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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-35345: Uutils coreutils · Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Affects Uutils coreutilsSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:34 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.09% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 0% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 22 Apr 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
UutilscoreutilsAffected–Fixed in–
GitHubcoreutilspkg:github/coreutilsOther threatsAffected–Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, avoid using the --follow=name option of uutils tail on directories writable by untrusted users, especially when running with elevated privileges. Consider using GNU tail as an alternative, which does not exhibit this behavior.

Description

A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.

References

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