Search: ******m*di*al.com
3,632 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-56386Apache bRPC · Integer Underflow High7.5EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56386 Integer underflow and out-of-bounds read in the HTTP/2 server DATA frame parser in Apache bRPC allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service by sending a malformed DATA frame with the PADDED flag set and a zero-length payload. Root Cause: The HTTP/2 DATA frame handler computed the fragment size from the attacker-controlled payload length and, when the PADDED flag was present, decremented the fragment size before ensuring that the frame contained the mandatory pad length byte. A zero-length padded DATA frame could therefore underflow the unsigned fragment size and read the pad length byte past the end of the frame buffer. Affected Scenarios: Apache bRPC servers that accept HTTP/2 traffic are affected when a remote client can send crafted HTTP/2 frames to the server. HTTP/2 may be reached through cleartext h2c detection on an HTTP port or through TLS ALPN negotiation. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3325 Note: The fix validates that a padded DATA frame has enough payload bytes for the pad length field before decrementing the fragment size or reading the pad length byte. Malformed zero-length padded DATA frames are rejected with HTTP/2 FRAME_SIZE_ERROR. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-113730orphan-oss ognl · Protection Mechanism Failure Medium5.6EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-113730 ### Summary OGNL's optional *stricter invocation* mode maintains a block list that prevents expressions from directly calling methods on dangerous classes such as `Runtime`, `ProcessBuilder`, and `ClassLoader`. The block list filters on the **declaring class of the method OGNL invokes**. Because `java.lang.reflect.Method` (and `Constructor`/`Field`) are not on the list, an expression can use reflection as a proxy — `someMethod.invoke(target, args)` — to reach a blocked method. The real call (e.g. `ProcessBuilder.start()`) then executes inside the JDK reflection machinery and never passes back through OGNL's `invokeMethod`, so the block list never sees it. ### Proof of concept Under the default OGNL context (public-only access, stricter invocation enabled), the following expression creates a file even though a direct `new ProcessBuilder(...).start()` is blocked: ``` (#pb=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({"/usr/bin/touch","rce-proof.txt"}), #methods=@java.lang.ProcessBuilder@class.getMethods(), #names=#methods.{ #this.getName() }, #startIdx=#names.indexOf("start"), #methods[#startIdx].invoke(#pb, null)) ``` ### Impact and scope — please read carefully **This is hardening of a defense-in-depth secondary layer, not a break of OGNL's primary security boundary.** In OGNL the stricter-invocation block list is a *secondary* mitigation. The **primary** access-control gate is the `MemberAccess` implementation supplied by the integrating framework or application, which OGNL consults on every constructor and method call. Frameworks that evaluate untrusted expressions are expected to install a restrictive `MemberAccess` — for example, Apache Struts' `SecurityMemberAccess`, which excludes dangerous classes and the `java.lang.reflect` package. Against such a `MemberAccess` this PoC is blocked at the very first step (the `new ProcessBuilder(...)` constructor), before reflection is ever reachable. The default context that ships with OGNL intentionally allows all public members and is **not** designed to sandbox untrusted input. An application that evaluates attacker-controlled expressions with that permissive default already has many paths to code execution, and this technique is not required to achieve it. **You are affected only if all of the following hold:** (1) your application evaluates untrusted/attacker-controlled OGNL expressions, (2) it uses OGNL's default permissive `MemberAccess` (or an equivalently permissive one that allows `java.lang.reflect`), and (3) it relies on the stricter-invocation block list as its sandbox. **Properly configured consumers — including Apache Struts with its `SecurityMemberAccess` — are not affected.** The actual protection for untrusted-expression scenarios remains a correctly configured `MemberAccess`; the block list should not be treated as a sandbox. ### Fix `java.lang.reflect.Method`, `java.lang.reflect.Constructor`, and `java.lang.reflect.Field` are added to the stricter-invocation block list, so reflection objects can no longer be used as invocation proxies in stricter mode. The `java.lang.invoke.MethodHandle` path was verified not to be exploitable (its signature-polymorphic `invoke`/`invokeExact` fail through OGNL's reflection-based invocation), so no additional classes are required. ### Credit Reported responsibly through Tidelift by 毛锐 (youyi.mr@alibaba-inc.com). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Midnight Mimosa is a widespread Android malware campaign involving malicious applications preinstalled in the firmware of low-cost MediaTek-based devices. It affects over 150 countries, with highest concentrations in Mexico, France, and Italy. The malware leverages platform-signed system apps to silently deploy payloads, evade security protections, and execute remotely supplied code. It monetizes compromised devices through advertising fraud and residential-proxy services. The malicious firmware components provide persistent system-level access before device activation and bypass conventional Android security controls by temporarily disabling Google Play Store protections. Affected devices include low-cost Android handsets, counterfeit flagship models, and devices from Doogee and Cubot. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-112958apostrophecms apostrophe · Cross-site Scripting Medium5.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-112958 ## Summary ApostropheCMS widget styles support project-defined schema fields. If a project defines a free-form `string` style field with a CSS `property` and no selector, an editor-controlled value is rendered as an inline CSS declaration. The resulting declaration is then inserted into the widget wrapper's `style="..."` attribute without HTML-attribute escaping. An attacker who can edit the widget can include a double quote in the style value, terminate the `style` attribute, and inject new HTML event-handler attributes. The payload is stored with the widget and executes in the Apostrophe site origin whenever the affected published page is rendered. This is a sibling of CVE-2026-33889 / `GHSA-97v6-998m-fp4g`. The earlier issue escaped from a `<style>` element through a malicious color value. This variant reaches a different sink related to the automatically generated widget wrapper's inline `style` and `class` attributes. ## Details ### Root Cause 1: Free-form string style values retain HTML metacharacters The standard string field converter uses `launder.string()` and length validation. This performs type normalization, not output encoding for an HTML attribute context: [`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/schema/lib/addFieldTypes.js:296-333`](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/aa5170c7df9ff9ea5ac2e72a008f12e28dae6ca8/packages/apostrophe/modules/%40apostrophecms/schema/lib/addFieldTypes.js#L296-L333) ```javascript self.addFieldType({ name: 'string', // ... convert(req, field, data, destination) { destination[field.name] = self.apos.launder.string(data[field.name]); destination[field.name] = checkStringLength( destination[field.name], field.min, field.max ); } }); ``` Quotes therefore remain in a value supplied through a style field. ### Root Cause 2: The value is converted into inline CSS without value validation For a field with `property` but no `selector` or media query, `renderScopedStyles()` selects inline rendering. The generic extractor concatenates the configured property and editor-controlled value: [`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/styles/ui/apos/universal/render.mjs:171-228`](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/aa5170c7df9ff9ea5ac2e72a008f12e28dae6ca8/packages/apostrophe/modules/%40apostrophecms/styles/ui/apos/universal/render.mjs#L171-L228) [`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/styles/ui/apos/universal/render.mjs:598-647`](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/aa5170c7df9ff9ea5ac2e72a008f12e28dae6ca8/packages/apostrophe/modules/%40apostrophecms/styles/ui/apos/universal/render.mjs#L598-L647) ```javascript rule = `${property}: ${normalized.value}${normalized.unit}`; // ... if (isInline) { return { css: '', classes: [ ...storage.classes ], inline: stringifyRules(storage.styles, true) }; } ``` For example, the value below becomes part of a `font-family` declaration: ```text serif" tabindex="0" autofocus onfocus="document.body.dataset.inline='executed' ``` ### Root Cause 3: Attribute values are serialized without HTML escaping `getWidgetAttributes()` places the inline CSS into an attribute tuple, then concatenates every tuple into `key="value"` without encoding `&`, `<`, `>`, `'`, or `"`: [`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js:251-322`](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/aa5170c7df9ff9ea5ac2e72a008f12e28dae6ca8/packages/apostrophe/modules/%40apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js#L251-L322) ```javascript if (styleParts.length) { attrs.push( [ 'style', `${styleParts.join(';')};` ] ); } if (options.asObject) { return Object.fromEntries(attrs); } return attrs .map(([ key, value ]) => `${key}="${value}"`) .join(' '); ``` The same raw serializer also makes a project-defined free-form `string` style with `class: true` a potential sibling path, because the string is added to `classes` and later serialized into `class="..."