Venom Spider Uses Server-Side Polymorphism to Weave a Web Around Victims
Arctic Wolf Labs discovered a new campaign by Venom Spider targeting corporate HR departments with fake resumes containing the More_eggs backdoor. The financially motivated threat group uses spear-phishing emails and abuses legitimate job platforms to apply for real jobs. The backdoor can steal credentials, customer data, and intellectual property. Several upgrades were found, including server-side polymorphism and evasion techniques. The attack chain involves obfuscated JavaScript, LNK files, and a dropper that generates polymorphic code. Organizations are advised to train employees on phishing awareness, especially those in HR who regularly open attachments from unknown senders.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Venom Spider threat group has launched a new campaign targeting corporate Human Resources (HR) departments by leveraging spear-phishing emails containing fake resumes embedded with the More_eggs backdoor malware. This campaign abuses legitimate job application platforms to submit these malicious resumes, increasing the likelihood of bypassing initial suspicion. The attack chain is sophisticated, involving obfuscated JavaScript, LNK (Windows shortcut) files, and a dropper that generates polymorphic code on the server side. Server-side polymorphism means that the malware payload dynamically changes its code structure with each infection attempt, making traditional signature-based detection ineffective. The More_eggs backdoor enables attackers to steal sensitive information such as user credentials, customer data, and intellectual property. The campaign also incorporates evasion techniques to avoid detection by security tools. The use of spear-phishing specifically targeting HR personnel is strategic, as these employees frequently handle attachments from unknown senders during recruitment processes, increasing the risk of successful compromise. The malware leverages multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques including command and scripting interpreter abuse (T1059.007), remote system discovery (T1016.001), user execution (T1204.002), and persistence mechanisms (T1547.001), among others. Although no known exploits in the wild have been reported yet, the campaign's complexity and targeted nature pose a significant threat to organizations, especially those with active recruitment processes and large HR departments.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the Venom Spider campaign represents a considerable risk to confidentiality and integrity of sensitive corporate data. HR departments often have access to personal employee information, recruitment strategies, and sometimes privileged access to internal systems. Successful compromise could lead to credential theft, enabling lateral movement within networks and potential exposure of customer data and intellectual property. This could result in financial losses, reputational damage, regulatory penalties under GDPR for data breaches, and disruption of business operations. The polymorphic nature of the malware complicates detection and response, potentially allowing prolonged undetected access. Given the targeting of HR departments, organizations with high recruitment activity or those in sectors with valuable intellectual property (e.g., technology, pharmaceuticals, finance) are at elevated risk. The campaign's evasion techniques further increase the likelihood of bypassing conventional security controls, making early detection and response challenging.
Mitigation Recommendations
Beyond standard phishing awareness training, European organizations should implement targeted security measures for HR teams, including: 1) Deploy advanced email filtering solutions that incorporate heuristic and behavior-based detection to identify polymorphic and obfuscated payloads; 2) Enforce strict attachment handling policies, such as sandboxing all attachments from external sources, especially those related to job applications; 3) Implement application whitelisting and restrict execution of LNK files and scripts from email attachments or downloads; 4) Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of detecting anomalous behaviors associated with backdoors and polymorphic malware; 5) Conduct regular threat hunting focused on indicators of compromise related to More_eggs and Venom Spider TTPs; 6) Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) across all systems to limit the impact of credential theft; 7) Maintain up-to-date asset inventories and network segmentation to contain potential breaches; 8) Collaborate with recruitment platforms to verify the authenticity of applicants and monitor for suspicious activity; 9) Establish incident response plans specifically addressing targeted phishing campaigns and backdoor infections.
