A new modular macOS information stealer named ClickLock Stealer has been discovered targeting users primarily in Europe, North America, and the Middle East. The malware is likely distributed via ClickFix social engineering pages that trick victims into pasting malicious commands into Terminal. Once executed, it deploys four components: a credential stealer, a Keychain stealer targeting Chrome's encryption key, a comprehensive crypto wallet harvester, and a persistent GSocket-based backdoor. The malware employs an aggressive 'locker' technique, killing all visible applications except password dialogs to force user compliance. It targets data from eight browsers, 31 crypto wallet extensions, seven password managers, desktop wallets, macOS Keychain, and shell history. The campaign has compromised at least 100 victims across 33 countries since May 2026, using compromised WordPress domains and Telegram for command and control and exfiltration.
TELEPUZ is a newly emerged modular malware-as-a-service first detected in April 2026, spreading through CLICKFIX-VIDAR infection chains. The lightweight, full-featured threat employs sophisticated evasion techniques including indirect syscalls, NTDLL unhooking, and anti-VM checks. It establishes persistence through service installation, communicates via WebSockets with C2 servers, and downloads additional modules for keylogging, credential theft, and web injection. The infection begins with social engineering tricks prompting victims to execute PowerShell commands, deploying VIDAR as a second stage which then delivers TELEPUZ components. Despite limited C2 infrastructure, high daily build volumes indicate active development and expanding operations by likely a small team or solo developer offering malware-as-a-service.
A ClickFix campaign has been identified that abuses Anthropic's Claude platform through shareable chat links to distribute MacSync Stealer targeting macOS users. Attackers utilized malvertising with paid Google ads to direct victims searching for Claude-related terms to malicious shared Claude chats falsely labeled as 'Apple Support.' These chats contained obfuscated installation commands that, when executed, deployed a multi-stage infection chain. The malware steals credentials from browsers and password managers, cryptocurrency wallet data, sensitive files, and system information. The campaign ran from June 12-19, 2026, targeting primarily Mac users with Russian-language comments in the code suggesting Russian-speaking threat actors. Domains used adopted themes related to U.S. local services to appear legitimate.
During June 2026, multiple infostealer families including Remus, ACRStealer, LummaC2, and Vidar were distributed through SEO poisoning techniques, disguised as illegal software such as cracks and keygens. Attacks utilized EXE files (84.5%) and DLL side-loading (15.5%) methods, with distribution primarily through Mediafire, Mega, and cloud storage platforms. Microsoft Corporation was the most frequently impersonated entity. MacOS environments were targeted through ClickFix techniques and malicious Bash scripts, with one variant dynamically obtaining C2 addresses via Polygon smart contracts. Email-based campaigns distributed AgentTesla and DarkCloud through compressed attachments, with both variants exfiltrating data via SMTP. The stolen credentials pose significant risks for dark web trading and secondary attacks.
The BabaDeda loader family has undergone significant advancements in its capabilities, particularly in stealth, evasion, and payload flexibility. Discovered during April 2026, this evolved framework continues to conceal malicious payloads within seemingly legitimate installer packages while expanding its functionality. The attack methodology begins with a social engineering exploit known as ClickFix, which encourages users to execute commands via trusted operating system utilities. This initial step transitions into a sophisticated multi-stage loader that employs several tactics, including hidden PowerShell commands, in-memory shellcode, DLL sideloading, and external payload storage.
A new macOS ClickFix campaign employs fake CAPTCHA pages to deceive users into executing malicious Terminal commands. The attack chain downloads and invisibly mounts a DMG file containing a self-signed information-stealer application bundle. This payload, assessed as belonging to the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) lineage—specifically the Odyssey variant—prompts users for passwords through fake System Preferences dialogs. The stealer harvests extensive data including browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet information from 13 standalone applications and 201 browser extensions, messaging app data, Apple Notes, Safari cookies, and macOS keychain entries. Exfiltrated data is compressed and sent to two command-and-control servers. The malware establishes persistence via LaunchAgent and trojanizes legitimate cryptocurrency applications including Ledger Live and Trezor Suite, replacing them with compromised versions downloaded from attacker infrastructure.
A sophisticated phishing campaign leverages evolved ClickFix techniques to bypass modern endpoint security through victim-assisted execution. Targets receive emails with urgent OneDrive document lures containing malicious ZIP attachments. The attack uses LNK shortcuts that redirect victims to landing pages, silently injecting PowerShell commands into their clipboard. Through social engineering, victims are tricked into manually executing commands via Win+R, circumventing traditional security filters. The campaign employs DNS TXT records for payload staging, avoiding HTTP detection. The threat infrastructure hosts multiple malicious components including obfuscated scripts, fake MSI installers masquerading as legitimate software like ConnectWise, and ISO images with spyware for persistent access. This represents a shift toward long-game tactics focused on establishing full post-compromise environmental control.
