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829 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-53045Microsoft · memory: tegra124-emc: Fix dll_change check MediumEPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53045 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53039 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS <0.1% | High7.8EPSS <0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52935 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-45707czlonkowski n8n-mcp · Improper Access Control High8.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45707 ## Summary When `ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true`, the HTTP transport documents that the target n8n instance is selected per-request from `x-n8n-url` / `x-n8n-key` headers. Requests that omitted those headers — or supplied only one of them — silently fell back to the process-level `N8N_API_URL` / `N8N_API_KEY` credentials configured for the operator's own n8n instance. As a result, an authenticated MCP tenant could cause n8n management calls to execute against the operator's instance instead of its own. This affects HTTP-mode deployments of `n8n-mcp` that are run as a shared multi-tenant service. Single-tenant deployments (`ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT` unset or `false`) are not affected. ## Impact An authenticated MCP tenant exploiting this path could read and write workflows, executions, data-table contents, and credential metadata on the operator's n8n instance. If the operator's n8n permits Code-node execution that reaches OS-level modules, the path could escalate to remote code execution inside the operator's n8n runtime. The process-level `N8N_API_KEY` is, in practice, a high-privilege key — Community Edition keys are unscoped by default, and even Enterprise scopes were configured for the operator's own needs and would carry over wholesale to a tenant who triggered the fallback. ## Patches Fixed in **n8n-mcp 2.51.2**. The fix: - Rejects header-less multi-tenant requests at the HTTP edge with HTTP 400 / JSON-RPC `-32602` before any handler runs. - Refuses to construct an env-credential n8n API client when `ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true`. - Closes secondary leak paths in trigger handlers and in the responses of `n8n_health_check`, `n8n_diagnostic`, `n8n_deploy_template`, and `n8n_audit_instance` so the operator's URL and env-key indicator are not surfaced to tenants. Single-tenant behavior is unchanged. ## Upgrade ```bash # NPM npx n8n-mcp@latest # Docker docker pull ghcr.io/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp:latest ``` ## Workarounds If an immediate upgrade is not possible, any one of the following reduces or eliminates exposure: - **Disable multi-tenant mode.** Set `ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=false` (or unset it) and run a separate n8n-mcp instance per tenant with that tenant's own `N8N_API_URL` / `N8N_API_KEY`. This removes the affected code path entirely. - **Reject malformed requests at a proxy.** Require both `x-n8n-url` and `x-n8n-key` headers on every request and return 400 if either is missing. Neutralizes the primary header-omission path but does not address the secondary response-shape disclosures, so this is a partial mitigation only. - **Reduce the blast radius of the operator API key.** If your n8n instance supports API key scoping (Enterprise, or a Community Edition build that exposes scopes), provision the operator's `N8N_API_KEY` with the minimum scopes required for the operator's own n8n-mcp functions. This does not close the boundary break but limits what a falling-back tenant can do. ## Credit Reported by [@u-ktdi](https://github.com/u-ktdi). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-5394pimcore/pimcore · Pimcore Platform - SQL Injection High7.0EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-5394 My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together. As part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix. We have reserved the CVE ID **"CVE-2026-5394"** for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at [https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons). We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you. Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this. ## Description An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend. The vulnerable flow accepts `compositeIndices` from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into `ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX` and `ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX` statements executed through Doctrine DBAL. Although the original report focused on `compositeIndices.index_key`, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is `compositeIndices.index_columns`, because it is inserted verbatim inside the `ADD INDEX (...)` clause. This permits injection of additional `ALTER TABLE` subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries. ## Vulnerability ### Root cause 1. Source: - `Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson()` accepts `compositeIndices` directly from imported JSON. 2. Assignment: - `Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices()` does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names. - The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to `__id` and `__type`, which is not a security control. 3. Sink: - `Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices()` builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via `$this->db->executeQuery(...)`. 4. Missing protection: - `quoteIdentifier()` is used for the `SHOW INDEXES` query, but not for the dynamic `ALTER TABLE` statements. - No server-side schema validation restricts `index_key` or `index_columns` to known safe identifier characters. ### Confirmed source-to-sink path 1. `importClassDefinitionFromJson()` decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards `compositeIndices`. 2. `setCompositeIndices()` stores those values without sanitizing identifier content. 3. `ClassDefinition::save()` reaches `ClassDefinition\Dao::update()`. 