Unmasking the Infrastructure of a Spear‑phishing Campaign
Censys researchers uncovered a spear‑phishing campaign where threat actors leveraged a cluster of 16 open directories hosting heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) files. The study analyzes how attackers set up these public-accessible directories to store malicious scripts, the obfuscation techniques employed, and the infrastructure's lifecycle.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
Researchers from Censys have uncovered a spear-phishing campaign infrastructure that relies on a cluster of 16 publicly accessible open directories hosting heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) files. These directories serve as the storage and distribution points for malicious scripts used in the campaign. The attackers employ advanced obfuscation techniques to conceal the true nature and functionality of the VBS payloads, complicating detection and analysis efforts. The campaign infrastructure lifecycle includes setting up these open directories, uploading obfuscated malicious scripts, and leveraging them in targeted spear-phishing attacks. The tags associated with this campaign indicate the use of multiple Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as Remcos, LimeRAT, DCrat, and AsyncRAT, which are known for their capabilities in remote control, data exfiltration, and persistence. The campaign also involves techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques like T1113 (Screen Capture), T1571 (Non-Standard Port), T1027.003 (Obfuscated Files or Information - Visual Basic), T1059.005 (Command and Scripting Interpreter - Visual Basic), T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment), and T1590 (Gather Victim Network Information). Although no known exploits in the wild have been reported, the infrastructure's public accessibility and use of obfuscated scripts pose a significant risk of enabling targeted attacks. The absence of affected software versions suggests this is an infrastructure and technique-based threat rather than a vulnerability in a specific product. The campaign's reliance on spear-phishing attachments and obfuscated VBS scripts highlights the importance of user awareness and robust email security controls. Overall, this threat represents a sophisticated spear-phishing operation leveraging publicly exposed infrastructure to distribute obfuscated malware payloads capable of remote access and data theft.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this spear-phishing campaign poses a medium-level risk primarily through targeted social engineering attacks that can lead to remote compromise via RATs. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, espionage, intellectual property theft, and potential lateral movement within networks. The use of obfuscated VBS scripts complicates detection by traditional antivirus and endpoint protection solutions, increasing the likelihood of successful infection. Organizations in sectors with high-value data or strategic importance, such as government, finance, critical infrastructure, and technology, are particularly at risk. The public availability of the infrastructure means the campaign can be scaled or adapted rapidly, increasing exposure. Additionally, the use of multiple RAT families suggests attackers may tailor payloads to specific targets or objectives, increasing the sophistication and potential damage. Disruption to operations, reputational damage, and regulatory consequences under GDPR for data breaches are possible impacts for European entities. The medium severity reflects the need for vigilance but also acknowledges that exploitation requires user interaction (opening spear-phishing attachments) and does not exploit zero-day vulnerabilities.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced email filtering solutions capable of detecting and blocking spear-phishing attachments, especially those containing obfuscated scripts like VBS files. 2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools with behavioral analysis to identify suspicious script execution and RAT activity beyond signature-based detection. 3. Conduct regular user awareness training focused on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and the risks of opening unsolicited attachments, particularly VBS files. 4. Restrict execution of scripts from user directories and network shares using application control policies such as Microsoft AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control. 5. Monitor network traffic for unusual outbound connections, especially to non-standard ports or known RAT command and control infrastructure. 