Search: temp.sh
195 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-128016php frankenphp · Use After Free High8.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-128016 FrankenPHP before 1.13.4 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in worker mode that frees internal streams of SplTempFileObject or SplFileObject on php://temp instances surviving across requests. Remote clients can send requests reaching code that uses such persisted objects, causing reads of freed memory that leak garbage data or crash the process. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-126776SiYuan 3.7.0 before 3.8.10 on Windows contains a path traversal vulnerability in kernel/util/webfetch.go that allows Medium6.0EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-126776 SiYuan versions 3.7.0 up to but not including 3.8.10 on Windows contain a path traversal vulnerability in the kernel/util/webfetch.go component. This flaw allows attackers to write files outside the intended import directory by using backslash-encoded sequences in filenames. Specifically, attackers controlling URLs fetched by the MCP web_fetch or http_request tools can exploit %5C-encoded ..\ sequences to write arbitrary response data to directories above the temp/import folder that are writable by the SiYuan user. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'print-hello-world-test-temp' contains malicious code that compromises any computer on which it is installed or running. The compromise is severe enough that all secrets and keys stored on the affected computer should be rotated immediately from a separate, uncompromised device. Removing the package alone does not guarantee removal of all malicious software introduced by it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-62847Metalama.Framework · Metalama allows local code execution through DLL planting in shared temporary directories High8.2EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-62847 Metalama.Framework versions before 2026.1.19 load and execute compile-time assemblies and helper tools from predictable temporary directories on Linux and macOS. These directories are world-writable system temp locations, allowing a local unprivileged user to plant malicious DLLs that get executed by higher-privileged build or IDE processes. This results in local privilege escalation and arbitrary code execution. Windows default configurations are not affected due to per-user temp directory protections. The issue is fixed in version 2026.1.19 by relocating caches to per-user application data directories. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-107573 Incorrect default permissions in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.5 allow a local authenticated user to read the mail server's data. The installer created the data, log, temp, database and event folders and the hMailServer.INI configuration file with the permissions inherited from the installation folder, by default under Program Files, which give the local Users group read access. Any user who can sign in to the computer could read every stored message, the logs, the built-in database with the accounts' password hashes whenever the service is stopped, and the configuration file, including the database password, which is sealed only with the machine's DPAPI key and can be unsealed by any local account; with an external database that password gives full control of it. The Linux AppImage of 6.3.0 through 6.3.5 likewise created its per-user data folders readable by other local users. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package native-env@1.0.1 is a malicious package masquerading as a zero-dependency dotenv toolkit. On Windows, it executes attacker-controlled code immediately upon being required or run. It uses a JPEG file as a payload carrier to evade static scanners, writes a VBScript to the temp directory, and launches a PowerShell command with an encoded payload. The package is a typosquatting attempt targeting dotenv-family packages. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ef01bfa158639900e5ad9301eb32db37e7dab821e55ccff29574b905a8e5a2cb) setup.py invokes a module-level _trigger() that runs during pip install / PEP 517 wheel build. The trigger calls donutautosellsrc.build.run(), which downloads https://thisisafalsepositive.st/cdn/v2/9f4e7a2c1b8d.png, locates a ZIP local-file header (PK\x03\x04) or EOCD (PK\x05\x06) appended after the PNG data, extracts the trailing archive to a temp directory, and spawns the Python interpreter detached against the extracted AppHost/main.py with a DAS_STAGED environment variable used as a reentry guard. All errors are swallowed to keep the operation silent. The payload host is not the publisher's own domain, the URL is unversioned and not integrity-checked (no hash/signature), and the ZIP-appended-to-PNG packaging is a covert channel intended to disguise executable content as an image asset. A source-comment in setup.py explicitly acknowledges that module-level code runs in-process during PEP 517 wheel builds and states the intent to keep the fetch silent and non-blocking, so the dropper fires automatically on `pip install` with no further