Real-time Open Source Software Supply Chain Security

On August 28, 2026, an attacker leveraged a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow in the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen. The workflow's issue_comment trigger did not enforce author-association gates, enabling any GitHub user to initiate npm publishing from a forked repository. The attacker submitted pull requests from forks and used comments to trigger publishing with OIDC token minting permissions. The payload included dual execution vectors: a binding.gyp file exploiting node-gyp's Python evaluation to run commands, and a preinstall hook. The main payload was a multi-megabyte obfuscated JavaScript file with three decryption layers, which bootstrapped the download of Bun v1.4.0. This attack method corresponds to the Mini Shai-Hulud toolkit, known from prior SAP and AntV supply chain compromises. The malicious versions were subsequently removed from npm.

The attack allowed unauthorized code execution within the npm package's release pipeline, resulting in the publication of malicious package versions. This compromises the integrity of the supply chain, potentially affecting users who installed these versions. The payload's complexity and obfuscation indicate a sophisticated attempt to evade detection and maintain persistence. However, the malicious versions have been removed from npm, limiting ongoing exposure.

All malicious versions have been removed from npm. Users should avoid installing the affected package versions published on or around August 28, 2026. Repository maintainers should enforce strict author-association checks on GitHub Actions triggers, especially for workflows that publish packages. Review and harden CI/CD pipelines to prevent unauthorized publishing, including restricting OIDC token permissions and validating triggers. Patch status is not explicitly stated; check the package repository and GitHub Actions workflow configurations for updates or fixes.