Malware or LLM? Silent Werewolf employs new loaders to attack Russian and Moldovan organizations
Silent Werewolf has launched two new campaigns targeting Russian and Moldovan organizations, utilizing sophisticated loaders to deliver malicious payloads. The attacks employ phishing emails with ZIP attachments containing obfuscated C# loaders. These loaders use legitimate tools and code obfuscation to evade detection. The first campaign exclusively targeted Russian energy, aircraft, and engineering sectors, while the second focused on both Moldovan and Russian entities. The adversaries hinder payload retrieval, making analysis challenging. They also utilize the Llama 2 large language model in some instances to bypass defenses. The campaigns demonstrate the threat actor's evolving tactics and their continued focus on espionage in the region.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Silent Werewolf threat actor has initiated two distinct malware campaigns targeting organizations primarily in Russia and Moldova. These campaigns utilize sophisticated phishing techniques, delivering ZIP attachments that contain obfuscated C# loaders. These loaders are designed to evade detection by employing code obfuscation and leveraging legitimate tools, complicating traditional signature-based detection methods. The loaders facilitate the delivery of malicious payloads, although the adversaries have implemented mechanisms to hinder payload retrieval, making forensic and malware analysis more challenging. Notably, some instances of these attacks incorporate the Llama 2 large language model (LLM) to bypass security defenses, representing an evolution in attacker tactics by integrating AI-driven methods. The first campaign focuses exclusively on critical sectors within Russia, including energy, aircraft, and engineering, indicating a strategic espionage motive. The second campaign expands the target set to include both Moldovan and Russian entities. The use of multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1132.001 (Data Encoding), T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell), T1036.005 (Masquerading), T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File), and others highlights the complexity and multi-faceted nature of these attacks. The campaigns underscore the threat actor’s capability to adapt and evolve, combining traditional malware delivery with AI-enhanced evasion tactics to maintain persistence and stealth within targeted networks.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, particularly those with business or operational ties to Russia and Moldova, this threat presents a significant espionage risk. While the campaigns currently focus on Russian and Moldovan sectors, the techniques employed—such as obfuscated loaders and AI-assisted evasion—could be adapted to target European entities, especially in critical infrastructure sectors like energy and aerospace. Successful compromise could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive intellectual property, disruption of operational technology, and potential sabotage. The use of legitimate tools and obfuscation complicates detection and response efforts, increasing dwell time and the potential for data exfiltration. Additionally, the integration of LLMs like Llama 2 to bypass defenses signals a new level of sophistication that could challenge existing security controls across Europe. The espionage focus suggests that confidentiality breaches are the primary concern, but the potential for integrity and availability impacts exists if attackers pivot to disruptive actions.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement advanced email filtering and sandboxing solutions capable of detecting obfuscated code and suspicious ZIP attachments. Employ behavioral analytics and endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools that can identify anomalous use of legitimate tools and scripting interpreters. Given the use of AI models like Llama 2 for evasion, integrating threat intelligence that monitors for AI-assisted attack patterns is critical. Organizations should enforce strict application whitelisting and monitor for masquerading techniques, ensuring that only authorized binaries and scripts execute. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) should be mandatory to reduce the risk of credential compromise. Regular threat hunting exercises focusing on the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified (e.g., T1132.001, T1059.007, T1036.005) can help detect early signs of compromise. Employee training on phishing awareness must be enhanced, emphasizing the risks of opening ZIP attachments from unknown sources. Network segmentation and strict egress filtering can limit lateral movement and data exfiltration. Finally, collaboration with national cybersecurity centers and sharing of threat intelligence related to Silent Werewolf activities will improve detection and response capabilities.