Affected Countries
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Italy
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 17158538b95777541d90754744f41f58
- hash: 2da2f53ffd9969aa8004d0e1060d2ed1
- hash: 46f142198eeeadc30c0b4ddfbf0b3ffd
- hash: b1e8602e283bbbdf52df642dd460a2a2
- hash: c16aa3276e4bcbbe212d5182de12c2b7
- hash: ebb5fb96bf2d8da2d9f0f6577766b9f1
- hash: ec103191c61e4c5e55282f4ffb188156
- hash: 0af266246c905431e9982deab4ad38aaa63d33a725ff7f7675eb23dd75ca4d83
- hash: 184788267738dfa09c82462821b1363dbec1191d843da5b7392ee3add19b06fb
- hash: 2fef6c59fbf16504db9790fcc6759938e2886148fc8acab84dbd4f1292875c6c
- hash: bd49b2db669f920d96008047a81e847ba5c2fd12f55cfcc0bb2b11f475cdf76f
- hash: ccb05ca9250093479a6a23c0c4d2c587c843974f229929cd3a8acd109424700d
- hash: f7a405795f11421f0996be0d0a12da743cc5aaf65f79e0b063be6965c8fb8016
- hash: f873352564a6bd6bd162f07eb9f7a137671054f7ef6e71d89a1398fb237c7a7b
- hash: 376c809afd6aad06121e199e70477ad9ebaf0795
- hash: d68d0668ee588e9229e7c1eb20da20b7b04e15c3
- domain: contactlistsagregator.com
- domain: municipiodechepo.org
- domain: onlinemail.kz
- domain: ryanberardi.com
- domain: api.incapdns.kz
- domain: blog.jasonlees.com
- domain: cast.voxcdn.kz
- domain: developer.master.org.kz
- domain: doefstf.ryanberardi.com
- domain: dtde.ryanberardi.com
- domain: host.moresecurity.kz
- domain: report.monicabellucci.kz
- domain: ssl.gstatic.kz
- domain: tool.municipiodechepo.org
- hash: f7a405795f11421f0996be0d0a12da743cc5aaf65f79e0b063be6965c8fb8016
- yara: d68d0668ee588e9229e7c1eb20da20b7b04e15c3
- yara: 376c809afd6aad06121e199e70477ad9ebaf0795
Venom Spider Uses Server-Side Polymorphism to Weave a Web Around Victims
Description
Arctic Wolf Labs discovered a new campaign by Venom Spider targeting corporate HR departments with fake resumes containing the More_eggs backdoor. The financially motivated threat group uses spear-phishing emails and abuses legitimate job platforms to apply for real jobs. The backdoor can steal credentials, customer data, and intellectual property. Several upgrades were found, including server-side polymorphism and evasion techniques. The attack chain involves obfuscated JavaScript, LNK files, and a dropper that generates polymorphic code. Organizations are advised to train employees on phishing awareness, especially those in HR who regularly open attachments from unknown senders.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The Venom Spider threat group has launched a new campaign targeting corporate Human Resources (HR) departments by leveraging spear-phishing emails containing fake resumes embedded with the More_eggs backdoor malware. This campaign abuses legitimate job application platforms to submit these malicious resumes, increasing the likelihood of bypassing initial suspicion. The attack chain is sophisticated, involving obfuscated JavaScript, LNK (Windows shortcut) files, and a dropper that generates polymorphic code on the server side. Server-side polymorphism means that the malware payload dynamically changes its code structure with each infection attempt, making traditional signature-based detection ineffective. The More_eggs backdoor enables attackers to steal sensitive information such as user credentials, customer data, and intellectual property. The campaign also incorporates evasion techniques to avoid detection by security tools. The use of spear-phishing specifically targeting HR personnel is strategic, as these employees frequently handle attachments from unknown senders during recruitment processes, increasing the risk of successful compromise. The malware leverages multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques including command and scripting interpreter abuse (T1059.007), remote system discovery (T1016.001), user execution (T1204.002), and persistence mechanisms (T1547.001), among others. Although no known exploits in the wild have been reported yet, the campaign's complexity and targeted nature pose a significant threat to organizations, especially those with active recruitment processes and large HR departments.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the Venom Spider campaign represents a considerable risk to confidentiality and integrity of sensitive corporate data. HR departments often have access to personal employee information, recruitment strategies, and sometimes privileged access to internal systems. Successful compromise could lead to credential theft, enabling lateral movement within networks and potential exposure of customer data and intellectual property. This could result in financial losses, reputational damage, regulatory penalties under GDPR for data breaches, and disruption of business operations. The polymorphic nature of the malware complicates detection and response, potentially allowing prolonged undetected access. Given the targeting of HR departments, organizations with high recruitment activity or those in sectors with valuable intellectual property (e.g., technology, pharmaceuticals, finance) are at elevated risk. The campaign's evasion techniques further increase the likelihood of bypassing conventional security controls, making early detection and response challenging.