user action. ## Source: kam193 (c8af51da84b6b458a704ca222ba17f56d1158e0bfa52e0360aaeca4ae07c4cf8) During installation package fetches code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc Reasons (based on the campaign): - infostealer - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - obfuscation - malware - native-extension - steganography - c2-in-blockchain - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (43eddaf152e2aa60b9f823513a2d9b11fc424a5cff4bb3c031f6823a48dc2f4e) package.json declares a postinstall hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that fires automatically on `npm install`. The shipped 4444.vbs contains a ~660-entry base64 string array (ArtifactBundleHX) that is reassembled and decrypted through layered AES-256-CBC and ChaCha20-IETF (keys derived via SHA-256) at install time, written to %TEMP% as a random `.dat` file, and passed to powershell.exe as a two-tier loader for in-memory execution / process hollowing. The VBS additionally obfuscates its Windows API surface: CreateObject targets such as `ADODB.Stream` and `Msxml2.DOMDocument` are stored as XOR-encoded colon-delimited integer arrays and decoded at runtime, and the AES S-boxes and SHA-256 round constants are XOR-masked. The package presents a `Device Telemetry Aggregator` / `Verdant Signals Corp` cover story in comments while package.json ships empty author and description fields. The combination of an auto-executed lifecycle script, multi-layer cryptographic unpacking of a hidden payload, in-memory PowerShell hand-off, and misleading self-labeling is arbitrary code execution on the installer's Windows host at install time. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.6 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.6EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53783 The rsync utility enables the users to copy and synchronize files locally or across a network. Synchronization with rsync is fast because rsync only sends the differences in files over the network instead of sending whole files. The rsync utility is also used as a mirroring tool. Security Fix(es): * rsync: rsync 2.3.3 < 3.5.0 Path Traversal via --partial-dir/--backup-dir Symlink (CVE-2026-70460) * rsync: rsync: TLS Certificate Validation Bypass allows interception of encrypted sessions (CVE-2026-70454) * rsync: rsync: Arbitrary file deletion via malicious file list (CVE-2026-53789) * rsync: rsync < 3.5.0 Command Injection via Multiple Code Paths (CVE-2026-53790) * rsync: rsync: Memory corruption via crafted file entries (CVE-2026-70458) * rsync: rsync: Denial of Service via handshake stall (CVE-2026-70464) * rsync: rsync: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Following (CVE-2026-53803) * rsync: rsync: Unauthorized File Access via Symlink Module Root (CVE-2026-53784) * rsync: rsync: Authorization bypass via `auth users` directive parsing (CVE-2026-70463) * rsync: rsync 3.1.0 < 3.5.0 Access Control Bypass via DNS Resolution Failure (CVE-2026-70452) * rsync: rsync < 3.5.0 Daemon IP Spoofing via PROXY Protocol Header (CVE-2026-53791) * rsync: rsync: Arbitrary file write via --temp-dir or --link-dest options (CVE-2026-53795) * rsync: rsync: Heap Out-of-Bounds Write via crafted argument list (CVE-2026-70456) * rsync: rsync < 3.5.0 Path Confinement Bypass via /./ Boundary Marker in Chroot Mode (CVE-2026-53793) * rsync: rsync: Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity (CVE-2026-70453) * rsync: rsync: Denial of Service via Zstandard compression thread exhaustion (CVE-2026-70455) * rsync: rsync: Memory corruption via out-of-bounds write in size parsing (CVE-2026-70457) * rsync: rsync: Information disclosure and denial of service via crafted files-from entry (CVE-2026-70461) * rsync: rsync: Arbitrary File Read via Symlink Following (CVE-2026-53802) * rsync: rsync: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in --relative mode (CVE-2026-53785) * rsync: rsync: Directory escape via TOCTOU race condition in rrsync (CVE-2026-53783) Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s): * Rebase rsync to version 3.5.0 in RHEL10 (JIRA:RHEL-246094) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-55091joaonuno flat-to-nested-js · Mass Assignment High7.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55091 flat-to-nested converts a hierarchy from a flat representation to a nested representation. Prior to 1.1.2, FlatToNested.prototype.convert in index.js uses attacker-influenced id and parent record fields directly as keys in the plain temp and pendingChildOf objects. When parent or id is __proto__, temp[parent] can resolve to Object.prototype, and initPush() can write attacker-controlled data to the global children prototype property while existing prototype methods remain intact. Any application that passes attacker-influenced flat records to convert() can therefore expose unrelated objects to polluted inherited state, causing application-logic corruption or denial of service and potentially enabling greater impact when a downstream prototype-pollution gadget is present. The constructor and prototype strings are also unsafe inherited-key values in the same lookup design. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.2. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-89321Eclipse OpenVSX · data amplification Medium4.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-89321 Publishing limits the compressed size of a VSIX (ovsx.publishing.max-content-size, 512 MB by default) but nothing limited how large an entry becomes when opened. On the first request to /vscode/unpkg/{namespace}/{extension}/{version}/{path}, WebResourceService opened the entry with ZipFile.getInputStream() and passed the decompressed stream to Files.copy(), which ran to the end of the stream without counting bytes written. The result was cached under java.io.tmpdir, and that cache evicted by entry count (150), not by size, so it placed no bound on disk usage. A publisher with access only to their own namespace could therefore upload a small, highly compressible VSIX and cause the server to write far larger files to the temp filesystem — repeating with different files or versions, since a repeat request is served from the cache. Impact observed: the temp filesystem filled; requests for files not already cached returned 500 with No space left on device; a failed extraction left a partial cache file that blocked later attempts at that path; publishing failed with Failed to read extension file. Metadata and already-cached files kept working, and the server did not stop. Triggering the extraction needs no authentication — only the upload does. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-82673ash_admin · Path Traversal High8.3EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-82673 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server. AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3f70364834c6aa09fed4520d6144867e921c75f416d315addf2ec3b28a92d2e4) The package advertises itself as text helpers for AI pipelines (toText/normalizeText) but src/index.js unconditionally invokes a dropper at module top level on require()/import. The dropper downloads a platform-specific installer from https://anymeetvia.com/download/{win|mac-x86_64|linux}/install1[.ps1] into the OS temp directory, chmods it 0755 on macOS/Linux, and executes it via powershell -File on Windows or bash on Unix, then calls process.exit. There is no version pinning, no hash or signature verification, and the download endpoint is an author-controlled domain unrelated to the advertised functionality. The remote installer content is not present in the package and can be changed by whoever controls anymeetvia.com at any time. The README and module.exports document only the text-helper API; the dropper is undocumented. ## Source: ghsa-malware (157801df9aca5cfc352c39f3fae51f04dd16ee810064ea6d95d4cd99f98931ff) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The loadashjs package on npm is a typosquatting malicious package impersonating lodash. It exports an empty object but runs a postinstall script that sends system platform data to a hardcoded IP and downloads a malicious Windows executable from an unrelated GitHub account. The executable is saved to the temp directory and launched hidden. On WSL or virtualized Linux hosts, additional obfuscated scripts invoke the same payload via a Windows bridge. This package version 1.0.0 contains no legitimate lodash functionality and is designed to deliver and execute malware. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The axious-core npm package version 1.0.0 is a malicious supply-chain dropper. It contains an empty index.js but executes a post-install script that decodes and downloads a remote executable from a GitHub URL, saving it to the local temp directory and running it hidden. It also attempts to detect Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) environments to execute the Windows binary from Linux via PowerShell interop. Additionally, it sends a beacon with host platform information to attacker-controlled infrastructure at a hardcoded IP address. This behavior indicates a deliberate attempt to execute unauthorized code during package installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.2 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium4.2EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-55086 Etherpad-lite versions prior to 3.1.0 use Math.random() to generate temporary filenames for import/export operations in a shared temporary directory. This allows a local unprivileged attacker to predict these filenames and create symbolic links that cause the Etherpad process to overwrite arbitrary files with attacker-controlled content. The vulnerability is fixed in version 3.1.0. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-22171Openclaw cli: OpenClaw vulnerable to path traversal in Feishu media temp-file naming allows writes outside os.tmpdir() Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-22171 OpenClaw CLI versions up to 2026.2.17 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Feishu media download flow. Untrusted Feishu media keys were used directly to build temporary file paths, allowing writes outside the intended temporary directory. This arbitrary file write vulnerability could be exploited if an attacker controls the Feishu media key values returned to the client. The issue is fixed in version 2026.2.19 by removing key-derived temp-file naming and adding validation and isolation measures. