Search: at.exe

A Windows 11 host running svchost.exe generated unusual DNS queries including google.com.onion, wildcard, and malformed domains within a very short time frame. These queries returned NXDOMAIN responses and did not lead to any follow-up connections or IP resolutions. The behavior resembles synthetic or malformed DNS queries rather than user-initiated activity and is similar to DNS probing or spoof detection patterns observed on other devices. The source of these queries under svchost.exe is unclear, and it is uncertain whether this is normal Windows DNS client behavior, network validation, or triggered by security tools. No confirmed malicious activity or exploit is reported.

A new campaign has been identified utilizing a valid digital signature from a Chinese technology company that remains unrevoked. The attack chain employs a dropper that retrieves an extension-based module list from command and control infrastructure. The malicious payloads exploit DLL Side-Loading techniques through a legitimate Tencent-signed executable to achieve code execution. The infrastructure includes Google Cloud Storage and a dedicated domain for command and control operations. Multiple components have been identified including an EXE dropper, DLL loader, DAT payload, and the legitimate Tencent executable used for side-loading purposes.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e19daf4f946816f5ba3c6e592eacc980861b281c6752b738de57fdd31f49279d) The package masquerades as a Tailwind plugin: README and the top of src/index.js are a verbatim clone of @tailwindcss/typography (require('tailwindcss/plugin'), prose-* class generator), even though the package name has no relationship to Tailwind. Appended after the cloned plugin code at src/index.js:124+ is a heavily obfuscated IIFE using an RC4-decoded string array and AES-decipher key table to hide its strings and control flow. The decoded action table contains keys 'cmd.npx', 'cmd.npxwin', 'pkg.link', 'cmd.install', 'flag.yes', which are consumed by helpers that call child_process.spawn with detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true and creationFlags set to DETACHED_PROCESS to silently run `npx -y <pkg.link>`, fetching and executing an attacker-controlled package from the npm registry on the developer's machine. On Windows an additional path uses keys 'ext.vbs', 'vbs.tag', 'win.wscript': a VBS file is written to os.tmpdir() with a crypto.randomBytes(4) hex prefix and launched via wscript.exe (detached, windowsHide), followed by process.exit(0), to hide the dropper invocation from the console. The action table also contains 'env.api' and 'api.base' entries, and the spawn helper clones process.env and injects api.base as the env.api value into the child, so the downstream npx-fetched package receives a C2/telemetry endpoint via environment. Because require('classbreeze-utils') is the plugin entry point loaded by any Tailwind build that adds it, the dropper fires automatically as soon as a build that depends on it runs, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled code on the developer/CI machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd3cdd1459bd1dce092c75b17f3940659f740a4efe533ba30b345976cef97736) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

To allow builds of Python to be run from an in-tree layout (rather than an installed file layout), the VPATH variable is defined at build time and used to locate certain landmarks - specifically, Modules/setup.local. When this landmark is found relative to VPATH relative to the executable, Python assumes it is running in a source tree and generates a different default sys.path. This code remains in release builds, so that release-ready builds can be built in-tree. On Windows, since builds are written to 'PCbuild/', the value of VPATH is set to '..\..', which results in a landmark of '..\..\Modules\setup.local'. This path is outside the install directory of Python, and may have different permissions, potentially allowing a low-privilege user to create the landmark and an alternative `Lib` folder that will be discovered by an otherwise restricted install. Such a setup occurs with the legacy default install location for all users (in the now superseded EXE installer), due to how Windows allows all users to create folders in the root directory of their OS drive. Our recommended mitigation on Windows is to migrate away from the legacy installer and use the new [Python install manager](https://www.python.org/downloads/latest/pymanager/) to install for the current user. Installs where the directory two levels above the Python installation directory have equivalent permissions are unaffected (in general, a per-user install cannot be modified at all by other users, removing any escalation of privilege risk, and could be directly modified by a privileged user, making the potential tampering irrelevant). Alternative mitigations might include preemptively creating and restricting access to a `Modules` directory. Be aware that only 3.13 and 3.14 will receive updated legacy installers - earlier fixes are only provided as sources. Platforms other than Windows allow VPATH to be overridden, but as they don't usually use a separated directory in the build for binaries, are unlikely to have a landmark reference outside of the install directory. The landmark detection involving VPATH is a fallback for when a more specific landmark - .\pybuilddir.txt - is absent, and was included for compatibility. Future releases of Python will no longer include the fallback, and so builds will need to generate or preserve the pybuilddir.txt file in order to work in-tree. This landmark file has been generated on Windows since 3.11, and on other platforms for longer.