Affected Countries
Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Germany, France, Poland, United Kingdom
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 129399b838d6526751faf16ecea92942
- hash: 1b24b16d33ba5b7dcc3ebd146a4e60de
- hash: 2bdd91c8b815db57708c288d0b5b0934
- hash: 33d6a1278c501ab1ca327761edab28cb
- hash: 40e14abd06af70230849704760272cea
- hash: 7cbe662203a44f3e416101d6ea377b85
- hash: 987822015413905afe5a95797fdbdd1d
- hash: bf6c1d8b7ad6d3cbdf0c0d82a1876ef2
- hash: cb36db26550d804add58f92fe636d120
- hash: d5b1c03f2f09579f7cdcdde8db779671
- hash: d8c1609d82a74843dc795128121c190c
- hash: 1ad071c3a13c2bceabf0f35c5528854c5c87d0e0
- hash: 40f68fe13718b2e81dbba41743ea3c90a9ffe4f8
- hash: 5e22617a0ba90c6a1b4214e37165488402b993e0
- hash: 76cc7b3c94e8cc83999e361cafeea060bff115ba
- hash: 816bdbfd575cc6ad39cdb104d8c8b997d6fe7aae
- hash: 89a6f448ea62b4508cc211b91a38f53f034d92b1
- hash: 92335b522bf02dc047e5a38faf3a85bf6f0ac204
- hash: a072e5f086eecb523453d094c10c193dcc660b24
- hash: afe120ff0efa51a6092e520f7f1bd04fde1bcd11
- hash: dc0625ec8ef237b3797ce2d2b4f000c743d9f7b1
- hash: e1df750645beb81e4e0dc50bdd2f893f5063e7ee
- hash: 0b705938e0063e73e03645e0c7a00f7c8d8533f1912eab5bf9ad7bc44d2cf9c3
- hash: 0d1b0d35dbf72bd6518d663eb0d66a91683e94435d3659d310e202e8c169d73a
- hash: 0d730d64432a80f950c0685f451606fde5dc27f7a58dcfe978c4cd784a08b0ef
- hash: 23e1cde0493f7444508d56fabd6883f476b790b262040a90ae00beb31b85279c
- hash: 3b283c67f597b926784d9cc07b6a4020f422dcbc1b669c67d993606e663dc5ea
- hash: 3d49a2ca08b48838fde89d3f349e08de3b58f3f9ddcdd07c8dff7559b5f01cba
- hash: 448245612a5388074e32251a0b44769170c586cc4c2ae06cd953c7a461ce34a6
- hash: 47b2b73e87bf21a076c7bfba34d5eee5a136d3d43d19679d14f705db034a97d7
- hash: 536cd589cd685806b4348b9efa06843a90decae9f4135d1b11d8e74c7911f37d
- hash: 56f62aa193a254ea2607bb1f42971ebbe4e69631d0afb1f80beb6a89b83046ca
- hash: 59b907430dde62fc7a0d1c33c38081b7dcf43777815d1abcf07e0c77f76f5894
- hash: 5e34d754b0a938de7e512614f8fc6d7cd6c704f76b05044e07c97bd44bd5d591
- hash: 6c8916e453c0fdcd9d4e1164d1f30c38ebe65aa6d26a0fb3f5586ed3fd33d1e9
- hash: 73d35df23a6cce8c8b941730dec16b1f10945725ba696c7db784a5e4b65d4aa3
- hash: 78a4e323910a0353d10fa19f8b003697d9d675ee9f15089d54dcfd8b7a9815c2
- hash: 95060ba948948eea9bfc801731960b97d3efceb300622630afcbccfe12c21ccd
- hash: 9c1acde0627da8b518b0522d6fed15cecf35b20ed8920628e9f580cfc3f450ed
- hash: 9cb6e6b8b81e97645760cc6d05298c7079565a5c6c9de3fb760e771bb699e583
- hash: af30d6c9431def22b93c52e7d7ba57a4290bbe6c94c7f822f0a5423c50671211
- hash: b4f57e04bc7d0df696ece85ff6f9b306a4e2925c6fdb1e68c80726a974534ff3
- hash: b923c1ee29c8fc5f96aae5128b6a4d414dd755ec0e11dbf636f7b92ba1e3d13e
- hash: c10d77e36dba3b410480359812c771c2185b0c586bd5e23a6d2454aba45208f2
- hash: c8268c6d2aa536937366f242abdfdae0b5432d6abc2680c4577ac2a252010182
- hash: cfd0d56ca3d6c9ca232252570522c4b904be2807c461276979b1f8c551ccd4aa
- hash: d8bf46a9919806112200cb52f6c235726d1b8102de1231ae4a956b7d292063ba
- hash: e14fdb6c0b5b64e1ca318b7ad3ac9a4fd6dec60ef03089b87199306eba6e0ca6
- hash: ea89ca6c00aea17ea97374e08c93e57fe2cf73a6ea36024cd659d757b51bda41
- hash: f3f2c3c5836ce6e3cb92aa6dfc0f133e15a7fd169a3d1049b7d82e49d1577273
Malware or LLM? Silent Werewolf employs new loaders to attack Russian and Moldovan organizations
Description
Silent Werewolf has launched two new campaigns targeting Russian and Moldovan organizations, utilizing sophisticated loaders to deliver malicious payloads. The attacks employ phishing emails with ZIP attachments containing obfuscated C# loaders. These loaders use legitimate tools and code obfuscation to evade detection. The first campaign exclusively targeted Russian energy, aircraft, and engineering sectors, while the second focused on both Moldovan and Russian entities. The adversaries hinder payload retrieval, making analysis challenging. They also utilize the Llama 2 large language model in some instances to bypass defenses. The campaigns demonstrate the threat actor's evolving tactics and their continued focus on espionage in the region.