CVE-2026-101204 is a medium severity vulnerability in FastStone Image Viewer up to version 8.3. It involves an out-of-bounds read in the TGA Image Handler component of FSViewer.exe. The flaw can be triggered remotely and requires user interaction. The vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts, and no patch or fix information is available.
The npm package chalk-figlet version 1.2.0 contains malicious code that executes during installation. It runs a postinstall script that downloads a binary named RuntimeBroker.exe from an untrusted HTTP source and executes it on the host system. The package masquerades as a harmless chalk and figlet wrapper but performs unauthorized code execution.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (ac3bbe97b41f8d8d1a74e9f369318620c08d648365a4e78d49d1da31d085531d)
package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that auto-runs on `npm install` on Windows. The bundled 4444.vbs is a ~674KB script containing large opaque base64 blobs and an AES key/IV pair (`stateFKK`, `manifestGCP`) which it uses at runtime to decrypt an embedded payload via `CreateDecryptor().TransformFinalBlock` and hand it to `C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe` for execution. After staging, the script self-cleans with `cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 8 >nul & del /f /q... & rmdir /s /q...` to remove its own artifacts. Cover-story comments label the script a `Sync Agent — diagnostic telemetry collector` from a fictitious `Wingtip Toys Corporation`, but the code performs no telemetry-shaped behavior — it decrypts and executes an opaque payload. The package ships no other functionality; installing it on Windows results in arbitrary attacker code running under the installer's user account.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (5cb86188f9853b34c6dc3cf9c8259a789920326e8ddf4ae4cd3566385bba3ea1)
The package presents itself as a dotenv-style environment loader but ships a Windows dropper that fires automatically on module load and on CLI invocation. Both dist/index.cjs (the package main) and dist/cli.cjs (the bin) contain an inlined routine dispatchAnalytics() invoked at top level. That routine reads dist/stest.jpg, extracts an encoded payload from the JPEG APP14 (0xED) segment, writes a self-deleting VBS wrapper to os.tmpdir(), and launches it via wscript.exe to run powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand, using detached and windowsHide to hide the console. The strings 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', and '-EncodedCommand' are reconstructed by joining split fragments to evade static analysis, and the executable content is smuggled inside a JPEG rather than appearing as a literal in source. Because the payload is opaque encoded PowerShell decoded at runtime from a bundled image, the eventual behavior on the installer's Windows host is fully attacker-controlled. Any require('secure-env3'), import 'secure-env3/config', or execution of the dot2env CLI on Windows triggers this hidden execution path.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (43eddaf152e2aa60b9f823513a2d9b11fc424a5cff4bb3c031f6823a48dc2f4e)
package.json declares a postinstall hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that fires automatically on `npm install`. The shipped 4444.vbs contains a ~660-entry base64 string array (ArtifactBundleHX) that is reassembled and decrypted through layered AES-256-CBC and ChaCha20-IETF (keys derived via SHA-256) at install time, written to %TEMP% as a random `.dat` file, and passed to powershell.exe as a two-tier loader for in-memory execution / process hollowing. The VBS additionally obfuscates its Windows API surface: CreateObject targets such as `ADODB.Stream` and `Msxml2.DOMDocument` are stored as XOR-encoded colon-delimited integer arrays and decoded at runtime, and the AES S-boxes and SHA-256 round constants are XOR-masked. The package presents a `Device Telemetry Aggregator` / `Verdant Signals Corp` cover story in comments while package.json ships empty author and description fields. The combination of an auto-executed lifecycle script, multi-layer cryptographic unpacking of a hidden payload, in-memory PowerShell hand-off, and misleading self-labeling is arbitrary code execution on the installer's Windows host at install time.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (f996c75c75423a57a64c1c89b04f2e1ba87674973dba2dd359df5b0937ffe3cf)
The package is a dotenv typosquat that runs a hidden Windows loader on every require() and on CLI startup. dist/index.cjs and dist/cli.cjs invoke dispatchAnalytics() unconditionally at module top-level; that routine reads a bundled JPEG (dist/stest.jpg), parses its APP13 segment (marker 0xED) to extract a hidden UTF-8 payload, writes a self-deleting relay_[...].vbs into os.tmpdir(), and spawns wscript.exe detached with windowsHide:true to launch powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand carrying the extracted payload. Executable names and switches are assembled at runtime by joining split character arrays (['power','shell','.exe'].join(''), ['-No','Profile'], ['-Non','Interactive'], ['-Encoded','Command'], ['wscript','.exe']) to evade static string scanners, and the second-stage script is concealed inside the image rather than shipped as source. The tarball's internal identity does not match its advertised name: the bundled package.json inside dist/cli.cjs declares name:'node-env-buffer' version 2.2.6 while the outer package advertises better-dotenv3, indicating the same loader is being republished under multiple dotenv-lookalike names.