4. `Dao::update()` calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for: - `object_store_<classId>` - `object_query_<classId>` 5. `Localizedfield\Dao` also calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for: - localized query tables - localized store tables ### Why this is exploitable The vulnerable `ADD INDEX` statement is built as: ```php 'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');' ``` `$columnName` is produced from `implode(',', $columns)` and is not quoted or validated. A malicious `index_columns` element such as: ```text slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- ``` produces SQL of the form: ```sql ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- ); ``` This remains a single `ALTER TABLE` statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table. ### Impact The issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class. Practical impact includes: - unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables - backend denial of service by breaking expected table layout - data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries `index_key` is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through `index_columns`. Relevant code: - `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137` - `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006` - `models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85` - `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218` - `models/DataObject/Localizedfield/ | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-48735py-pdf pypdf · Unthrottled Resource Allocation Medium6.9EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48735 ### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage. This requires parsing large XMP metadata, possibly with lots of unnecessary elements. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.12.1](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.12.1). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3796](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3796). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-48525jpadilla pyjwt · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48525 > [!NOTE] > Practical impact depends on whether request body-size limits are enforced upstream (proxy/web-server/framework). Deployments with typical body-size caps (≤2 MB) bound the amplifier significantly; deployments accepting larger token inputs are more exposed. When verifying detached JWS tokens using the unencoded-payload option (`"b64": false`, RFC 7797), PyJWT performs **Base64URL decoding of the compact-serialization payload segment** *before* enforcing the detached-payload rules. For `b64=false`, PyJWT later **discards** that decoded payload and replaces it with the caller-provided `detached_payload`. In practice, this turns the middle segment into an attacker-controlled “work amplifier”: a remote client can supply an arbitrarily large Base64URL payload segment that forces **CPU work + memory allocations** even if the signature is invalid. This creates an **unauthenticated DoS** vector against any endpoint that verifies detached JWS using PyJWT. --- ## Affected Component(s) * `jwt/api_jws.py` * `PyJWS.decode()` / `PyJWS.decode_complete()` * `_load()` (parsing and Base64URL decoding) --- ## Root Cause (exact logic flaw) ### What happens in the code In `jwt/api_jws.py`, `decode_complete()` does the following (order matters): * Calls `_load(jwt)` first, which decodes the token segments * Only after that, checks `header.get("b64")` and if `False`, it replaces `payload = detached_payload` and rebuilds the signing input This behavior is visible in `decode_complete()`: * `_load(jwt)` happens **before** the `b64=false` handling * then `payload = detached_payload` and `signing_input = ... detached_payload` happens afterward ([GitHub][1]) Inside `_load()`, PyJWT unconditionally performs: * `payload = base64url_decode(payload_segment)` This is the expensive step the attacker can amplify ([GitHub][1]) ### Why this becomes a vulnerability For `b64=false` detached JWS, the payload segment in compact form is effectively **not needed** for verification in PyJWT’s own logic (since the library uses `detached_payload` as the real payload). Yet PyJWT still decodes it first, meaning: * cost is paid **even when signature is invalid** * the decoded bytes are **discarded** * attacker controls the size of this cost via token length --- ## Impact (evidence-driven) ### Security impact * **Unauthenticated remote DoS**: decoding work happens before signature rejection → attacker does not need signing key. * **CPU amplification**: Base64URL decode time scales linearly with payload segment size. * **Memory amplification**: decoded output allocates large byte buffers (tens of MB per request). * **Operational impact**: request queueing / worker starvation under modest concurrency bursts. ### Standards context (RFC 7797) RFC 7797 explicitly notes this option is used when payload is large and/or detached, and discusses interoperability requirements around marking it critical (“crit” with “b64”). ([IETF Datatracker][2]) (PyJWT supports `crit` validation, but the issue here is decode order / unbounded decode of an unused segment.) --- ## Affected Versions * **Confirmed affected:** PyJWT **2.12.1** (tested from your local editable install and repo). * **Likely affected:** all versions that include detached payload support for JWS decoding, which was introduced in **2.4.0** (“Add detached payload support for JWS encoding and decoding”). ([pyjwt.readthedocs.io][3]) (For GHSA, this phrasing is strong: “confirmed” + “likely since feature introduction”.) --- # Threat Model ### Typical real deployment A service verifies signed HTTP requests or webhooks using detached JWS: * token is provided in JSON body / query / header * actual payload is the HTTP request body passed as `detached_payload` ### Attacker * remote unauthenticated client * can send requests to verify endpoint * does **not** need a valid signature (invalid signature still triggers the expensive decode path) ### Attack chain 1. Attacker crafts a JWS compact token with header containing `"b64": false` and `crit:["b64"]`. 2. Attacker inflates the **payload segment** (middle segment) to millions of Base64URL characters. 