A Chinese-speaking threat actor group known as Red Heron exploited a recently disclosed remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-60004) in Gitea, a self-hosted Git service, in a multinational campaign. The campaign targeted internet-facing Gitea instances across multiple countries, including Canada, Argentina, Taiwan, the United States, and Sri Lanka, focusing on sectors such as defense, elections, energy, aerospace, telecommunications, government, and research. The attackers used automated tools to steal source code, credentials, and maintain persistent access, including root-level control on some infrastructure. They deployed a novel Linux implant named JITTERLY with extensive post-exploitation capabilities and embedded a previously undocumented rootkit called SIXZUT to maintain stealth and persistence. The campaign demonstrates rapid weaponization of n-day vulnerabilities in development platforms and highlights significant risks to source code confidentiality and infrastructure integrity.
## Summary
API token permission checks only match the HTTP method and route path. The `expand` query parameter on task read endpoints embeds data from other permission groups (task comments, reactions, time entry counts) without checking whether the token holds those scopes. A token scoped only to `tasks` read permissions can therefore read task comments and reactions it was explicitly not granted.
## Details
`models.CanDoAPIRoute` (`pkg/models/api_routes.go`, ~line 440) authorises API tokens purely by comparing `method` and `c.Path()` against the routes stored for each granted permission group. The query string is never consulted.
The task read endpoints accept `expand`:
- `GET /api/v1/tasks/:task`, `GET /api/v1/tasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go` ReadOne/ReadAll, `pkg/models/task_collection.go`)
- `GET /api/v2/tasks/:id`, `GET /api/v2/tasks`, `GET /api/v2/projects/:project/tasks` (`pkg/routes/api/v2/tasks.go`, `task_collection.go`)
Accepted values include `comments`, `comment_count`, `reactions`, `time_entries_count`. `addMoreInfoToTasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go`, ~line 683) loads and embeds that data. At that layer only a `web.Auth` (the plain owner user, resolved by `auth.GetAuthFromClaims`) is available, so the token's scopes cannot be enforced there either.
Result: the `tasks_comments`, `reactions`, and `time_entries` permission groups are advisory for any data reachable through a task expansion.
## Impact
A holder of an API token scoped to `tasks: [read_one]` or `tasks: [read_all]` (or `projects_views_tasks: [read_all]`) can read the full bodies of task comments, all reactions, and time entry counts on every task the token owner can access, despite `GET /api/v1|v2/tasks/:task/comments` and the reactions endpoints correctly returning 401 for the same token.
The leak is limited to data the token owner can already see, and is read-only. The realistic victim is a user who grants a narrowly scoped token to a third-party integration expecting comments to stay private.
## Proof of Concept
Against the test fixtures (`pkg/db/fixtures/api_tokens.yml`, token 1 has `{"tasks":["read_all","update"]}`, plaintext `tk_2eef46f40ebab3304919ab2e7e39993f75f29d2e`):
```
GET /api/v2/tasks/1/comments
Authorization: Bearer tk_2eef46f40ebab3304919ab2e7e39993f75f29d2e
-> 401 {"code":11,"message":"missing, malformed, expired or otherwise invalid token provided"}
GET /api/v2/tasks?expand=comments&filter=id%3D1
Authorization: Bearer tk_2eef46f40ebab3304919ab2e7e39993f75f29d2e
-> 200, response items[0].comments contains the full comment objects
```
Same behaviour with `expand=reactions`, and on the v1 endpoints `GET /api/v1/tasks?expand=comments` / `GET /api/v1/tasks/1?expand=comments`. Any user-created token with only `tasks` read permissions reproduces this.
## Recommended Fix
Enforce expansions in the single existing choke point, `models.CanDoAPIRoute`: after the method/path match succeeds, read `c.QueryParams()["expand"]` and require the token to hold the owning group's read permission for each value, e.g.
- `comments`, `comment_count` -> `tasks_comments.read_all`
- `reactions` -> `reactions.read_all`
- `time_entries_count` -> `time_entries.read_all`
(`subtasks`, `buckets`, `is_unread` are task-level data and need nothing extra.) Doing this in the middleware covers both v1 and v2 without handler or model changes. Add a table-driven test alongside `pkg/webtests/api_token_method_matching_test.go` asserting a `tasks`-only token gets 401 with `expand=comments` and 200 once `tasks_comments.read_all` is added.
