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861 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database pinokio-redis is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of pinokio-redis (1.0.127) exists and all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a400b0342add77fd3a58e086334b35e11d79e234b180bb360f48adcd61ec4acd, SHA-1: 04b6035df92ef9eb790d64d425c05c51fce46ca7. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2593226767577439cd32d202e0e5e07ef74a6526f9ad7cb42f4bad087d04aa30) The package name presents as a Redis client for Pinokio, but the shipped tarball contains a credential-harvest and data-relay toolkit that has no relationship to Redis. dist/discordRelayUpload.js issues outbound POSTs and shells out (ping) to relay collected content; dist/hfCredentials.js and dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js decode base64-embedded blobs (Buffer.from(..., 'base64')) at runtime; dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js performs fetch() calls to huggingface.co endpoints under a "secret scan" module name — a shape consistent with harvesting scanned secrets rather than defending them. dist/deploymentDefaults.js and scripts/encode-deployment.mjs carry base64-encoded deployment configuration decoded at runtime, obscuring destination endpoints. scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at npm install (postinstall) and issues network activity (GET, ping) on install without user interaction, providing auto-execution on default install. The combination — install-time auto-executed agent, base64-obfuscated configuration/payloads across multiple files, a Discord upload relay path, and a "secretScan" module that fetches to remote endpoints — describes an installer-side credential and data exfiltration toolkit, not a Redis integration. Name/purpose mismatch, install-time execution, and multi-file obfuscation together satisfy the active-attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d8c9c7ad731c0929056de138dff2c461e808854d25aea316f6fe865a3d04d8c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full co | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database zredis-typed is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of zredis-typed (1.0.127) exists; all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a1853a45bcb561f96e0e7c0dec7f96e640ae53be62e65158880812ff104c9e41, SHA-1: b74170f2d850bfd8d0a9d750af88a03ba2c42e61. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (330bc399769c68aa2a7f09a635bb038680c88c855268cc3643759492ebd96de9) The package name presents as a typed Redis client, but the tarball ships a multi-file exfiltration payload unrelated to any Redis functionality. `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` performs host reconnaissance (ping) and POSTs base64-encoded content to remote endpoints. `dist/relayServer.js` similarly runs ping-based host probing. `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` fetches attacker-controlled URLs on huggingface.co (used here as a data/staging endpoint), and `dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js` performs credential/secret scanning with base64 encoding of results. `dist/hfCredentials.js` handles third-party (Hugging Face) credential material via base64 decode. `dist/deploymentDefaults.js` and `scripts/encode-deployment.mjs` encode/decode deployment payloads via base64. `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` is registered as an install-time agent that performs outbound GET requests and host ping — running automatically on `npm install`. The combination of postinstall-time network activity, host reconnaissance, filesystem secret scanning, base64-encoded payload handling, Discord-labeled relay upload, and hardcoded remote fetch endpoints is unambiguous credential/data exfiltration disguised as a Redis type package. Nothing in the shipped modules implements a Redis client. The traced content also tripped the safety filter on downstream analysis, corroborating the malware shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (73b8d51428450de7f67cb29aa402a94aefd62bdcf03e4f0eee43c554576eec2e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 1.0% | High7.5EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-4967 In IMS, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: kam193 (ad72fe1fdc56e7fb5716a906fb8481bfe1e477d2f97c649d5db853a79130628a) Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. --- Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: kam193 (93043b3f00a64c66fb0680256387471b656f222556c282c9cb1680347f14fae8) Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. --- Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: kam193 (9494382fb3885f95987ec830f096aac6cde589cac9485b6a347bafed9a8a7e39) Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. --- Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: kam193 (b8b4f17043a9c57ea2087c59c771151186c117ab64cbf5c45df85df62469aa89) Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. --- Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.0EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58460 react-native-receive-sharing-intent contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows a co-resident malicious application to write files outside the intended cache directory by supplying a crafted _display_name value containing dot-dot path components through a malicious ContentProvider. Attackers can fire an explicit ACTION_SEND intent at the consuming app's exported share-receiver activity to overwrite arbitrary files in the consuming app's private data directory, including databases, shared preferences, and cached configuration, with attacker-controlled content. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.9% | High8.7EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2024-58352 Landray OA contains an unauthenticated HQL injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to query arbitrary Hibernate entity classes by injecting malicious HQL syntax into the uid POST parameter of the wechatLoginHelper.do endpoint. Attackers can exploit the lack of input sanitization in the string-concatenated filter expression passed to the Hibernate findList() call to extract sensitive data such as administrator password hashes and, with sufficient database privileges, perform file-write operations enabling remote code execution. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2024-03-11 (UTC). EPSS 0.9%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 1.3% | Critical9.3EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2024-14037 Redsea Cloud eHR contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution by uploading malicious files through the PtFjk.mob servlet endpoint. Attackers can submit a multipart POST request with a JSP webshell disguised using a spoofed image/jpeg Content-Type to bypass the absence of extension and MIME type validation, with the uploaded file stored at a predictable path under the uploadfile directory and executed directly by the web server. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2024-11-03 (UTC). EPSS 1.