6. Regularly audit and secure public-facing infrastructure to prevent attackers from leveraging open directories or misconfigured services. 7. Employ threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators related to this campaign and proactively block associated IPs or domains. 8. Enforce the principle of least privilege to limit the impact of potential compromises and segment networks to contain lateral movement. 9. Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the risk of credential theft exploitation following initial infection. 10. Establish incident response plans tailored to malware infections involving RATs and spear-phishing to enable rapid containment and remediation.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Poland
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 1e768bd3a48253dd4b61c0ffead91488
- hash: 3aabc215331102df8f2a93ce097d37db
- hash: 7c49b97157ded99194130320e884c697
- hash: d867cb352bc3d5854f18282d03f191ef
- hash: 0012bb17a84a2ef674f69c1373e2868f6e3d6811
- hash: 0592a174dcc1420909aa22c7f0641602d2ac4a2f
- hash: 2a8ab6d18d53f25f826cb0cefbda28a7a61c2f77
- hash: 4fd7a9efb3b42ecd8931f799fe6a821f2dc7b136
- hash: 662da402d2a6e13e0cbc8792b84a7c4a8fe2fba7
- hash: 9963a857a61525ee23bb8727a0b8ad8f4c09b162
- hash: e067e30dd07a1b1cd1041834a0e304883b3de83a
- hash: 06469b3dd05621ecca3f37422c35d29a9225247b518e88788ae5b2d36d6ad765
- hash: 147d83d58ba5ab7429dea557c9d5579a609b8d460522a745b841ee22e73c5b33
- hash: 274db7b7ec6f0e233a791b06f00bf82fe570a6869ed7df804e5b3e47006c3763
- hash: 319a560130015fa1c53149234321ba5313e5a93f06de6675f5da4a8c2dfa1cf1
- hash: 3a98f55acd11e08e9a8090f8955bc51cb7de692c865074f9f5a68de813860df2
- hash: 41781819707c4d4b0173d63da71b0c3b7b2ae8794b08c4cc26dc201e1adb5f0f
- hash: 4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3
- hash: 474ce68f3ade2dd6a215ea7ae6d5d9fb6a1298bdda55417e9ed58ca8ad143955
- hash: 4ff7dc3005e7c33836c224ef8715ab09280d0d2c4e0c441e19bd59bc3af6b7b9
- hash: 59339b7d2ca67b55eef533e66eede5cda4b6b62e5823786ef881d387dff902a5
- hash: 657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc
- hash: 7dde62518fe19b2e6c8a17b29339e7c11f655da8adfbfc8d1c6d499c967f0a15
- hash: 81d75922646f0d7fab2613307117867cba27e9c71c3f57d8ca6627666df709c7
- hash: 95f61fba6418c812c4c62d0c7ee4c8e5c369fc76e044cab6de3b6ddf787db2ed
- hash: ad8ff8bba2c5ebc9781993dd7512f904b4acd65337e134951ed47432ceb554a2
- hash: b07d45eff14b4f083365d736010157724ac0e2f89770aece807fe67fa59ef7ce
- hash: b0ae166bcd563139925f2203f90e31efd0b067cf16fcce390a0e149f57d4c94d
- hash: b7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb
- hash: bc017dce8d74cef666069fa07d66e3f1ea952d0b1a0e50f51a8cc3b920da0966
- hash: bf7fd17c0c92daa075224804a037b5940872ac4011f161e49bc0c790bbfa7d43
- hash: cfb58601339563b1fc1ecf3f9db1ce704e515cad7eacacf69a7e88704646304f
- hash: d5095fc28d9b189698d2feebe96eceb5ee9d31877a0f2ed970356ff079455d73
- hash: d8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5
- hash: ed6643adcd866ebe085c51be955c632a8fce08efce99cf87f8a42dcf1e5ef36a
- ip: 154.26.154.57
- ip: 186.169.80.199
- ip: 193.142.146.50
- ip: 193.23.3.29
- ip: 213.199.55.238
- ip: 213.209.150.22
- ip: 216.250.253.13
- ip: 45.141.233.60
- ip: 78.142.18.221
- ip: 89.117.77.234
- url: http://154.26.154.57:2404
- url: http://186.169.80.199:1515
- url: http://193.142.146.50:2404
- url: http://193.23.3.29:2404
- url: http://213.199.55.238:5555
- url: http://213.209.150.22:55140
- url: http://216.250.253.13:2404
- url: http://45.133.180.26:3010
- url: http://45.141.233.60:55330
- url: http://78.142.18.221:2401
- url: http://89.117.77.234:2404
- domain: dcupdate.duckdns.org
- domain: dgflex.duckdns.org
- domain: gotemburgoxm.duckdns.org
- domain: purelogs2025.duckdns.org
- domain: rem25rem.duckdns.org
- domain: remc21.duckdns.org
- domain: romanovas.duckdns.org
- domain: sosten38999.duckdns.org
- domain: trabajonuevos.duckdns.org
Unmasking the Infrastructure of a Spear‑phishing Campaign
Description
Censys researchers uncovered a spear‑phishing campaign where threat actors leveraged a cluster of 16 open directories hosting heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) files. The study analyzes how attackers set up these public-accessible directories to store malicious scripts, the obfuscation techniques employed, and the infrastructure's lifecycle.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