An investigation revealed a malicious email campaign directing victims to download a ZIP file from MediaFire. The infection chain began with a Python setup executable (Setu.exe) that side-loaded a malicious 400 MB python37.dll containing repeated byte padding. The DLL performed process injection into dllhost.exe, establishing communication with a C2 server at 138.124.186.2:7000. The threat actor deployed three persistence mechanisms: a PowerShell-based path, a fake EdgeUpdate Python executable with scheduled task, and NetSupport RMM as a third access method. The analysis highlights the importance of comparing file timestamps during triage to identify malicious artifacts within compressed archives.

The TestPGAgent PyPI package versions 0.1 and 0.2 contain malicious code that executes during installation. The setup.py script uses base64-encoded obfuscated code to launch Windows mshta.exe to fetch and run a remote HTML application from an attacker-controlled HTTP server. This allows arbitrary code execution on any Windows machine installing these package versions. The malicious payload is unpinned, mutable, and unrelated to the declared publisher, indicating clear malicious intent.

CVE-2026-36213 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Microvirt MEmu Android Emulator version 9.2.7.0 via the MemuService.exe component. It allows a local attacker with limited privileges to gain higher privileges on the affected system. The vulnerability has a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 7.8, indicating a significant impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability if exploited. No patch or official remediation is currently confirmed.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (dfb184ffa15fd011b84658a6b5cd68582e78827258a8373f0da1ef34248bfb09) The package advertises itself as an email-confirmation utility, but index.js contains only no-op stubs that console.log demo messages. The real behavior is in scripts.postinstall, which runs install-hook.js. That script holds a 280KB+ base64 string, XOR-decodes it with key 0x42, writes the resulting Windows PE to %TEMP%\tmp_<timestamp>.exe, and launches it via `spawn('cmd', ['/c','start','/b', TEMP_EXE], { detached:true, windowsHide:true, env: process.env })` — detached, hidden window, with the installer's full environment passed in. The dropped binary is opaque, unsigned, and not justified by the package's stated purpose. Immediately after launching the binary, install-hook.js writes a cleanup_<ts>.js to %TEMP% and spawns it detached. The cleanup script waits ~90 seconds, then deletes `mailconfirmer` from the host project's package.json and package-lock.json (with a `findstr /v` fallback), recursively removes the module's own folder under node_modules via `cmd /c rmdir /s /q`, and registers a `schtasks /create` fallback to retry the deletion. This self-erasing behavior is anti-forensics intended to hide the dropper after detonation, tampering with the installer's project manifests in the process. Installer impact on Windows hosts: arbitrary attacker-controlled native code executes on `npm install` with the user's full environment, and traces of the offending package are scrubbed from the project tree. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9ee8735a788175ac76593cc58d41a253a19b86d2fdb8cc38cb3517ed6963219d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Acronis Threat Research Unit identified two espionage campaigns targeting Cambodian government entities in defense and public works sectors, attributed to a cluster tracked as Khmer Shadow. Both campaigns delivered a custom C++ loader named NIGHTFORGE through government-themed lures in self-extracting archives. NIGHTFORGE employs sophisticated evasion techniques including NTDLL unhooking and Hell's Gate syscall resolution to decrypt and execute a Havoc Demon payload in memory. The loader utilizes DLL sideloading through a legitimate VMware-signed binary (VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe) and establishes persistence via COM-based scheduled tasks. Despite advanced technical capabilities, the actor demonstrated poor operational security by reusing identical payloads and infrastructure across targets. The campaigns targeted Cambodia's Information Collection Bureau and Ministry of Public Works and Transport using meeting-themed social engineering lures.