PRTG Network Monitor before version 26.2.120.1449 ships a demo EXE/Script sensor that multiplies two integer parameters using cscript.exe. If a non-numeric value is passed instead, cscript.exe raises a 'Type mismatch' runtime error that includes the offending parameter value in plaintext. PRTG provides a documented placeholder variable, %windowspassword, which resolves to the configured Windows/domain password used by PRTG and can be passed as a sensor parameter.
Any PRTG user who is not restricted to read-only access and is permitted to create sensors (the default for non-read-only users) can pass %windowspassword as an argument to the demo VBScript sensor, triggering the type-mismatch error and causing PRTG to display the plaintext password in the sensor's error output.
CVE-2026-51990 is a critical code injection vulnerability in Sogou Input Method versions prior to 16.3.0.3498. It allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the biz_helper.exe component. The vulnerability has a high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating severe impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The issue is fixed in version 16.3.0.3498.
Threat actors exploited trusted brands and cloud services in a sophisticated web campaign combining fraudulent DocuSign workflows, Florida healthcare screening lures, and deceptive cloud infrastructure to deploy ConnectWise ScreenConnect Access clients. The attack utilized Cloudflare Pages hosting with fake Cloudflare verification workflows to establish legitimacy. Victims were socially engineered to download a ZIP archive containing a malicious HTA file that employed Base64-encoded VBScript, fake Adobe interfaces, UAC privilege escalation, and Microsoft Defender SmartScreen registry modifications. The attack leveraged living-off-the-land techniques using native Windows tools like mshta.exe, curl.exe, and msiexec.exe for silent ScreenConnect installation, ultimately providing unauthorized remote access. The campaign was classified as Zero Hour Fraudulent and blocked at the web entry point before payload delivery could occur.
Cisco Talos disclosed a complex WebDAV infection chain linked to a Russian threat actor (UAT-10820) targeting a Ukrainian government organization. The campaign delivers the Amatera stealer along with secondary payloads such as ZigCryptoStealer and NetSupport Manager. This operation appears opportunistic and broad-based, focusing on cryptocurrency and credential theft rather than a highly targeted attack. Attackers use creative delivery and evasion techniques, including abusing legitimate infrastructure like the BNB Smart Chain for bulletproof hosting and fake CAPTCHA prompts to bypass web filters. Secondary payloads include a vulnerable driver to terminate endpoint detection and response (EDR) software and unauthorized remote access tools, enabling persistent control over infected systems. Security teams are advised to monitor for unusual WebDAV activity and suspicious DLL execution via rundll32.exe ordinal calls, educate users about fake verification prompts, and ensure endpoint solutions have robust memory scanning capabilities. No patch information is provided for this threat. The disclosure also includes a broader discussion on cybersecurity workforce mental health but is unrelated to the technical threat.
In June 2026, a new malware family named SloppyRAT was identified, likely used by ransomware-related threat actors to establish footholds for lateral movement. Delivered through multi-stage ClickFix infection chains, the malware features encrypted code blocks, EtherHiding for command-and-control resolution via Polygon JSON-RPC protocol, and multiple anti-analysis techniques including junk code and indirect system calls. SloppyRAT implements certificate pinning to prevent TLS traffic inspection and includes 47 built-in PowerShell-like commands for remote access. The infection chain uses finger.exe, IronPython, and deploys CastleLoader and CastleRAT components before installing SloppyRAT. Despite sophisticated capabilities, the codebase contains numerous software bugs affecting persistence mechanisms and other features, suggesting active development.
A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-36433) exists in Actions Semiconductor Co. Ltd Tool - Media Player Utilities version 4.46. This flaw allows a physically proximate attacker to execute arbitrary code via the Production.dll and RdiskUpgrade.exe components. The vulnerability has a high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating severe impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Two sophisticated phishing campaigns employed browser-in-the-browser (BiTB) techniques to deceive victims into installing rogue ScreenConnect remote management tools. Attackers sent phishing messages with malicious links redirecting targets to fake Adobe Reader update pages. The BiTB technique created convincing fake browser windows within webpages, displaying legitimate-looking Adobe URLs to bypass user awareness training. Victims were tricked into downloading ScreenConnect installers disguised as Adobe software updates. Each incident resulted in deployment of multiple rogue ScreenConnect instances for redundant persistence, followed by execution of defense-evasion binaries (HideCursor.exe and HideUL.exe) designed to hide attacker activities. The attacks established service-based persistence through Windows services, enabling continued remote access. Both campaigns were intercepted before further damage occurred, demonstrating how threat actors combine social engineering throughout the entire attack chain...
