CVE-2025-27458: Endress+Hauser MEAC300-FNADE4 · Weak Cryptography
Affects Endress+Hauser MEAC300-FNADE4Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 10% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 3 Jul 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
AI-suggested
1. Network Segmentation: Isolate MEAC300-FNADE4 devices on dedicated, secured network segments with strict access controls to limit exposure to untrusted networks. 2. Use VPN or Encrypted Tunnels: Since VNC communication is unencrypted, implement VPNs or secure tunnels (e.g., SSH tunnels) to protect VNC traffic from interception. 3. Disable VNC Access: Where possible, disable VNC access to the device or restrict it to trusted management hosts. 4. Strong Password Policies: Enforce strong, complex passwords for VNC authentication to increase the difficulty of password derivation. 5. Monitor Network Traffic: Deploy intrusion detection systems to monitor for suspicious VNC traffic or repeated authentication attempts. 6. Vendor Engagement: Engage with Endress+Hauser for updates or patches addressing this vulnerability and plan for timely deployment once available. 7. Alternative Access Methods: Consider using more secure remote access methods that employ modern cryptographic protocols. 8. User Training: Educate network and security teams about the risks of unencrypted VNC and the importance of secure remote access configurations.
Description
The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.
References
- endress.com (opens in a new tab)
- sick.com/psirt (opens in a new tab)
- cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ics-recommended-practices (opens in a new tab)
- first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1 (opens in a new tab)
- sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2025/sca-2025-0008.json (opens in a new tab)
- sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2025/sca-2025-0008.pdf (opens in a new tab)