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Unmasking the Infrastructure of a Spear‑phishing Campaign

Medium
Published: Wed Jun 11 2025 (06/11/2025, 09:40:24 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

Censys researchers uncovered a spear‑phishing campaign where threat actors leveraged a cluster of 16 open directories hosting heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) files. The study analyzes how attackers set up these public-accessible directories to store malicious scripts, the obfuscation techniques employed, and the infrastructure's lifecycle.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 07/12/2025, 05:46:21 UTC

Technical Analysis

Researchers from Censys have uncovered a spear-phishing campaign infrastructure that relies on a cluster of 16 publicly accessible open directories hosting heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) files. These directories serve as the storage and distribution points for malicious scripts used in the campaign. The attackers employ advanced obfuscation techniques to conceal the true nature and functionality of the VBS payloads, complicating detection and analysis efforts. The campaign infrastructure lifecycle includes setting up these open directories, uploading obfuscated malicious scripts, and leveraging them in targeted spear-phishing attacks. The tags associated with this campaign indicate the use of multiple Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as Remcos, LimeRAT, DCrat, and AsyncRAT, which are known for their capabilities in remote control, data exfiltration, and persistence. The campaign also involves techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques like T1113 (Screen Capture), T1571 (Non-Standard Port), T1027.003 (Obfuscated Files or Information - Visual Basic), T1059.005 (Command and Scripting Interpreter - Visual Basic), T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment), and T1590 (Gather Victim Network Information). Although no known exploits in the wild have been reported, the infrastructure's public accessibility and use of obfuscated scripts pose a significant risk of enabling targeted attacks. The absence of affected software versions suggests this is an infrastructure and technique-based threat rather than a vulnerability in a specific product. The campaign's reliance on spear-phishing attachments and obfuscated VBS scripts highlights the importance of user awareness and robust email security controls. Overall, this threat represents a sophisticated spear-phishing operation leveraging publicly exposed infrastructure to distribute obfuscated malware payloads capable of remote access and data theft.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, this spear-phishing campaign poses a medium-level risk primarily through targeted social engineering attacks that can lead to remote compromise via RATs. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, espionage, intellectual property theft, and potential lateral movement within networks. The use of obfuscated VBS scripts complicates detection by traditional antivirus and endpoint protection solutions, increasing the likelihood of successful infection. Organizations in sectors with high-value data or strategic importance, such as government, finance, critical infrastructure, and technology, are particularly at risk. The public availability of the infrastructure means the campaign can be scaled or adapted rapidly, increasing exposure. Additionally, the use of multiple RAT families suggests attackers may tailor payloads to specific targets or objectives, increasing the sophistication and potential damage. Disruption to operations, reputational damage, and regulatory consequences under GDPR for data breaches are possible impacts for European entities. The medium severity reflects the need for vigilance but also acknowledges that exploitation requires user interaction (opening spear-phishing attachments) and does not exploit zero-day vulnerabilities.