This analysis examines a sophisticated Vidar infostealer variant that employs a custom virtual machine to obfuscate its malicious code through proprietary bytecode interpretation. The malware implements extensive anti-analysis measures including debugger detection via NtQueryInformationProcess and RDTSC timing checks, sandbox evasion by identifying antivirus processes and checking system resources, and environment fingerprinting. Vidar targets credentials from web browsers including Chromium and Gecko-based extensions, Azure authentication tokens, FileZilla FTP credentials, and captures screenshots. It utilizes SeDebugPrivilege for elevated access, creates hidden desktops for browser automation, and exfiltrates stolen data through Telegram channels. The malware performs cleanup operations to remove execution artifacts and proxies DLL execution through rundll32.exe to blend with legitimate Windows processes.
Acunetix 25.11.251107123 for Windows contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Web Vulnerability Scanning Engine (wvsc.exe) that allows low-privileged local attackers to execute arbitrary code as SYSTEM by exploiting a missing hardcoded directory path for OpenSSL-related files. Attackers can create the missing directory, place a malicious file at the expected path, and cause the SYSTEM-level wvsc.exe process to load and execute it, resulting in full privilege escalation.
Since February 2026, there has been a resurgence of attacks abusing Node.js, targeting government, technology, and hospitality sectors. Attackers use the legitimate, signed node.exe binary to execute malicious JavaScript payloads, bypassing signature-based detection. Notable incidents include compromises of an Asian technology company and a U.S. fintech firm, involving advanced techniques such as EtherHiding and deployment of Rust-based backdoors linked to ransomware operations. Multiple attacks involve ModeloRAT, associated with initial access broker Woodgnat, connected to various ransomware families. Attackers combine living-off-the-land tactics with commodity malware and employ ClickFix techniques for initial access.
SiYuan Windows installer before version 3.8.1 (affected versions >= 2.0.14) contains an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in its NSIS installer, which invokes system executables such as TASKKILL by name rather than by absolute path. Because NSIS nsExec::Exec resolves these calls using a search path that includes the installer's own launch directory ahead of System32, an attacker who plants a malicious executable (e.g., a renamed TASKKILL.exe) in that directory can have it executed when the installer runs. These calls occur in electron-builder's preInit hook before the license page is displayed, and with an all-users (elevated) install the planted binary executes with an elevated token, resulting in local privilege escalation.
In July 2026, multiple APT campaigns targeted South Korean entities using spear phishing emails with malicious LNK files. Seven distinct attack types employed various techniques such as PowerShell scripts, AutoIt programs, DLL side-loading, and curl.exe downloads. Malware was distributed via platforms like GitHub, Google Drive, and Dropbox, disguised as legitimate documents or resumes. The campaigns deployed backdoors, infostealers, keyloggers, and XenoRAT malware to exfiltrate sensitive information and maintain persistence through Task Scheduler entries. Communication with command and control servers used PubNub channels with Base64-encoded data. The attacks focused on deceiving victims with work-related content to execute malicious payloads.
PaperCut has released an emergency patch for a zero-day vulnerability actively exploited in the wild affecting its NG and MF print management solutions. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to gain remote control over PaperCut's trusted configuration and execute arbitrary Java code within the application process. PaperCut urges users to install the emergency patches and implement mitigations such as disconnecting the application server from the internet and restricting access to trusted IPs. Indicators of compromise include suspicious activity related to pc-app.exe and truncated or deleted server.log files, suggesting attackers may attempt to cover their tracks. The vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078. The investigation is ongoing, and the attacker identity remains unknown. Approximately 1,000 PaperCut instances remain exposed to the internet, primarily in North America and Europe.
A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-30612) exists in Time4 Popcorn applications for Windows (<= 6.2.1.18), MacOS (<= 6.2.1.17), and Android (<= 3.5.0.173). It allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via specific updater components (updater.exe on Windows and PT.updd on MacOS). The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 9.8, indicating high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.