Researchers from Censys have uncovered a spear-phishing campaign infrastructure that relies on a cluster of 16 publicly accessible open directories hosting heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) files. These directories serve as the storage and distribution points for malicious scripts used in the campaign. The attackers employ advanced obfuscation techniques to conceal the true nature and functionality of the VBS payloads, complicating detection and analysis efforts. The campaign infrastructure lifecycle includes setting up these open directories, uploading obfuscated malicious scripts, and leveraging them in targeted spear-phishing attacks. The tags associated with this campaign indicate the use of multiple Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as Remcos, LimeRAT, DCrat, and AsyncRAT, which are known for their capabilities in remote control, data exfiltration, and persistence. The campaign also involves techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques like T1113 (Screen Capture), T1571 (Non-Standard Port), T1027.003 (Obfuscated Files or Information - Visual Basic), T1059.005 (Command and Scripting Interpreter - Visual Basic), T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment), and T1590 (Gather Victim Network Information). Although no known exploits in the wild have been reported, the infrastructure's public accessibility and use of obfuscated scripts pose a significant risk of enabling targeted attacks. The absence of affected software versions suggests this is an infrastructure and technique-based threat rather than a vulnerability in a specific product. The campaign's reliance on spear-phishing attachments and obfuscated VBS scripts highlights the importance of user awareness and robust email security controls. Overall, this threat represents a sophisticated spear-phishing operation leveraging publicly exposed infrastructure to distribute obfuscated malware payloads capable of remote access and data theft.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this spear-phishing campaign poses a medium-level risk primarily through targeted social engineering attacks that can lead to remote compromise via RATs. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, espionage, intellectual property theft, and potential lateral movement within networks. The use of obfuscated VBS scripts complicates detection by traditional antivirus and endpoint protection solutions, increasing the likelihood of successful infection. Organizations in sectors with high-value data or strategic importance, such as government, finance, critical infrastructure, and technology, are particularly at risk. The public availability of the infrastructure means the campaign can be scaled or adapted rapidly, increasing exposure. Additionally, the use of multiple RAT families suggests attackers may tailor payloads to specific targets or objectives, increasing the sophistication and potential damage. Disruption to operations, reputational damage, and regulatory consequences under GDPR for data breaches are possible impacts for European entities. The medium severity reflects the need for vigilance but also acknowledges that exploitation requires user interaction (opening spear-phishing attachments) and does not exploit zero-day vulnerabilities.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced email filtering solutions capable of detecting and blocking spear-phishing attachments, especially those containing obfuscated scripts like VBS files. 2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools with behavioral analysis to identify suspicious script execution and RAT activity beyond signature-based detection. 3. Conduct regular user awareness training focused on recognizing spear-phishing attempts and the risks of opening unsolicited attachments, particularly VBS files. 4. Restrict execution of scripts from user directories and network shares using application control policies such as Microsoft AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control. 5. Monitor network traffic for unusual outbound connections, especially to non-standard ports or known RAT command and control infrastructure. 6. Regularly audit and secure public-facing infrastructure to prevent attackers from leveraging open directories or misconfigured services. 7. Employ threat intelligence feeds to stay updated on emerging indicators related to this campaign and proactively block associated IPs or domains. 8. Enforce the principle of least privilege to limit the impact of potential compromises and segment networks to contain lateral movement. 9. Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the risk of credential theft exploitation following initial infection. 10. Establish incident response plans tailored to malware infections involving RATs and spear-phishing to enable rapid containment and remediation.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- []
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 68494f081b7474f8fb19f291