### Summary
When you share a project with a team, the API lets you attach any team on the instance, including teams you have nothing to do with, as long as you're an admin of the project. Listing a project's teams then returns each team's full member roster. So any logged-in user can spin up a throwaway project, attach team IDs one by one, and read back the name, description, and complete member list of every team on the instance. Normally you can only see teams you belong to; this path ignores that.
### Details
Sharing a project with a team is a two-step flow: you PUT a team to the project, then you GET the project's teams to see them. The share endpoint only enforces that you're an admin of the target project, it doesn't care whether the team you're referencing is one you're allowed to see. Any existing team ID is accepted.
The listing endpoint is even more permissive: read access to the project is enough, which you obviously have on a project you created. And its response isn't just a list of team names, it includes each team's description, creator, and a full members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag.
Put together, an attacker who owns a single project can walk the team ID space and pull the roster of every team in the instance, including teams they aren't a member of. This contradicts how team visibility works everywhere else in the product, where you only ever see teams you belong to. Emails are stripped from the roster, so what leaks is identities and org structure rather than contact details.
The fix is to require that the caller actually has access to the team they're attaching, not just to the project.
### PoC
The attacker needs nothing but an ordinary account.
1. Create a throwaway project you own:
2. Attach team IDs one by one (sweep the range you want):
```
PUT /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams
{<SNIP>, "team_id": <N>, <SNIP>}
```
3. Read them back with their rosters:
```
GET /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams
```
Each entry contains the team name, description, creator, and a members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag, for teams you are not a member of.
### Impact
Information disclosure of the instance-wide team directory: team names, descriptions, and full membership, for teams the attacker has no relationship with. This maps out the organisation's group structure and who belongs where, useful for targeting and social engineering. Any authenticated account is enough; no share link, no admin rights, no victim interaction.
### Summary
`registerAPIRoutesV2` never applies the unconditional pre-auth rate-limit floor (`unauthRateLimit()`) to the v2 public routes — it passes that limiter only to `/api/v2/ws` — and otherwise relies on `setupRateLimit`, which registers nothing when `ratelimit.enabled` is false (the default). So on a stock install every v2 pre-auth endpoint (login, register, password-reset token, oauth token) is unthrottled, while its v1 twin is throttled.
### Details
`unauthRateLimit()` -> `perMinuteIPRateLimit("noauth", RateLimitNoAuthRoutesLimit)` (`pkg/routes/rate_limit.go`, ~lines 100-118) is an unconditional per-IP floor (default 10/60s) that deliberately ignores `RateLimitEnabled`, which is why v1's pre-auth routes are throttled even with the global limiter off. v1 applies it: `ur := a.Group(""); ur.Use(unauthRateLimit())` (`pkg/routes/routes.go` ~line 459). `registerAPIRoutesV2` (~lines 405-431) passes the `unauthRateLimit()` instance only to `/api/v2/ws`; its auth routes get only `setupRateLimit(a, ...)`, which is config-gated and registers nothing by default.
### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0)
```
POST /api/v1/login x25 -> 429 from attempt 5
POST /api/v2/login x25 -> 403 x25, 429 x0
POST /api/v1/user/password/token -> 429 (throttled)
POST /api/v2/user/password/token x20 -> 404 x20, 429 x0
```
Request bodies are byte-identical across versions (shared `user.Login` / `user.PasswordTokenRequest`). Both v2 endpoints reach their handlers (403/404, not route-404), so the comparison is valid.
### Impact
The pre-auth rate-limit floor — the instance's only default anti-brute-force / anti-abuse control — is absent on all v2 public endpoints. Enables unbounded credential guessing, account-enumeration probing, and password-reset flooding on a default install. Reported as an authentication-control bypass, not a DoS.
### Fix
Apply `unauthRateLimit()` to the v2 public route group, matching v1.
Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.6, charts/capsule/templates/configuration.yaml configures the validating webhook with namespace/finalize instead of the Kubernetes resource name namespaces/finalize. A user with namespaces/finalize RBAC can send a PUT request to /api/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/finalize, and the singular rule never matches the plural resource, so the validating webhook is not invoked and the user can change the namespace tenant label. matchPolicy: Equivalent does not compensate because it handles API group and version equivalence rather than resource-name errors. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.13.6.
