A missing bounds check in the TLS 1.3 Certificate-message parser of NetX Secure lets a malicious TLS 1.3 server trigger an unsigned-integer underflow and a subsequent heap out-of-bounds read in any peer that processes a remote Certificate message. It is reachable pre-authentication, during the normal handshake, before certificate verification completes.
The TLS 1.3 Certificate-message parser in NetX Secure decrements the message length to skip a context byte without first establishing that the message has a byte to skip. A zero-length Certificate message therefore wraps the unsigned length to `0xFFFFFFFF`, which makes the bounds check that follows vacuous and sends the parser reading past the session packet buffer.
The trigger is a four-byte handshake header and requires no cryptographic validity. It is reachable pre-authentication.
The Web add-on's HTTP server dereferences and releases an uninitialized pointer when it detects a `Content-Length` underflow while processing a `PUT` request. The condition is reachable by an unauthenticated remote client with a single malformed request.
The X.509 parser in NetX Secure accepts an RSA public key of any size, but every signature-verification path decrypts into fixed-size buffers dimensioned for the `NX_CRYPTO_MAX_RSA_MODULUS_SIZE` default of 4096 bits. A certificate carrying a larger modulus drives an out-of-bounds write past a file-scope static during ordinary certificate-chain verification.
It is reachable pre-authentication. The issuer used for the crypto operation is looked up in the remote, peer-supplied store before the trusted store, so the attacker supplies the oversized key themselves as an intermediate in the chain they present. It triggers on a TLS or DTLS client verifying a malicious server's chain, and on a server performing client-certificate authentication.
`_gx_multi_line_text_view_display_info_get()` reads one byte past the end of the application's text buffer when the string it is given ends with a carriage return (`\r`). The over-read can also cause callers to advance their index past the end of the string, producing a second over-read in `_gx_multi_line_text_view_string_total_rows_compute()` and a row of text that is not in the source.
The GUIX software JPEG decoder reads four kinds of marker segment without checking that each is long enough to hold what it reads. A truncated segment is therefore read past the end of the caller's image buffer. Separately, a zero chroma sampling factor makes the block decode loop non-terminating. Both reproduce in the default configuration, in which `GX_SOFTWARE_DECODER_SUPPORT` is enabled.
The GUIX JPEG software decoder enforces no ordering on JPEG markers. A file that places a second `SOF0` frame header after `SOS` re-runs the frame header parser after the output buffer has already been allocated and its geometry latched. The decoder returns `GX_SUCCESS` and publishes a `GX_PIXELMAP` whose reported dimensions and `data_size` exceed the allocation behind it.
Any consumer that trusts the returned structure reads out of bounds, including GUIX's own display drivers, reached through the ordinary draw path.
Reproduces in the shipped default configuration; `GX_SOFTWARE_DECODER_SUPPORT` is enabled by default.
The GUIX binary resource loader never checks that a font page's glyph range is well formed. `gx_page_header_first_glyph` and `gx_page_header_last_glyph` are read verbatim from the file and only the upper bound of `last_glyph` is validated, so a page declaring `first_glyph > last_glyph` makes `last - first + 1` underflow to a very large unsigned count.
That count is multiplied by a glyph record size to reserve the load buffer, and the multiply is unchecked, so it wraps to a small value and the loader allocates a buffer far smaller than the data it is about to write. The load pass then recomputes the count in a narrower type and writes attacker-controlled glyph records into the undersized buffer.
`gx_binres_theme_load()` and `gx_binres_font_load()` take the resource as a bare `GX_UBYTE *` with no length, and `GX_BINRES_DATA_INFO` has no field to carry one. Every read is therefore performed at an offset the file itself chose, against a buffer whose extent the loader does not know. A resource that declares more data than it contains is read past its end, and an offset stored in the file is turned into a pointer without being bounded.
This is a distinct defect from GHSA-hgcj-22cg-4hfv, which was an underflowed glyph count. It needs no underflow and no wrapped multiply: a perfectly well-formed, narrow glyph range reaches it.
`_gx_binres_pixelmap_table_load()` in the GUIX binary resource (theme) loader indexes the pixelmap table with a value read verbatim from the resource file and never bounds it against the table size. A crafted theme drives a write of up to roughly 256 KB past the end of the table.
The overflowed buffer is allocated by GUIX itself, through `_gx_system_memory_allocator`, rather than supplied by the caller, so the loader corrupts its own arena. The public API `gx_binres_theme_load()` takes no size parameter, so no amount of caller diligence prevents this.
