In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.
This requires:
A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.
An active Datadog session cached locally.
Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.
This requires:
A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
An active Datadog session in the Android app.
Impact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim's session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, the exported launcher activity AppActivity accepts an attacker-supplied session (including OAuth tokens) from Intent extras with no permission guard, and signs the app into that session without validating it against the backend.
This requires a malicious application co-installed on a device with the Datadog app installed, and an OAuth token the attacker is willing to load into the victim's app.
Impact: A co-installed application can switch the victim's Datadog app to a session the attacker controls. This is an account-confusion issue; it does not by itself expose the victim's existing session or data.
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with a caller-supplied conversation_id. When the activity closes and no in-process session matches that ID, it unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 (the Bits AI chat notification), with no check on the caller's identity or ownership of the conversation.
This requires a malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.
Impact: A co-installed application can silently dismiss the victim's Bits AI chat notification. No chat content is exposed; conversation data remains server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller.
Levi Strauss & Co. (Levi's) says that hackers used social engineering on three of its employees to gain access to and steal corporate data stored on their machines. [...]
A 26-year-old Canadian man once described as one of the most consequential cybercrime threat actors of 2024 has pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy to hack and extort more than 165 organizations that used the cloud provider Snowflake . Connor Riley Moucka , of Kitchener, Ontario, also admitted to stealing call and text history records of more than 100 million AT&T customers. A surveillance photo of Connor Riley Moucka, a.k.a. “Judische” and “Waifu,” dated Oct 21, 2024, 9 days before Moucka’s arrest. This image was included in an affidavit filed by an investigator with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The U.S. Justice Department said between February and October 2024, Moucka and co-conspirators used stolen login credentials to steal cloud-hosted data belonging to at least 165 customers of a U.S.-based software-as-a-service company. The hackers targeted stolen credentials for Snowflake customer accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication, and extorted or attempted to extort a host of well-known companies, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus. Snowflake responded to the data thefts by increasing password complexity requirements and enforcing multi-factor authentication. Moucka adopted new nicknames frequently — sometimes operating multiple identities concurrently — but two of his best-known monikers were “ Judische ” and “ Waifu .” Judische’s admitted role in the Snowflake data thefts was first documented by KrebsOnSecurity in a September 2024 story about the overlap between Western, English-speaking cybercriminals and extremist groups that harass and extort minors into harming themselves or others. That September 2024 story identified Judische as a software engineer from Ontario who has been involved in numerous data breaches and voice phishing attacks against U.S. companies since at least 2020. A little more than a month later, Canadian authorities arrested Moucka on a provisional warrant from the United States. The government says Moucka and others used their unauthorized access to steal billions of sensitive customer records and download terabytes of information, “including individuals’ non-content call and text history records, banking and other financial information, payroll records, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration numbers, driver’s license numbers, passport numbers, social security numbers and other personally identifiable information. They then extorted victims by threatening to publish data online.” Moucka also threatened and harassed government officials and security researchers who were helping to track him down. The Justice Department said the conspirators made over $2.5 million in ransom payments, and that in at least one instance, Moucka re-extorted a victim with threats of further disclosure of the victim’s stolen data. “Moucka used the stolen data of a government officer and members of a then-former government officer’s immediate family in this re-extortion attempt,” reads a statement from the Justice Department. One of Moucka’s admitted co-conspirators is Cameron “Kiberphant0m” Wagenius , a U.S. Army soldier who pleaded guilty in July 2025 to extorting AT&T and Verizon for their customer account data. Less than a month before Wagenius’s arrest, KrebsOnSecurity published a deep dive into Kiberphant0m’s various Telegram and Discord identities over the years, revealing how the owner of the accounts told others they were in the Army and stationed in South Korea. One of several selfies on the Facebook page of Cameron Wagenius. Kiberphant0m also re-extorted victims. Immediately following Moucka’s arrest, Kiberphant0m posted on hacker forums what he claimed were the AT&T call logs for then President-elect Donald Trump and for then Vice President Kamala Harris, as well schematics allegedly stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Wagenius is set to be sentenced on September 3, 2026. The government says he faces a maxim…
CVE-2026-5134 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in Loca Software Informatics Technology Ltd. Co. CMS. It allows an attacker to inject malicious SQL commands due to improper neutralization of special elements in SQL queries. The vulnerability affects all CMS versions up to and including 06082026. The vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts, and no official patch or remediation guidance is available. The CVSS score is 9.8, indicating a high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (6b9fb0d73b7d26454a227e93754f11ff2405424b1279490863055e8d8c8c6498)
Package targets the electrode-io internal name `electrode-ota-ui-app` with an inflated 99.0.1 version to win dependency resolution against a private registry. package.json declares both `main: index.js` and `scripts.postinstall: node index.js`, so on `npm install` and on any `require()` the package unconditionally runs `collectAndSend()` in index.js. That function gathers host identifiers via `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`, and `os.release()`, resolves the installer's public IP via ipify and geo/ISP data via ipapi.co, and POSTs a JSON payload to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain `https://itfv50wbocctx0j32fyfq8z7uy0ptdn1c.oastify.com/callback`, controlled by the package author. README self-labels as a dependency-confusion PoC, but the callback is live and any installer whose resolver picks this public package over the intended internal one is compromised.
CrowdStrike co-founder Dmitri Alperovitch discusses how cyber operations support kinetic warfare, signal coming conflicts, and reshape the global battlefield. The post The Fourth Battlefield: The Growing Role of Cyber Operations in Global Conflict appeared first on SecurityWeek .
CVE-2026-21553 is a high-severity vulnerability in the modems of Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies Co., Ltd. models T8100, T9100, T8200, and T8300. It involves improper input validation that could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service without requiring any privileges or user interaction.
CVE-2026-21552 is a high-severity vulnerability in the modem components of Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies Co., Ltd. products T8100, T9100, T8200, and T8300. It involves improper input validation that could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service without requiring any privileges or user interaction.
CVE-2026-21551 is a high-severity vulnerability in the modem components of Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies Co., Ltd. products T8100, T9100, T8200, and T8300. The issue arises from improper input validation, which could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service without requiring any additional execution privileges. No information about patches or fixes is currently available.
CVE-2026-21550 is a high-severity vulnerability in the modem components of Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies Co., Ltd. products T8100, T9100, T8200, and T8300. It involves improper input validation that could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service without requiring any additional execution privileges. No information about patches or fixes is currently available.
CVE-2026-21549 is a high-severity vulnerability in Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies Co., Ltd. modem products T8100, T9100, T8200, and T8300. It involves improper input validation that could lead to a remote denial of service (DoS) without requiring any additional execution privileges. No confidentiality or integrity impact is indicated. No patch or official remediation guidance is currently available.
CVE-2026-21548 is a high-severity vulnerability in Unisoc (Shanghai) Technologies Co., Ltd. modem products T8100, T9100, T8200, and T8300. It involves improper input validation in the NR modem component, which could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service without requiring user interaction or privileges. The vulnerability does not impact confidentiality or integrity but can disrupt availability by causing a system crash or reboot.
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## Source: kam193 (0f81b904b849df393cbe5c34f952af65d8b28e0797e33d62cf964df77d4929c7)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: kam193 (e8cdbb30c1c2ddf88a76d18b935d4accf68155f936b5df59a8864fafd7f4e06f)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
---
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.