Search: ms-software-update.com
130 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 4.0 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-41254SUSE · Security update for lcms2 Medium4.0EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-41254 This security update for lcms2 addresses two integer overflow vulnerabilities identified as CVE-2026-41254 and CVE-2026-42798. Both vulnerabilities occur in different components of the software: CubeSize in cmslut.c and ParseCube in cmscgats.c. These issues could potentially lead to unexpected behavior or crashes. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.6% | HighEPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-25707 This update for zypper, libzypp, libsolv fixes the following issues: Changes in zypper: Update to 1.14.98: - Transactional systems: Delegate rw-commands to transactional-wrapper if available (jsc#PED-13680, jsc#PED-15607) On a transactional system where the root filesystem is mounted read-only, zypper commands that modify the system cannot be executed directly. If the system provides a transactional-wrapper utility, zypper will automatically attempt to invoke it. The wrapper transparently executes the zypper command within a new, writable snapshot and manages the lifecycle of that snapshot based on the command's exit status. On transactional systems lacking a transactional-wrapper, users must manually invoke specialized tools -such as transactional-update- to install, update, or remove software. - Add --filter-version-change to zypper lu. Adds filtering by version change significance to reduce noise in update listings. Supports levels: rebuild (hides rebuild-only changes) and package (hides all release-only changes). - Autorefresh ris-services the way as plugin-services (bsc#1246504) It's actually wrong to treat service refreshes different depending on the service type. For the purpose of a service it makes no difference how the data about the repos to use are acquired. Changes in libzypp: Updated to 17.38.13: - A .repo files "path=" entry must not refer to a location outside the repo (bsc#1267874, CVE-2026-44942) A "path=" entry may solely denote a sub-directory of the baseurl where the metadata are located. A relative path trying to access data outside the baseurl is reported and sanitized. - Repo "keyhint" must denote a filename, no path (bsc#1267426, CVE-2026-44941) - Fix potential crash on malformed or malicious repository metadata (fixes #740) - Repo metadata: discard entries referring to a location outside the repo (bsc#1259802, CVE-2026-25707) Mirroring those data locally would refer to a location outside the repo's local cache directory. Those data entries are reported and discarded. - zypp.conf: Allow [env] section to add environment variables. This feature is designed to enable environment-specific settings or debugging options over an extended period. See zypp.conf(5). - Prevent configured scripts from escaping the sigcheck directory (bsc#1265223, CVE-2026-44933) - StringV: guard hasPrefix/hasPrefixCI against reading past the view end (fixes #735) - Mandatory signature verification plugin support (PED#11922) - Fix purge-kernel -rc kernel handling (bsc#1239718) - Explicitly_set_pool_DISTTYPE_RPM (fixes #726) - Check for trusted key updates when updating the general keyring (bsc#1259706) - Support multiple MirroredOrigin authorities (bsc#1253193) - Workaround doxygen bug: doxygen/doxygen#12057 - libzypp.spec: Add missing graphviz-gd BuildRequires (boo#1259842) Changes in libsolv: Updated to 0.7.39: - fix solv_chksum_free segfault when called with a NULL pointer - made repo_add_solv more robust against corrupt files [bsc#1265935] [CVE-2026-9149] - fix potential buffer overflow when verifying EdDSA signatures [bsc#1266039] [CVE-2026-48863] - added limit checks in multiple places to catch overflows - reduce the size of the language id cache - fixed Debian canon selection - fixed dbpath detection in repo_rpmdb_librpm - reduced stack usage in repo page compression (needed for musl) - fix parsing of sha512 checksums in debian repositories [bsc#1265938] [CVE-2026-9150] - improve speed of dirpool_add_dir makeing parsing of filelists.xml twice as fast - fix parsing of recommends in the old Mandriva synthesis format | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.4% | Critical9.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46949 Oracle has released a Critical Security Patch Update (CSPU) in June 2026 addressing multiple vulnerabilities across a wide range of Oracle E-Business Suite products and other Oracle software components. The update includes 245 new security patches targeting vulnerabilities in Oracle code and third-party components. Oracle strongly recommends applying these patches promptly to mitigate risks, as attackers have attempted to exploit previously patched vulnerabilities when patches were not applied. The CSPU complements Oracle's quarterly Critical Patch Updates and aims to provide focused, high-priority fixes with minimal disruption. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12003 To allow builds of Python to be run from an in-tree layout (rather than an installed file layout), the VPATH variable is defined at build time and used to locate certain landmarks - specifically, Modules/setup.local. When this landmark is found relative to VPATH relative to the executable, Python assumes it is running in a source tree and generates a different default sys.path. This code remains in release builds, so that release-ready builds can be built in-tree. On Windows, since builds are written to 'PCbuild/', the value of VPATH is set to '..\..', which results in a landmark of '..\..