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656 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (14f3eeecfabfcb249c5f6ec2a20824355ac313ab18c677334076ca9501607ec8) At install time, setup.py invokes install_sitecustomize(), which copies src/temp_development_package_test/setup/sitecustomize.py into Python's purelib site-packages directory as sitecustomize.py (setup.py:34 destination = site_packages / "sitecustomize.py"; setup.py:36 shutil.copy2(source, destination)). Python auto-imports sitecustomize on every interpreter startup, so this places an interpreter-wide hook outside the package's own namespace that fires for every subsequent Python process on the host — a classic persistence mechanism. The hook payload file is not actually shipped in this 0.2 sdist, so the install would currently raise FileNotFoundError, but the install-time mechanism and intent to write a global hook are unambiguous. The package metadata corroborates a throwaway / probe release: name, author, and summary are all the literal placeholder 'temp_development_package_test'; setup.py imports base64 but never uses it; cli.py imports from an unrelated, undeclared module 'pg_agent.orchestration.coordinator'. The combination — placeholder identity plus install-time write of a global interpreter hook — is not a legitimate package shape. ## Source: kam193 (5cdc1d94dd0cfb62a4a0267ae52bf1a72dfa31a6854196b4bb220759b7c6e878) Starting with version 0.4, package installs a sitecustomize.py that executes during Python engine initialization. The embeded code uses mshta to download malicious code, as in other packages from the campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm Reasons (based on the campaign): - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - obfuscation - malware - tool:mshta | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-48853grpc · Deserialization of Untrusted Data Critical9.2EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48853 Deserialization of Untrusted Data and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerabilities in elixir-grpc grpc allow unauthenticated attackers to crash the BEAM node via atom table exhaustion and, when a decoded term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution on the server. 'Elixir.GRPC.Codec.Erlpack':decode/2 (lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex) calls :erlang.binary_to_term/1 on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option, no size bound, and no type guard. Any unauthenticated peer that sends a request with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can send a crafted payload that mints arbitrary new atoms (which are never garbage-collected, exhausting the bounded atom table and crashing the VM) or that encodes a fun term which, if applied anywhere downstream, executes attacker-controlled code inside the server process. This issue affects grpc: from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4639df1cd39850efb8106cbc5ecf3648f386c0cc5cff6c457d90f6a4d569cef0) On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js connects to a hardcoded attacker IP (http://213.218.160.189:8080, fallback:80), sends a base64-encoded host fingerprint (hostname, username, platform, arch) as the `q` query parameter, optionally XOR-decrypts the HTTP response with an embedded hex key, writes the decrypted bytes to a hidden file (`.node_<rand>.js`) under /tmp or %LOCALAPPDATA%/Temp, spawns it as a detached Node process with stdio ignored and windowsHide set, calls unref(), and deletes the staging file ~5 seconds later. The script also performs anti-analysis checks (scans `tasklist` for wireshark/fiddler/procmon/x64dbg/ida), introduces a randomized 0.5–2.5s start delay, and skips execution when `npm_config_dry_run` is set to evade dry-run inspection. The combination of plaintext HTTP fetch from a bare IP, payload decryption, hidden filename staging, detached background execution, and anti-analysis gating is a textbook install-time dropper that yields full code execution on the installer's machine and exfiltrates host identification to the attacker for follow-on targeting. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fe1f5e89ee0d8a218fe820d79c429a0178e4266b0720568eba6814f37702bc07) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General OnyxC2 emerged in early 2026 as a malware-as-a-service stealer sold on cybercrime networks for $250 monthly. The platform includes a web panel, payload builder, and tiered pricing structure with refund guarantees. Written in C++ with assembly for direct syscalls, it targets approximately 210 applications across nine categories: 45 browsers, 109 extensions including 2FA tools, 5 password managers, 17 cryptocurrency wallets, 11 FTP clients, 5 email clients, and VPN/messaging applications. The stealer achieves 99% detection evasion through mutated builds and delivers via DLL sideloading using signed binaries. Higher tiers unlock remote access capabilities including HVNC, LSASS dumping, reverse SOCKS5 proxy, keylogging, and reverse shell. Distribution occurs through fake installers delivered as password-protected archives, with C2 communication over Cloudflare-fronted HTTPS to akmuniverstall.top. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1b0701ad772209918c78eb4d038cce43946517f3558cbec1988c121c115a641d) node-denv presents itself as a pino-compatible logging middleware (index.js exports `module.exports.pino = middleware` and mimics pino's option shape including DEFAULT_LEVELS, formatters.bindings, redact, and customLevels). When a consumer instantiates the middleware, the package spawns a detached `node lib/caller.js` child process. lib/caller.js performs an HTTPS GET against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/EXSIF, reads the `.cookie` field from the JSON response, and passes it to `new Function.constructor("require", s)` invoked with the real `require` — granting the remotely-fetched JavaScript full Node.js capabilities (filesystem, network, child_process, env). The fetch is retried up to 5 times. A second jsonkeeper.com payload URL (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/ZK45J) is base64-encoded as `DEV_API_KEY` in lib/const.js as a fallback C2. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous mutable JSON paste host — the attacker can change the executed payload at any time without republishing the package. The pino impersonation lures developers searching for the popular logger into installing this package, at which point any normal use triggers remote code execution on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (39fd50e1c53ebcbf807d385f8a99cca3d059175cf50b3819571029c812e719fb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5dea0702101217f4a918a23191023bbd9e7d3b5478028bb0868341a574526e97) On `npm install`, postinstall.js executes unconditionally and performs three installer-harming actions. (1) It enumerates every key/value pair in `process.env` and scans for HTB{...} flag patterns (postinstall.js:42-45). (2) It reads a hardcoded list of absolute filesystem paths (/flag.txt, /root/flag.txt, /app/flag.txt, etc.) and shells out via `/bin/sh -c 'grep -Rao 'HTB{[^}]*}' /app /tmp /root /home /opt /usr/src'` to recursively scan the installer's filesystem (postinstall.js:65). (3) It HTTP-PUTs the discovered string (or a `NOFLAG uid=... cwd=...` fallback containing host identifiers) to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://154.57.164.70:30569/api/modules/ECT-472839` over plain HTTP. Additionally, postinstall.js:13-25 /:104-109 writes attacker-chosen content into common web document roots (/usr/share/nginx/html/flag.txt, /var/www/html/flag.txt, /app/public/flag.txt, etc.), creating a public leak channel on any installer machine that also serves a webroot. Although the package self-describes as a 'CTF payload for verdaccio supply-chain testing', publishing it to the public npm registry exposes any installer (CI runner, developer machine, container build) to environment scraping, filesystem search, host-info exfiltration, and webroot poisoning. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6d71f699510b488ccfcbffb3506c7201419f7229c5aa2544aae21845b8c56081) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Acronis Threat Research Unit identified two espionage campaigns targeting Cambodian government entities in defense and public works sectors, attributed to a cluster tracked as Khmer Shadow. Both campaigns delivered a custom C++ loader named NIGHTFORGE through government-themed lures in self-extracting archives. NIGHTFORGE employs sophisticated evasion techniques including NTDLL unhooking and Hell's Gate syscall resolution to decrypt and execute a Havoc Demon payload in memory. The loader utilizes DLL sideloading through a legitimate VMware-signed binary (VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe) and establishes persistence via COM-based scheduled tasks. Despite advanced technical capabilities, the actor demonstrated poor operational security by reusing identical payloads and infrastructure across targets. The campaigns targeted Cambodia's Information Collection Bureau and Ministry of Public Works and Transport using meeting-themed social engineering lures. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (29345b97ddc8c5fe985d1a69d53db15e4126052929267a584b463e94f43b0bc3) tailwind-typography-plus@2.1.0 impersonates the legitimate @tailwindcss/typography Tailwind CSS plugin (confusable name, copied plugin export shape, identical modifier and color-theme names) and weaponizes that drop-in usage with require-time arbitrary code execution. The package main src/index.js calls initScaleEngine() at top level, which runs src/responsive-scale.js. responsive-scale.js loads data/font-metrics.json, reverses an obfuscation transform over the 'ratio' floats (byte = round((ratio - 0.10) / 1.75 * 255)) to reconstruct a UTF-8 source string, then compiles it with `new Function('require','process','Buffer','console', source)` and immediately invokes the resulting function with full Node context (require, process, Buffer, console). Whatever bytes the maintainer encodes into font-metrics.json execute with full Node privileges on every `require('tailwind-typography-plus')`, with no signature, hash, or origin check. Separately, src/styles.js contains a top-level IIFE that on require creates os.tmpdir()/.tailwind-color-space-v2, evades CI environments via `!process.env.CI &&!process.env.TAILWIND_DISABLE_TELEMETRY`, and writes probe-<pid>.json containing arch, platform, execPath, and timestamp. The file carries an author comment explicitly labelled 'STEALTH PAYLOAD AREA / Replace the example below with your actual virus logic. / This executes once on first build after npm install.' — the package documents itself as malware scaffolding. The combination of typosquat naming, copied API surface, obfuscated require-time code-execution dropper, and self-labelled payload-insertion point is malicious by design. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c7c8d8dc7e81d4a27f46d92be719778dbd259d92a62e77e19c7242335c2d2d73) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (501daa3c8b2c9c2609dc60fd90ae59710a603ae56fa5dcc867d24913889c5413) ai-sdk-helpers@1.2.1 is a typosquat impersonating the Vercel AI SDK ecosystem (homepage ai-sdk.guide, author 'AI SDK Guide <hello@ai-sdk.guide>'). On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js reads installer-owned identity files it did not create — ~/.gitconfig, ~/.config/git/config,./.git/config (for the developer's git email) and ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml (for the GitHub CLI login and email) — and collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), and CI environment variables. The collected data is POSTed in plaintext JSON to https://npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app/ (scripts/postinstall.js line 147 / line 163). Comments in the script claim the data is 'anonymous' and 'one-way hashed', but the traced payload ships the raw scmEmail, githubLogin, githubEmail, hostname, username, and cwd fields. The tarball additionally ships scripts/publish-versions.sh, whose comment 'This creates the appearance of an active, maintained package' documents a republish loop of 21 fake versions to manufacture apparent activity. The combination of typosquat naming against Vercel's AI SDK, install-time harvest of developer→employer identity from installer-managed git/GitHub config, exfiltration to a third-party Cloudflare Run endpoint, and the shipped version-spam script establishes a coordinated install-time identity-exfiltration campaign targeting AI/LLM developers. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e33e9e9c454638a63c5ef112aeb9e9abc2d805effd5dc0ceebf54746cf7ef327) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit BlueTeam This content is a community-shared set of detection queries for identifying suspicious PowerShell and living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) activities in production environments. It includes specific queries to detect unusual parent processes for LOLBins, PowerShell spawned from office or browsers, encoded PowerShell commands with payload decoding, reflective loading indicators, and behavioral baseline layering to reduce false positives. The post is a knowledge-sharing resource rather than a direct security vulnerability or exploit. | Reddit BlueTeam | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-40988Spring Security · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-40988 An application using spring-security-saml2-service-provider and the REDIRECT binding for SAML 2.0 Login or Logout may be vulnerable to a denial of service by way of an unbounded writer that inflates the compressed SAML payload into memory. Affected versions: Spring Security 5.7.0 through 5.7.23; 5.8.0 through 5.8.25; 6.3.0 through 6.3.16; 6.4.0 through 6.4.16; 6.5.0 through 6.5.10; 7.0.0 through 7.0.5. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit BlueTeam This is a project update describing the implementation of a robust watermarking pipeline using DCT-QIM (Discrete Cosine Transform - Quantization Index Modulation) for intellectual property protection. The system embeds a resilient payload into mid-frequency DCT coefficients of images and videos, designed to withstand modifications such as resampling, compression, and cropping. It uses Reed-Solomon channel coding for error correction and a soft-symbol scoring with beam search for extraction. Verification employs a normalized Levenshtein similarity metric to assess watermark integrity even under tampering. The project is intended to maintain authorship traceability of digital assets. No vulnerabilities or exploits are reported. | Reddit BlueTeam | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (39e37d95fb040c83277583e2bf90b56363f86360337f1c30e63c85eb56579ada) The package advertises itself as a simple SQL helper but its main entry index.js is heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io string-array + RC4 + base64, 218-entry shuffled literal array, two RC4 decoders) with no human-readable logic. After deobfuscation, the top-level IIFE requires os/fs/path/child_process/axios, installs uncaughtException and unhandledRejection handlers to suppress errors, then assembles an IPv4 address at runtime by concatenating four numeric octets with '.', issues an axios HTTP GET to that host, writes the response body into os.tmpdir() with flag 'w+', and invokes child_process exec/spawn on the written file with windowsHide:true and cwd set to the tmp directory. This is a generic remote-binary dropper: the destination is mutable, the payload is opaque and unverified, the URL is built at runtime to evade static scanners, and the fetched file is unrelated to any SQL functionality. The dropper fires the moment any consumer require()s the package, so installing this dependency results in attacker-controlled code being downloaded to and executed from the consumer's temp directory. ## Source: ghsa-malware (af206fa9674f6676548fa54503b38eaa9a0cd31b267e4b7a39598bfde93c0e54) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Threat actors are increasingly leveraging the global interest in artificial intelligence by impersonating popular AI platforms such as ChatGPT, Copilot, DeepSeek, and Claude in social engineering campaigns. These operations span phishing attacks, malvertising, and search engine optimization-driven tactics that ultimately lead to credential theft, financial fraud, or malware infections. Observed campaigns include ChatGPT-themed phishing collecting credit card data targeting South Africa, Claude-themed adversary-in-the-middle attacks harvesting credentials and access tokens, malvertising campaigns distributing Vidar stealer through fake AI plugin downloads, and fraudulent DeepSeek V4 installers on GitHub. The initial access broker Storm-3075 has been identified employing AI-themed malvertising, while the financially motivated actor Fox Tempest provides malware-signing-as-a-service to enhance payload legitimacy. These campaigns combine traditional social engineering tactics with AI branding to improve success... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 2.2% | CVE-2026-11451GL.iNet GL-MT3000 · Command Injection Medium6.9EPSS 2.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11451 A flaw has been found in GL.iNet GL-MT3000 4.4.5. This impacts the function snprintf of the file /cgi-bin/glc of the component FTP Protocol Handler. Executing a manipulation of the argument media_dir can lead to command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 4.8.1 will fix this issue. You should upgrade the affected component. The vendor explains: "In version 4.8.1, before writing media_dir to the FTP configuration command, the code escapes single quotes using escape_single_quote(). The payloads in the report—which rely on closing a single quote, appending commands with a semicolon, and commenting out the tail with #—cannot escape execution under the current code path. We also verified this on a GL‑MT3000 device running firmware version 4.8.1 using similar payloads calling the /NAS_API_SET_PROTO_CONFIG interface. Although the interface returned success, the marker file intended to prove command execution was not created; the payload was written into /etc/vsftpd.conf only as ordinary configuration content and did not trigger any shell command execution. Therefore, with the current firmware version and default runtime environment, we could not reproduce the claimed “unauthorized command injection in set_proto_config”." EPSS 2.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4a5756a79331cdda67721e39889609f5c0b5e342b678dbce2de97c94ec2dbe29) The package installs `funcdesc-setup.pth`, which Python auto-executes at interpreter startup for any environment where this package is installed. The.pth file is obfuscated with single-letter aliases (`_O`, `_T`, `_G`, `_o`, `_s`, `_u`,...) and wraps its real payload in `exec()` over an inline string, gated by a `/tmp/.bun_ran` sentinel. On first run it calls `urllib.request.urlretrieve` to download the Bun JavaScript runtime release archive from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip`, extracts it to `/tmp/b/bun`, chmods it executable, and then invokes `bun run _index.js` against a bundled `_index.js` shipped inside the package. The advertised purpose of funcdesc is a Python function-description protocol; there is no legitimate reason for it to fetch and run an alternate JavaScript runtime, stage binaries in `/tmp`, or execute opaque bundled JS outside the documented Python API. The pattern (auto-loaded.pth, obfuscated exec, alternate-runtime dropper, mismatched purpose, in-file `__version__` still reading `0.2.1`) is consistent with a hijacked release rather than legitimate maintainer behavior. The harm fires automatically every time a Python interpreter starts in any environment where this version is installed, not only at `pip install`, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. ## Source: kam193 (c6f85c691f141dc4c962171ac49945286bb40e15cb8450d2f42d048a3f53bb22) Versions 0.2.2, 0.2.3 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8d1c97dced5d8f917e2e9901e0ed99fb0034bfafb5a3d46ad47eeba76a883c57) The package installs `mrbios-setup.pth` into site-packages. Python auto-loads.pth files at every interpreter startup, so the contained payload runs unconditionally for any `python` invocation on a machine where mrbios has been installed — not just when the package is explicitly imported. The payload is wrapped in an `exec()` of a string built from single-letter aliased imports (`_o`, `_s`, `_u`, `_p`, `_y`, `_T`, `_G`) to evade static review. When executed, it downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{os}-{arch}.zip` to `/tmp/b/bun`, chmods it executable (mode 509 / 0o775), and invokes it to run a sibling `_index.js` shipped in the package. A `/tmp/.bun_ran` sentinel gates re-execution per temp directory. The package advertises itself as a 'bioinformatics scripts management tool' and has no documented need for a JavaScript runtime; the JS payload runs outside Python's introspectable surface, so its behavior is not visible to ordinary Python tooling. The combination of unconditional auto-execution via.pth, deliberate obfuscation, alien-runtime fetch from a non-publisher source, and execution of bundled JavaScript whose contents are opaque to the Python ecosystem constitutes an install/startup-time remote code execution surface against any installer. ## Source: kam193 (3bc0ad232af6f3dafcf2d02441531485e0b459c2659542375c62f4f7003c9e08) Versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3cc7d54b0e30e24367551e3f19ab7387cf397cf9e1b5889c9f04ff871c771c38) The package installs okite-setup.pth, which Python auto-loads on every interpreter start. The.pth file contains a one-line obfuscated exec() of a string program (variables reduced to one- and two-character names like _o, _s, _u, _b, _z, _zf) that performs urllib.request.urlretrieve against https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip, extracts the Bun JavaScript runtime to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it 0755, and runs a sibling _index.js (with a glob fallback `*/_index.js`) via subprocess as `bun run _index.js`. Execution is gated only by a /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel so it fires once per temp directory lifetime. The stated package purpose is "A Pythonic RPC package" — there is no legitimate reason an RPC library would fetch and execute an alternate language runtime, and routing the payload through Bun deliberately bypasses Python-level inspection of the actual behavior. The combination of (a) execution at every interpreter start via.pth abuse, (b) outbound fetch of a runtime from a third-party release host, (c) use of that runtime to execute a bundled JS file, and (d) heavy obfuscation in a file format that should contain only `import` statements is an unambiguous alternate-runtime-dropper pattern. ## Source: kam193 (ec7e17ca2529781ce61d69b2d7e765c5e3e790d3ae2e2f187b006d710d7f9ed1) Versions 0.0.7, 0.0.8 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A multi-stage phishing campaign emerged in early May 2026, impersonating LinkedIn and Indeed through typosquatted domains to deliver malicious payloads. The attack chain begins with fake CAPTCHA pages distributed via Google Ads, leveraging the legacy Finger protocol and native Windows utilities. Victims are tricked into executing commands that deploy portable Python runtimes (CPython or IronPython), which then execute in-memory shellcode. The campaign delivers CastleLoader, a Malware-as-a-Service framework using ChaCha20 and RC4 encryption for C2 communications, followed by a Python-based remote access trojan. The RAT provides interactive shell control, in-memory payload execution, and persistence mechanisms. The campaign represents an evolution of browser-based social engineering, combining Living-off-the-Land binaries with Python-based delivery to maintain a fileless footprint and evade detection through legitimate system utilities. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45678 OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation provides eBPF instrumentation based on the OpenTelemetry standard. Prior to version 0.9.0, the Postgres protocol parser assumes BIND message payloads contain a valid NUL-terminated portal name. A crafted empty or unterminated payload can make OBI slice beyond the end of the captured buffer and panic. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.0. | CVE Database V5 |
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