`. The inline-property path was the path dynamically verified. ### Root Cause 4: The unsafe string is used by the automatic public wrapper Styled widgets use `getWidgetAttributes()` to create a wrapper around the rendered widget: [`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js:448-457`](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/aa5170c7df9ff9ea5ac2e72a008f12e28dae6ca8/packages/apostrophe/modules/%40apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js#L448-L457) ```javascript if (hasStyles && self.options.stylesWrapper !== false) { const styles = self.apos.styles.prepareWidgetStyles(widget); const styleTag = self.apos.styles .getWidgetElements(styles, { scene: req.scene }); const wrapperAttrs = self.apos.styles.getWidgetAttributes(styles); return `${styleTag}<div${wrapperAttrs ? ' ' + wrapperAttrs : ''}>${markup}</div>`; } ``` Consequently, the injected attribute is present on normal public page renders, not only in the editor UI. ### Why the CVE-2026-33889 defense does | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-112956apostrophecms apostrophe · Incorrect Authorization Medium6.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-112956 ## Review scope and evidence limits Package: @apostrophecms/import-export, version 3.7.0. Release tag reviewed: @apostrophecms/import-export@3.7.0, commit 9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce (September 30, 2026). Current main reviewed: 5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6. The importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, and core permission implementation have no differences between that release tag and the reviewed main. This follow-up is a static remediation review. We have not repeated the original end-to-end reproductions against the latest release or tested a deployed site. Current exploitability and impact therefore still require maintainer validation; the observations below establish that the reported security checks remain absent in public source. The original emailed PDF contains the original reproduction material. Please refer to that existing private attachment. ## Archive duplicate continuation permits unauthorized published-content replacement The overrideDuplicates() continuation still accepts client-supplied replacement choices, rather than binding them to a server-maintained, user-owned duplicate analysis. The replacement and write helpers do not establish a single canonical resource identity and authorization context before the update. This leaves the reported gap between draft editing authority and the published target selected for replacement unresolved at source level. The original report describes a contributor crossing the publication boundary through duplicate replacement on an import-enabled localized type. We have not repeated that end-to-end sequence on 3.7.0. Suggested remediation: bind continuation state to the initiating user, archive, job, permitted source/target mapping, locale and mode; reject inconsistent identity metadata; derive permissions from the actual loaded target and require publication authority for published targets. Source: overrideDuplicates(), replaceDocId(), and insertOrUpdateDoc() in the [importer](https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6/packages/import-export/lib/methods/import.js). ## Coordination Vivek R / Winfunc Original reporting team: Mufeed VH / Winfunc | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-112896Pillow · Out-of-bounds Read High8.8EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-112896 ## Summary A small attacker-supplied TIFF can be opened and loaded normally, then reach an out-of-bounds read when an application saves it back to TIFF with retained metadata. The fixed reproducer is a 1×1, 16-bit grayscale, PackBits-compressed TIFF containing tag 320 (ColorMap) with **768 SHORT values**: three zero-filled planes of 256 entries each. No Python object is forged and no metadata is injected after loading. Pillow's TIFF encoder allocates **768 × 2 = 1536 bytes**, then passes three plane pointers separated by 256 SHORT entries to libtiff. With `BitsPerSample = 16`, libtiff instead expects **65536 SHORT values per plane** and attempts a **131072-byte read** from a plane pointer. Existing ASAN observations identify a heap-buffer-overflow READ crossing the 1536-byte allocation made in `PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew`. The malformed ColorMap need not be a valid palette for this grayscale image. The issue is that accepted metadata is forwarded on save without reconciling the fixed plane extent with the effective sample depth. Opening/loading alone is not the demonstrated fault; the encoder path is required. ## Impact and prerequisites An application must accept the input, retain the relevant TIFF metadata, and invoke the libtiff-backed TIFF save path. The observed consequence is an out-of-bounds read and ASAN termination. Process-memory exposure during encoding is a potential consequence, **not demonstrated by extracting arbitrary heap contents in this report**. No arbitrary