Threat Intelligence Database

PhpWeasyPrint is a PHP library allowing PDF generation from a URL or an HTML page. Prior to version 2.6.0, `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` fetches the content of option values server-side via `file_get_contents()` when the value looks like a URL, without restricting the URL scheme. The `attachment` option of `Pdf` is the reachable sink: any value that passes `isOptionUrl()` (`filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)`) is downloaded by the PHP process and embedded into the generated PDF. Because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `file` and PHP stream wrappers such as `php://`, an attacker who can influence the `attachment` value reaches both a **Server-Side Request Forgery** primitive (e.g. internal HTTP endpoints, cloud metadata) and a local file disclosure primitive (`file://`, `php://filter/...`), with the fetched bytes exfiltrated as a PDF attachment. This is the same class of issue KnpLabs/snappy patched for its `xsl-style-sheet` option in GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56. The library is documented as a one-to-one substitute for KnpLabs/snappy and shares the same code shape. PhpWeasyPrint version 2.6.0 contains a patch for the issue.

PhpWeasyPrint is a PHP library allowing PDF generation from a URL or an HTML page. Prior to version 2.6.0, `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` guarded the output filename against the `phar://` stream wrapper with a case-sensitive blacklist. PHP stream wrappers are case-insensitive, so `PHAR://`, `Phar://`, etc. bypass the check and reach `fileExists()` (`file_exists()`) in `prepareOutput()`. On PHP 7 (which the library still supports — PHP 7.4+), this triggers deserialization of a crafted PHAR archive's metadata, leading to remote code execution. This is the patch-bypass of CVE-2023-28115. The same issue and fix were handled upstream in KnpLabs/snappy (GHSA-92rv-4j2h-8mjj). PhpWeasyPrint version 2.6.0 contains a patch for the issue.

PhpWeasyPrint is a PHP library allowing PDF generation from a URL or an HTML page. Prior to version 2.5.1, `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` builds the shell command for WeasyPrint by passing the binary path through `escapeshellarg()` first and then checking the *quoted* result with `is_executable()`. On POSIX `escapeshellarg('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint')` returns `'/usr/local/bin/weasyprint'` with the single-quote characters as part of the string, so `is_executable()` looks for a file whose actual name includes those quotes. That file never exists, the "safe" branch is dead code, and the raw `$binary` string (set via the constructor or `setBinary()`) flows directly into `Symfony\Component\Process\Process::fromShellCommandline()`. Any deployment whose binary path is sourced from configuration, an environment variable, or a per-tenant setting reaches a shell-command-injection sink. The library is documented as a one-to-one substitute for KnpLabs/snappy and inherited the exact pre-fix codepath KnpLabs patched in GHSA-vpr4-p6fq-85jc. PhpWeasyPrint version 2.5.1 contains a patch for the issue.

PhpWeasyPrint is a PHP library allowing PDF generation from a URL or an HTML page. Prior to version 2.6.0, `AbstractGenerator::$temporaryFiles` is a public array, and `removeTemporaryFiles()` — invoked from `__destruct()` and from a registered shutdown function — calls `unlink()` on every entry without verifying that the path is contained within the temporary folder. Any code holding a reference to a generator instance can push an arbitrary path into the array and have it deleted on script shutdown. This mirrors the KnpLabs/snappy issue GHSA-87qc-37cw-84h4. PhpWeasyPrint version 2.6.0 contains a patch for the issue.