Malware#kaynldr#nightforgeCambodia

## Impact Arbitrary file write leading to remote code execution when cloning or checking out a malicious Git repository on Windows. Dulwich's path-element validator accepted tree entries whose filenames contained bytes that Windows interprets as structural path syntax: - \ — the Windows path separator. A single tree entry named .git\hooks\pre-commit.exe was treated as one valid filename on POSIX but materialized as nested directories .git/hooks/pre-commit.exe on Windows, planting a file inside the victim's .git directory. Git for Windows then executes that hook on the next git commit, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution in the victim's user context. The same primitive can be used with ..\outside.txt to escape the work tree. - : — the NTFS alternate-data-stream marker. .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION writes directly into the victim's .git entity, bypassing the .git-as-a-directory check. - git~<digits> — NTFS 8.3 short-name aliases of .git. Only the literal git~1 was rejected; git~2, git~10, GIT~1, etc. were all accepted. Contributing configuration bugs made matters worse. The core.protectNTFS and core.protectHFS settings were looked up under a wrong option name and so user-set values were silently ignored, and core.protectNTFS only defaulted to true on Windows (Git upstream has defaulted it to true everywhere since CVE-2019-1353). Both have been corrected. Anyone who clones, fetches, or checks out an untrusted repository with Dulwich on Windows - either through the Dulwich CLI, porcelain.clone, or any downstream tool built on Dulwich - is impacted. POSIX clones are not directly exploitable (on POSIX \ is a literal filename byte), but a POSIX user can unknowingly propagate a malicious tree to Windows consumers via push or re-publication. ## Patches Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. The fix lives in three commits: - Read core.protectNTFS / core.protectHFS under their documented option names so user-set values are honored. - Default core.protectNTFS to true on every platform, matching Git's PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT=1. - Reject \, :, and all git~<digits> 8.3 short-name forms in validate_path_element_ntfs. ## Workarounds There is no effective pre-patch workaround. On affected versions the core.protectNTFS configuration key was silently ignored, so setting it to true does not mitigate the issue. Users who cannot upgrade should avoid cloning, fetching, or checking out untrusted repositories with Dulwich on Windows. After upgrading the NTFS validator is on by default on every platform, so no additional configuration is required. ## Resources - Git upstream path validation: https://github.com/git/git/blob/master/path.c (is_ntfs_dotgit, verify_path) - CVE-2019-1353 — the Git upstream vulnerability that established core.protectNTFS = true as the cross-platform default - CVE-2019-1354 — backslash-in-tree-path class in Git, analogous to this issue

Ghidra before 12.1 contains a command injection vulnerability in URL annotation handling on Windows where cmd.exe metacharacters are not properly escaped. Attackers can execute arbitrary commands under the Ghidra user's privileges by embedding malicious URLs in program comments that victims click.

A sophisticated phishing campaign exploits Amazon's brand reputation through spoofed security alerts to deliver HarborWatch Agent, a custom remote access trojan. The attack chain begins with emails impersonating Amazon security notifications about suspicious account activity, directing victims to lookalike domains. Users are presented with fake CAPTCHA verification pages that employ ClickFix social engineering techniques, instructing them to execute PowerShell commands on their own systems. The multi-stage infection downloads mysql.exe from compromised infrastructure, which communicates with a Chinese-language command and control panel branded Harbor Sentinel. The RAT collects extensive system information including OS details, architecture, CPU count, disk usage, memory status, and network configurations, exfiltrating data through API endpoints to the threat actor's monitoring infrastructure.

7-Zip is a file archiver with a high compression ratio. Versions 9.34 through 26.00 contain an off-by-one heap out-of-bounds read in the WIM (Windows Imaging) archive handler's security descriptor lookup. In CHandler::GetSecurity (CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp), the per-image SecurOffsets table holds numEntries + 1 cumulative offsets, but the check securityId >= SecurOffsets.Size() admits securityId == numEntries, and the function then reads SecurOffsets[securityId + 1], fetching one UInt32 past the end of the heap-allocated CRecordVector (which performs no bounds checking on operator[]). The securityId is attacker-controlled at offset +0xC of any directory entry in WIM metadata, and the handler is registered for .wim, .swm, .esd, and .ppkg and enabled by default in stock 7z.dll; the OOB triggers zero-click in the GUI because 7zFM.exe's ListView calls GetRawProp(kpidNtSecure) for every item during listing (ASan-confirmed), and is also reachable via CLI listing with 7zz l -slt. Impact is limited to denial of service under hardened allocators and minor information disclosure, since the OOB value is only consumed arithmetically as a length and is not surfaced to the attacker; there is no write primitive.