3. Server calls `PyJWS.decode(...detached_payload=...)`. 4. PyJWT decodes the inflated segment (CPU + memory). 5. Signature is rejected afterward (401) — but resources already consumed. 6. Repeated requests or bursts cause queueing/worker starvation → DoS. --- # Proof of Concept - file names + results ## PoC placement * [server_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132755/server_localhost.py) * [client_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132757/client_localhost.py) * [flood_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132760/flood_localhost.py) --- ## PoC # 1 - Localhost verification server **File:** [server_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132755/server_localhost.py) **Purpose:** real HTTP endpoint (`POST /verify`) that calls PyJ | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-45704 ### Summary `CustomReports` uses inconsistent authorization between the report listing endpoint and the report detail endpoint. - The listing flow filters reports based on report-sharing rules - The detail flow only checks generic `reports` or `reports_config` permissions As a result, a low-privileged backend user who was not granted access to a report can still read that report directly by name even though it does not appear in the user's visible report list. In the local Docker reproduction: - The report `poc-secret-report` was not visible to the low-privileged user in the report list - The same user was still able to retrieve the report configuration directly by name ### Root Cause The listing flow in `getReportConfigAction()` filters reports through `loadForGivenUser()`: - [[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L245)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L252)#L245) - [[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L253)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L252) - [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L253) - [[Config/Listing/Dao.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Config/Listing/Dao.php#L44)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/[Config/Listing/Dao.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Config/Listing/Dao.php#L52)#L44) - [Config/Listing/Dao.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Config/Listing/Dao.php#L52) However, `getAction()` only checks generic permissions and then loads the report directly by name: - [[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L146)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L149)#L146) - [[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L151)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L155)#L149) - [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L151) - [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L155) This means the same report object is protected by different authorization models depending on which endpoint is used. The result is a classic "not visible in list, but readable by direct request" access-control bypass. ### Impact An attacker can read sensitive report metadata without authorization, including: - Report name - Grouping information - Display and icon metadata - Data source configuration - Column configuration - Sharing settings From the source code, other report endpoints such as `data`, `chart`, `create-csv`, and `download-csv` also resolve reports by name in a similar way: - [[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L275)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L284)#L275) - [[CustomReportController.php](https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L313)](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L284) - [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L313) This report only treats unauthorized report-config retrieval as reproduced. The other execution paths should be verified separately. ### Preconditions - | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d747cc7acd8bbc1defbf475aa3202fd332fd43135a6fedddfcc37356ce02eb54) Package presents itself as the legitimate slopus/happy CLI (README instructs `npm install -g happy`; homepage, repository, bugs, and author fields all point at happy.engineering / github.com/slopus/happy), but the published name is ggk-happy and the shipped code has been modified in ways that harm installers: 1. Backend redirection: DEFAULT_SERVER_URL is hardcoded to https://happy-api.ask-ggk.com and DEFAULT_WEBAPP_URL to https://happy.ask-ggk.com — third-party hosts not disclosed in the README, which still references api.cluster-fluster.com. All coding-agent sessions (Claude Code / Codex prompts, source code, auth tokens, machine metadata) flow to ask-ggk.com instead of the publisher advertised in package metadata. 2. Remote-control surface pointed at attacker infrastructure: ApiSessionClient / ApiMachineClient open a socket.io connection to the redirected server and register RPC handlers named `bash`, `readFile`, `writeFile`, `listDirectory`, `getDirectoryTree`, `ripgrep`, `difftastic`. The `bash` handler runs `execAsync(data.command, options)` on parameters supplied by the remote server. Whoever operates happy-api.ask-ggk.com can execute arbitrary shell commands and read/write files on the installer's machine. 3. Install-time auto-takeover: scripts/postinstall.cjs, on global or root install, unconditionally spawns `node bin/happy.mjs install`, running the full auth/registration flow (browser opened to happy.ask-ggk.com, machine registered to happy-api.ask-ggk.com, daemon started) at `npm install -g` time. Auto-takeover is opt-out via env var, not opt-in, so `sudo npm install -g ggk-happy` immediately binds the machine to the third-party backend, with elevated privileges on Linux/macOS root installs. 4. Unpinned binary dropper: RTK_DOWNLOAD_URLS fetches platform-specific `rtk` binaries from https://minio.ask-ggk.com/happy/rtk-*.{zip,tar.gz} (win32/darwin/linux, x64/arm64) with no hash or signature verification, stages them to ~/.local/share/ggkhappy/rtk/bin/rtk (or %LOCALAPPDATA%\ggkhappy\rtk\bin\rtk.exe), and later invokes them via execFile. Purpose of the binary is not documented. 