On May 14, 2026, a supply chain attack was discovered targeting the Okendo Reviews widget, a customer review platform used by over 18,000 brands. The threat actor injected malicious JavaScript code into the legitimate widget, which is deployed on high-traffic e-commerce pages including storefronts and product pages. The compromised JavaScript acted as a staged loader, using obfuscation, localStorage tracking, User-Agent filtering, and XOR-based decoding to conceal next-stage infrastructure. The attack employed ClickFix-style social engineering to deceive users into executing malicious commands, ultimately delivering remote access trojans like NetSupport and Remcos, or information stealers such as StealC. Affected websites received hundreds of thousands to millions of monthly visitors, with nearly 15,000 blocks recorded in a single day.
This analysis covers infostealer distribution trends observed during May 2026, based on automated collection systems and diagnostic logs. Distribution occurred primarily through illegal software disguised as cracks and keygens, as well as email campaigns. ACRStealer, Remus, and LummaC2 were most prevalent, with distribution via domains including Mediafire and AWS S3 buckets. Microsoft was the most impersonated company, followed by Auslogics and NVIDIA. EXE files represented 78.9% of execution types, while DLL side-loading accounted for 21.1%. macOS environments saw ClickFix techniques and malicious Bash scripts, with 142 scripts and 12 C2 domains identified. Email campaigns distributed AgentTesla and DarkCloud. Remus showed significant growth, comprising 36% of distributions. LummaC2 remained the most prevalent overall variant.
Cybercriminals orchestrated a sophisticated malvertising operation leveraging Google Ads to impersonate popular AI developer tools including Claude AI, ChatGPT Codex, Perplexity, Cursor IDE, and JetBrains. Over seven weeks spanning April to June 2026, attackers deployed 106 unique malicious hostnames across six distinct waves, initially hosting ClickFix social engineering pages on GitLab infrastructure before pivoting to weaponize claude.ai's legitimate shared chat feature. The campaign targeted technically proficient users searching for AI development tools, tricking them into executing terminal commands that deployed the MacSync infostealer. This credential-harvesting malware collected browser data, SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallets. The Asia-Pacific region sustained the heaviest impact with 67.2% of over 2,000 victims, particularly concentrated in Taiwan. Anthropic responded by banning malicious accounts and implementing additional abuse mitigations.
In March 2026, threat actors leveraged AI-powered website builders to create typosquatting domains impersonating a Brazilian bank. The campaign employed ClickFix techniques, presenting victims with fake CAPTCHA and BSOD screens to trick them into executing malicious PowerShell commands. This delivered SmartRAT, a PowerShell-based banking trojan with capabilities including encrypted C2 communications, remote control of screen/keyboard/mouse, credential theft through keylogging and banking overlays, and QR code interception for transaction fraud. The malware establishes persistence via scheduled tasks and Windows services, and targets Brazilian financial institutions, payment platforms, and cryptocurrency exchanges. The threat actors' C2 panel contained critical authentication flaws allowing client-side bypass, suggesting deployment without adequate security review.
A ClickFix social engineering attack on an unmonitored endpoint led to a multi-stage intrusion affecting over 11 hosts. The infection chain began with a malicious HTA payload that silently installed an MSI package containing Potemkin, a custom loader with a deterministic DGA. Potemkin delivered RMMProject, a 4.4 MB Lua-scriptable RAT featuring browser credential theft with Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass, hidden-desktop remote control, and 15 distinct task types. The attacker deployed EtherRAT, a Node.js backdoor resolving C2 addresses from Ethereum blockchain, and established a Cloudflare tunnel for persistent access. Hands-on-keyboard activity included battling Windows Defender through AMSI patches, registry modifications, and service termination, followed by lateral movement via WMIExec and SMBExec to deploy malware across the network and reach the domain controller.
SilabRAT is an advanced Remote Access Trojan offered as Malware-as-a-Service on Darkweb forums since late 2025, developed by threat actor o1oo1 and sold for $5,000 monthly. This financially-motivated tool focuses on credential theft and cryptocurrency operations, featuring Hidden Virtual Network Computing for invisible remote control, browser profile cloning to bypass session protections, and automated cryptocurrency wallet password cracking. The RAT bypasses Chrome App-Bound Encryption, performs session hijacking, and includes keylogging, clipboard monitoring, and remote desktop capabilities. Distributed through phishing and ClickFix campaigns with operator-hosted infrastructure, SilabRAT uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption for command-and-control communications. The developer also offers AsmCrypt, a companion crypter service, creating a complete malware bundle from evasion to execution and remote control.