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in MikroTik RouterOS versions before 7.23.4 (long-term) and 7.24.2 (stable) in the mtget binary's TFTP RRQ builder function. Authenticated users with read-only group membership can crash the mtget worker process by supplying a crafted URL path of 507 bytes or more to the /tool fetch command. On older versions, this overflow can be exploited for persistent privilege escalation. The vulnerability is fixed in versions 7.23.4, 7.24.2, and 6.49.21.
Description
`SimpleACLAuthorizer` evaluated the user-level command set by returning early when `nimbus.users` was empty,
before `nimbus.groups` was considered. An operator who restricted cluster access by group alone, leaving
`nimbus.users` unset, therefore received no restriction at all: every authenticated principal was permitted
every user-level operation, including `submitTopology`, `beginFileUpload` and `getNimbusConf`.
`docs/SECURITY.md` presents `nimbus.groups` as a supported way to lock down a cluster, so a deployment
following the documentation could believe it was restricted while it was not. The failure is silent; nothing
in the logs or the configuration indicates that the group list is being ignored.
Both lists left empty continues to mean that no restriction is configured, which is the shipped default and
is unchanged.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where `nimbus.groups` is evaluated whether or not `nimbus.users` is set.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should additionally populate `nimbus.users` with the intended
principals, since a non-empty user list causes the group list to be evaluated on affected versions.
Operators should review Nimbus access logs for operations by principals outside the intended groups.
Note that after upgrading, a cluster configured with `nimbus.groups` alone becomes restrictive for the first
time. This includes `NimbusClient`, which calls `getLeader` on every connection, so clients outside the
configured groups will begin to be refused.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
Description
The Logviewer offers `logs.users` and `logs.groups` so operators can control who may read log content. For
daemon logs those settings were not applied: the access decision combined the "this is a daemon log" flag
with the authorizer result in a way that discarded the authorizer's answer whenever the flag was set, and
the daemon log page and download endpoints reached the handler without consulting an authorizer at all. Any
user able to pass the configured servlet filter could therefore read `nimbus.log`, `supervisor.log` and the
other daemon logs on every reachable node, which contain other tenants' topology names, owners and
configuration fragments.
The same advisory covers the log listing endpoints, which accepted a user argument and never applied it, so
`/listLogs` and `/searchLogs` returned every tenant's topology and worker log file names regardless of the
caller. That part is metadata only.
There was no configuration that closed either behaviour.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the daemon log paths evaluate the same configured user and group lists that the
worker log paths already used, and the listing endpoints filter by the requesting user.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the Logviewer behind a reverse proxy that restricts the
daemon log endpoints, and should treat daemon log content as readable by any filter-authenticated user.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
Missing Authorization vulnerability in Apache Syncope.
An administrator with task execution entitlements might be able to mass (de)provision group members, regardless of their group-related administration capabilities.
This issue affects Apache Syncope: from 3.0.0-M0 through 3.0.16, from 4.0.0-M0 Through 4.0.7, from 4.1.0-M0 through 4.1.2.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.8 / 4.1.3, which fix this issue.
A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-51990) in Tencent's Sogou Input Method for Windows has been exploited by the Chinese threat group UNC3569 to achieve system-level code execution via a crafted URL. The flaw involves unvalidated command-line argument injection, unrestricted URL navigation, and an outdated Chromium browser engine with disabled sandboxing. The exploit enables deployment of the GrayRabbit backdoor, which provides extensive remote control capabilities. Tencent released a patch in version 16.3.0.3498 that addresses the URL parameter validation but did not update the underlying Chromium configuration. The vulnerability has been actively exploited in the wild.
Parallels Desktop runs prl_disp_service as root. Local clients reach it on the world-writable socket /var/run/prl_disp_service.socket. PrlSrv_LoginLocal accepts peer credentials. No Parallels signature. No admin group.
