Threat Intelligence Database

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (78aef0d64a7d761d2987d27aea462083425e5692475cd81332b7a3152c754308) On Windows, scripts/postinstall.js XOR-decodes a hardcoded C2 host (node22.lunes.host:3258), authenticates with a 5-minute rolling HMAC-SHA256 token, downloads encrypted Python marshal bytecode from /sync and /go, decrypts it with a sha256 keystream, writes a.dat blob and a Python launcher to %TEMP%, and spawns it detached/hidden via wscript.exe //B //nologo against a generated.vbs — with a code comment explicitly noting that this 'escapes npm job object'. The launcher and.vbs self-delete after spawn. The package.json also pulls a transitive dependency 'node-fetch-core' from an unpinned GitHub master-branch tarball owned by the same author, providing a second mutable auto-execution surface that bypasses registry review and can be swapped post-publish. The package name mimics the well-known node-fetch library, consistent with a typosquat lure delivering this payload. Multi-layer obfuscation (XOR-encoded host/port, HMAC time-window authentication, keystream-encrypted payload, marshal'd bytecode), explicit npm job-object evasion, and self-deleting launchers are operational malware tradecraft, not legitimate install scaffolding. ## Source: ghsa-malware (618e71900ba6c670ed38028718e5dc5db3147ada60e3c7f11a0a519d33a4e783) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e049b6382f522be35ebc44b090d56723dacfc2fe15ffa05b345fe46f5aea392a) The package presents itself as "Pure Node.js telemetry for RuntimeDev platform" but implements a full remote-access trojan. The `runtimedev-link` bin, when invoked with a `--token` that encodes an `apiBase` and hash, enters a command loop that polls `POST /api/telemetry/poll-command` at the operator-supplied base URL and executes any returned `command` string through `/bin/sh` (or the Windows shell) via `execSync`, returning stdout/stderr to `/api/telemetry/command-result` (transport.js). The same agent handles server-issued `directoryScan` and `downloadRequest` operations, zipping arbitrary filesystem paths and uploading them base64-encoded to `/api/telemetry/upload-download`; every telemetry cycle reports hostname, username, OS info, home-directory tree, Chrome/Edge/Brave extension inventories, and the host's public IP fetched from api.ipify.org. On first run the agent installs cross-platform persistence: a Windows Task Scheduler entry marked `<Hidden>true</Hidden>` with a LogonTrigger launched via `wscript.exe //B` against a generated VBS; a macOS LaunchAgent plist with `RunAtLoad` + `KeepAlive`; a Linux systemd `--user` unit with `Restart=always` plus `loginctl enable-linger`, falling back to crontab `@reboot` or XDG autostart. Credentials are staged at `~/.config/runtimedev-link/agent.env`. To further evade endpoint visibility, `lib/portable_runtime.js` downloads a standalone Node.js 22.22.0 tarball from nodejs.org, extracts it into `~/.local/share/runtimedev-link/runtime/`, chmods `bin/node` to 0755, and configures persistence to invoke that private interpreter against a copied agent CLI, decoupling ongoing execution from the user's Node/npm. The exfil/C2 destinations are configurable per token, so any attacker distributing a token targets their own infrastructure; the code paths themselves are unambiguously RAT machinery. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bad42e28746353937971161510019f72f4c501f54d3a40410710ae83e83db724) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e19daf4f946816f5ba3c6e592eacc980861b281c6752b738de57fdd31f49279d) The package masquerades as a Tailwind plugin: README and the top of src/index.js are a verbatim clone of @tailwindcss/typography (require('tailwindcss/plugin'), prose-* class generator), even though the package name has no relationship to Tailwind. Appended after the cloned plugin code at src/index.js:124+ is a heavily obfuscated IIFE using an RC4-decoded string array and AES-decipher key table to hide its strings and control flow. The decoded action table contains keys 'cmd.npx', 'cmd.npxwin', 'pkg.link', 'cmd.install', 'flag.yes', which are consumed by helpers that call child_process.spawn with detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true and creationFlags set to DETACHED_PROCESS to silently run `npx -y <pkg.link>`, fetching and executing an attacker-controlled package from the npm registry on the developer's machine. On Windows an additional path uses keys 'ext.vbs', 'vbs.tag', 'win.wscript': a VBS file is written to os.tmpdir() with a crypto.randomBytes(4) hex prefix and launched via wscript.exe (detached, windowsHide), followed by process.exit(0), to hide the dropper invocation from the console. The action table also contains 'env.api' and 'api.base' entries, and the spawn helper clones process.env and injects api.base as the env.api value into the child, so the downstream npx-fetched package receives a C2/telemetry endpoint via environment. Because require('classbreeze-utils') is the plugin entry point loaded by any Tailwind build that adds it, the dropper fires automatically as soon as a build that depends on it runs, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled code on the developer/CI machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd3cdd1459bd1dce092c75b17f3940659f740a4efe533ba30b345976cef97736) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.