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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_tunnel_key: Defer dst_release to RCU callback Fix a race-condition use-after-free in tunnel_key_release_params(). The function releases the metadata_dst of the old params synchronously via dst_release() while deferring the params struct free with kfree_rcu(). A concurrent tunnel_key_act() reader on the datapath may still hold the old params pointer (under rcu_read_lock_bh) and proceed to call dst_clone(&params->tcft_enc_metadata->dst) after the writer's dst_release has already pushed the dst's rcuref to RCUREF_DEAD. zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com produced a poc which i (and Victor) verified that KASAN reports: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88806158de40 by task poc/9388 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9388 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.1.0-rc7 #7 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 print_report+0x139/0x4ad mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 atomic_sub_return_release include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:326 __rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:109 rcuref_put include/linux/rcuref.h:173 dst_release+0x5b/0x370 net/core/dst.c:168 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:272 skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:284 skb_release_head_state+0x293/0x400 net/core/skbuff.c:1163 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1187 [..] Allocated by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2f1/0x830 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 offload_action_alloc+0x2f/0x130 net/core/flow_offload.c:35 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x1ba/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:258 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 [..] Freed by task 9391: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 __kasan_slab_free+0x6b/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2689 slab_free mm/slub.c:6251 kfree+0x21f/0x6b0 mm/slub.c:6566 tcf_action_offload_add_ex+0x4ad/0x880 net/sched/act_api.c:284 tcf_action_offload_add net/sched/act_api.c:293 tcf_action_init+0x66e/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1547 tcf_action_add+0xf6/0x5d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2101 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88806158de00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of freed 256-byte region [ffff88806158de00, ffff88806158df00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88806158d600 pfn:0x6158c head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_map ---truncated---

@injectivelabs/sdk-ts@1.20.21 (published 2026-07-08 ~20:59 UTC) contains a wallet-credential stealer disguised as "key derivation telemetry". A file packages/sdk-ts/src/utils/key-derivation-telemetry.ts plus a hook added to packages/sdk-ts/src/core/accounts/PrivateKey.ts capture wallet secrets during key derivation: - PrivateKey.fromMnemonic(words) forwards the full BIP-39 mnemonic to trackKeyDerivation('fm', words). - PrivateKey.fromHex(privateKey) forwards a string-form hex private key to trackKeyDerivation('fh', privateKey) (a Uint8Array input sends the literal 'bytes' instead). Captured values are queued, base64-encoded, and POSTed on a ~2s batch via fetch() (with a Node https fallback) to an endpoint built at runtime from a String.fromCharCode array, disguised as Content-Type: application/grpc-web+proto with the secret carried in the X-Request-Id header and keepalive:true. Classification: information stealer (mnemonic / private-key exfiltration). Trigger: runtime, on any call to PrivateKey.fromMnemonic() or PrivateKey.fromHex(string) — there is NO install script. Malicious CODE is present only in @injectivelabs/sdk-ts. The other @injectivelabs/* packages published at 1.20.21 (utils, networks, ts-types, exceptions, and the wallet-* family) were version-bump-only and were deprecated by the maintainer as compromised; they depend on @injectivelabs/sdk-ts@1.20.21 and therefore deliver the payload transitively. Every affected package now carries the npm deprecation 'SECURITY: version 1.20.21 is compromised. Do not install.' Introduced in git commits 01219285b16c / fd105db9073a / 5486f13e799d (direct, unsigned pushes to the master branch under a maintainer account). The release was built and published through the repository's GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publishing workflow (.github/workflows/publish.yaml, event=push, run 28975012939), so 1.20.21 carries a VALID SLSA provenance attestation despite being malicious — provenance attests the build, not the intent. Reverted in commit 7c4b1a092 ('revert: exfiltration telemetry') and fixed in 1.20.23 (1.20.22 was never published). Root cause (how the maintainer account's write access was obtained) is undisclosed by the vendor. Exfiltration endpoint: the char-code array decodes to https://testnet.archival.chain.grpc-web.injective.network/ , which resolves to an Injective testnet archival node (15.235.87.88, OVH; chain-id injective-888, moniker injective-testnet-archival) — i.e. Injective's OWN infrastructure, NOT attacker-operated infra. Whether the exfiltrated secrets were collectable by the attacker (e.g. via that node's request logs) is unconfirmed. Affected users must assume any mnemonic or private key used with 1.20.21 is compromised and rotate it from a clean machine. Note: the community report at https://github.com/InjectiveLabs/injective-ts/issues/697 cites the endpoint as 'hexhole.injective.network'; that string does NOT appear in the shipped code and does not resolve. The code-derived endpoint above is authoritative. IoC: sdk-ts@1.20.21 tarball sha256 5348d2bb381c6abf2592e922920fca51cb9e0cc320c83d6270d83952e821e601. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (dce156fa9e153261f384633eb80b2d493c99ba1666d1b4b874b361a1cc574030) The wallet/accounts module (dist/esm/accounts-jQ1GSgaW.js) contains injected code that reconstructs a remote host from a char-code array via String.fromCharCode, decoding to testnet.archival.chain.grpc-web.injective.network, and builds the endpoint https://<host>/. When a wallet is created or used, the code reads the BIP-39 mnemonic (via @scure/bip39 generateMnemonic and ethers HDNodeWallet) and POSTs it base64-encoded, placed in an X-Request-Id header with an application/grpc-web+proto content-type, to that endpoint, with a Node http fallback. The char-code obfuscation of the host and the grpc-web framing disguise the exfiltration as normal Injective SDK traffic. Any mnemonic handled by this version is transmitted to the operator of that host, exposing the wallet's master key. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8956028ee9ffde286b860693d1d821d525832400027d3f9f4ef8cc1116b8c436) @injectivelabs/sdk-ts@1.20.21 (published 2026-07-08 ~20:59 UTC) contains a wallet-credential stealer disguised as "key derivation telemetry". A file packages/sdk-ts/src/utils/key-derivation-telemetry.ts plus a hook added to packages/sdk-ts/src/core/accounts/PrivateKey.ts capture wallet secrets during key derivation: - PrivateKey.fromMnemonic(words) forwards the full BIP-39 mnemonic to trackKeyDerivation('fm', words). - PrivateKey.fromHex(privateKey) forwards a string-form hex private key to trackKeyDerivation('fh', privateKey) (a Uint8Array input sends the literal 'bytes' instead). Captured values are queued, base64-encoded, and POSTed on a ~2s batch via fetch() (with a Node https fallback) to an endpoint built at runtime from a String.fromCharCode array, disguised as Content-Type: application/grpc-web+proto with the sec