After login, PrlSrv_InstallAppliance lets you pick the appliance folder (sVmParentPath). The daemon unpacks with one string, tar -xf "%1" -C "%2", then Qt QProcess::splitCommand chops that string into words. A quote in the folder name closes early. The leftover text becomes extra tar flags. macOS tar --use-compress-program= runs the named program as root.
Red Hat has issued a security advisory for a kernel update addressing two vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel. The first is a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability in the network scheduler component (CVE-2026-64530) caused by a missing handler for TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle. The second vulnerability (CVE-2026-74480) involves the network bridge component, specifically stopping fast-leave after deleting a port group. These issues affect the kernel packages in Red Hat Enterprise Linux for ARM 64 (aarch64) version 10. A patch is available and should be applied, with a system reboot required for the update to take effect. Red Hat rates the update as important and recommends prompt installation to improve security posture.
A critical remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-51990) in Tencent's Sogou Input Method for Windows is actively exploited by the UNC3569 threat group to deploy the GrayRabbit backdoor malware. The attack chain abuses a custom URI handler, an unrestricted URL navigation in an embedded Chromium webview, and a known flaw in an outdated Chromium 80 engine running without sandboxing. Tencent released a patch in version 16.3.0.3498 that validates URL arguments and restricts navigation to approved domains, but the underlying Chromium engine remains outdated and unsandboxed.
WWBN AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 fails to validate video access permissions in the commentAddNew.json.php endpoint, allowing authenticated users to post comments on password-protected and group-restricted videos. Attackers can submit POST requests with a valid session to add comments to videos they cannot watch, bypassing password and group access controls.
Concrete CMS before 9.5.3 is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in the Move Multiple Groups feature. The dashboard/users/groups/bulkupdate/confirm() endpoint moved the selected group tree nodes without validating an action token, so a state-changing group move could be processed for an authenticated user who did not initiate it. Because relocating a group under a new parent causes that group's members to inherit the parent's permissions, a forged move can change effective authorization. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v4.0 score of 5.7 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks riodrwn for reporting.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: unregister the connection before draining the rx tasklet smc_conn_free() calls smc_ism_unset_conn() only while the link group is still on its device list, and never sets conn->killed. smc_lgr_terminate_sched() unlinks the group immediately and defers killing its connections to a work item, so a connection freed in that window keeps its smcd->conn[] slot with both gates in smcd_handle_irq() open, and the device can re-arm the receive tasklet after tasklet_kill() has returned. On the DMB-nocopy path the ghost send buffer is freed right after that drain, so the re-armed tasklet dereferences it. Unregister unconditionally and drain before the detach at both teardown sites, mirroring rmb_desc, which smc_buf_unuse() releases after the drain. Clear conn->sndbuf_desc before freeing it as well, so a reader that samples the pointer cannot get one that is already freed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() smc_rx_splice() hands RMB pages to a pipe and takes a socket reference per entry so the smc_sock stays alive until the reader finishes. The connection does not: a concurrent close runs smc_conn_free(), which releases the receive buffer back to the link group pool. smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() tests sk_state before taking the socket lock. The state can change between the test and the lock, and smc_rx_update_cons() then dereferences conn->rmb_desc and walks conn->lgr, which smc_conn_free() has already released. On the is_reg_err path smcr_buf_unuse() frees the descriptor outright, so this is a use-after-free. Take the socket lock first and test conn->freed instead. smc_conn_free() sets that flag before releasing anything, and every caller holds the socket lock. The two paths exclude each other: either the pipe release runs first with everything valid, or it sees the flag and skips the update.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: do not dereference an unset send buffer on the SMC-D teardown path smc_close_stream_wait() calls smc_tx_prepared_sends() from inside its sk_wait_event() condition, and sk_wait_event() evaluates that condition once with the socket lock released. smcd_buf_detach() clears conn->sndbuf_desc from smc_conn_kill() under lock_sock(), so a link group terminating while a socket waits there leaves the helper dereferencing NULL, faulting out of close(). SIOCOUTQ reads the field by hand, and smc_close_cancel_work() drops the lock across two cancel_*_sync() calls. Sample the pointer once in the helper, report nothing prepared while it is unset, and bound the ioctl the same way. The receive tasklet dereferences the field directly in smc_cdc_msg_recv_action(), not through this helper; 1/2 is what keeps it from running that late.