Reproduces in the shipped default configuration; `GX_BINARY_RESOURCE_SUPPORT` is enabled by default.
The PNG chunk reader has no notion of chunk ordering. It records whether an IDAT has been seen and whether a tRNS has already supplied transparency, but nothing prevents an IHDR being read a second time.
A PNG carries exactly one IHDR and it is the first chunk. A file that places a second one after IDAT rewrites the image width, height, bit depth and pixel depth *after* the decoded-data buffer has already been allocated and filled from the original values. The pass that reverses the PNG row filters then derives its own extent from the new dimensions and walks the old allocation, moving image bytes past the end of it.
The buffer is allocated by GUIX rather than supplied by the caller, so the application has no way to size it defensively. The decoder is compiled in by default.
A memory-protected ThreadX module's queue request reaches the Module Manager's dispatch layer, which decides how much of the module's buffer the privileged queue copy may touch and hands that extent to the module port's range check. A queue's `tx_queue_message_size` is a count of `ULONG`s and the copy moves that many words, so the extent is `message_size * sizeof(ULONG)` bytes.
The front-send dispatcher passed the word count itself. `tx_queue_send` and `tx_queue_receive`, either side of it in the same header, have always multiplied.
A source buffer ending `message_size` bytes into memory the module may read was therefore accepted, and `_txe_queue_front_send` then read `message_size * sizeof(ULONG)` bytes from it in privileged mode — `3 * message_size` bytes past the end of what the module is allowed to read. The words are written into the queue's message area, so a module that can receive from that queue reads them back.
A malicious USB MTP/PTP device can cause the USBX host to read past a heap buffer during ordinary object enumeration, leaking adjacent heap contents to the application or faulting on an unmapped page.
In Eclipse OpenJ9 versions up to 0.63, opening a supplied diagnostic dump bundle with the jdmpview tool, or equivalent DTFJ code, may cause the analyst's machine to read an arbitrary local file named inside the bundle and send its contents to an arbitrary remote host.
A VideoStreaming interface reports the size of its whole class-specific descriptor block in the `wTotalLength` field of its input header. The USBX host recorded that figure and used it as the budget for walking the format, frame and frame-interval descriptors, without holding it against the configuration descriptor actually received.
A device that reports a `wTotalLength` larger than the descriptors it supplies therefore had its own claim believed. Once the real bytes ran out the walk kept going, dereferencing the cursor past the end of the configuration buffer, in the host's context, whenever the application queried format or frame data.
A HID report descriptor is a sequence of items, each declaring in its header how many data bytes follow. The USBX host walks that sequence by advancing over each header and parsing the data behind it.
The walk checked that an item fitted in the descriptor only **after** it had advanced past the header and parsed the payload, and the item analysis it relied on never measured the declared sizes against the bytes actually received. A HID peripheral returning a short report descriptor therefore drove a heap out-of-bounds read during ordinary enumeration.
Mounting an attacker-controlled FAT image with fault tolerance enabled causes an out-of-bounds heap write during log replay. The write is attacker-positioned and attacker-valued, and on a common embedded memory layout it reaches the FX_MEDIA driver callback, giving control of the instruction pointer.
In Eclipse ioFog Controller versions 3.8.0 through 3.9.1, operator WebSocket upgrades on the exec and log routes do not verify the bearer JWT. The payload is decoded and its groups or roles are used as RBAC subjects. A self-minted token whose groups contain admin matches the built-in admin role, with no account and no RoleBinding. The attacker can open an exec or log session for a microservice or fog whose UUID they already know. HTTP routes are not affected: they verify the token before RBAC. Agent WebSockets verify the fog token and are not affected.
In Eclipse ioFog Controller versions 3.8.0 through 3.9.1, POST, PUT, and PATCH bodies on routes that enable template substitution are rendered by an uncapped Liquid engine before authentication and RBAC. The bearer check does not reject a missing or invalid token, and the auth rate limit applies only to user login routes. A small JSON body can stall or abort the Controller process. The anonymous caller does not receive the rendered result; the impact is availability of the control plane, including the agent API and in-process WebSocket relays on that process.
PIA's token verification (`verify_token` in `pia/oidc.py`) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the `jwks_uri` contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS — the only check is that the field is non-empty (`pia/oidc.py:42-52`). An approved identity provider — and every registered per-project Jenkins instance under `https://ci.eclipse.org/<project>/oidc` is a separate such party (`pia/models.py`) — can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext `http`, from PIA's own network position. The fetch happens before any signature is verified, as a side effect of an unauthenticated `POST /v1/upload/sbom` request that is ultimately rejected with 401.