Threats tagged 'homebrew'

GitPython versions from 5.5.3 up to but not including 9.25.2 have a vulnerability where the clone_from() and clone() methods do not block the --separate-git-dir option by default. This option allows redirecting the repository's .git metadata directory to an arbitrary filesystem path controlled by the caller. As a result, an attacker able to supply this option can cause GitPython to create repository metadata outside the intended clone destination, potentially planting files or directories at arbitrary locations permitted by filesystem permissions.

CVE-2026-78676 is a critical vulnerability in GitPython's GitConfigParser affecting multi-line git-config values. The issue arises because multi-line values read from disk are re-serialized incorrectly, causing dormant config lines to be interpreted as active injected directives. This can lead to arbitrary code execution via the core.hooksPath configuration, which controls Git hook execution paths. The vulnerability affects GitPython versions from 5.5.3 up to but not including 9.25.2 and is fixed in version 9.25.2.

GitPython versions from 5.5.3 up to but not including 9.25.2 contain a vulnerability where the SubmoduleConfigParser used to parse the .gitmodules file follows [include] directives by default. Since .gitmodules is attacker-controlled in cloned repositories, this allows an attacker to cause the parser to read arbitrary local files. When the included file is not a valid git-config format, the parser raises an exception that leaks the first line of the file in the error message. This leads to local file content disclosure of the first line of any readable file on the victim system during common read-only operations like enumerating submodules.

## Summary `Repo.blame()` / `Repo.blame_incremental()` guard forwarded revision options against `unsafe_git_revision_options`, but that denylist only contains the file-WRITE options `--output`/`-o`. `git blame` also honors `--contents <file>` and `-S <file>`, which cause the file's lines to be echoed into the blame result — an arbitrary file READ. Neither option is in the denylist, so a caller-influenced revision value of `--contents=<path>` passes the guard and leaks file contents. This is a distinct sink-option and impact class (READ) from GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v (which addressed the blame `--output` WRITE), directly analogous to GHSA-539m-9xh6-q6rr (archive READ gap accepted separately from the archive write/exec advisory). ## Root Cause `unsafe_git_revision_options = ["--output","-o"]` (`git/repo/base.py:188`). The `rev` string is passed to `_option_candidates([rev], kwargs)` and placed BEFORE the `--` separator (base.py:841). The canonical name of `--contents=...` is `contents`, which is not on the denylist, so no `UnsafeOptionError` is raised. The trailing `--` protects only the pathspec, not the option before the revision. ## Impact Arbitrary local file read at the privileges of the host process; the file's line contents appear in the blame result returned to the caller. Pure VALUE control (the caller forwards a user-influenced revision string). Default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. ## Proof of Concept ```python result = repo.blame("--contents=/etc/passwd", "a.txt") # result rows carry the victim file's line text ``` ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: app calls `repo.blame(rev, file)` with attacker `rev="--contents=/etc/passwd"` (or kwarg `contents="/etc/passwd"`, or `-S`). 2. Check: `Git.check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([rev,...], kwargs), unsafe_git_revision_options)` @ base.py:841. Guard: denylist = `["--output","-o"]` only. Bypass proof: canonical name `contents` ∉ denylist → no error. 3. Sink: `self.git.blame(rev, "--", file, p=True, ...)`. argv (observed): `['git','blame','-p','--contents=<secret>','HEAD','--','a.txt']`. 4. Impact: blame result rows carry the victim file's line text. ## Bypass Evidence Independently reproduced (independent test harness, default `allow_unsafe_options=False`): `blame('--contents=<secret>','a.txt')` → guard PASSED; result rows = `['GATE_SECRET_LINE_A','GATE_SECRET_LINE_B']`. Control: `blame('--output=…')` still BLOCKED (guard active on this path). `-S` kwarg argv also reaches git unguarded. ## Affected Versions `GitPython <= 3.1.58` (denylist present verbatim on the latest release tag). ## Suggested Fix Prefer an allowlist of blame options; at minimum add `--contents`/`-S` (and any other path-taking blame options) to `unsafe_git_revision_options`, and make the membership rule "the option takes a filesystem path" rather than "the option writes output". --- Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use

### Impact Material for MkDocs 7.2.0 through 9.7.6 contains a DOM-based cross-site scripting vulnerability in the optional `search.suggest` feature. A crafted `q` URL parameter could execute JavaScript in the documentation site's origin after user interaction. ### Patches The issue is fixed in Material for MkDocs 9.7.7. Users should upgrade to 9.7.7 or later. ### Workarounds Sites unable to upgrade should disable the `search.suggest` feature.