read primitive, full memory-disclosure chain, code execution, address-space bypass, or cross-process effect is claimed. The 131072-byte attempted copy is not the number of bytes proven disclosed. This report does not run a synthetic-canary serializer or collect an unsanitized encoded output. ## Tested environment and limits of the evidence The existing observations were recorded on August 30, 2026, with **CPython 3.11.8 on macOS ARM64**, using the unmodified official **Pillow 12.3.0** wheel and its bundled **libtiff 4.7.1**: - Wheel: `pillow-12.3.0-cp311-cp311-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl` - Wheel size: `4785266` bytes - Wheel SHA-256: `37d6d0a00072fd2948eb22bce7e1475f34569d90c87c59f7a2ec59541b77f7a6` - Pillow source revision: `bb1d8e8ab8d29048624d96e3ee53cecf7c13d13d` - Bundled libtiff SHA-256: `e8988717b7470394a47d5ccd343130796b24ee70b6d885d3818e0e0b53238be1` Apple's ASAN runtime was injected at process startup. This is **not an ASAN-rebuilt Pillow wheel**; allocation/memcpy interception detects the reported boundary violation, but the wheel's native instructions are not comprehensively instrumented. Only this concrete full-package environment is established here. No affected-version range, current development-branch result, or patched release is asserted. Severity is **Unknown**; no CVSS score is proposed. Separate earlier evidence reached the original Pillow 8.0.1 encoder constructor compiled as a component against a modern Python/libtiff environment. **That was not a complete Pillow 8.0.1 installation** and does not establish the historical package's full runtime behavior. It is not part of this reproducer or an affected-version range. ## Observed evidence and controls The earlier integration harness performed the natural sequence `Image.open(BytesIO(input))`, `image.load()`, then `image.save(BytesIO(), format="TIFF")`, without replacing the image's metadata. Each case was recorded three times: | Original fixture | Bytes | Recorded result | | --- | ---: | --- | | `colormap16` | 1685 | Loaded as `I;16`; save terminated with ASAN exit 86, READ of size 131072 crossing a 1536-byte heap region (3/3). | | `colormap8` | 1684 | Same fixed ColorMap, but 8-bit samples; save succeeded and retained SHORT/count 768 (3/3). | | `colormap_absent` | 137 | Same 16-bit geometry without ColorMap; save succeeded (3/3). | Address-free summary of the recorded native diagnostic: ```text AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 131072 0 bytes after 1536-byte region Copy path: memcpy -> _TIFFmemcpy -> setByteArray -> _TIFFsetShortArrayExt -> _TIFFVSetField -> TIFFVSetField -> ImagingLibTiffSetField -> PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew Allocation: calloc -> PyImaging_LibTiffEncoderNew ``` Input SHA-256 values (also enforced inside the script): - `colormap16`: `5f38e0ead90b97949fb0c98c63f9c68d00ba9181db6631ecb8927376dcc75f4d` - `colormap8`: `fdb26d9135549ed44824901985086c5ee4f06515699ca3291e498c523935405c` - `colormap_absent`: `bd54979624f3ffb713342e0458caff9e17c477f940cda2f0960feebfabbc9556` ## Root cause and source references - [Pillow `src/encode.c`, lines 870–899, pinned revision](https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/bb1d8e8ab8d29048624d96e3ee53cecf7c13d13d/src/encode.c#L870): the ColorMap tuple must contain exactly 768 entries; a 1536-byte allocation is passed with a fixed stride of 256. The check does not reconcile that extent with `BitsPerSample`. - [Pillow `src/PIL/TiffImagePlugin.py`, lines 1944–19 | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity The TeamUpdraft.com website was compromised on October 17-18, 2026, resulting in unauthorized access to customer data including names, emails, billing addresses, order history, hashed passwords, two-factor authentication settings, and connection keys for UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault, and UpdraftClone. The UpdraftPlus plugin and backups stored on third-party remote storage were not affected. Attackers appear to be using compromised backup datasets to create new administrator accounts on WordPress sites using Updraft. The vendor has contained the breach, reset credentials, and is releasing emergency updates to disconnect old keys and connections. Users are advised to change passwords, check for unauthorized admin accounts, remove suspicious plugins, and follow specific remediation steps for UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault, and UpdraftClone users. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-63209SUSE · Security update for aliyun-cli High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-63209 A security update for aliyun-cli addresses CVE-2026-63209, a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the github.com/klauspost/compress library's s2.NewDict() function. This flaw allows an attacker to bypass repeat index validation and cause a process crash. The update to version 3.5.1 includes this fix along with multiple other improvements and bug fixes. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'zxhgssiyluwxchn' version 1.0.0 contains a single HTML file that renders a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge page with heavily obfuscated JavaScript. This JavaScript reconstructs a URL impersonating cloudflare.com to serve a phishing landing page. The package does not execute code on installation, but serves as static hosting for browser-side phishing via npm CDN proxies. Installing this package does not run malicious code locally, but users fetching the HTML in browsers may be targeted for phishing. The package is considered malicious and should be removed. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-111839 CVE-2026-111839 is a missing authorization vulnerability in VideoWhisper.com's Broadcast Live Video product affecting versions prior to 7.3.8. This flaw allows unauthorized access due to incorrectly configured access control security levels. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS score of 5.3 and impacts confidentiality but not integrity or availability. A fix is available in version 7.3.8. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-112043calcom cal.com · Authorization Bypass Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-112043 A weakness has been identified in calcom cal.com and cal.diy up to 6.2.0. Impacted is the function createWebhookProcedure of the file packages/trpc/server/routers/viewer/webhook/util.ts of the component Webhook Handler. Executing a manipulation of the argument ID can lead to authorization bypass. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity This content discusses the development of a phishing URL detector focused on identifying phishing attempts based solely on URL text analysis. The detector achieves about 90% detection on unseen phishing URLs but struggles with false positives and phishing hosted on compromised legitimate sites. It highlights challenges such as phishing URLs hosted on trusted domains like docs.google.com and the difficulty of blocking such domains outright. The tool is open source and intended as a learning resource rather than an active threat report. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-1108832Way VideoCalls and Random Chat (WordPress plugin) · Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness Medium6.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-110883 CVE-2026-110883 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in VideoWhisper.com's 2Way VideoCalls and Random Chat software. It affects versions from the initial release up to 6.1.5. The flaw allows attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized access. The vulnerability has a medium severity rating with a CVSS score of 6.5. No official patch or remediation information is provided in the available data. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 3.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-55453Microsoft · CUPS ipp backend status-line injection can update queue PPD and lead to conditional RCE as lp via foomatic-rip Low3.3EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-55453 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-101300Wegow · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High7.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-101300 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) reported in the ticket sales chart PDF export functionality of Wegow. According to the report, an authenticated user with a promoter account can manipulate the <svg> parameter of the POST request generated by selecting Download PDF. The content is processed by the export.highcharts.com service, which sends HTTP requests to attacker-controlled external resources and embeds their responses in the generated PDF. The reported behavior allows the export service to be used as an intermediary for these requests. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-63430ammonia · Cross-site Scripting Medium6.3EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-63430 If a certain set of MathML tags are enabled, an attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code into the user's browser. The `annotation-xml` tag has slightly different behavior than the other "integration point" tags in MathML and SVG, but ammonia didn't handle it, so it didn't correctly strip the namespace-incompatible tags. This vulnerability only has an effect when the `math` and `annotation-xml` tags are both enabled, but the `encoding` attribute is disabled, because it relies on the following sequence of steps: 1. User writes code like `<math><annotation-xml encoding="text/html"><gadget></annotation-xml></math>`. 2. Namespace filtering checks the DOM, and it passes. `<gadget>` is parsed as HTML. 3. Attribute filter strips it down to `<math><annotation-xml><gadget></annotation-xml></math>`. Because the encoding attribute is gone, `<gadget>` is now parsed as MathML. 