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash1e768bd3a48253dd4b61c0ffead91488 | MD5 of 657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc | |
hash3aabc215331102df8f2a93ce097d37db | MD5 of b7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb | |
hash7c49b97157ded99194130320e884c697 | MD5 of d8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5 | |
hashd867cb352bc3d5854f18282d03f191ef | MD5 of 4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3 | |
hash0012bb17a84a2ef674f69c1373e2868f6e3d6811 | SHA1 of d8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5 | |
hash0592a174dcc1420909aa22c7f0641602d2ac4a2f | — | |
hash2a8ab6d18d53f25f826cb0cefbda28a7a61c2f77 | — | |
hash4fd7a9efb3b42ecd8931f799fe6a821f2dc7b136 | SHA1 of b7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb | |
hash662da402d2a6e13e0cbc8792b84a7c4a8fe2fba7 | SHA1 of 4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3 | |
hash9963a857a61525ee23bb8727a0b8ad8f4c09b162 | — | |
hashe067e30dd07a1b1cd1041834a0e304883b3de83a | SHA1 of 657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc | |
hash06469b3dd05621ecca3f37422c35d29a9225247b518e88788ae5b2d36d6ad765 | — | |
hash147d83d58ba5ab7429dea557c9d5579a609b8d460522a745b841ee22e73c5b33 | — | |
hash274db7b7ec6f0e233a791b06f00bf82fe570a6869ed7df804e5b3e47006c3763 | — | |
hash319a560130015fa1c53149234321ba5313e5a93f06de6675f5da4a8c2dfa1cf1 | — | |
hash3a98f55acd11e08e9a8090f8955bc51cb7de692c865074f9f5a68de813860df2 | — | |
hash41781819707c4d4b0173d63da71b0c3b7b2ae8794b08c4cc26dc201e1adb5f0f | — | |
hash4297de28d569560bf2cd287e1a44771ec4f8deac993cb69b54b36fa497af52d3 | — | |
hash474ce68f3ade2dd6a215ea7ae6d5d9fb6a1298bdda55417e9ed58ca8ad143955 | — | |
hash4ff7dc3005e7c33836c224ef8715ab09280d0d2c4e0c441e19bd59bc3af6b7b9 | — | |
hash59339b7d2ca67b55eef533e66eede5cda4b6b62e5823786ef881d387dff902a5 | — | |
hash657e021f0dfdd8c628a428a824da278d14d674aefd248f86a58f5bbe4472f0dc | — | |
hash7dde62518fe19b2e6c8a17b29339e7c11f655da8adfbfc8d1c6d499c967f0a15 | — | |
hash81d75922646f0d7fab2613307117867cba27e9c71c3f57d8ca6627666df709c7 | — | |
hash95f61fba6418c812c4c62d0c7ee4c8e5c369fc76e044cab6de3b6ddf787db2ed | — | |
hashad8ff8bba2c5ebc9781993dd7512f904b4acd65337e134951ed47432ceb554a2 | — | |
hashb07d45eff14b4f083365d736010157724ac0e2f89770aece807fe67fa59ef7ce | — | |
hashb0ae166bcd563139925f2203f90e31efd0b067cf16fcce390a0e149f57d4c94d | — | |
hashb7d205a1560b07a92d744053744c29823064e2c415a71887fccd8524a3cad3fb | — | |
hashbc017dce8d74cef666069fa07d66e3f1ea952d0b1a0e50f51a8cc3b920da0966 | — | |
hashbf7fd17c0c92daa075224804a037b5940872ac4011f161e49bc0c790bbfa7d43 | — | |
hashcfb58601339563b1fc1ecf3f9db1ce704e515cad7eacacf69a7e88704646304f | — | |
hashd5095fc28d9b189698d2feebe96eceb5ee9d31877a0f2ed970356ff079455d73 | — | |
hashd8119df3e735dba78bc6c528f2737d8acb2e87f442596c810afcb5fa85261ad5 | — | |
hashed6643adcd866ebe085c51be955c632a8fce08efce99cf87f8a42dcf1e5ef36a | — |
Ip
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
ip154.26.154.57 | CC=US ASN=AS141995 contabo asia private limited | |
ip186.169.80.199 | CC=CO ASN=AS3816 colombia telecomunicaciones s.a. esp | |
ip193.142.146.50 | CC=NL ASN=AS208046 maximilian kutzner | |
ip193.23.3.29 | CC=DE ASN=AS207083 hostslim b.v. | |
ip213.199.55.238 | CC=CA ASN=AS9009 m247 ltd | |
ip213.209.150.22 | CC=TR ASN=AS39144 redes digitales de telecomunicacion en internet sl | |
ip216.250.253.13 | CC=US ASN=AS396073 majestic hosting solutions llc | |
ip45.141.233.60 | CC=BG ASN=AS25211 euro crypt eood | |
ip78.142.18.221 | CC=NL ASN=AS208046 maximilian kutzner | |
ip89.117.77.234 | CC=LT ASN=ASNone |
Url
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
urlhttp://154.26.154.57:2404 | — | |
urlhttp://186.169.80.199:1515 | — | |
urlhttp://193.142.146.50:2404 | — | |
urlhttp://193.23.3.29:2404 | — | |
urlhttp://213.199.55.238:5555 | — | |
urlhttp://213.209.150.22:55140 | — | |
urlhttp://216.250.253.13:2404 | — | |
urlhttp://45.133.180.26:3010 | — | |
urlhttp://45.141.233.60:55330 | — | |
urlhttp://78.142.18.221:2401 | — | |
urlhttp://89.117.77.234:2404 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domaindcupdate.duckdns.org | — | |
domaindgflex.duckdns.org | — | |
domaingotemburgoxm.duckdns.org | — | |
domainpurelogs2025.duckdns.org | — | |
domainrem25rem.duckdns.org | — | |
domainremc21.duckdns.org | — | |
domainromanovas.duckdns.org | — | |
domainsosten38999.duckdns.org | — | |
domaintrabajonuevos.duckdns.org | — |
Threat ID: 684953df9ea7c3ca70af04f5
Added to database: 6/11/2025, 10:01:03 AM
Last enriched: 7/12/2025, 5:46:21 AM
Last updated: 8/14/2025, 5:37:29 PM
Views: 21
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