Threat Intelligence Database

CVE-2026-83557 is a deserialization vulnerability in FasterXML jackson-databind's default polymorphic type validator. The default validator denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific unsafe base types but omits java.lang.Comparable, which is implemented by many classes. This omission allows applications using @JsonTypeInfo with Comparable-typed properties and no custom validator to accept type identifiers for any Comparable implementation, potentially enabling unsafe object creation such as java.io.File. The vulnerability affects multiple jackson-databind versions from 2.11.0 up to but excluding 3.2.2 in various ranges. No official patch or remediation guidance is provided in the input data.

CVE-2026-68497 is a high-severity denial of service vulnerability in FasterXML jackson-databind affecting versions >=2.0.0 <2.18.10, >=2.19.0 <2.21.6, >=2.22.0 <2.22.2, >=3.0.0 <3.1.6, and >=3.2.0 <3.2.2. It arises because the library deserializes JSON strings bound to javax.xml.datatype.Duration or XMLGregorianCalendar fields by passing them directly to JDK factory methods that parse numeric components with O(n²) complexity, without enforcing length limits on the string input. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause excessive CPU consumption and denial of service by submitting a specially crafted JSON string with very long numeric components. No polymorphic typing or special configuration is required to trigger this issue.

CVE-2026-19032 is a medium severity vulnerability in FasterXML jackson-databind that involves unsafe reflection via deserialization of java.nio.file.Path from untrusted JSON input. The vulnerability arises because the deserialization process resolves a URI scheme from attacker-controlled input and uses it to select a FileSystemProvider via Java's ServiceLoader mechanism without restricting schemes. While built-in providers do not perform network I/O or mounting, a third-party provider could potentially be triggered, leading to side effects. The issue affects multiple jackson-databind versions from 2.8.0 up to but excluding 3.2.2 in various version ranges. No direct code execution or data confidentiality impact is described, and the impact is bounded by the behavior of the selected FileSystemProvider.

Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure.

TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.

A vulnerability in jackson-databind versions 2.18.0 through 2.18.8 and 2.21.0 through 2.21.4 allows bypassing the @JsonView filter for creator properties annotated with @JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY). This occurs because the active view check is missing in the creator-property branch of the deserialization code, enabling attacker-controlled JSON to populate restricted properties even when a more restrictive view is active.