4. The gadget is written in such a way that it exploits the parsing differences between HTML and MathML. Additionally, the gadget can only be written using a tag that is parsed as raw text in HTML. These [elements] are: * title * textarea * xmp * iframe * noembed * noframes * plaintext * noscript * style * script Applications that do not explicitly allow any of these tags should not be affected, since none are allowed by default. [elements]: https://github.com/servo/html5ever/blob/045a0378f2b0f8d4a350793899cf722a2a9b3d11/html5ever/src/tree_builder/rules.rs ### Impact Low: Requires both MathML and at least one raw-text HTML tag to be enabled, and most websites don't enable either of those. ### Patches - https://github.com/rust-ammonia/ammonia/pull/245 (released in 4.1.3) - https://github.com/rust-ammonia/ammonia/pull/244 (released in 4.0.2) - https://github.com/rust-ammonia/ammonia/pull/243 (released in 3.3.2) ### Workarounds Call <code>builder.[add_clean_content_tags](https://docs.rs/ammonia/latest/ammonia/struct.Builder.html#method.add_clean_content_tags)("annotation-xml")</code> to remove the annotation-xml element and all of its children, including the XSS gadget. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-55840Erudika scoold · Open Redirect Medium5.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55840 Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to 1.69.1, the getBackToUrl() method in src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/utils/HttpUtils.java validates the backto and returnto parameters with Strings.CI.startsWith against the configured server URL. An attacker can supply an absolute URL whose hostname begins with the legitimate hostname, causing URI.resolve() to retain the attacker URL and the prefix check to accept it. A victim who follows the crafted sign-in link can be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain after authentication, enabling phishing and possible credential or token theft. This issue is fixed in version 1.69.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-100409opennextjs-cloudflare · Improper Handling of URL Encoding High7.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-100409 ## Summary When cache interception is enabled, `@opennextjs/cloudflare` can interpret percent-encoded paths differently during middleware matching and cache lookup. An encoded request may fail to match authorization middleware, then be decoded into the cache key of a protected route. The cached response may consequently be returned without invoking the middleware. `enableCacheInterception` is disabled by default. ## Impact A remote unauthenticated attacker may retrieve cached content from routes intended to be protected by middleware. An application is affected when it: - explicitly enables `enableCacheInterception`; - relies on middleware for access control; and - has a matching cached route. ## Details Middleware matching previously used the encoded request pathname, while cache interception decoded the pathname before selecting a cache entry. For example, consider an application with: - middleware matcher `/admin/:path*`; - middleware returning `401 Authentication required` for `/admin`; - a statically generated, cached `/admin` route; and - cache interception enabled: ```ts export default defineCloudflareConfig({ incrementalCache: staticAssetsIncrementalCache, enableCacheInterception: true, }); ``` An attacker can request: ```http GET /%61dmin ``` The encoded pathname does not match `/admin/:path*`, so the authorization middleware is not invoked. Cache interception then decodes `%61dmin` to `admin` and may return the cached `/admin` response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK x-opennext-cache: HIT Protected content ``` Malformed paths exposed an additional inconsistency. For example: ```http GET /%61dmin/%ZZ ``` The previous implementation decoded each segment independently. It decoded `%61dmin` to `admin` but retained the malformed `%ZZ` segment, allowing cache lookup to continue using a partially decoded pathname. ## Patches The fix aligns encoded-path handling across middleware matching and cache lookup, and rejects malformed paths instead of partially decoding them. See the upstream fixes in [opennextjs-aws#1199](https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-aws/pull/1199) and [opennextjs-aws#1200](https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-aws/pull/1200). Users should upgrade to `@opennextjs/cloudflare@1.20.2` or later. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible for an application: 1. Disable cache interception by removing `enableCacheInterception: true`. 2. Enforce authorization inside protected route handlers rather than relying exclusively on middleware. 3. Reject encoded paths for protected routes at a trusted proxy before they reach the Worker. Adding individual encoded matcher variants is not a complete workaround because pathnames can have multiple equivalent encodings. | CVE Database V5 |
Page 12 of 191 · 2 duplicate CVE records merged