5. Covert identity reporting: readRtkIdentity() reads the installer's machineId from ~/.happy settings and the auth token from ~/.happy/access.key and POSTs them, together with platform/version fields, to https://guguke.ask-ggk.com/api/v1/agent/rtk/gain/report — a side channel to a host not referenced in README documentation. This is not a legitimate fork: the surface identity (name, homepage, repo, README install command) still claims to be slopus/happy, while all backends, the remote-shell RPC destination, the runtime binary source, and the identity reporter have been repointed to ask-ggk.com infrastructure. Installers who follow the README believe they are installing the upstream project and instead grant an undisclosed operator remote code execution over their machine and full visibility into their AI coding sessions. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | – | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-1002Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat build of Cryostat 4.2.0: new RHEL 9 container image security update HighEPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-1002 The Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 container images have been updated to fix several bugs. Users of Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 container images are advised to upgrade to these updated images, which contain backported patches to fix these bugs and add these enhancements. Users of these images are also encouraged to rebuild all container images that depend on these images. Security Fix(es): * golang.org/x/image: Denial of Service via malformed WEBP image parsing (CVE-2026-33813) * follow-redirects: Information disclosure via cross-domain redirects (CVE-2026-40895) * io.quarkus:quarkus-vertx-http: Authorization bypass via semicolons in HTTP requests (CVE-2026-39852) * github.com/jackc/pgx: Memory-safety vulnerability (CVE-2026-33815, CVE-2026-33816) * github.com/go-jose/go-jose: Go JOSE: Denial of Service via crafted JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object (CVE-2026-34986) * lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports (CVE-2026-4800) * netty: Denial of Service via HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frame flood (CVE-2026-33871) * io.netty/netty-codec-http: Request smuggling via incorrect parsing of HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values (CVE-2026-33870) * path-to-regexp: Denial of Service via crafted regular expressions (CVE-2026-4926) * undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers (CVE-2026-1525) * google.golang.org/grpc: gRPC-Go: Authorization bypass due to improper HTTP/2 path validation (CVE-2026-33186) * undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression (CVE-2026-1526) * undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter (CVE-2026-2229) * undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length (CVE-2026-1528) * io.vertx/vertx-core: static handler component cache can be manipulated to deny the access to static files (CVE-2026-1002) You can find images updated by this advisory in the Red Hat Container Catalog (see the References section). | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (048493f47bc6a8b0a61c93d14a9bfbbe5edd77baff2d2423870e3cc8b7099b0a) On require, index.js invokes initPlugin() at the module top level, which performs an HTTPS GET to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/VL3WY, parses the response JSON, and passes the 'cookie' field to new Function.constructor('require', body)(require). This compiles attacker-controlled JavaScript and invokes it with the installer's `require`, granting arbitrary code execution with full Node.js privileges on every import. The payload host (jsonkeeper.com) is an anonymous paste service whose contents are mutable, so the executed code can change at any time without a package update. The package is also a typosquat of the widely-installed `normalize-path`: it impersonates the original author (Jon Schlinkert) in package.json and mimics the normalizePath API surface to lure consumers who mistype the dependency name. ## Source: ghsa-malware (72df791955fa3a6c17ed65991ceb827e6f5c82846699195e5c809c8000337a8a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-39831Lxd: The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com Critical9.1EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-39831 A vulnerability in the Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types in the Go Cryptography code embedded in Google Guest Agent allowed signatures to be accepted without verifying the User Presence flag. This flaw permitted unattended use of hardware security keys, bypassing the requirement for physical touch confirmation. The issue affected multiple Ubuntu LTS releases and was addressed by updates to the Google Guest Agent package. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.8% | High7.5EPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-25679 Collector with the supported components for a Red Hat build of OpenTelemetry Security Fix(es): * net/url: Incorrect parsing of IPv6 host literals in net/url (CVE-2026-25679) * google.golang.org/grpc/grpc-go: google.golang.org/grpc/authz: gRPC-Go: Authorization bypass due to improper HTTP/2 path validation (CVE-2026-33186) * github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3: github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4: Go JOSE: Denial of Service via crafted JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object (CVE-2026-34986) * crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Denial of Service via inefficient certificate chain validation (CVE-2026-32281) * crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Certificate validation bypass due to incorrect DNS constraint application (CVE-2026-33810) * golang: internal/syscall/unix: Root.Chmod can follow symlinks out of the root (CVE-2026-32282) * crypto/tls: golang: Go crypto/tls: Denial of Service via multiple TLS 1.3 key update messages (CVE-2026-32283) * crypto/x509: crypto/tls: golang: Go: Denial of Service vulnerability in certificate chain building (CVE-2026-32280) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-24049Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.17.54 security and extras update High7.