Mitigation Recommendations

1. Implement advanced email filtering solutions capable of detecting and blocking spear-phishing attachments, especially those containing obfuscated scripts like VBS files. 2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools with behavioral analysis to identify suspicious script execution and RAT activity beyond signature-based detection. 3. Conduct regular user awareness training focused on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and the risks of opening unsolicited attachments, particularly VBS files. 4. Restrict execution of scripts from user directories and network shares using application control policies such as Microsoft AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control. 5. Monitor network traffic for unusual outbound connections, especially to non-standard ports or known RAT command and control infrastructure. 6. Regularly audit and secure public-facing infrastructure to prevent attackers from leveraging open directories or misconfigured services. 7. Employ threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators related to this campaign and proactively block associated IPs or domains. 8. Enforce the principle of least privilege to limit the impact of potential compromises and segment networks to contain lateral movement. 9. Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the risk of credential theft exploitation following initial infection. 10. Establish incident response plans tailored to malware infections involving RATs and spear-phishing to enable rapid containment and remediation.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
[]
Adversary
null
Pulse Id
68494f081b7474f8fb19f291
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash1e768bd3a48253dd4b61c0ffead91488
MD5 of 657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc
hash3aabc215331102df8f2a93ce097d37db
MD5 of b7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb
hash7c49b97157ded99194130320e884c697
MD5 of d8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5
hashd867cb352bc3d5854f18282d03f191ef
MD5 of 4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3
hash0012bb17a84a2ef674f69c1373e2868f6e3d6811
SHA1 of d8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5
hash0592a174dcc1420909aa22c7f0641602d2ac4a2f
hash2a8ab6d18d53f25f826cb0cefbda28a7a61c2f77
hash4fd7a9efb3b42ecd8931f799fe6a821f2dc7b136
SHA1 of b7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb
hash662da402d2a6e13e0cbc8792b84a7c4a8fe2fba7
SHA1 of 4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3
hash9963a857a61525ee23bb8727a0b8ad8f4c09b162
hashe067e30dd07a1b1cd1041834a0e304883b3de83a
SHA1 of 657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc
hash06469b3dd05621ecca3f37422c35d29a9225247b518e88788ae5b2d36d6ad765
hash147d83d58ba5ab7429dea557c9d5579a609b8d460522a745b841ee22e73c5b33
hash274db7b7ec6f0e233a791b06f00bf82fe570a6869ed7df804e5b3e47006c3763
hash319a560130015fa1c53149234321ba5313e5a93f06de6675f5da4a8c2dfa1cf1
hash3a98f55acd11e08e9a8090f8955bc51cb7de692c865074f9f5a68de813860df2
hash41781819707c4d4b0173d63da71b0c3b7b2ae8794b08c4cc26dc201e1adb5f0f
hash4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3
hash474ce68f3ade2dd6a215ea7ae6d5d9fb6a1298bdda55417e9ed58ca8ad143955
hash4ff7dc3005e7c33836c224ef8715ab09280d0d2c4e0c441e19bd59bc3af6b7b9
hash59339b7d2ca67b55eef533e66eede5cda4b6b62e5823786ef881d387dff902a5
hash657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc
hash7dde62518fe19b2e6c8a17b29339e7c11f655da8adfbfc8d1c6d499c967f0a15
hash81d75922646f0d7fab2613307117867cba27e9c71c3f57d8ca6627666df709c7
hash95f61fba6418c812c4c62d0c7ee4c8e5c369fc76e044cab6de3b6ddf787db2ed
hashad8ff8bba2c5ebc9781993dd7512f904b4acd65337e134951ed47432ceb554a2
hashb07d45eff14b4f083365d736010157724ac0e2f89770aece807fe67fa59ef7ce
hashb0ae166bcd563139925f2203f90e31efd0b067cf16fcce390a0e149f57d4c94d
hashb7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb
hashbc017dce8d74cef666069fa07d66e3f1ea952d0b1a0e50f51a8cc3b920da0966
hashbf7fd17c0c92daa075224804a037b5940872ac4011f161e49bc0c790bbfa7d43
hashcfb58601339563b1fc1ecf3f9db1ce704e515cad7eacacf69a7e88704646304f
hashd5095fc28d9b189698d2feebe96eceb5ee9d31877a0f2ed970356ff079455d73
hashd8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5
hashed6643adcd866ebe085c51be955c632a8fce08efce99cf87f8a42dcf1e5ef36a

Ip

ValueDescriptionCopy
ip154.26.154.57
CC=US ASN=AS141995 contabo asia private limited
ip186.169.80.199
CC=CO ASN=AS3816 colombia telecomunicaciones s.a. esp
ip193.142.146.50
CC=NL ASN=AS208046 maximilian kutzner
ip193.23.3.29
CC=DE ASN=AS207083 hostslim b.v.
ip213.199.55.238
CC=CA ASN=AS9009 m247 ltd
ip213.209.150.22
CC=TR ASN=AS39144 redes digitales de telecomunicacion en internet sl
ip216.250.253.13
CC=US ASN=AS396073 majestic hosting solutions llc
ip45.141.233.60
CC=BG ASN=AS25211 euro crypt eood
ip78.142.18.221
CC=NL ASN=AS208046 maximilian kutzner
ip89.117.77.234
CC=LT ASN=ASNone

Url

ValueDescriptionCopy
urlhttp://154.26.154.57:2404
urlhttp://186.169.80.199:1515
urlhttp://193.142.146.50:2404
urlhttp://193.23.3.29:2404
urlhttp://213.199.55.238:5555
urlhttp://213.209.150.22:55140
urlhttp://216.250.253.13:2404
urlhttp://45.133.180.26:3010
urlhttp://45.141.233.60:55330
urlhttp://78.142.18.221:2401
urlhttp://89.117.77.234:2404

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domaindcupdate.duckdns.org
domaindgflex.duckdns.org
domaingotemburgoxm.duckdns.org
domainpurelogs2025.duckdns.org
domainrem25rem.duckdns.org
domainremc21.duckdns.org
domainromanovas.duckdns.org
domainsosten38999.duckdns.org
domaintrabajonuevos.duckdns.org

Threat ID: 684953df9ea7c3ca70af04f5

Added to database: 6/11/2025, 10:01:03 AM

Last enriched: 7/12/2025, 5:46:21 AM

Last updated: 8/14/2025, 5:37:29 PM

Views: 21

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