\Modules\setup.local'. This path is outside the install directory of Python, and may have different permissions, potentially allowing a low-privilege user to create the landmark and an alternative `Lib` folder that will be discovered by an otherwise restricted install. Such a setup occurs with the legacy default install location for all users (in the now superseded EXE installer), due to how Windows allows all users to create folders in the root directory of their OS drive. Our recommended mitigation on Windows is to migrate away from the legacy installer and use the new [Python install manager](https://www.python.org/downloads/latest/pymanager/) to install for the current user. Installs where the directory two levels above the Python installation directory have equivalent permissions are unaffected (in general, a per-user install cannot be modified at all by other users, removing any escalation of privilege risk, and could be directly modified by a privileged user, making the potential tampering irrelevant). Alternative mitigations might include preemptively creating and restricting access to a `Modules` directory. Be aware that only 3.13 and 3.14 will receive updated legacy installers - earlier fixes are only provided as sources. Platforms other than Windows allow VPATH to be overridden, but as they don't usually use a separated directory in the build for binaries, are unlikely to have a landmark reference outside of the install directory. The landmark detection involving VPATH is a fallback for when a more specific landmark - .\pybuilddir.txt - is absent, and was included for compatibility. Future releases of Python will no longer include the fallback, and so builds will need to generate or preserve the pybuilddir.txt file in order to work in-tree. This landmark file has been generated on Windows since 3.11, and on other platforms for longer. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-48114NCEAS metacat · SQL Injection Critical9.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48114 Metacat is data repository software that helps researchers preserve, share, and discover data. Versions 2.0.0 and and above contain an unauthenticated SQL injection in the /harvesterRegistration endpoint. HarvesterRegistration.dbInsert() builds an INSERT against HARVEST_SITE_SCHEDULE via string concatenation, using a quoteString() helper that performs raw single-quote wrapping without escaping. Three request parameters reach the sink: unit, contactEmail, and documentListURL. The servlet does not verify a real LDAP identity. Allowing the vulnerable insert to proceed. Since the PostgreSQL backend permits stacked queries via Statement.executeUpdate(), this vulnerability allows full read/write/execute access in the Metacat database context. The vulnerability was remediated in Metacat 3.0.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 1.3% | CVE-2024-39331SUSE · Security update for syft Critical9.8EPSS 1.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-39331 This security update for the Syft tool addresses multiple issues through versions 1.43.0, 1.44.0, and 1.45.0. The updates include new feature additions such as support for additional binary classifiers and architectures, as well as numerous bug fixes related to package detection, parsing errors, and cataloging inaccuracies. The update aims to improve the accuracy and reliability of Syft's software composition analysis capabilities. No specific vulnerability details or exploit information are provided in the available data. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) has introduced a two-hour delay before automatically updating extensions to mitigate risks associated with software supply chain attacks. This delay applies to most extensions except those from trusted publishers like Microsoft, GitHub, and OpenAI, which continue to update immediately. The feature aims to provide an additional layer of protection by allowing time to detect and respond to potentially compromised or problematic extension releases. Users retain the option to manually update extensions immediately if desired. This change aligns with similar time-delay controls recently adopted by other package managers to reduce exposure to malicious package versions. The update is available starting with VS Code version 1.123. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research On June 2, 2026, the White House signed an Executive Order directing federal agencies to harden their systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses and to stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse — most of it on a 30-day clock. Here’s what the EO requires and how Tenable can help. Key takeaways: The new AI Security Executive Order will require national security and civilian federal agencies to prioritize cyber defenses to account for new frontier AI model capabilities. Tenable is well positioned to help federal agencies gain visibility across their environments, including AI assets, and to prioritize the vulnerabilities and other exposures that pose the highest risk; Tenable AI-enabled exposure management capabilities can help support vulnerability remediation and automate multi-step remediation workflows. The vulnerability and patching clearinghouse which will be developed under the Executive Order will require strong engagement from private sector partners, including Tenable, to drive actionable insights on AI-associated vulnerabilities and mitigation prioritization. On June 2, 2026, the President signed an Executive Order (EO) titled “ Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security .” The direction is clear and the calls to action are fast-moving. Within 30 days: Federal agencies must begin hardening their information systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses. CISA must issue new directives or guidance for civilian agencies. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury), with the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), must stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse focused on finding and fixing software vulnerabilities. Within 60 days, Treasury, with the Department of War (DoW), NSA and CISA, in consultation with the White House and other agencies, must establish a classified benchmarking process to assess the capabilities of frontier AI models through voluntary collaboration with AI developers. While the Executive Order applies to U.S. federal agencies, the need to prepare for changes in the threat landscape brought about by the advanced cyber capabilities of frontier AI models applies to any organization that needs to manage cyber risk. Here’s a breakdown of what the AI EO requires, the deadlines that matter, and where Tenable fits. What the AI Executive Order requires The EO’s operative provisions sit in Section 2 (“Upgrading American systems for advanced AI”) and Section 3 (“Secure frontier model deployment”). The cybersecurity core is in Section 2. Within 30 days: National security and defense systems. The Committee on National Security Systems must prioritize the cyber defense of National Security Systems (NSS) and the Secretary of War must do the same for DoW information systems (Section 2(a) and 2(b)). Civilian federal systems and critical infrastructure. CISA, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the National Cyber Director, must release Binding Operational Directives (BODs) “and other guidance as appropriate” to: Expedite and prioritize the cyber defense of civilian federal information systems. Establish or expand federal programs and services that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. Facilitate access to cybersecurity tools and services, including where appropriate, covered frontier models, for agencies, state and local authorities, and critical infrastructure operators such as rural hospitals, community banks, and local utilities. Worth noting, while the EO directs CISA to release BODs or other guidance for federal civilian agencies, the specific implementation directives are not yet known (Section 2(c)). The AI cybersecurity clearinghouse. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the National Cyber Director, NSA, and CISA, must form an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse, in voluntary collaboration with the AI industry and critical infrastructure operators. The EO tasks the clearinghouse with three concrete functions, per Section 2(d): Coordinate and deconflict scanning for software vulnerabilities Discover and validate those vulnerabilities Coordinate and prioritize the remediation and distribution of vulnerability patches. Grant funding for AI vulnerability detection. OMB, with the National Cyber Director and CISA, must determine whether existing federal grant programs have funding that can be directed toward applicants developing advanced AI vulnerability detection (Section 2(e)). Within 60 days: Cybersecurity workforce. The Office of Personnel Management must expand hiring and placement pathways for cybersecurity specialists through the United States Tech Force (Section 2(f)). Secure frontier model deployment. Treasury, NSA, and CISA, in consultation with NIST and others, must develop a classified benchmarking process to assess the advanced cyber capabilities of AI models. They must also set the threshold for designating a “covered frontier model,” and design a voluntary framework through which developers can give the government up to 30 days of pre-release access to those models. The Executive Order is explicit that it does not create any mandatory licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for AI models (Section 3). No fixed deadline: Criminal enforcement. The EO directs the Attorney General to prioritize enforcement against those who use AI to illegally access or damage computer systems (Section 4). For federal cybersecurity leaders, this is less a future-state policy document than a near-term planning trigger. Watch for CISA’s issuance of BODs and other guidance, and for readouts on the clearinghouse, during June and July. How Tenable can help The EO’s center of gravity — finding software vulnerabilities, validating them, prioritizing them, and driving remediation — is the work Tenable's platform is built to do. While the AI Executive Order focuses on vulnerability discovery, validation, prioritization, and remediation, the benefit of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform is that it addresses vulnerabilities alongside other security weaknesses, including misconfigurations of AI systems and overpermissioned AI agents, to serve as the system of action for mitigating cyber exposure and reducing cyber risk across organizations’ expanding attack surfaces. Below, learn how specific Tenable capabilities map to the EO’s requirements. Continuous vulnerability detection across the attack surface Sections 2(a) through 2(d) turn on the ability to find vulnerabilities across a wide range of systems continuously. Tenable One Vulnerability Management and Tenable Security Center provide network-based and agent-based assessment across IT assets, with credentialed scanning for greater depth. Tenable One Cloud Exposure extends that visibility to cloud workloads and configurations, and Tenable One Attack Surface Management maps internet-facing assets that agencies may not know they have. For agencies operating classified or air-gapped