woodpecker-ci vulnerabilities and threats

Woodpecker CI/CD engine versions from 1.0.0 up to but not including 3.16.0 contain an improper privilege management vulnerability. The Kubernetes backend allows users with Push permission on a repository to specify an arbitrary ServiceAccount for pipeline pods without administrator authorization. This can lead to privilege escalation where an attacker may access sensitive secrets and potentially take over the Kubernetes cluster. The issue is fixed in version 3.16.0.

Woodpecker before 3.15.0 matches the ApprovalAllowedUsers bypass list against pipeline.Author. For the GitLab forge driver, pipeline.Author is populated from the git commit author name (commit.author.name) carried in the webhook payload, which is attacker-controlled and not verified by GitLab. A user who can open a merge request from a fork can set the commit author name to match an entry in ApprovalAllowedUsers, causing needsApproval to return false so the pipeline runs without the required approval. This defeats the fork-approval security boundary and allows execution of attacker-controlled pipeline steps on a Woodpecker agent and exfiltration of CI secrets exposed to the run. Other built-in forge drivers (Gitea, Forgejo, GitHub, Bitbucket) derive pipeline.Author from the forge-validated sender/actor identity and are not affected.

Woodpecker before 3.15.0 registers the /api/orgs/lookup/*org_full_name endpoint without authentication middleware, and the LookupOrg handler unconditionally dereferences the session user (user.ForgeID, via ForgeFromUser) when selecting the forge to query. For an unauthenticated request session.User returns nil, so any unauthenticated HTTP request triggers a NULL pointer dereference in the handler. The panic is recovered by gin recovery middleware and the server continues serving (returning HTTP 500), but each request writes a multi-line panic stack trace to the error log. A low-bandwidth unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly probe the endpoint to flood the logs (about 37 lines per request), inflating disk usage and downstream log-ingestion cost and burying legitimate log events.

Woodpecker is a CI/CD engine. Starting in version 3.0.0 and prior to version 3.14.1, a vulnerability in Woodpecker CI's gRPC layer allowed any authenticated agent to impersonate any other agent on the same server by injecting a forged `agent_id` value into outgoing gRPC metadata. The server correctly verified the JWT token but then discarded the verified agent identity in favor of the client-supplied value. Version 3.14.1 patches the issue. As a workaround, disable org agents (`WOODPECKER_DISABLE_USER_AGENT_REGISTRATION=true`) and delete existing ones.