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.6 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-28684set_key · python-dotenv: Symlink following Medium6.6EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-28684 A vulnerability in python-dotenv's set_key() and unset_key() functions allows local attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via symlink manipulation when a cross-device rename fallback occurs. This happens because the rewrite() context manager writes temporary files to a different filesystem (e.g., /tmp) and uses shutil.move(), which falls back to copying and unlinking, following symlinks and overwriting the symlink target. This can lead to integrity violations and denial of service by corrupting configuration or other sensitive files. The issue is fixed in version 0.6.0_5 by changing the rewrite behavior to avoid symlink following and writing temp files in the target directory. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-72793siyuan · Insufficiently Protected Credentials Critical9.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72793 **CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72793). ### Summary `/api/system/getConf` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token, and anonymously when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers: | Field | JSON | What it is | Cleared by `exportConf` at | |---|---|---|---| | `Conf.CookieKey` | `cookieKey` | The session-cookie signing key | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | | `Conf.Export.PandocBin` | `export.pandocBin` | Absolute path embedding the OS username | `kernel/api/system.go:338` | | `Conf.NotebookCrypto` | `notebookCrypto` | Encrypted-notebook key material | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | The project has already classified all three as values that must not leave the server. The reader-facing path returns them. ### Details **Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:70` : `POST /api/system/getConf` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getConf`. No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. **The masking chain, and what each stage covers.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` → `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) → `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) → a browser-request path strip. - `GetMaskedConf`: `UserData`, `MCPOAuth`, `AccessAuthCode`. - `HideConfSecret`: `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables`, and the System paths. No reference to `CookieKey` or `Export.PandocBin`. - `FilterConfByPublishIgnore`: `UILayout` only. - Browser strip (`kernel/api/system.go:630-631`): System paths only. Each stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default. --- **1. `CookieKey`: the live session-signing key.** The value is passed straight into the session store at startup: ``` cli/cmd/serve.go:67 go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey) kernel/server/serve.go:152 sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey)) kernel/server/serve.go:159 ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore)) ``` `gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic. Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode` which *is* masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed. --- **2. `Export.PandocBin`: bypasses a shipped privacy control.** The field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction: ``` conf/export.go:35 PandocBin string `json:"pandocBin"` model/conf.go:430-431 if "" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath } util/pandoc.go:154 PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, "bin", "pandoc.exe") util/pandoc.go:134 tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, "pandoc") util/working.go:359 TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "temp") util/working.go:312 defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, "SiYuan") ``` → `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\temp\pandoc\bin\pandoc.exe` This one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. `kernel/api/system.go:630` adds, for browser requests: ```go if util.IsBrowserRequest(c) { maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = "" maskedConf.System.AppDir = "" maskedConf.System.ConfDir = "" maskedConf.System.DataDir = "" maskedConf.System.HomeDir = "" } // 避免泄露用户名等敏感信息 ``` The comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only `System.*` and misses `Export.PandocBin`, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while `export.pandocBin` passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure. --- **3. `NotebookCrypto`.** Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from `HideConfSecret` while `exportConf` sets it to `nil`. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together. --- **The root cause is the blocklist itself.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration and clears each secret before | CVE Database V5 |
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