SQLite 'sqldiff.exe' does not securely handle the way the Microsoft Windows C runtime converts Unicode characters to ANSI codepages. An attacker could use the '-L' option to load an arbitrary DLL with a crafted command line argument string that results in command line file arguments being misinterpreted as command line options. Fixed on or around 2025-12-26.

Seagull Software BarTender 2021 R1 through 12.0.1 contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability that allows low-privileged local users to escalate privileges. The DataServiceSingleton .NET Remoting endpoint is bound to localhost on TCP port 7375 via BtSystem.Service.exe, limiting the attack surface to local access only. The endpoint is configured with BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider and TypeFilterLevel set to Full. A low-privileged local attacker can send YSoSerial.NET-generated BinaryFormatter payloads to the localhost-bound endpoint to achieve code execution as NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM. The vulnerability was corrected in BarTender 12.1, released on August 14, 2026. Users should upgrade to BarTender 12.1 or later.

Seagull Software BarTender 2010, 2016, and 2019 contain an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the .NET Remoting service exposed on TCP port 7375 via BtSystem.Service.exe. The service registers an unauthenticated singleton endpoint — BarTenderSystem for BarTender 2016 <= R9, and DataServiceSingleton for BarTender 2019 <= R10 — configured with BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider and TypeFilterLevel set to Full. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit .NET Remoting object unmarshalling to read or write arbitrary files on the server using the .NET WebClient class, or coerce NTLMv2 authentication by supplying a UNC path to an attacker-controlled server, enabling sensitive credential disclosure, remote code execution, or lateral movement depending on service account privileges and network environment. The service runs in the context of NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. This vulnerability is corrected in BarTender 12.0.1. Users of affected releases should upgrade to BarTender 12.0.1 or later.

Activity began with a ClickFix-style social engineering chain that led to MSI execution, PowerShell staging, and installation/use of Deno to run attacker-controlled JavaScript. Follow-on activity downloaded a portable Python runtime, `install.pyc`, and an encrypted `.MOa` container, which was later decrypted to recover a 64-bit Windows PE payload. Analysis of the recovered payload showed Steam Community being used as a dead-drop resolver for C2, with the profile title resolving to `smokeenew[.]com`, while `ip-api.com` was used for victim network/geolocation profiling. The payload also contained logic for browser/wallet data collection, clipboard/keylogging-related capabilities, Defender exclusions, UAC bypass/relaunch behavior through `ComputerDefaults.exe`, and a C2-tasked mechanism to receive and install an additional `Krutyak.zip` / `usbmmidd_v2` component. Recommendations: Block artifacts where applicable.

Windows 11's input pipeline causes typed passwords from third-party applications like PuTTY, WinSCP, and MySQL to appear in system process memory such as LSASS.exe, Defender (MsMpEng.exe), and ctfmon.exe. This is due to Windows telemetry and text input buffering, not malicious credential harvesting. Passwords may remain in ctfmon.exe memory even after application closure, posing a risk if non-admin malware accesses that process. Credential Guard does not protect these third-party passwords as they are not Windows authentication credentials. This behavior is architectural and expected, not a vulnerability, but it creates a real risk of password exposure through memory forensics or malware. Mitigations include using secure credential APIs, key-based authentication, password managers with secure injection, and avoiding typing passwords into standard text input fields.

A user reported finding a trojan named "Servicehost.exe" on their PC, detected by Malwarebytes and identified via VirusTotal. The user is concerned that this malware may have recorded or leaked private calls. The report is based on a Reddit post linking to VirusTotal scan results, but no detailed technical or vendor advisory information is available. There is no confirmation of active exploitation or specific capabilities beyond the user's concern and VirusTotal detections.

Local privilege escalation due to EXE hijacking vulnerability. The following products are affected: Acronis DeviceLock DLP (Windows) before build 9.0.15051.93227.