Mitigation Recommendations
Beyond standard phishing awareness training, European organizations should implement targeted security measures for HR teams, including: 1) Deploy advanced email filtering solutions that incorporate heuristic and behavior-based detection to identify polymorphic and obfuscated payloads; 2) Enforce strict attachment handling policies, such as sandboxing all attachments from external sources, especially those related to job applications; 3) Implement application whitelisting and restrict execution of LNK files and scripts from email attachments or downloads; 4) Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of detecting anomalous behaviors associated with backdoors and polymorphic malware; 5) Conduct regular threat hunting focused on indicators of compromise related to More_eggs and Venom Spider TTPs; 6) Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) across all systems to limit the impact of credential theft; 7) Maintain up-to-date asset inventories and network segmentation to contain potential breaches; 8) Collaborate with recruitment platforms to verify the authenticity of applicants and monitor for suspicious activity; 9) Establish incident response plans specifically addressing targeted phishing campaigns and backdoor infections.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/venom-spider-uses-server-side-polymorphism-to-weave-a-web-around-victims"]
- Adversary
- Venom Spider
- Pulse Id
- 681587bd6ded7af256a18a26
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash17158538b95777541d90754744f41f58 | — | |
hash2da2f53ffd9969aa8004d0e1060d2ed1 | — | |
hash46f142198eeeadc30c0b4ddfbf0b3ffd | — | |
hashb1e8602e283bbbdf52df642dd460a2a2 | — | |
hashc16aa3276e4bcbbe212d5182de12c2b7 | — | |
hashebb5fb96bf2d8da2d9f0f6577766b9f1 | — | |
hashec103191c61e4c5e55282f4ffb188156 | — | |
hash0af266246c905431e9982deab4ad38aaa63d33a725ff7f7675eb23dd75ca4d83 | — | |
hash184788267738dfa09c82462821b1363dbec1191d843da5b7392ee3add19b06fb | — | |
hash2fef6c59fbf16504db9790fcc6759938e2886148fc8acab84dbd4f1292875c6c | — | |
hashbd49b2db669f920d96008047a81e847ba5c2fd12f55cfcc0bb2b11f475cdf76f | — | |
hashccb05ca9250093479a6a23c0c4d2c587c843974f229929cd3a8acd109424700d | — | |
hashf7a405795f11421f0996be0d0a12da743cc5aaf65f79e0b063be6965c8fb8016 | — | |
hashf873352564a6bd6bd162f07eb9f7a137671054f7ef6e71d89a1398fb237c7a7b | — | |
hash376c809afd6aad06121e199e70477ad9ebaf0795 | — | |
hashd68d0668ee588e9229e7c1eb20da20b7b04e15c3 | — | |
hashf7a405795f11421f0996be0d0a12da743cc5aaf65f79e0b063be6965c8fb8016 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domaincontactlistsagregator.com | — | |
domainmunicipiodechepo.org | — | |
domainonlinemail.kz | — | |
domainryanberardi.com | — | |
domainapi.incapdns.kz | — | |
domainblog.jasonlees.com | — | |
domaincast.voxcdn.kz | — | |
domaindeveloper.master.org.kz | — | |
domaindoefstf.ryanberardi.com | — | |
domaindtde.ryanberardi.com | — | |
domainhost.moresecurity.kz | — | |
domainreport.monicabellucci.kz | — | |
domainssl.gstatic.kz | — | |
domaintool.municipiodechepo.org | — |
Yara
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
yarad68d0668ee588e9229e7c1eb20da20b7b04e15c3 | Rule to detect More_eggs_Dropper | |
yara376c809afd6aad06121e199e70477ad9ebaf0795 | Rule to detect More_eggs_JavaScript |
Threat ID: 683d16f3182aa0cae230aeca
Added to database: 6/2/2025, 3:13:55 AM
Last enriched: 7/3/2025, 2:28:24 PM
Last updated: 7/26/2025, 11:02:29 AM
Views: 10
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