Threat database

Deserialization of Untrusted Data and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerabilities in elixir-grpc grpc allow unauthenticated attackers to crash the BEAM node via atom table exhaustion and, when a decoded term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution on the server. 'Elixir.GRPC.Codec.Erlpack':decode/2 (lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex) calls :erlang.binary_to_term/1 on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option, no size bound, and no type guard. Any unauthenticated peer that sends a request with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can send a crafted payload that mints arbitrary new atoms (which are never garbage-collected, exhausting the bounded atom table and crashing the VM) or that encodes a fun term which, if applied anywhere downstream, executes attacker-controlled code inside the server process. This issue affects grpc: from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0.

A high severity vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc (versions from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a gzip decompression bomb. The issue arises because the grpc gzip decompressor calls :zlib.gunzip/1 directly on attacker-controlled data without limiting decompressed size or checking compression ratio, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential out-of-memory crashes.

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust the BEAM's memory and crash the server by streaming a large or slow-trickle unary request body. 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':read_full_body/3 (lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) accumulates every received chunk into a single growing binary with no size cap. Additionally, when the client omits the grpc-timeout header, the per-chunk read timeout resolves to :infinity, allowing a slow-trickle client to keep the connection alive indefinitely while memory grows. A single connection is sufficient to exhaust server memory and crash the node. This issue affects grpc: from 0.3.0-alpha.2 before 1.0.0.