An active campaign targets Internet-facing Microsoft SQL Server instances by abusing T-SQL commands to deliver malware. Attackers scan for exposed servers on TCP port 1433 and use brute-force attacks with predefined credentials to gain access. Once authenticated, malicious T-SQL commands download and execute malware including a UPX-packed Go binary with the Naabu scanner, an XMRig cryptocurrency miner, and the Gh0st RAT remote access trojan. The malware enables CPU resource hijacking for Monero mining and provides extensive remote control capabilities such as keylogging and screen capture.
Noodle RAT is a modular remote access trojan with distinct Windows and Linux versions, used since at least mid-2016 by Chinese-speaking threat actors. It has been involved in espionage and cybercrime campaigns targeting multiple Asia-Pacific countries. The malware features shared command-and-control infrastructure and modular capabilities, with the Windows variant operating as an in-memory backdoor and the Linux variant providing reverse shell and proxy functionalities. Multiple threat groups have deployed Noodle RAT, which appears to be actively maintained and possibly commercially available.
An active malware campaign utilizes fraudulent software-download websites impersonating trusted vendors to distribute malicious installers. The operation primarily targets China-based operations of multinational organizations and Chinese-speaking users across healthcare, manufacturing, gaming, technology, logistics, government, and education sectors. The malicious installers deploy malware capable of establishing persistence, disabling Windows Update services, configuring Microsoft Defender exclusions, deleting volume shadow copies, and establishing command-and-control communications. Microsoft attributes this activity with moderate confidence to the Chinese threat cluster Silver Fox, known for using spoofed vendor download pages to distribute remote access trojans. The campaign leverages high-fidelity clones of legitimate vendor websites hosted on Chinese domains, delivering server-side generated payloads through ZIP archives.
Chinese cybercrime group GoldenEyeDog has been active since 2015, regularly updating malware and leveraging code-signing certificates to bypass Windows SmartScreen since 2024. A subgroup called CylindricalCanine uses Golden Gh0st Loader and Golden Gh0st RAT, modified versions of the 2008 Gh0st RAT, primarily targeting finance organizations in the Asia Pacific region through phishing campaigns. In April 2026, these actors compromised a DigiCert support member's device and stole code-signing certificates intended for customers, which they used to sign their own malware. The malware uses DLL sideloading, custom WebSocket protocols for command and control, and includes capabilities for remote access, credential theft, keylogging, SOCKS proxy tunneling, and RDP backdoor creation. Analysis reveals consistent tactics including using legitimate executables to load malicious DLLs that decrypt payloads from files disguised as logs.
Beginning in August 2025, a sophisticated intrusion was discovered where attackers used log poisoning techniques to deploy a web shell on vulnerable phpMyAdmin panels. The threat actors exploited misconfigured web applications to plant China Chopper web shells, controlled via AntSword, before deploying Nezha, an open-source monitoring tool, to facilitate remote command execution. This led to the deployment of Ghost RAT on compromised systems. Analysis revealed over 100 compromised machines, predominantly located in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. The attackers demonstrated technical proficiency through multi-stage operations, utilizing AWS and VPS infrastructure, with indicators pointing to China-nexus threat actors. The campaign highlights increasing abuse of legitimate publicly available tools to achieve malicious objectives while maintaining plausible deniability.
An active malware campaign has been discovered distributing malicious VBScript files through WhatsApp direct messages since June 2026. The operation affects users across multiple countries, with Malaysia experiencing the highest concentration of victims. Attackers compromise WhatsApp accounts and send weaponized VBS files disguised as business and financial documents to contacts. The multi-stage infection chain ultimately deploys legitimate ManageEngine Endpoint Central RMM software, providing persistent remote access to compromised systems. The scripts employ heavy obfuscation, Chinese-language comments, and modify Windows UAC settings. Infrastructure overlaps with ValleyRAT and Gh0st RAT operations suggest possible Chinese-speaking operators, though attribution remains uncertain. The campaign primarily targets individual users through opportunistic rather than focused methods, exploiting social engineering techniques with localized filenames in multiple languages.
RONINGLOADER is a sophisticated multi-stage malware loader used by the DragonBreath APT group to deploy an updated variant of the gh0st RAT. It begins infection via trojanized NSIS installers disguised as legitimate software and employs advanced evasion techniques including signed driver abuse, thread-pool injection, and Protected Process Light (PPL) exploitation to disable Microsoft Defender. The loader terminates antivirus processes, applies custom Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies, and injects payloads into trusted system processes to avoid detection. This campaign targets Chinese EDR tools but demonstrates advanced tactics that could be adapted elsewhere. The malware’s complexity and stealth capabilities pose a medium severity threat, with potential impacts on confidentiality and integrity. European organizations using Windows environments with Microsoft Defender could be at risk, especially those in critical infrastructure and government sectors. Mitigation requires tailored detection of abnormal driver behavior, WDAC policy monitoring, and restricting installation of unsigned drivers. Countries with high adoption of Microsoft Defender and strategic geopolitical interest in China-related espionage are most likely affected.
This report details two interconnected malware campaigns targeting Chinese-speaking users in 2025, using large-scale brand impersonation to deliver Gh0st RAT variants. The first campaign, active from February to March, mimicked three brands across over 2,000 domains. The second campaign, starting in May, impersonated over 40 applications with more sophisticated infection chains. Both campaigns used cloud infrastructure for payload delivery and DLL side-loading for evasion. The adversary demonstrated an evolving operational playbook, advancing from simple droppers to complex multi-stage infections. The campaigns' infrastructure remained active for months, indicating a persistent and well-resourced threat actor focused on Chinese-speaking targets globally.
Phantom Taurus, a newly identified Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, has been conducting espionage operations targeting government and telecommunications organizations across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The group's primary focus includes ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, and military operations, with the objective of gathering sensitive information. Phantom Taurus employs distinctive tactics, techniques, and procedures, including a new malware suite called NET-STAR. This suite consists of three web-based backdoors designed to target Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers. The group has recently shifted from targeting emails to directly accessing databases, demonstrating their ability to adapt and evolve their methods. Phantom Taurus' activities align with Chinese strategic interests, and their infrastructure overlaps with other known Chinese APT groups.
A series of attacks targeting Korean Internet cafés have been identified, focusing on systems with specific management software installed. The threat actor, active since 2022, uses Gh0st RAT for system control and ultimately installs T-Rex CoinMiner for cryptocurrency mining. The initial access method remains unknown. The attacks involve memory patching of management software and use of downloaders. The malware suite includes Gh0st RAT, its droppers, patchers, downloaders, and T-Rex CoinMiner. Unlike typical coin mining operations using XMRig for Monero, this actor employs T-Rex, likely due to the presence of high-performance GPUs in Internet café PCs. The attacks have been ongoing since late 2024, prompting responses from management software manufacturers.