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Snake Keylogger in Geopolitical Affairs: Abuse of Trusted Java Utilities in Cybercrime Operations

Medium
Published: Mon Jun 30 2025 (06/30/2025, 16:30:56 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

The S2 Group’s intelligence team has identified through adversary tracking a new phishing campaign by Snake Keylogger, a Russian origin stealer programmed in .NET, targeting various types of victims, such as companies, governments or individuals. The campaign has been identified as using spearphishing emails offering oil products.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 06/30/2025, 16:54:47 UTC

Technical Analysis

The Snake Keylogger is a malware strain originating from Russia, identified as a .NET-based stealer primarily used in targeted phishing campaigns. It is designed to capture sensitive information such as credentials and other personal data by logging keystrokes and potentially harvesting system information. The recent campaign tracked by the S2 Group targets a broad spectrum of victims, including companies, government entities, and individuals, using spearphishing emails themed around oil product offers. This thematic choice likely aims to exploit geopolitical interests and economic sectors related to energy, increasing the likelihood of successful compromise. The malware is distributed via spearphishing, a highly targeted form of phishing that uses personalized messages to deceive recipients. The campaign abuses trusted Java utilities, indicating a sophisticated approach to evade detection by leveraging legitimate software components. The malware is categorized under multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information), T1082 (System Information Discovery), T1555 (Credentials from Password Stores), T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment), T1574.002 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading), and T1588.002 (Obtain Capabilities: Malware-as-a-Service), highlighting its multifaceted attack vectors and capabilities. Although no known exploits in the wild are reported, the malware operates as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS), suggesting it is accessible to various threat actors, potentially increasing its proliferation. The campaign’s geopolitical context and targeting of strategic sectors underscore its relevance in cybercrime operations linked to geopolitical affairs.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, the Snake Keylogger poses a significant threat to confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data, especially in sectors related to energy, government, and critical infrastructure. Successful infections could lead to credential theft, unauthorized access to internal systems, espionage, and potential disruption of operations. The use of spearphishing tailored to oil product offers indicates a focus on entities involved in energy markets, which are critical to many European economies. Compromise of government or corporate credentials could facilitate further lateral movement, data exfiltration, or sabotage. The malware’s ability to hijack execution flows and evade detection complicates incident response efforts. Additionally, the MaaS model lowers the barrier for less sophisticated attackers to deploy this malware, increasing the risk of widespread attacks. The medium severity rating reflects the moderate ease of exploitation via phishing but acknowledges the potentially high impact on targeted organizations.

