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619 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The @ethers-sdk/wallet npm package version 5.8.0 contains malicious code that compromises any computer on which it is installed or run. The presence of this package indicates a full system compromise, and all secrets and keys stored on the affected machine should be rotated immediately from a separate, secure device. Removing the package alone does not guarantee removal of all malicious software introduced by it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.7 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-5846 The Watchfire BC550 controller software version 12.30 contains hard-coded self-signed RSA private keys and X.509 certificates embedded in plaintext within its firmware. These cryptographic materials are used for HTTPS/TLS authentication and encryption of the device's web management interface. The presence of hard-coded keys poses a risk of unauthorized access if the keys are extracted and reused by attackers. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package '@ai-agent-node/agent-node' contains malicious code that compromises any computer on which it is installed or running. The presence of this package indicates a full system compromise, and all secrets and keys stored on the affected machine should be rotated immediately from a different, secure device. Removing the package alone does not guarantee removal of all malicious software introduced by it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @zannstore/baileys contains malicious code that compromises any computer on which it is installed or run. The presence of this package indicates a full system compromise, and all secrets and keys stored on the affected machine should be rotated immediately from a separate, secure device. Removing the package alone does not guarantee removal of all malicious software introduced by it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 41f06f992406b144eaa87a5a91961a8ab4e46d9a38fc94e03ccd644a97252949 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors five times between July 29, 2026, and August 2, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in the Netherlands. This indicator can be used to detect the presence of this specific malicious file in environments and security tools. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash b9b0d9654fea3fd034fa62ae3d8805379c8c7fe5168b7c44f2f55702e541e72e was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on July 27, 2026. The file was detected twice in attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in MU. This indicator can be used to detect the presence of this specific malicious payload in environments by matching the hash against files in endpoint detection and response (EDR), antivirus (AV), and threat intelligence feeds. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64227 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: driver: Check ACPI_COMPANION() against NULL during probe Since every platform driver can be forced to match a device that doesn't match its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device's ACPI companion object should verify its presence. Accordingly, add requisite ACPI_COMPANION() or ACPI_HANDLE() checks against NULL to 13 platform drivers handling core ACPI devices. Also change the value returned by the ACPI thermal zone driver when the device's ACPI companion is not present to -ENODEV for consistency with the other drivers. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 805a01d5cda9cf31423b7fc2cc70165098505500c9107bb47b4303c0a60cb208 was observed twice on July 26, 2026, by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. This indicator can be used to detect the presence of this specific malicious payload in environments by matching the hash against files in endpoint detection and response (EDR), antivirus (AV), and threat intelligence feeds. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 5b694a7351bb12f07ad0d3bde910eacd5debeccdfcdb52081317e4da944cb730 was observed twice on 2026-07-26 by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors. The file is associated with the ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in MU. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload, which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. No direct exploit or patch information is available for this indicator. Organizations should match this hash against their environments and security tools to detect potential presence. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64511 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference After commit 9b311b7313d6 ("ACPI: NFIT: Install Notify() handler before getting NFIT table"), acpi_nfit_probe() installs an ACPI notify handler for the NFIT device before checking the presence of the NFIT table. If that table is not there, 0 is returned without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the driver data pointer of the NFIT device. If the platform firmware triggers an NFIT_NOTIFY_UC_MEMORY_ERROR notification on the NFIT device at that point, acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify() will dereference a NULL pointer. Prevent that from occurring by adding an acpi_desc check against NULL to acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify(). | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-64314Linux kernel · crypto: chacha20poly1305 – validate poly1305 template argument chachapoly_create() Medium5.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64314 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's crypto subsystem related to the chacha20poly1305 algorithm was fixed. The function chachapoly_create() improperly assumes the presence of a second template argument and passes it directly to strcmp() without validating it, leading to a potential dereference of an error pointer. This flaw could cause kernel instability or denial of service. The issue has been addressed by validating the template arguments properly before use. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.4 | High7.4GCVE Database Multiple HTTP/1.1 request-smuggling vulnerabilities exist in the blaze server's Java wire parser used by org.http4s:http4s-blaze-server_2.13. These parser laxities cause disagreement on request boundaries when paired with stricter intermediaries, potentially allowing bypass of front-end access controls, response queue poisoning, and cache poisoning. The vulnerabilities affect versions prior to 0.23.18. Exploitability depends on the presence of a fronting proxy that interprets requests differently. Deploying behind an RFC-compliant reverse proxy can mitigate the risk until an upgrade is possible. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database #### Summary The Budibase Worker service exposes a public, unauthenticated API endpoint (`GET /api/global/users/tenant/:id`) that returns sensitive user information including `tenantId`, `userId`, `email`, and `ssoId`. The endpoint is registered in the `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS` list with a `TODO` comment acknowledging it "should be an internal API." Any unauthenticated party can enumerate user emails or IDs to extract sensitive tenant and user metadata, enabling targeted attacks against multi-tenant deployments. #### Details **Public endpoint registration** at `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts` lines 56-59: ```typescript // TODO: This should be an internal api { route: "/api/global/users/tenant/:id", method: "GET", }, ``` This endpoint is listed in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS`, which is passed to `auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)` at line 154. When a request matches a public endpoint pattern, the authentication middleware sets `ctx.publicEndpoint = true` and calls `next()` without performing any authentication (verified at `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/authenticated.ts` lines 124-126, 249-251). All subsequent middleware also skips for public endpoints: - `buildTenancyMiddleware` — passes through - `activeTenant` — passes through - `buildCsrfMiddleware` — skipped for GET methods (line 48 of csrf.ts) - The `budibaseAccess` gate at lines 160-168 explicitly returns `next()` when `ctx.publicEndpoint` is true **Route registration** at `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts` line 139: ```typescript loggedInRoutes .get("/api/global/users/tenant/:id", controller.tenantUserLookup) ``` `loggedInRoutes` has no auth middleware group — it is created with `endpointGroupList.group()` (no middleware). **Handler implementation** at `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts` lines 548-562: ```typescript export const tenantUserLookup = async ( ctx: UserCtx<void, LookupTenantUserResponse> ) => { const id = ctx.params.id // is email, check its valid if (id.includes("@") && !emailValidator.validate(id)) { ctx.throw(400, `${id} is not a valid email address to lookup.`) } const user = await userSdk.core.getFirstPlatformUser(id) if (user) { ctx.body = user // Returns full PlatformUser object — no field filtering } else { ctx.throw(400, "No tenant user found.") } } ``` The `id` parameter accepts either an email address (detected by `@` presence) or a user ID. The response returns the **full** `PlatformUser` object from `packages/types/src/documents/platform/users.ts`: ```typescript export interface PlatformUserByEmail extends Document { tenantId: string // Tenant identifier userId: string // Internal user ID } export interface PlatformUserById extends Document { tenantId: string // Tenant identifier email?: string // User email address ssoId?: string // SSO provider identifier } export interface PlatformUserBySsoId extends Document { tenantId: string // Tenant identifier userId: string // Internal user ID email: string // User email address ssoId?: string // SSO provider identifier } ``` The lookup function (`packages/backend-core/src/users/lookup.ts:48-53`) queries the `PLATFORM_USERS_LOWERCASE` CouchDB view with `include_docs: true`, returning the complete platform user document including CouchDB `_id` and `_rev`. **Affected files:** - `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:56-59` — Public endpoint registration - `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:139` — Route on unauthenticated group - `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:548-562` — Handler returning full user object - `packages/backend-core/src/users/lookup.ts:48-53` — Platform user lookup with `include_docs: true` - `packages/types/src/documents/platform/users.ts:6-36` — PlatformUser types #### PoC **Static verification:** 1. Observe `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:56-59`: endpoint in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS` with `// TODO: This should be an internal api` 2. Trace handler at `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:548-562`: no auth checks, returns `ctx.body = user` (full object) 3. Trace middleware chain: all middleware passes through for `ctx.publicEndpoint === true` 4. Confirm no field filtering, sanitization, or authorization between request and response **Dynamic verification (requires running Budibase instance with at least one user):** ```bash # No authentication headers or cookies required # Lookup by email: curl -s http://localhost:4002/api/global/users/tenant/admin@example.com # Response (200 OK): # { # "_id": "admin@example.com", # "_rev": "1-abc123...", # "tenantId": "tenant-uuid-here", # "userId": "us_uuid-here" # } # Lookup by user ID: curl -s http://localhost:4002/api/global/users/tenant/us_someuserid123 # Response (200 OK): # { # "_id": "us_someuserid123", # "_rev": "1-abc123...", # "tenantId": "tenant-uuid-here", # "email": "admin@example.com", # "ssoId": "google-oauth-id" | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-65604zalando skipper · Improper Input Validation High8.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-65604 Skipper contains an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197 in which oversized request bodies bypass Open Policy Agent (OPA) deny-on-presence Rego policies. When a request body exceeds the configured maxBodyBytes limit, Skipper forwards the full payload to the upstream service while OPA evaluates against an empty parsed_body, so policies that deny requests based on body content are not enforced and forbidden actions proceed. No fixed version is available; v0.27.26 adds documentation guidance only. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash b3232d2cd03b051c59aef952ecfea3358c172351a27a989df31720395c3cbb4a was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on July 23, 2026. The file was detected twice during attacker activity originating from infrastructure in Germany. The observed technique corresponds to T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating the file is likely a payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool used in attacks. This indicator can be used to detect the presence of this malicious payload in environments by matching the hash against files in endpoint detection and response (EDR), antivirus (AV), and threat intelligence feeds. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'encryptstringadmin' contains malicious code that compromises any computer on which it is installed or running. The presence of this package indicates a full system compromise, and all secrets and keys stored on the affected machine should be rotated immediately from a different, trusted device. Removing the package alone does not guarantee the removal of all malicious software introduced by it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash ef42e6fd238baa990731f2ab20d130c489c1689588c5842713f28b4e90724019 was observed twice on July 21, 2026, by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Great Britain. This indicator can be used to detect the presence of this specific malicious file in environments by matching the hash against files and threat intelligence feeds. | OffSeq Mirage |
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