Threat database

draw.io Desktop versions prior to 31.4.4 contain a path traversal vulnerability allowing arbitrary local file disclosure. The issue arises because several Electron main process read-side IPC handlers operate on user-chosen filesystem paths without proper authorization checks, leading to a read/write authorization asymmetry. This vulnerability is fixed in version 31.4.4.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.3.8, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java checks IPv6 Unique Local Addresses in Utils.sanitizeUrl() by comparing the text prefixes fc00:: and fd00::, but the JDK returns the expanded address form, so the fc00::/7 range, including the AWS metadata range fd00:ec2::/32, is not blocked. An unauthenticated request to /embed2.js?fetch= can therefore make src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/EmbedServlet2.java fetch an IPv6 ULA internal resource and reflect the response to the requester. Utils.validatedAddress() uses the same private-address check for the separate ProxyServlet path, which requires ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1. The primary /embed2.js path requires no proxy feature flag or DNS rebinding, and it can disclose cloud metadata credentials or data from other IPv6-reachable internal services. This issue is fixed in version 30.3.8.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, the OAuth callback handler in src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/AbsAuth.java skips comparison of stateToken and cookieToken whenever IS_GAE is false, which affects self-hosted Docker and WAR deployments. An attacker can provide an authorization code for the attacker's cloud-storage identity and induce a victim to visit a callback URL, causing the victim's draw.io session to become authenticated as the attacker identity without a valid state binding. The shared handler affects Google Drive, OneDrive, GitHub, GitLab, and Dropbox integrations. The victim can then unknowingly perform cloud-storage actions under the attacker's identity, causing session integrity loss and misattribution, but the identity binding does not itself grant access to existing victim cloud files. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, deployments with ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery because src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java performs the private-address check in Utils.sanitizeUrl() using one DNS resolution, while src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/ProxyServlet.java later calls URL.openConnection() and performs a second resolution. An attacker-controlled hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and then to a private, link-local, or cloud metadata address when the connection is opened. Successful exploitation can return cloud instance metadata or responses from internal HTTP services through the proxy. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/ExportProxyServlet.java uses request.getPathInfo() to build a proxyPath and appends it directly to EXPORT_URL without rejecting dot segments or confirming that the normalized destination remains under the configured export path. An unauthenticated request containing traversal segments can therefore address unintended routes on the internal export server, and the servlet forwards all request headers and the request body to that destination, allowing arbitrary header injection. Depending on the export service configuration, exploitation can expose administration, debugging, health, or configuration endpoints and can permit unintended internal actions. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.5, opening or importing a crafted .drawio file can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the draw.io origin when selected cells are processed by TextFormatPanel.addFont() in src/main/webapp/js/grapheditor/Format.js. An HTML sibling cell keeps the formatted-label path enabled while an editable=0 plain-text sibling is excluded from the merged selection style but remains in the iteration set. graph.cellRenderer.getLabelValue() returns that plain-text label without HTML encoding, and mxUtils.canConvertHtmlToSvg() parses it as HTML, bypassing the earlier CVE-2026-46642 remediation. Successful exploitation can expose diagram data, browser storage, non-HttpOnly cookies, and same-origin actions available to the victim. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.5.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 29.7.12, a crafted .drawio file can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the editor's origin when the file is opened. The vulnerability is not in the label sanitizer (which works correctly on the rendering path) but in a feature-detection routine in the Text Format panel that reads the raw cell label and assigns it to a detached element's innerHTML without sanitization. Browsers fire onerror for failed image loads even on detached elements, so an <img src=x onerror=...> payload in any cell label triggers script execution as soon as the cell is selected — which import does automatically. This issue has been patched in version 29.7.12.

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 29.7.9, the draw.io client accepts a ?gitlab= URL parameter that overrides the GitLab server URL used during OAuth sign-in. A crafted link causes the user's click on draw.io's "Authorize in GitLab" dialog to open a popup on the attacker-controlled host instead of gitlab.com. This can lead to credential fishing and session state token exfiltration. This issue has been patched in version 29.7.9.