Mitigation Recommendations

European organizations should implement targeted anti-phishing training focusing on spearphishing tactics related to geopolitical and energy sector themes. Deploy advanced email filtering solutions that analyze attachments and links for obfuscation and suspicious behavior, particularly those exploiting trusted Java utilities. Employ endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of detecting DLL side-loading and unusual process behaviors associated with Snake Keylogger. Enforce strict application whitelisting and code signing policies to prevent unauthorized execution of malicious payloads. Regularly audit and secure credential stores, implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the impact of credential theft, and monitor for anomalous access patterns. Incident response teams should be prepared to analyze obfuscated files and investigate suspicious Java utility usage. Sharing threat intelligence within industry and government sectors can improve detection and response capabilities. Finally, maintaining up-to-date backups and network segmentation can limit the damage in case of compromise.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
green
References
["https://lab52.io/blog/snake-keylogger-in-geopolitical-affairs-abuse-of-trusted-java-utilities-in-cybercrime-operations/"]
Adversary
TA-558
Pulse Id
6862bbc0715c6120c479147a
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash0fadeb197ff352da80b7850c91ad3cce
MD5 of fe223090ea59abc54312c48ed89765ea5c8821df78134adc094cd799973dde39
hash164ecf9c0462f9e67544b7aa49963927
MD5 of b33d93e82b4a964c1306d40b054e6a2703e050357a513ab8873651dd4d669f4b
hash4cd81306bd16f7fac08f0d0531a3d3f7
MD5 of 6d7158bf300a5a8769d106500a60141e63436bfc35cab1d24e047aad1dc880ce
hash976fba387368277c488354a9dbcba903
MD5 of f099cb320a26b6284e9ca24b352b19d2109bb3df0beeded3c34377c9b934ed3b
hashcf7c69404338fb5806a0382d598b073f
MD5 of 54468a4c1261c1c3f4136854c29a50080be77416d040b083ac51776c957a1182
hashfda26498758aafef1d1e94670f852bd9
MD5 of 830703e20378110b1db917fcd498fa731aafed37fb1055c002693662053ad13c
hash144bd5e9d01fd1d3145f2d26d001bafb0c04e597
SHA1 of fe223090ea59abc54312c48ed89765ea5c8821df78134adc094cd799973dde39
hash31a4b95d70663077bf5bde4452f83a2d0a81bfca
SHA1 of 830703e20378110b1db917fcd498fa731aafed37fb1055c002693662053ad13c
hashb50ce12ddac387cf3170c26a3375cb16691660b8
SHA1 of 54468a4c1261c1c3f4136854c29a50080be77416d040b083ac51776c957a1182
hashbba68d84a51d6b8fb65ab45c0c908416fd21a414
SHA1 of 6d7158bf300a5a8769d106500a60141e63436bfc35cab1d24e047aad1dc880ce
hashc815560c86b855d58fa58dca5b78941e0d2b5689
SHA1 of b33d93e82b4a964c1306d40b054e6a2703e050357a513ab8873651dd4d669f4b
hashe8f33cf8b7cf353579a8388f3e3e8aa9ef4f227a
SHA1 of f099cb320a26b6284e9ca24b352b19d2109bb3df0beeded3c34377c9b934ed3b
hash0171212441aef19491692062218aaa6fba9684f59e162691ab056a7369569ad9
hash07dd7611034b2199726f006f93f144751d1f94e596908f8c5c2f5dcd245530af
hash0877f1e39454438733df34bfec11fc23023a449c6ece07f0d15a852d140e64c5
hash132ac2a27f43b1a830986c6d74b1e5cc855b248c93fa69893421c79d73a21fdb
hash19c4eac334c6218e8a9fae3c0bae8a28beb75c474780f3a567974e96f94cf35a
hash2e52628677cd6615c58b99ba3a85b3e41f60d752e2651293dcddcb814b9f6d18
hash3d0df3b1329d9f7dae79678325e3855734a0f31f995c32fe2ec6632d5043e40c
hash4855d6832e2889cfb0047e515b761c365bf8792ff30a84571ace896b7903f702
hash54468a4c1261c1c3f4136854c29a50080be77416d040b083ac51776c957a1182
hash5739aa1e1e86c11fb29cc40451bd55a06f3b8a98a58d364525a571d6b3c5c44c
hash6d7158bf300a5a8769d106500a60141e63436bfc35cab1d24e047aad1dc880ce
hash7cc53ec159a15cb2eacb8db7de25b35f2ef0e7aef0f3aa712c13560de16ddc20
hash7daf0aa227d0e846edd1229cd744e3afd8ca3898e12836605d8f08038ef34203
hash830703e20378110b1db917fcd498fa731aafed37fb1055c002693662053ad13c
hash9dae36cf2664e4bd348b1c7bcd9e886243fdd86e04d854e9a49e80ce358aa868
hash9f092c5069fdf376163326428b27d3f44283f6a5cc7fc6e57b5f8584919b7d8b
hashabec75593c542693e475be1d3b6e51cffcb599acaa5089ea578f13f30316d628
hashb33d93e82b4a964c1306d40b054e6a2703e050357a513ab8873651dd4d669f4b
hashc9065f726d9bce286d1df97516f7fa04004fa4fea0719933926a58b8cb93b9a0
hashccde5a1ae465a65b483f8f97e3d4b97957fc869cc4aca8b4fdd02a821aaf45a8
hashd244fede5f1b101146f733ec426fc7bb604ee4a7ab51ee88d8055b6866c7f708
hashd3ca4ed0a462c73c55d3aed4cfa5a969eacfdde152f67437fe3bb14fefb17612
hashd44bae3e448d78cdb976b7f811be53f32efb28d0d2ba964d09edd79a95dcc4b3
hashdbf6d6a302e7c9f7ef1bbc32e4efd61ded782e08ef16ad86a7a4858b4e1e9d9d
hashe31eda04b9ee78bb41c990eca89554ffadab27a5c47d5efd66f11f5947958dde
hasheb56af5727614192c73d71b8a7c22933872076cb9e62380320dfe09937d4f052
hashf099cb320a26b6284e9ca24b352b19d2109bb3df0beeded3c34377c9b934ed3b
hashf44877b93c347c93a38c05c9144030d144a4af7c243a57957479448c23b081cd
hashf4cc2b43480778392d4ea48e6af1ac47f646b3c3f295797752be2be20d13067e
hashf57ac8aa79dbe0a7a746f8de245361d912fe1f59f43d5cde835e94a2dbf0cfdb
hashfe223090ea59abc54312c48ed89765ea5c8821df78134adc094cd799973dde39

Email

ValueDescriptionCopy
emailharrysnakelogger@dklak.cam
emailserverhar244@gpsamsterdamqroup.com

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domainfiber13.dnsiaas.com

Threat ID: 6862bdbb6f40f0eb728c6aed

Added to database: 6/30/2025, 4:39:23 PM

Last enriched: 6/30/2025, 4:54:47 PM

Last updated: 7/30/2025, 4:22:49 PM

Views: 33

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