Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in NerdPress Hubbub Lite allows Stored XSS.
This issue affects Hubbub Lite: from n/a through 1.36.3.
In Progress® Telerik® UI for AJAX prior to v2026.2.708, insufficient validation of the language parameter in the spell check handler may allow an attacker to influence server-side file path resolution and trigger unintended server-side requests.
## Summary
The fix for GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (CVE-2026-23845, "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API"), shipped in mailpit `v1.28.3`, hardened `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::downloadCSSToBytes` with a 5MB size cap, a `text/css` content-type check, login-info stripping in `isValidURL`, and an opt-in `--block-remote-css-and-fonts` config flag — but **did not add the IP-filtering dialer that the same codebase already uses on the two sister SSRF endpoints** (the proxy handler and link-check). At HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06), `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` is mis-named — it builds an `http.Client` whose `Transport.DialContext` calls `net.Dialer.DialContext` directly with no IP allowlisting. As a result, the SSRF originally reported by Bao Anh Phan still permits the server to dial:
- loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`),
- private (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `fc00::/7`),
- link-local incl. **cloud IMDS** (`169.254.0.0/16`, especially `169.254.169.254`),
- CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`),
- and any other reserved/multicast range,
— provided the target replies with `HTTP/200` and a content-type beginning with `text/css`. With redirect-following (`CheckRedirect` allows redirects to any `isValidURL` URL with no IP filter), an attacker-controlled public site can redirect mailpit's request into the private network without ever appearing in the email's HTML.
In the default mailpit deploy (no UI auth, no SMTP auth, port 1025/8025 exposed), this is an unauthenticated, network-reachable SSRF triggered by sending an HTML email and then issuing one HTTP `GET` to `/api/v1/message/{id}/html-check`.
## Affected versions
- `internal/htmlcheck/css.go` at HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06).
- All versions `>= v1.28.3` (the version that shipped the GHSA-6jxm fix). Versions `<= v1.28.2` are vulnerable to the original GHSA-6jxm; versions `>= v1.28.3` carry the still-vulnerable variant described here.
## The incomplete fix
The original GHSA-6jxm fix added size+content-type+login-info hardening to `downloadCSSToBytes`. But the dialer it uses still has no `safeDialContext`. The companion `linkcheck` and `proxy` handlers in the same codebase have all-three protections: size cap, content-type/redirect filter, **AND** a `safeDialContext` that runs `tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP)` per resolved address — same pattern the htmlcheck dialer should adopt.
Side-by-side at HEAD `8bc966e`:
| File | Function | `safeDialContext` (IP filter)? | TOCTOU-safe (dial-by-IP)? |
|---|---|---|---|
| `internal/linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext` line 140-163 | dial check | YES | YES (resolved IP joined with port) |
| `server/handlers/proxy.go::safeDialContext` line 393-415 | dial check | YES | YES |
| `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` line 275-310 | dial check | **NO** | n/a |
The mis-named `newSafeHTTPClient` reads:
```go
// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:275-310
func newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client {
dialer := &net.Dialer{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
}
tr := &http.Transport{
Proxy: nil,
DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address) // no IP filter
},
...
}
client := &http.Client{
Transport: tr,
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 3 { return errors.New("too many redirects") }
if !isValidURL(req.URL.String()) { return errors.New("invalid redirect URL") }
return nil
},
}
return client
}
```
`isValidURL` only rejects non-http(s) and userinfo URLs — it does NOT reject internal IPs. Compare `linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext`:
```go
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
...
if !config.AllowInternalHTTPRequests {
for _, ip := range ips {
if tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked request to %s (%s): private/reserved address", host, ip)
}
}
}
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port))
```
That's the protection htmlcheck is missing.
## Reachability chain (default deploy)
```
Listen() # config/config.go:36 SMTPListen = "[::]:1025"
↓
SMTP server # internal/smtpd/main.go:222-249 AuthRequired: false, AuthHandler: nil
↓ attacker injects HTML body with <link rel="stylesheet" href="...attacker.com/redirect.css">
↓
storage.Store(...)
↓
Listen() # server/server.go HTTPListen
↓ attacker sends GET /api/v1/message/{id}/html-check
apiv1.HTMLCheck # server/apiv1/other.go:18
↓ no UI auth in default deploy (auth.UICredentials == nil)
htmlcheck.RunTests(msg.HTML)
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### Summary
The restrictions on redirect URLs in `openrun` can be bypassed by attackers, leading to open redirect attacks.
### Details
In the current project, the referrer header value is used for subsequent redirects, so there is currently a validation for this redirect value. The current validation logic requires that the host and schema of the redirect URL be the same as the current website's URL, and finally, the path part is used for redirection. This check seems robust, but it can still be bypassed by attackers.
<img width="1606" height="1346" alt="QQ20260602-140205-2-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83c549f3-38d7-444d-90f0-131d806f67ff" />
Here's the problem: Assuming the current website is `http://127.0.0.1:25222/`, if the attacker passes in a redirect URL of `http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com`, its host and schema are obviously the same as the current website, thus bypassing the verification. However, the issue lies in the final redirect URL, which is the path part of the URL, i.e., `//fushuling.com`.
Browsers automatically complete the HTTP header for URLs starting with `//`, ultimately successfully bypassing the restriction and redirecting to the external address `http://fushuling.com`.
This vulnerable behavior was successfully reproduced locally. Normally, specifying an external address directly will be blocked, so it will not redirect.
<img width="1587" height="717" alt="QQ20260602-140756-2-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51430c42-bd10-401b-9c9f-27a91a0bc648" />
However, if the redirect URL is `http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com`, the existing validation logic is bypassed, and the Location header is successfully set to `//fushuling.com`.
```
POST /redirecttest/abc/frag HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:25222
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com
Cache-Control: max-age=0
sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="122"
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.6261.57 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Sec-Fetch-Site: none
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0
```
<img width="1536" height="729" alt="QQ20260602-140925-2-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31fde919-5f90-409f-8b14-af6c9c71761b" />
The user was then successfully redirected to the external address `http://fushuling.com`.
<img width="1692" height="855" alt="QQ20260602-141005-2-5" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83b43ef6-52fa-4218-908b-7795394ae707" />
### PoC
```
http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com
```
### Impact
Open Redirect
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