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Chris Thompson's journey took him from hacking game controls as a teenager to founding IBM’s X-Force Red team. The post Hacker Conversations: Chris Thompson, Former Head of IBM X-Force Red, Co-Founder of RemoteThreat appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 2.4% | High8.7EPSS 2.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-32833 Cudy LT300 3.0 running firmware prior to version 2.5.12 contains an OS command injection vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands by injecting shell metacharacters into the cbid.system.ntp.current POST parameter in the system time configuration interface. Attackers can submit malicious payloads through the NTP settings endpoint to achieve remote code execution on the underlying system. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2dcf100385d43e4bb2e48489a99d1fc2d4f919953963fa0339966bd5270f61b3) All published JavaScript in dist/ (index.js, client.js, server.js, react.js, and sibling chunks) is heavily obfuscated using javascript-obfuscator (declared as a devDependency) with the hex-identifier and shuffled string-array dispatcher style. The package declares no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hooks; no fetch-and-execute against remote hosts, no reads of installer-secret paths (~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, browser profiles), no enumeration of process.env, and no hardcoded credentials or attacker-controlled C2 endpoints were observed in the entry points reviewed. The 'ping/GET/id' keyword co-occurrence flagged in dist/server.js fires inside the obfuscated bundle and is not corroborated by any reachable exfiltration path in the files read. Obfuscation of the entire shipped surface makes the code unauditable and is a legitimate transparency concern for an 'ai-node-agent' library — reviewers should weigh maintainer trust before adopting — but on its own does not meet the threshold for a published block. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0730db02e46f4cfb224880f60bcdcdd43ed4d1bc97c68ee404428f7c592445cb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (92ceffaf94fc190f70c18587857f2f0a674a9699512eec79f5cf738eefaa54ca) Package advertises itself as a pino+zod logging helper but ships content that does not match that purpose: a `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` module containing POST/upload code paths and base64 buffer handling, a `dist/relayServer.js` module, a `dist/secretScan/` tree (agentStartupAudit.js, contentScanner.js) that performs fetches against huggingface.co, a `dist/hfCredentials.js` with base64 decoding, a `dist/deploymentDefaults.js` with multiple base64 buffers, and a `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` containing GET/ping/id patterns. The presence of a `postinstall-agent.mjs` under `scripts/` is concerning as a possible install-time agent, and the shipped relay/upload/secret-scan modules suggest behavior far outside the declared logging-library scope. However, without traced execution context confirming whether postinstall-agent.mjs is actually invoked by a lifecycle hook, where the base64 blobs decode to, and whether the Discord/HuggingFace endpoints carry installer data outward, the intent cannot be conclusively classified. Routing to human review for inspection of package.json lifecycle hooks, the contents of deploymentDefaults.js base64 payloads, and the data flow into the Discord upload and HuggingFace fetch paths. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d57b4e49a62a8ca174c6c14820e5b101d042e3aea94438df19f9b12286a7cf30) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.4% | Critical9.2EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9222 Setracker2 Android Companion App com.tgelec.setracker versions 3.1.5 and prior only require the password hash when authenticating with backend services from the client. This could allow an attacker, who knows the hash, to authenticate and gain full access. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-9221Shenzhen i365-Tech Setracker2 Parental Control App (Android) package com.tgelec.setracker · Weak Cryptography High8.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9221 The Setracker2 Android Companion App (com.tgelec.setracker) versions 3.1.5 and earlier uses MD5 to generate a request signature for authenticating communications between the mobile client and the backend REST API. Attackers could potentially reverse the signature to recover the session ID. With the session ID exposed, an attacker could impersonate the legitimate user and issue authenticated API requests. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9220 Setracker2 Android Companion App com.tgelec.setracker versions 3.1.5 and prior encrypts requests between the watch and its backend with static hardcoded AES keys and initialization vectors. This allows an attacker to decrypt Setracker2 watch traffic. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9219 Setracker2 Android Companion App com.tgelec.setracker versions 3.1.5 and prior have a predictable registration ID derived from IMEI. The enrollment system lacks additional authentication before assignment. If an attacker is able to obtain the registration ID, they would be able to arbitrarily enroll watches belonging to other users. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A Chinese web-development framework called DCloud Uni-App has become the technical foundation for over 236,000 scam domains since 2022, powering fake cryptocurrency exchanges, pig-butchering operations, wallet drainers, gambling platforms, and brand-impersonation sites. The framework gained prominence after the 2024 RainbowEx cryptocurrency scam in Argentina, which defrauded residents of San Pedro. Similar operations include the Lightning Shared Scooter Co. (LSSC) scam in the United States, which caused millions in losses across multiple states, and the currently-active Yuechi Sharing Technology Ltd. bicycle-sharing investment scam. These operations use legitimate hosting providers, with approximately 6% utilizing bulletproof hosting, particularly CTG Server. The scams target victims globally through WhatsApp, Telegram, and social media, converting victims into recruiters for pyramid-style operations. Enterprise exposure reaches over 985 distinct organizations across 25 industry verticals, with over five m... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-49319Alps Electric Remote Keyless Entry System (RKES) R53R0 · Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay Medium6.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-49319 Remote Keyless Entry System (RKES), using the 433 MHz key fob bearing FCC ID CWTR53R0 manufactured by ALPS ALPINE CO., LTD., is vulnerable to a roll-back attack against its rolling-code authentication. An attacker within RF range who records two consecutive lock or unlock transmissions from a legitimate key fob can later replay the same pair of transmissions repeatedly. During testing, replaying the first captured transmission caused the RKES to enter a state in which replaying the second captured transmission resulted in a successful lock or unlock operation of the vehicle. Tested and confirmed on a 2024 Suzuki Swift (SWIFT ISG GLS AC 1.2 5P 4x2 TM). | CVE Database V5 |
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