.ls_remote('.', upload_pack=...)` | blocked by cmd.py:1141 (options-side fixed - protocol-side is the residual gap) | | T3 | `repo.merge_base('main','side', upload_pack=...)` | **not blocked**; argv `git merge-base --upload-pack=... main side`; rc 129 silently converted to `[]` | | T4 | `repo.index.move(['f1','f2'], output=...)` | **not blocked**; option reaches `git mv` (rc 129) | ### Coverage matrix (main @ a54d159) `check_unsafe_protocols`: 7 call sites (`_clone`, `archive`, `set_url`, `create`, `fetch`, `pull`, `push`) - none on `ls_remote`. `check_unsafe_options`: 24 call sites incl. `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `IndexFile.remove` - absent on `merge_base` and `move`. ### Precedents (same repo, same guard family) - **CVE-2022-24439 / GHSA-hcpj-qp55-gfph** (critical): `check_unsafe_protocols` on the clone path - Site 1 is the same `ext::` primitive on a sibling API. - **CVE-2023-40267 / GHSA-pr76-5cm5-w9cj** (critical, 'incomplete fix for CVE-2022-24439'): `check_unsafe_options` - unguarded kwargs to argv treated as RCE (`shell=True` on Windows). - **CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4** (high, fixed 3.1.47): underscored-spelling bypass - rollout still active in 2026. - **CVE-2026-67323 / GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v** (high, 8.4, fixed 3.1.51): added `check_unsafe_options` to `archive`/`ls_remote`/`iter_commits`/`blame`; its PoC is literally `repo.git.ls_remote('.', upload_pack=...)`. Establishes that a wrapper missing the check is itself a vulnerability. This report is the residual gap of that rollout: `ls_remote` got options but not protocols; `merge_base`/`move` got neither. ### Recommended fix (existing helpers, 1-3 lines per site) 1. `Git.ls_remote`: `if not allow_unsafe_protocols: self.check_unsafe_protocols(args[0])` + new `allow_unsafe_protocols: bool = False` (the `_clone` pattern, base.py:1536-1538). 2. `Repo.merge_base`: `check_unsafe_options(Git._option_candidates(list(rev), kwargs), unsafe_options=self.unsafe_git_revision_options)` (the `iter_commits` pattern); stop masking non-128 statuses. 3. `IndexFile.move`: the `remove()` pattern with `unsafe_git_pathspec_from_file_options`. One advisory, three affected methods, severity anchored on Site 1 - mirroring CVE-2026-67323's bundling.

### Summary This is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made `Actor._from_string` regex-free, but `parse_actor_and_date` still runs `_re_actor_epoch` on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62. ### Details `git/objects/util.py:322`: ```python _re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$") ``` `.+?` and `(.*)` can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required ` (\d+) ([+-]\d+)` tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point. It is called from `parse_actor_and_date` (`git/objects/util.py:335`), which runs on the author and committer lines in `Commit._deserialize` (`git/objects/commit.py:917`, `:931`) and on the tagger line in `git/objects/tag.py:129`. The published payload (letters plus an unterminated `<`) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not: | author line (after `author `) | 2 KB | 8 KB | 32 KB | |---|---|---|---| | `'a'*n + ' <'` (advisory payload) | 0.0 ms | 0.1 ms | 0.4 ms | | `' '*n` | 28 ms | 453 ms | 7,700 ms | | valid line, long name (control) | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | Cost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length. ### PoC ```python import time from git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date line = "author " + " " * 32000 t = time.perf_counter() parse_actor_and_date(line) print(f"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s") # ~7 s on 3.1.62 ``` End to end, reading `Commit.author` on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid `1191999972 -0700` tail takes 1.3 ms. Note for reproducing: `git hash-object -t commit -w` refuses such an object (`missingEmail`), so the test object was written with `--literally`. A remote can still serve one, because `fetch.fsckObjects` and `transfer.fsckObjects` default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 ("craft a commit object with a malformed author field"). ### Impact CPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to `Commit.author`, `Commit.committer` or `TagObject.tagger` on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects. ### Suggested fix Match the leading field name with `.[^ ]*` instead of `.+?`. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but `.[^ ]*` cannot overlap the following `(.*)`, so the backtracking disappears: ```python _re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$") _re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$") ``` Verification on current main (73a72c9): - Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex. - `' '*n` at 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms). - The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change - The new regression test, `test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear`, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s). The full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below. ```diff diff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py index a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644 --- a/git/objects/util.py +++ b/git/objects/util.py @@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -> Tuple[int, int]: # Precompiled regexes -_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$") -_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*)$") +# The leading field name ("author", "committer", "tagger") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than +# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the +# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically. +_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$") +_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$") def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -> Tuple[Actor, int, int]: diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py index cf4299d5..e1631420 100644 --- a/test/test_util.py +++ b/test/test_util.py @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify from git.objects.util import ( altz_to_utctz_str, from_timestamp, + parse_actor_and_date, parse_date, tzoffset, utctz_to_altz, @@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase): Actor("name last another", "some-very-long-email@example.com"), ) + def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self): + # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make + # _re_actor_epoch backtrack

### Summary `Repo._clone()`'s handling of `separate_git_dir` never disables `Git.polish_url()`'s environment-variable expansion, unlike every other caller of that helper that handles attacker-influenced data. Since `separate_git_dir` can be derived from an attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` submodule name, a completely ordinary `clone` + `submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True)` on a malicious repository expands an environment variable of the attacker's choosing and exposes its value both as a persistent on-disk directory name and, whenever DEBUG-level logging is enabled (a common CI/verbose-logging configuration), in a `Popen(...)` log line that is not redacted the way credential-bearing arguments are. ### Root cause / Details `git/repo/base.py`'s `_clone()` has: ```python sep_dir = kwargs.get("separate_git_dir") if sep_dir: kwargs["separate_git_dir"] = Git.polish_url(sep_dir) ``` This is the only remaining `Git.polish_url()` call site handling attacker-influenced data that does not pass `expand_vars=False` (there is one other unguarded call site, `clone_path` at line 1537, but its input is the caller's own local destination path, not attacker-controlled). The sibling fixes for `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` added `expand_vars=False` to `clone_url` (5 lines below this one, in the same function), `git/repo/base.py:1599`, `remote.py:814`, and `submodule/base.py:686` — this one did not receive it. (`submodule/root.py` also currently sets `expand_vars=False` at a related call site, but that was added incidentally by a later, unrelated commit, not as part of these security fixes.) `Git.polish_url()`'s docstring itself says: "Disable this for values obtained from an untrusted source, such as remote URLs." Its non-Cygwin branch does plain `os.path.expandvars()` on the entire string, including embedded variables anywhere in an absolute path. `separate_git_dir` reaches `_clone()` from `Submodule._clone_repo()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`) as `module_abspath = osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name)`, where `name` is the raw `.gitmodules` submodule section name — fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository. `_validated_name()` (added by the fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`) only rejects names that are absolute, contain a drive letter, or contain `..` path components; it does not reject `$`. `_need_gitfile_submodules()` is true for git ≥ 1.7.5, i.e. the default path for virtually every real-world installation. ### Reproduction (live, against real, unmodified GitPython code, no monkeypatching) Built a hostile repository with a plain, ordinary git command: `git submodule add --name '$GPY_SECRET_MARKER' ../evil_submodule sub`. Set an environment variable in the "victim" process (standing in for a real CI secret such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`): `GPY_SECRET_MARKER=AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345`. Then ran the exact ordinary workflow the `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` advisory's own PoC also uses: ```python repo = Repo.clone_from(evil_parent_url, victim_clone_dir) repo.submodule_update(init=True, recursive=True) ``` Observed result (`ls .git/modules/`): ``` .git/modules/AKIA_TOTALLY_FAKE_BUT_SECRET_LOOKING_VALUE_12345/ (a full git repo: HEAD, config, objects/, refs/, hooks/) ``` The literal `$GPY_SECRET_MARKER`-named directory was never created — only the expanded one exists, proving expansion happened before the value reached the `git clone --separate-git-dir=...` subprocess argument. The persistent, expanded-name directory under `.git/modules/` is itself the primary disclosure channel — it survives on disk for as long as the clone does. A second, independent channel: with the `git.cmd`/`git.repo.base` loggers at DEBUG level (a common CI/verbose-logging setting, not requiring any special flag), GitPython's own `Popen(...)` debug log line prints the fully expanded `--separate-git-dir=<value>` subprocess argument verbatim — `remove_password_if_present()` only redacts URL passwords/Authorization headers, not path-style arguments like this one, so the expanded value is not scrubbed. (The call also fails downstream with an `OSError`/`FileNotFoundError` referencing the original, unexpanded name, since `_write_git_file_and_module_config()` looks for a directory using the pre-expansion name — but that error message itself does not contain the expanded/secret value.) **Control**: the same call with an ordinary (no `$`) submodule name succeeds normally and creates `.git/modules/<name>` as expected — isolating the gap to submodule names containing environment-variable syntax specifically. ### Already-known check Checked all 35 published `gitpython-developers/GitPython` security advisories in full text. `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers the same `name` → `.git/modules/<name>` path but for path-traversal (`../../..`), not variable expansion. `GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w` covers the sibling `path` field reaching unguarded `os.makedirs()`. `GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67`/`GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573` co