Search: account.email-pm.me
56 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 9.6 | EPSS 0.2% | Critical9.6EPSS 0.2%GCVE Database The @better-auth/sso plugin versions >=0.1.0 and <1.6.11 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability via unvalidated OpenID Connect (OIDC) endpoint URLs when skipDiscovery is set to true. Authenticated users can exploit this by registering malicious OIDC providers, causing the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs. This can lead to reading internal HTTP responses, including cloud metadata services. If trustEmailVerified is enabled, attackers can escalate to account takeover by forging verified email claims that link to existing user accounts. The issue is fixed in version 1.6.11 by validating OIDC endpoint URLs against public routability or trusted origins and tightening schema validation. Workarounds include disabling provider self-registration, restricting access, network egress controls, and disabling trustEmailVerified until patched. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 10.0 | Critical10.0GCVE Database --- title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true --- ## Summary Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The `/api/providers` endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, `/api/usage/stats` exposes full plaintext API keys, and `/api/usage/request-logs` + `/api/usage/request-details` expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication. ## Affected Endpoints | Endpoint | Method | Issue | |---|---|---| | `/api/providers` | GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs | | `/api/providers/:id` | GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) | | `/api/providers` | POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys | | `/api/providers/:id` | PUT | Modify any existing provider connection | | `/api/providers/:id` | DELETE | Delete any provider connection | | `/api/usage/stats` | GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data | | `/api/usage/request-logs` | GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) | | `/api/usage/request-details/:id` | GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses | | `/api/version` | GET | Exposes current version info | | `/api/models` | GET | Exposes full model routing catalog | | `/api/v1/models` | GET | Exposes model list | ## Impact ### Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication An attacker can: 1. **Add a malicious provider** — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router 2. **Modify existing providers** — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic 3. **Delete all providers** — cause complete denial of service 4. **Read all provider configurations** — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses ### Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., `sk-...`) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts. ### Critical: Conversation history leak `/api/usage/request-details` returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces. ## Steps to Reproduce ### 1. Unauthenticated read of all providers ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/providers ``` Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes. ### 2. Create a provider without authentication ```bash curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}' ``` Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and `isActive: true`. ### 3. Modify an existing provider without authentication ```bash curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}' ``` Returns the updated connection object. ### 4. Delete a provider without authentication ```bash curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> ``` Returns `{"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}`. ### 5. Read full usage stats with API keys ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats ``` Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests. ### 6. Read request logs ```bash curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50" ``` Returns paginated request logs with timestamps, models, providers, user emails, token counts. ### 7. Read full conversation ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/request-details/<request-uuid> ``` Returns complete conversation turns for that request. ### 8. Read version info ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/version ``` Returns `{"currentVersion":"0.4.19","latestVersion":"0.4.45","hasUpdate":true}`. ## Root Cause The Next.js API routes under `src/app/api/*` lack authentication middleware on several endpoints. Specifically: - `/api/providers/*` — No auth check before CRUD operations on provider connections stored in the database - `/api/usage/stats` — No auth check before returning aggregated usage data including full API keys - `/api/usage/request-logs` — No auth check before returning request history - `/api/usage/request-details/:id` — No auth check before returning full conversation contents ## Suggested Fix 1. Add authentication middleware to all `/api/providers/*` routes (GET, POST, | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The tme-xca-react package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a 'tme' internal namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511630928838656. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (46077a15086044da0333de317d1d64309de37355e3630ad78126f28f0d6d096b) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code ## Source: ghsa-malware (9658410180b55c2b87a859a01472dace3280720a84dedb244befa677caa2581d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The anthropic-toolkit npm package is a typosquatting malicious package that does not provide legitimate library code but instead executes a post-install script that collects extensive sensitive information from the host system. This includes host and user identifiers, git configuration and history, SSH public key emails, cloud account details, internal DNS domains, and CI environment metadata. The collected data is sent to a remote server, enabling high-value reconnaissance for targeted phishing and supply-chain attacks. Installation of this package compromises the host, and all secrets and keys on the affected system should be rotated from a separate, trusted machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (768ddf82a7644f1678a27f3037c8a3fc4fae5f00b6181d6507a49892d20a7fda) On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js automatically reads a broad set of installer-side identity and cloud-configuration files — ~/.gitconfig and the parent project's.git/config plus.git/logs/HEAD (committer emails), ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml (GitHub login), every ~/.ssh/*.pub file (key identity comments / emails), ~/.config/gcloud/properties (GCP project and account), ~/.aws/config (profile names and SSO identifiers), /etc/resolv.conf (corporate DNS search domains), os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, current working directory, and the parent project's package.json. The collected data is bundled into a JSON payload and POSTed via https.request to the hardcoded endpoint https://npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app/. The package presents itself as a helper for the OpenAI Agents SDK (name `openai-agents-helpers`, author `OpenAI Agents JS Guide`, homepage `openai-agents-js.guide`, depends on `@openai/agents`), but none of those identifiers are owned by OpenAI — the branding impersonates the official SDK ecosystem to lure developers who are likely to have OpenAI API keys and cloud credentials in their environment. Collection is opt-out (an env var disables it) rather than opt-in, and the destination is not a documented publisher domain. Even with a credential-line skip filter, the exfiltrated data (AWS profile/SSO names, GCP project + account, GitHub login, SSH key identity emails, corporate DNS search domain, hostname, username) is high-value reconnaissance for targeted phishing and follow-on account compromise. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6303be8ee54533f33251590555db82063d5274b4d11a626603cca87c849e7807) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'ollama-helpers' versions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 contains malicious code that executes automatically upon installation. It collects extensive sensitive information from the host system, including OS hostname, usernames, git user emails, SSH public key comments, cloud account identifiers, and more, then exfiltrates this data to an anonymous Google Cloud Run endpoint. The package impersonates the official Ollama ecosystem but is unrelated and does not include the expected main executable, confirming it is a pure data exfiltration tool. There is no user consent or opt-out for this telemetry-like behavior. Systems with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-48166filamentphp filament · Timing Side Channel Medium5.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48166 Filament is a collection of full-stack components for accelerated Laravel development. From 4.0.0 until 4.11.5 and 5.6.5, the login page has an observable timing discrepancy that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate registered email addresses. The impact is limited to disclosing whether an account exists for a given email. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.11.5 and 5.6.5. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-35676thorsten phpMyFAQ · Weak Password Recovery High8.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-35676 phpMyFAQ before 4.1.3 contains an unauthenticated password reset vulnerability in the user password update API endpoint that allows attackers to change account passwords without token validation. Attackers can enumerate valid username and email pairs and force immediate password changes by sending PUT requests to the /api/index.php/user/password/update endpoint, causing account disruption and invalidating legitimate user credentials. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.2EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-35675 phpMyFAQ before 4.1.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the password reset endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to reset any user account password without token verification or email confirmation. Attackers can enumerate valid usernames, obtain plaintext passwords via email, and achieve complete account takeover including administrative access. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A supply chain attack has compromised the node-ipc npm package, with malicious versions 9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1 containing obfuscated stealer and backdoor functionality. The attack vector involved takeover of a dormant maintainer account through an expired email domain. The malware fingerprints host environments, enumerates and reads local files including SSH keys, cloud credentials, database configurations, and various developer secrets. Collected data is compressed into a gzip archive and exfiltrated via DNS TXT queries to attacker-controlled infrastructure disguised as legitimate Azure domains. The payload targets over 100 file patterns across macOS and Linux systems, focusing on developer credentials from AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, Docker, npm, GitHub, and numerous other services. The malicious code executes during CommonJS module loading, forking a detached child process to perform credential harvesting while avoiding detection through obfuscation and DNS-based covert channels. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (92a244ab5171edadc3082bc97d5b0834c4cfe98f2e5b6437503a30a7c1ac38aa) nolimit-x ships an entirely obfuscator.io-packed runtime (45 files under.ad/, including the x0.js entrypoint) with no readable source, and devDependencies + the build script confirm the obfuscation is intentional (`build: node scripts/obfuscate.js`, `javascript-obfuscator` in devDependencies). The decoded entrypoint exposes a CLI offensive toolkit: a `send` subcommand for bulk SMS via SMTP-to-carrier email gateways and bulk email; an `auth` subcommand performing OAuth device-code flows against Microsoft and Google to obtain SMTP + Microsoft Graph credentials; an `extract` subcommand that reads a victim mailbox's contacts via Graph + IMAP and writes them to disk; a `web` subcommand that injects a sending panel into a logged-in Chrome webmail tab; a `dkim` subcommand that generates DKIM keys for arbitrary sender domains; and `scan-redirects`. README markets it as an "Advanced email sender" with keywords including "red-team" and "smtp". A hardcoded license check (`http://api.nolimitent.xyz:4100/api/activate`) POSTs hardware ID, license key, hostname, and platform in cleartext when the operator runs license-gated subcommands. main and bin both point at.ad/x0.js, which calls program.parse() at module top level — a consumer that require()s the package will run commander against the consumer's process.argv (no network fires until argv matches a subcommand, but the library/CLI conflation plus pervasive obfuscation make pre-install audit infeasible). The package is a packaged phishing/spam/credential-phishing toolkit dressed as an npm library; installer-side harm is bounded (no auto-exfil at install or import), but the package's purpose is to enable attacks on third parties (mailbox owners, SMS recipients, OAuth account holders), and the obfuscation defeats normal supply-chain audit. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ccf60ba7ea5c4024535d8fb6006c06a6dc0c2bcd9f617d93f9f4bc07386f609b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure. `common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing. Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e769b4a4ea131df52366622b66d63dfbc7c1f5642ac8478c37f86d6c25477bb8) The package presents itself as a generic 'Common Telegram service for NestJS applications' but functions as one party's production application published as a library. Multiple installer-harming behaviors are present: 1. Authentication backdoor. AppModule registers AuthGuard as a global APP_GUARD. dist/guards/auth.guard.js line 84 accepts the literal string 'santoor' as a valid x-api-key (or apiKey query parameter) and grants access to any route. Any NestJS service that imports AppModule from this package exposes every endpoint to anyone who sends `x-api-key: santoor`. The same value is baked into the shipped Swagger UI as the default auth value. 2. Silent relay of consumer outbound HTTP. dist/utils/fetchWithTimeout.js (used package-wide) automatically POSTs the original request (URL, method, headers, body, params) to https://helper-thge.onrender.com/execute-request whenever an upstream call returns 403 or 495, unless the consumer overrides process.env.bypassURL. The relay endpoint is author-controlled and authenticated with the same 'santoor' shared secret, so the author can read every mirrored request — including any auth headers or bodies the consumer's service was sending to its own upstreams. 3. Default proxy and IP-management routing through author infrastructure. dist/components/Telegram/utils/generateTGConfig.js line 97 defaults PROXY_API_URL to https://cms.paidgirls.site/ip-management and PROXY_API_KEY to 'santoor'. With proxying enabled, all MTProto traffic for the consumer's Telegram sessions is routed through SOCKS5 proxies chosen by the author, who can intercept, drop, or correlate the consumer's Telegram identities. 4. Remote zip drop into the consumer's working directory. dist/cloudinary.js line 87 fetches https://cms.paidgirls.site/folders/<folderName>/files/download-all, writes the response to process.cwd()/temp.zip, and calls zip.extractAllTo(process.cwd(), true) — overwriting any files in the consumer's working directory with whatever the author's server returns. There is no hash check, signature, or version pinning, and the destination is mutable. If extracted files land where the consumer's process later loads code or config, this is full RCE in the consumer's environment. 5. Hardcoded couplings that are not disclosed. dist/guards/auth.guard.js lines 15-26 hardcode ALLOWED_IPS and ALLOWED_ORIGINS for paidgirls.site, zomcall.netlify.app, and tgchats.netlify.app, and the package wires logging notifications to specific Telegram channels owned by the author. Taken together, importing AppModule from this package gives the author master authentication on the consumer's API, a persistent traffic-mirroring channel, control of the consumer's Telegram proxy path, and an ability to write arbitrary files into the consumer's process CWD on demand. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3e16628ad8dc1e6a6c98044a97ae5b72aec56f8a5a5bbc5bdff50bdaf51d978e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-29139SEPPmail Secure Email Gateway · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel High7.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-29139 CVE-2026-29139 is a high-severity authentication bypass vulnerability in SEPPmail Secure Email Gateway versions before 15.0.3. It allows an attacker to take over accounts by exploiting the GINA account initialization process to reset a victim's account password. The vulnerability has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 7.8, indicating a significant risk due to its network attack vector and lack of required privileges or user interaction. No known exploits are reported in the wild, and no official patch or remediation link is provided in the available data. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-29132SEPPmail Secure Email Gateway · Missing Authentication Medium6.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-29132 CVE-2026-29132 is a medium severity vulnerability in SEPPmail Secure Email Gateway versions before 15.0.3. It allows an attacker who has access to a victim's GINA account to bypass a second-password authentication check, enabling unauthorized reading of protected emails. This vulnerability is categorized under CWE-306, indicating missing authentication for a critical function. There is no information about an available patch or official fix at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General On March 31, NSFOCUS CERT detected that the npm repository of the HTTP client library Axios was poisoned by the supply chain. The attacker bypassed the normal GitHub Actions CI/CD pipeline of the project, changed the account email address of the axios maintainer to an anonymous ProtonMail address, and manually released a malicious version with a Trojan backdoor through the npm CLI. When the user installs it, a persistent remote control will be established on the host. The impact is wide-ranging, and relevant users are requested to take measures for investigation and protection as soon as possible. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 1.0% | CVE-2025-34255D-Link Nuclias Connect · Observable Response Discrepancy Medium6.9EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-34255 D-Link Nuclias Connect firmware versions <= 1.3.1.4 contain an observable response discrepancy vulnerability. The application's 'Forgot Password' endpoint returns distinct JSON responses depending on whether the supplied email address is associated with an existing account. Because the responses differ in the `data.exist` boolean value, an unauthenticated remote attacker can enumerate valid email addresses/accounts on the server. NOTE: D-Link states that a fix is under development. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2025-59943thorsten phpMyFAQ · Incorrect User Management High8.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-59943 phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 4.0-nightly-2025-10-03 and below do not enforce uniqueness of email addresses during user registration. This allows multiple distinct accounts to be created with the same email. Because email is often used as an identifier for password resets, notifications, and administrative actions, this flaw can cause account ambiguity and, in certain configurations, may lead to privilege escalation or account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.13. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2025-48062discourse · Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output High7.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-48062 Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to version 3.4.4 of the `stable` branch, version 3.5.0.beta5 of the `beta` branch, and version 3.5.0.beta6-dev of the `tests-passed` branch, certain invites via email may result in HTML injection in the email body if the topic title includes HTML. This includes inviting someone (without an account) to a PM and inviting someone (without an account) to a topic with a custom message. This issue is patched in version 3.4.4 of the `stable` branch, version 3.5.0.beta5 of the `beta` branch, and version 3.5.0.beta6-dev of the `tests-passed` branch. This can be worked around if the relevant templates are overridden without `{topic_title}`. | CVE Database V5 |
Page 3 of 3