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3 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-73222davila7 claude-code-templates · OS Command Injection High8.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-73222 ### Summary `npx claude-code-templates --studio` launches "Claude Code Studio", an Express HTTP server (`cli-tool/src/sandbox-server.js`, default port 3444) that binds to **all interfaces** (`0.0.0.0`), sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, and requires **no authentication**. Two POST endpoints pass attacker-controlled request-body fields into `child_process.spawn(..., { shell: true })`. Because `shell: true` makes Node join the argv array into a single `sh -c` string, the fields are parsed by the shell and metacharacters execute. Any unauthenticated attacker who can reach the port — a malicious web page the developer visits, or anyone on the same LAN — can execute arbitrary OS commands on the developer's machine. ### Details In `cli-tool/src/sandbox-server.js`: - `app.listen(PORT, ...)` is called with no host argument, so the server listens on `0.0.0.0` / `::` (reachable from the LAN, not just localhost). - The CORS middleware sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` and answers the preflight `OPTIONS` for any origin, so a browser will deliver cross-origin POSTs to it. - There is no authentication on any endpoint. The vulnerable sinks: 1. `POST /api/execute` — the `prompt` body field flows into `executeLocalTask()`: ```js const child = spawn('claude', [finalPrompt], { /* ... */ shell: true }); The only validation on prompt is a length check (>= 10 chars). With shell: true, finalPrompt is interpreted by the shell. 2. POST /api/install-agent — the agentName body field: const child = spawn('npx', ['claude-code-templates@latest', '--agent', agentName, '--yes'], { /* ... */ shell: true }); 2. agentName is used unvalidated. (The same unsafe pattern is also reachable through /api/execute's agent field via checkAndInstallAgent().) Root cause: spawn(cmd, argsArray, { shell: true }) does not keep argsArray as separate argv entries — Node builds cmd + ' ' + argsArray.join(' ') and runs it via sh -c, so every element is subject to shell parsing. PoC # Victim npx claude-code-templates --studio # server on 0.0.0.0:3444 # Attacker (another LAN host, or a malicious web page fetch(), or locally) curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3444/api/execute \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"prompt":"aaaaaaaaaa; touch /tmp/CCT_RCE_PROOF","mode":"local"}' curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3444/api/install-agent \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"agentName":"x; touch /tmp/CCT_AGENT_PROOF #"}' ls -la /tmp/CCT_RCE_PROOF /tmp/CCT_AGENT_PROOF # both created => injected commands ran The aaaaaaaaaa padding satisfies the 10-char minimum, then ; (or $(...), or backticks) starts the injected command. claude/npx do not even need to be installed — the injected segment runs regardless. Confirmed at runtime on v1.28.13 (Node 22, Linux): both marker files were created, the server listened on *:3444, and an OPTIONS preflight from Origin: https://evil.example returned 200 with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. Impact Unauthenticated remote code execution (CWE-78) on any machine running --studio. Two reachability paths: - Drive-by: a developer running --studio who visits an attacker-controlled web page — the page's cross-origin fetch() (Content-Type application/json) passes the wildcard CORS preflight and delivers the POST, achieving RCE with no other interaction. - LAN: because the server binds 0.0.0.0, anyone on the same network (office, co-working space, public Wi-Fi) can hit port 3444 directly. Impact is full compromise of the developer's user account (arbitrary command execution with the developer's privileges): source code, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and .env secrets. Suggested fix - Remove shell: true from all three spawns so arguments stay discrete argv entries (kills the injection). - Validate agentName against a strict allowlist (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$). - Bind to loopback only (app.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1', ...)). - Replace the wildcard CORS with a same-origin allowlist and reject other origins. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-40230 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: prevent poison consumption when splitting THP When performing memory error injection on a THP (Transparent Huge Page) mapped to userspace on an x86 server, the kernel panics with the following trace. The expected behavior is to terminate the affected process instead of panicking the kernel, as the x86 Machine Check code can recover from an in-userspace #MC. mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 0: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 3: bd80000000070134 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffff8372f8bc> {memchr_inv+0x4c/0xf0} mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC afff7bbff88a ADDR 1d301b000 MISC 80 PPIN 1e741e77539027db mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:d06d0 TIME 1758093249 SOCKET 0 APIC 0 microcode 80000320 mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check The root cause of this panic is that handling a memory failure triggered by an in-userspace #MC necessitates splitting the THP. The splitting process employs a mechanism, implemented in try_to_map_unused_to_zeropage(), which reads the pages in the THP to identify zero-filled pages. However, reading the pages in the THP results in a second in-kernel #MC, occurring before the initial memory_failure() completes, ultimately leading to a kernel panic. See the kernel panic call trace on the two #MCs. First Machine Check occurs // [1] memory_failure() // [2] try_to_split_thp_page() split_huge_page() split_huge_page_to_list_to_order() __folio_split() // [3] remap_page() remove_migration_ptes() remove_migration_pte() try_to_map_unused_to_zeropage() // [4] memchr_inv() // [5] Second Machine Check occurs // [6] Kernel panic [1] Triggered by accessing a hardware-poisoned THP in userspace, which is typically recoverable by terminating the affected process. [2] Call folio_set_has_hwpoisoned() before try_to_split_thp_page(). [3] Pass the RMP_USE_SHARED_ZEROPAGE remap flag to remap_page(). [4] Try to map the unused THP to zeropage. [5] Re-access pages in the hw-poisoned THP in the kernel. [6] Triggered in-kernel, leading to a panic kernel. In Step[2], memory_failure() sets the poisoned flag on the page in the THP by TestSetPageHWPoison() before calling try_to_split_thp_page(). As suggested by David Hildenbrand, fix this panic by not accessing to the poisoned page in the THP during zeropage identification, while continuing to scan unaffected pages in the THP for possible zeropage mapping. This prevents a second in-kernel #MC that would cause kernel panic in Step[4]. Thanks to Andrew Zaborowski for his initial work on fixing this issue. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.8 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium4.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-4081 Use of entitlement "com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation" and lack of launch and library load constraints allows to substitute a legitimate dylib with malicious one. A local attacker with unprivileged access can execute the application with altered dynamic library successfully bypassing Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC). Acquired resource access is limited to previously granted permissions by the user. Access to other resources beyond granted-permissions requires user interaction with a system prompt asking for permission. This issue affects DaVinci Resolve on macOS in all versions. Last tested version: 19.1.3 | CVE Database V5 |
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