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The Silent Werewolf threat actor has initiated two distinct malware campaigns targeting organizations primarily in Russia and Moldova. These campaigns utilize sophisticated phishing techniques, delivering ZIP attachments that contain obfuscated C# loaders. These loaders are designed to evade detection by employing code obfuscation and leveraging legitimate tools, complicating traditional signature-based detection methods. The loaders facilitate the delivery of malicious payloads, although the adversaries have implemented mechanisms to hinder payload retrieval, making forensic and malware analysis more challenging. Notably, some instances of these attacks incorporate the Llama 2 large language model (LLM) to bypass security defenses, representing an evolution in attacker tactics by integrating AI-driven methods. The first campaign focuses exclusively on critical sectors within Russia, including energy, aircraft, and engineering, indicating a strategic espionage motive. The second campaign expands the target set to include both Moldovan and Russian entities. The use of multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1132.001 (Data Encoding), T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell), T1036.005 (Masquerading), T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File), and others highlights the complexity and multi-faceted nature of these attacks. The campaigns underscore the threat actor’s capability to adapt and evolve, combining traditional malware delivery with AI-enhanced evasion tactics to maintain persistence and stealth within targeted networks.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, particularly those with business or operational ties to Russia and Moldova, this threat presents a significant espionage risk. While the campaigns currently focus on Russian and Moldovan sectors, the techniques employed—such as obfuscated loaders and AI-assisted evasion—could be adapted to target European entities, especially in critical infrastructure sectors like energy and aerospace. Successful compromise could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive intellectual property, disruption of operational technology, and potential sabotage. The use of legitimate tools and obfuscation complicates detection and response efforts, increasing dwell time and the potential for data exfiltration. Additionally, the integration of LLMs like Llama 2 to bypass defenses signals a new level of sophistication that could challenge existing security controls across Europe. The espionage focus suggests that confidentiality breaches are the primary concern, but the potential for integrity and availability impacts exists if attackers pivot to disruptive actions.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement advanced email filtering and sandboxing solutions capable of detecting obfuscated code and suspicious ZIP attachments. Employ behavioral analytics and endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools that can identify anomalous use of legitimate tools and scripting interpreters. Given the use of AI models like Llama 2 for evasion, integrating threat intelligence that monitors for AI-assisted attack patterns is critical. Organizations should enforce strict application whitelisting and monitor for masquerading techniques, ensuring that only authorized binaries and scripts execute. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) should be mandatory to reduce the risk of credential compromise. Regular threat hunting exercises focusing on the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified (e.g., T1132.001, T1059.007, T1036.005) can help detect early signs of compromise. Employee training on phishing awareness must be enhanced, emphasizing the risks of opening ZIP attachments from unknown sources. Network segmentation and strict egress filtering can limit lateral movement and data exfiltration. Finally, collaboration with national cybersecurity centers and sharing of threat intelligence related to Silent Werewolf activities will improve detection and response capabilities.