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: mcast: Fix use-after-free when processing MLD queries When processing an MLD query, a pointer to the multicast group address is retrieved when initially parsing the packet. This pointer is later dereferenced without being reloaded despite the fact that the skb header might have been reallocated following the pskb_may_pull() calls, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by copying the multicast group address when the packet is initially parsed. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881154b8e90 by task kworker/4:1/118 Workqueue: mld mld_query_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512) mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) </TASK> [...] Freed by task 118: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285) kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6251 mm/slub.c:6566) pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:2335) __pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2878 (discriminator 4)) __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1495 (discriminator 1)) mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: sockmap: Fix use-after-free of sk->sk_socket in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). syzbot reported use-after-free of AF_UNIX socket's sk->sk_socket in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). [0] In unix_stream_sendmsg(), the peer socket's ->sk_data_ready() is called after dropping its unix_state_lock(). Although the sender socket holds the peer's refcount, it does not prevent the peer's sock_orphan(), and the peer's sk_socket might be freed after one RCU grace period. Let's fetch the peer's sk->sk_socket and sk->sk_socket->ops under RCU in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880594da860 by task syz.4.1842/11013 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 11013 Comm: syz.4.1842 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x8a3/0xe80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2482 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:721 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x972/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2639 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2671 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1bd/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7facf899c819 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007facf9827028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007facf8c15fa0 RCX: 00007facf899c819 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000500 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007facf8a32c91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007facf8c16038 R14: 00007facf8c15fa0 R15: 00007ffd41b01c78 </TASK> Allocated by task 11013: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4538 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4866 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x2b8/0x640 mm/slub.c:4885 sock_alloc_inode+0x28/0xc0 net/socket.c:316 alloc_inode+0x6a/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:347 new_inode_pseudo include/linux/fs.h:3003 [inline] sock_alloc net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sock_create+0x12d/0x9d0 net/socket.c:1562 sock_create net/socket.c:1656 [inline] __sys_socketpair+0x1c4/0x560 net/socket.c:1803 __do_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1856 [inline] __se_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1853 [inline] __x64_sys_socketpair+0x9b/0xb0 net/socket.c:1853 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 15: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2685 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:6165 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x187/0x630 mm/slub.c:6295 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: blk-cgroup: fix use-after-free in cgwb_release_workfn() cgwb_release_workfn() calls css_put(wb->blkcg_css) and then later accesses wb->blkcg_css again via blkcg_unpin_online(). If css_put() drops the last reference, the blkcg can be freed asynchronously (css_free_rwork_fn -> blkcg_css_free -> kfree) before blkcg_unpin_online() dereferences the pointer to access blkcg->online_pin, resulting in a use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blkcg_unpin_online (./include/linux/instrumented.h:112 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:389 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 block/blk-cgroup.c:1367) Write of size 4 at addr ff11000117aa6160 by task kworker/71:1/531 Workqueue: cgwb_release cgwb_release_workfn Call Trace: <TASK> blkcg_unpin_online (./include/linux/instrumented.h:112 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:389 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 block/blk-cgroup.c:1367) cgwb_release_workfn (mm/backing-dev.c:629) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3278 kernel/workqueue.c:3385) Freed by task 1016: kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6246 mm/slub.c:6561) css_free_rwork_fn (kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5542) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3302 kernel/workqueue.c:3385) ** Stack based on commit 66672af7a095 ("Add linux-next specific files for 20260410") I am seeing this crash sporadically in Meta fleet across multiple kernel versions. A full reproducer is available at: https://github.com/leitao/debug/blob/main/reproducers/repro_blkcg_uaf.sh (The race window is narrow. To make it easily reproducible, inject a msleep(100) between css_put() and blkcg_unpin_online() in cgwb_release_workfn(). With that delay and a KASAN-enabled kernel, the reproducer triggers the splat reliably in less than a second.) Fix this by moving blkcg_unpin_online() before css_put(), so the cgwb's CSS reference keeps the blkcg alive while blkcg_unpin_online() accesses it.