environments — relevant to the National Security Systems named in Section 2(a) — Tenable Enclave Security is built to run vulnerability and configuration assessment inside those boundaries. Risk-based prioritization, not “patch everything” Section 2(d) doesn’t only call for discovering vulnerabilities — it calls for prioritizing them for remediation. That distinction matters because no agency can patch everything at once. Tenable’s Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) uses machine learning, trained on the company’s corpus of more than 1.7 trillion security findings accumulated over more than 25 years of continuous scanning, to forecast which vulnerabilities are most likely to be exploited, so defenders can focus on the smaller set that represents real, immediate risk. By leveraging AI-generated features and expert intelligence from Tenable's Research Special Operations team, VPR helps organizations pinpoint the critical 1.6% of vulnerabilities that represent actual business risk . Tenable also ingests CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — the continuously updated, authoritative list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) under active exploitation — directly into prioritization, aligning remediation guidance to the same source CISA uses to track risk across the federal enterprise. AI-enabled defensive tooling Section 2(c) directs CISA to establish or expand programs that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. As frontier AI models accelerate the rate at which vulnerabilities can be discovered and exploited , the traditional window for manual remediation is rapidly closing. The June 2026 AI Executive Order recognizes this shift, directing federal agencies to counter machine-speed threats with AI-enabled cyber defenses within 30 days. Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , is designed to help counter machine-speed threats, supercharge productivity, and accelerate risk reduction by automating multi-step remediation workflows. Security teams can leverage pre-built agents directly in the user interface or build custom agents via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), turning exposure intelligence into decisive action at machine speed. At the same time, as agencies build custom models or adopt third-party tools like ChatGPT and Copilot, they fundamentally expand their attack surface. It is now critical to protect enterprise AI, shadow AI, training data, and underlying infrastructure from emerging threats like adversarial attacks, data poisoning, and model theft. Tenable secures this expanding attack surface with Tenable One AI Exposure , which is designed to help agencies see, manage, and control the risks introduced by generative AI. Tenable One AI Exposure allows agencies to discover and inventory AI tools and libraries, and apply AI usage policies across the environment — a growing requirement as agencies adopt AI and need to account for it as part of | Tenable Research | |||
| High | 8.6 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.6EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46273 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmveth: Disable GSO for packets with small MSS Some physical adapters on Power systems do not support segmentation offload when the MSS is less than 224 bytes. Attempting to send such packets causes the adapter to freeze, stopping all traffic until manually reset. Implement ndo_features_check to disable GSO for packets with small MSS values. The network stack will perform software segmentation instead. The 224-byte minimum matches ibmvnic commit <f10b09ef687f> ("ibmvnic: Enforce stronger sanity checks on GSO packets") which uses the same physical adapters in SEA configurations. The issue occurs specifically when the hardware attempts to perform segmentation (gso_segs > 1) with a small MSS. Single-segment GSO packets (gso_segs == 1) do not trigger the problematic LSO code path and are transmitted normally without segmentation. Add an ndo_features_check callback to disable GSO when MSS < 224 bytes. Also call vlan_features_check() to ensure proper handling of VLAN packets, particularly QinQ (802.1ad) configurations where the hardware parser may not support certain offload features. Validated using iptables to force small MSS values. Without the fix, the adapter freezes. With the fix, packets are segmented in software and transmission succeeds. Comprehensive regression testing completedd (MSS tests, performance, stability). EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.8% | MediumEPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-28390 A denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2026-28390) exists in the compat-openssl10 package used by Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. The flaw is due to a NULL pointer dereference in CMS EnvelopedData processing within OpenSSL libraries provided for compatibility with older software. Red Hat has issued a security update to address this moderate severity issue. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Learn how attackers exploit automated bot traffic as part of software supply chain attacks to artificially inflate download counters and mask malicious payloads as legitimate. Key takeaways Volume doesn’t equal trust. Packages with numerous versions and high download counts might seem legitimate, but attackers can easily manipulate those metrics. Attackers exploit automated infrastructure. By initially flooding the registry with numerous benign versions of a package, threat actors trigger automatic downloads from mirrors, scanners, and analysis bots, which artificially inflate traffic. Although old download-inflation techniques still work, attackers are developing new sophisticated techniques to deceive developers into installing malicious packages. Downloads count metric Following recent software supply chain attacks in which Tenable has seen attackers steal access tokens and secrets from developer workstations and CI/CD build servers, we started actively monitoring and analyzing npm packages uploaded to the public registry. Initially, we used download counts as a primary metric to determine package relevance. During our monitoring, we identified a recurring anomaly: Brand new packages displayed unusually high download counts within hours of upload. Upon further investigation, we discovered that those packages also had many versions. We found that packages whose content got updated frequently — usually by systematically uploading many new versions for the same package — had an unusually high downloads count. We observed this technique being used deliberately in the wild for the first time in our analysis of the malicious “ambar-src” package , which reached more than 50,000 downloads in three days after attackers uploaded more than 700 versions. We named this technique “download pumping.” Developers and security tools frequently use download counts as one of the metrics to assess a package's legitimacy. Since there is no simple method for determining if a package is legitimate, this artificial inflation effectively disguises the threat. Analysis In the “ambar-src” campaign, threat actors systematically published hundreds of benign versions of the package before introducing the actual malicious payload. Because npm registers each interaction with these updates as traffic, this repetitive version-publishing process achieved two goals: It heavily populated the package’s release history, creating a dense changelog that made the project appear actively maintained and historically legitimate to developers evaluating it. Every time a new version was published, automated systems like repository mirrors and analysis bots automatically downloaded it. Because the attackers systematically uploaded hundreds of versions, they artificially generated a massive wave of automated traffic, inflating the package's download count to more than 50,000 downloads in just three days. From Tenable’s initial analysis, each version uploaded to the npm public registry typically receives between 100 and 150 downloads from automated systems. We verified that fact by running our proof-of-concept (POC) and analyzing the download count. Download pumping PoC To validate these mechanisms, we conducted a POC that replicated the download pumping behavior. We created test packages and systematically published a high volume of new versions to the npm registry. As the npm team stated in their blog , their download stats are naive by design, and they do not put much effort into filtering automated bot traffic. Thus, various repository mirrors, analytical bots, and automated security scanners immediately pulled each new version we uploaded. This validated that an attacker can predictably generate a baseline of downloads entirely through automated publishing, requiring zero organic user interaction. During our POC, we wanted to see how different package properties might affect the automated download volume. We were working under the assumption that packages with postinstall scripts raise the interest level of security scanners. Postinstall scripts are highly interesting to defenders because attackers frequently use these lifecycle hooks to automatically execute malicious payloads the moment a package is installed. Since this is a common malware-deployment technique, automated security scanners prioritize downloading and inspecting packages that have these scripts configured. It is important to note that security scanners don’t have to download the package itself to determine if the npm package has a postinstall script configured, as this data is available in the package metadata in the public registry. For those reasons, we believed that security scanners are more likely to download packages with install scripts configured, as they are more likely to contain malicious code. We deployed three distinct test packages to npm to test our assumption and observed the following results: Version bump only: 135.55 downloads per version This was our baseline test package. We didn’t add or remove any code when publishing a new version, nor did we make any other attempt to make the package look interesting. We simply bumped up the version number each time. Static postinstall script: 141.91 downloads per version This was our second test package, and the first one to have a postinstall script configured, but we didn’t change the script when publishing new versions. Dynamic postinstall script: 158.16 downloads per version In this third test package, we changed the postinstall script every time we bumped up the version. We did this as we believed that security scanners would be more interested in packages whose postinstall script changed, as it could be an indicator of compromise. Graph showing how Tenable’s first POC software package experienced a spike in downloads when we started publishing new versions of it. This data demonstrates a straightforward cause-and-effect: automated infrastructure and security scanners naturally generate more download traffic for packages that exhibit interesting or actively changing behaviors. Other package managers While our research focused specifically on the npm ecosystem, the fundamental mechanics behind this technique are not unique to npm. Other package registries such as PyPI , RubyGems , and NuGet operate with similar automated