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-24049 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.17.54. See the following advisory for the container images for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17598 Security Fix(es): * Kubelet: CRI-O: kube-apiserver: Kubelet, CRI-O, kube-apiserver: Denial of Service via SPDY streaming code (CVE-2026-35469) * google.golang.org/grpc/grpc-go: google.golang.org/grpc/authz: gRPC-Go: Authorization bypass due to improper HTTP/2 path validation (CVE-2026-33186) * wheel: wheel: Privilege Escalation or Arbitrary Code Execution via malicious wheel file unpacking (CVE-2026-24049) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.17 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.17/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2025-58183Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.18.42 packages and security update Medium4.3EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-58183 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.18.42. See the following advisory for the container images for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17448 Security Fix(es): * golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url (CVE-2025-61726) * crypto/x509: golang: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption via crafted certificate (CVE-2025-61729) * pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion from malformed RELATIVE-OID (CVE-2026-23490) * golang: archive/tar: Unbounded allocation when parsing GNU sparse map (CVE-2025-58183) * golang: archive/zip: Excessive CPU consumption when building archive index in archive/zip (CVE-2025-61728) * crypto/tls: crypto/tls: Incorrect certificate validation during TLS session resumption (CVE-2025-68121) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.18 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.18/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 1.4% | CVE-2026-0261Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS · OS Command Injection Medium6.1EPSS 1.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0261 Multiple command injection vulnerabilities in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enable an authenticated administrator to bypass system restrictions and run arbitrary commands as a root user. To be able to exploit this issue, the user must have access to the PAN-OS CLI or Web UI. The security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators and by restricting access to the management web interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW and Prisma Access® are not impacted by these vulnerabilities. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2025-61662Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.15.64 bug fix and security update High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-61662 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.15.64. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:14772 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.15/html/release_notes/ Security Fix(es): * openssh: OpenSSH GSSAPI: Information disclosure or denial of service due to uninitialized variables (CVE-2026-3497) * libarchive: Infinite Loop Denial of Service in RAR5 Decompression via archive_read_data() in libarchive (CVE-2026-4111) * libarchive: libarchive: Information disclosure via heap out-of-bounds read in RAR archive processing (CVE-2026-4424) * libpng: LIBPNG has a heap buffer overflow in png_set_quantize (CVE-2026-25646) * nghttp2: nghttp2: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP/2 frames after session termination (CVE-2026-27135) * vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via command injection in glob() function (CVE-2026-33412) * grub2: Missing unregister call for gettext command may lead to use-after-free (CVE-2025-61662) * openssl: OpenSSL: Arbitrary code execution due to out-of-bounds write in PKCS#12 processing (CVE-2025-69419) * libarchive: libarchive: Arbitrary code execution via integer overflow in ISO9660 image processing (CVE-2026-5121) * vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via 'helpfile' option processing (CVE-2026-25749) * vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via OS command injection in the netrw plugin (CVE-2026-28417) * vim: Vim: Denial of service and information disclosure via crafted swap file (CVE-2026-28421) * kernel: crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place (CVE-2026-31431) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.15 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.15/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-4827 We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices. * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the “Program” mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-35385Red Hat Security Advisory: openssh security update High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-35385 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.15.66. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28961 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.15/html/release_notes/ Security Fix(es): * kernel: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err() (CVE-2026-43037) * OpenSSH: OpenSSH: Privilege escalation via scp legacy protocol when not preserving file mode (CVE-2026-35385) * kernel: Linux kernel: smb: client: reject userspace cifs.spnego descriptions (CVE-2026-46243) * kernel: net/sched: act_pedit: extend the writable skb range per key (CVE-2026-46331) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.15 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.15/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 2.7 | EPSS 2.4% | Low2.7EPSS 2.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-3497 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.13.67. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:21689 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.13/html/release_notes Security Fix(es): None For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.13 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.13/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-within-minor. | GCVE Database |
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