In May 2026, a new malware family named MLTBackdoor was identified, likely leveraged by ransomware-related threat actors to establish footholds for lateral movement. Delivered through multi-stage ClickFix infection chains targeting automotive-related web pages, this backdoor employs sophisticated obfuscation techniques including Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic and Control Flow Flattening. MLTBackdoor features indirect system calls, API hashing, and extensive anti-analysis checks that detect debuggers and sandboxed environments. Its capabilities include filesystem operations and a powerful Beacon Object File loader that dynamically expands functionality. The malware uses custom encrypted binary protocols over TLS with Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange for command-and-control communications. Additionally, it implements a deterministic date-based Domain Generation Algorithm to maintain persistence when hardcoded C2 domains become unreachable, demonstrating advanced resilience against takedown attempts.
A sophisticated phishing campaign exploits Amazon's brand reputation through spoofed security alerts to deliver HarborWatch Agent, a custom remote access trojan. The attack chain begins with emails impersonating Amazon security notifications about suspicious account activity, directing victims to lookalike domains. Users are presented with fake CAPTCHA verification pages that employ ClickFix social engineering techniques, instructing them to execute PowerShell commands on their own systems. The multi-stage infection downloads mysql.exe from compromised infrastructure, which communicates with a Chinese-language command and control panel branded Harbor Sentinel. The RAT collects extensive system information including OS details, architecture, CPU count, disk usage, memory status, and network configurations, exfiltrating data through API endpoints to the threat actor's monitoring infrastructure.
A multi-stage phishing campaign emerged in early May 2026, impersonating LinkedIn and Indeed through typosquatted domains to deliver malicious payloads. The attack chain begins with fake CAPTCHA pages distributed via Google Ads, leveraging the legacy Finger protocol and native Windows utilities. Victims are tricked into executing commands that deploy portable Python runtimes (CPython or IronPython), which then execute in-memory shellcode. The campaign delivers CastleLoader, a Malware-as-a-Service framework using ChaCha20 and RC4 encryption for C2 communications, followed by a Python-based remote access trojan. The RAT provides interactive shell control, in-memory payload execution, and persistence mechanisms. The campaign represents an evolution of browser-based social engineering, combining Living-off-the-Land binaries with Python-based delivery to maintain a fileless footprint and evade detection through legitimate system utilities.
DriveSurge is a newly identified threat actor operating as an Initial Access Broker using a Pay-Per-Install model to supply victim leads to downstream actors. The actor has compromised thousands of websites, injecting malicious code that redirects visitors through zTDS (Traffic Distribution System) to deliver malware via two primary methods: FakeUpdates, which impersonate browser update prompts for Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Safari, and eight other browsers; and ClickFix, which tricks users into executing malicious PowerShell commands disguised as fixes. DriveSurge leverages sophisticated infrastructure including bulletproof hosting, obfuscated JavaScript injection patterns, and environment-specific targeting including macOS systems. The operation has been active since at least September 2025, utilizing specific technical fingerprints including unique file naming conventions and server configurations that enable detection and tracking of their evolving infrastructure.
Threat actors exploited the EtherHiding technique to store ClearFake payload routing instructions within smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain testnet, creating an immutable command-and-control infrastructure that cannot be taken down. The attack began with injected JavaScript on a compromised Swiss website that queried blockchain contracts to deliver malicious payloads. Victims passing anti-analysis checks were fingerprinted by operating system and routed to platform-specific ClickFix social engineering overlays. The campaign simultaneously deployed SectopRAT, a .NET-based remote access trojan capable of browser session hijacking, and ACRStealer, a C++ infostealer targeting credentials and cryptocurrency wallets. An on-chain execution tracker confirmed each compromise in real time. Four smart contracts shared a single deployer wallet, with the oldest deployed nearly a year before analysis, indicating a long-running, actively maintained operation.
The ClickFix campaign is a malware operation that has evolved from simple disk-based infections to advanced, obfuscated attacks using fake CAPTCHA pages to trick victims into running malicious PowerShell commands. Early variants used cleartext commands to download batch scripts deploying DeerStealer InfoStealer. Later versions employ fileless execution with XOR encryption or Base64 compression, running entirely in memory. The most advanced stage uses server-side polymorphism to dynamically generate unique obfuscated payloads per victim, delivering Vidar InfoStealer. The campaign has been active since March 2026, with increased activity through May, leveraging approximately 4,500 live domains. It uses techniques to evade forensic detection by deleting traces after execution.
Device code phishing attacks have exploded across the threat landscape, with new toolkits emerging weekly. This surge coincides with publicly released criminal toolkits and multiple phishing-as-a-service offerings like EvilTokens and Tycoon. Threat actors abuse the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow to compromise Microsoft 365 and other enterprise accounts by tricking users into authorizing malicious applications. Current implementations use on-demand code generation, addressing the 15-minute expiration limitation of previous techniques. Most activity appears to be generated using AI-based coding techniques. Successful attacks lead to full account takeover, data theft, business email compromise, and potential ransomware deployment. The technique represents the natural evolution of credential phishing as organizations improve their defenses against traditional multifactor authentication bypass methods.