infrastructure — mirrors, security scanners, and analysis bots — that pull new versions as they are published. Although the specific download amplification and trust metrics may differ across ecosystems, the core principle remains the same: where automated systems react to new publications, there is potential for abuse. Real-world example of download pumping As already stated, we first observed this technique being used in the wild during our analysis of the “ambar-src” package . Let’s look at this in more detail. The attackers created an npm package containing utility code that can be used for legitimate purposes, such as MathUtils, StringUtils and Time functions. The attackers then systematically uploaded 428 legitimate versions of the package in just two hours. The attackers did this to gain initial credibility and attempt to lure developers to use their code. Three days later, the attackers uploaded a new version containing malicious code. By this point, the attackers’ package already had more than 30,000 downloads. In total, the attackers uploaded 724 versions including malicious and legitimate versions. This led to an artificially generated wave of automated traffic, resulting in around 50,000 downloads total. This repetitive version-publishing process successfully inflated the package's download count and created a dense release history, making the project appear historically legitimate before the malware was deployed. Past research on npm download manipulation The manipulation of npm downloads metrics is not a new discovery. In a 2021 research blog , independent developer Andy Richardson showed how prone the npm registry’s download tracking is to abuse, by demonstrating that bad actors can send HTTP requests to a package’s tarball URL to fake downloads. Using automated tools, the researcher successfully drove nearly 1 million spoofed downloads in a single week for a completely unused package. Tenable validated this technique still works in 2026. By sending HTTP requests directly to the URL of the package’s tarball, Tenable successfully inflated a test package’s metric to 17,000 downloads in approximately one hour, using nothing more than a standard office laptop and an internet connection. However, this new version-flooding method we’ve identified offers two distinct advantages: First, it provides amplification, because an attacker gains 100 to 150 automated downloads from repository mirrors for every single version they upload, rather than just one download per HTTP request. Second, systematically publishing these updates populates the release history, creating a dense version log that makes the package appear actively maintained and historically legitimate. Mitigation of supply chain attacks Organizations should not depend on download counts or version histories to determine if a package is legitimate. As we have demonstrated, attackers can easily fake these metrics using automated systems, creating a false sense of trust. Instead, organizations should adopt common industry best practices, such as version pinning and implementing minimum package-age restrictions. These best practices are effective, as security vendors and the open-source community actively monitor these registries and typically detect malicious packages fairly quickly, within a couple of days at most. By enforcing a short waiting period of three to four days before allowing a new package or new version of an existing package into your environment, you allow the community time to identify these threats in the public registry. Once they are detected, they are removed from the public registry, eliminating the risk. It is worth noting that npm is actively working to improve the security of its ecosystem. Recent efforts include adding support for package-age checks directly in the npm CLI, as well as strengthening authentication mechanisms for package maintainers to reduce the risk of account takeovers. While these are meaningful steps in the right direction, the reality is that no single measure can fully prevent malicious code from reaching the public registry. Supply chain attacks will continue to evolve, and organizations should also layer their own defenses rather than rely on the ecosystem alone. For example, organizations can add extra protection for CI/CD build servers by deploying ephemeral CI/CD runners that are destroyed immediately after a single use to prevent malware from lingering. Operating those temporary runners without persistent storage makes it harder for threat actors to save their payloads or establish persistence across different build jobs. Additionally, organizations should enforce least-privilege network access. Restricting outbound traffic makes it harder for malicious payloads running on the build server to reach the open internet to download second-stage malware payloads like “msinit.exe.” So what? Currently, developers are still being hacked through open-source supply chain techniques . The metrics developers and security tools depend on — download counts, version history, maintenance activity — are superficial indicators that, as we have demonstrated, an attacker can manipulat with minimal effort. But the problem runs deeper than fake signals. Even when a package has a legitimate track record with a trusted maintainer behind it, that trust can be compromised overnight. Recent waves of account takeovers, social engineering campaigns, and credential theft targeting established maintainers have shown that a package's history is no guarantee of its current safety, even for legitimate packages. A new version published under a trusted name can carry a malicious payload, and the package manager has no built-in