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://bi-zone.medium.com/malware-or-llm-silent-werewolf-employs-new-loaders-to-attack-russian-and-moldovan-organizations-c4135e2ec17c"]
- Adversary
- Silent Werewolf
- Pulse Id
- 6835ec34a49fc3b818e049b7
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash129399b838d6526751faf16ecea92942 | — | |
hash1b24b16d33ba5b7dcc3ebd146a4e60de | — | |
hash2bdd91c8b815db57708c288d0b5b0934 | — | |
hash33d6a1278c501ab1ca327761edab28cb | — | |
hash40e14abd06af70230849704760272cea | — | |
hash7cbe662203a44f3e416101d6ea377b85 | — | |
hash987822015413905afe5a95797fdbdd1d | — | |
hashbf6c1d8b7ad6d3cbdf0c0d82a1876ef2 | — | |
hashcb36db26550d804add58f92fe636d120 | — | |
hashd5b1c03f2f09579f7cdcdde8db779671 | — | |
hashd8c1609d82a74843dc795128121c190c | — | |
hash1ad071c3a13c2bceabf0f35c5528854c5c87d0e0 | — | |
hash40f68fe13718b2e81dbba41743ea3c90a9ffe4f8 | — | |
hash5e22617a0ba90c6a1b4214e37165488402b993e0 | — | |
hash76cc7b3c94e8cc83999e361cafeea060bff115ba | — | |
hash816bdbfd575cc6ad39cdb104d8c8b997d6fe7aae | — | |
hash89a6f448ea62b4508cc211b91a38f53f034d92b1 | — | |
hash92335b522bf02dc047e5a38faf3a85bf6f0ac204 | — | |
hasha072e5f086eecb523453d094c10c193dcc660b24 | — | |
hashafe120ff0efa51a6092e520f7f1bd04fde1bcd11 | — | |
hashdc0625ec8ef237b3797ce2d2b4f000c743d9f7b1 | — | |
hashe1df750645beb81e4e0dc50bdd2f893f5063e7ee | — | |
hash0b705938e0063e73e03645e0c7a00f7c8d8533f1912eab5bf9ad7bc44d2cf9c3 | — | |
hash0d1b0d35dbf72bd6518d663eb0d66a91683e94435d3659d310e202e8c169d73a | — | |
hash0d730d64432a80f950c0685f451606fde5dc27f7a58dcfe978c4cd784a08b0ef | — | |
hash23e1cde0493f7444508d56fabd6883f476b790b262040a90ae00beb31b85279c | — | |
hash3b283c67f597b926784d9cc07b6a4020f422dcbc1b669c67d993606e663dc5ea | — | |
hash3d49a2ca08b48838fde89d3f349e08de3b58f3f9ddcdd07c8dff7559b5f01cba | — | |
hash448245612a5388074e32251a0b44769170c586cc4c2ae06cd953c7a461ce34a6 | — | |
hash47b2b73e87bf21a076c7bfba34d5eee5a136d3d43d19679d14f705db034a97d7 | — | |
hash536cd589cd685806b4348b9efa06843a90decae9f4135d1b11d8e74c7911f37d | — | |
hash56f62aa193a254ea2607bb1f42971ebbe4e69631d0afb1f80beb6a89b83046ca | — | |
hash59b907430dde62fc7a0d1c33c38081b7dcf43777815d1abcf07e0c77f76f5894 | — | |
hash5e34d754b0a938de7e512614f8fc6d7cd6c704f76b05044e07c97bd44bd5d591 | — | |
hash6c8916e453c0fdcd9d4e1164d1f30c38ebe65aa6d26a0fb3f5586ed3fd33d1e9 | — | |
hash73d35df23a6cce8c8b941730dec16b1f10945725ba696c7db784a5e4b65d4aa3 | — | |
hash78a4e323910a0353d10fa19f8b003697d9d675ee9f15089d54dcfd8b7a9815c2 | — | |
hash95060ba948948eea9bfc801731960b97d3efceb300622630afcbccfe12c21ccd | — | |
hash9c1acde0627da8b518b0522d6fed15cecf35b20ed8920628e9f580cfc3f450ed | — | |
hash9cb6e6b8b81e97645760cc6d05298c7079565a5c6c9de3fb760e771bb699e583 | — | |
hashaf30d6c9431def22b93c52e7d7ba57a4290bbe6c94c7f822f0a5423c50671211 | — | |
hashb4f57e04bc7d0df696ece85ff6f9b306a4e2925c6fdb1e68c80726a974534ff3 | — | |
hashb923c1ee29c8fc5f96aae5128b6a4d414dd755ec0e11dbf636f7b92ba1e3d13e | — | |
hashc10d77e36dba3b410480359812c771c2185b0c586bd5e23a6d2454aba45208f2 | — | |
hashc8268c6d2aa536937366f242abdfdae0b5432d6abc2680c4577ac2a252010182 | — | |
hashcfd0d56ca3d6c9ca232252570522c4b904be2807c461276979b1f8c551ccd4aa | — | |
hashd8bf46a9919806112200cb52f6c235726d1b8102de1231ae4a956b7d292063ba | — | |
hashe14fdb6c0b5b64e1ca318b7ad3ac9a4fd6dec60ef03089b87199306eba6e0ca6 | — | |
hashea89ca6c00aea17ea97374e08c93e57fe2cf73a6ea36024cd659d757b51bda41 | — | |
hashf3f2c3c5836ce6e3cb92aa6dfc0f133e15a7fd169a3d1049b7d82e49d1577273 | — |
Threat ID: 6835ef34182aa0cae21b26e7
Added to database: 5/27/2025, 4:58:28 PM
Last enriched: 6/26/2025, 5:35:14 PM
Last updated: 8/12/2025, 8:55:38 AM
Views: 26
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