mechanism to catch it. In practice, there is no deterministic method to determine if a new package is malicious or not. Therefore, each package you install and use must be treated like it could be malicious. The meaningful trust signal comes after the fact: from security vendors and the open-source community actively scanning and analyzing packages once they are published. This is exactly why enforcing minimum-age requirements on new packages and new versions is such an effective control . A short waiting period of a few days gives the security community time to detect, flag, and remove threats from the public registry before they ever reach your environment. Organizations that consume packages the moment they are published are accepting risk that is entirely avoidable. Download pumping is ultimately just the initial entry vector for a much larger objective. Attackers using these techniques are generally aiming for one of two outcomes. First, they aim to compromise build servers and CI/CD pipelines. By successfully injecting a malicious dependency into these systems, threat actors achieve “God-mode” over the infrastructure, which can lead to a full compromise of the entire production environment. Second, and even worse, they aim to compromise the developers of highly popular packages. By hijacking a trusted maintainer’s environment, attackers can inject malicious code that thousands of downstream organizations automatically pull, creating a massive cascading effect across the broader software supply chain. How Tenable can help defend against supply chain attacks To defend against supply chain attacks, you need to know exactly what code is running in your environment. The Tenable One Exposure Management Platform and Tenable Nessus can help you build a complete asset inventory of the npm packages used across your organization. Use the following Nessus plugins to build an inventory of the npm modules in your environment: 200172 - Node.js Modules Installed (Windows) 179440 - Node.js Modules Installed (macOS) 178772 - Node.js Modules Installed (Linux) As Tenable continuously analyzes your environment, you get direct visibility into exactly what is installed on your systems. This visibility ensures you can quickly locate and remove compromised packages as soon as a new threat is discovered. Beyond building a complete inventory, organizations also need to actively monitor their environments for live threats. Tenable One Cloud Exposure , a CNAPP, builds on this visibility by continuously monitoring your cloud environment to proactively detect these types of supply chain attacks in real time. Together as part of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform, these tools proactively detect supply chain attacks across your environments, ensuring your security teams can immediately identify and neutralize malicious activity before attackers can fully compromise your production systems. | Tenable Research | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (048493f47bc6a8b0a61c93d14a9bfbbe5edd77baff2d2423870e3cc8b7099b0a) On require, index.js invokes initPlugin() at the module top level, which performs an HTTPS GET to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/VL3WY, parses the response JSON, and passes the 'cookie' field to new Function.constructor('require', body)(require). This compiles attacker-controlled JavaScript and invokes it with the installer's `require`, granting arbitrary code execution with full Node.js privileges on every import. The payload host (jsonkeeper.com) is an anonymous paste service whose contents are mutable, so the executed code can change at any time without a package update. The package is also a typosquat of the widely-installed `normalize-path`: it impersonates the original author (Jon Schlinkert) in package.json and mimics the normalizePath API surface to lure consumers who mistype the dependency name. ## Source: ghsa-malware (72df791955fa3a6c17ed65991ceb827e6f5c82846699195e5c809c8000337a8a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky researchers conducted an in-depth analysis of Kimsuky APT activity, revealing tactical shifts and new malware variants based on the PebbleDash platform. The group introduced HelloDoor, a Rust-based backdoor, httpMalice leveraging HTTP and Dropbox communications, and updated MemLoad and httpTroy variants. Kimsuky maintains persistence through legitimate tools including VSCode Tunneling with GitHub authentication and DWAgent remote management software. Initial access occurs via spear-phishing with malicious attachments disguised as documents. The group primarily targets South Korean entities across government and defense sectors, with additional PebbleDash attacks observed in Brazil and Germany. Infrastructure relies on free South Korean hosting services and tunneling services like Cloudflare Quick Tunnels and Ngrok. Both PebbleDash and AppleSeed malware clusters demonstrate ongoing development with shared distribution methods, stolen certificates, and overlapping targets, indicating single-actor c... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-4827 We strongly recommend the following industry cybersecurity best practices. * Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from the business network. * Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your industrial control and safety systems, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. * Place all controllers in locked cabinets and never leave them in the “Program” mode. * Never connect programming software to any network other than the network intended for that device. * Scan all methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network such as CDs, USB drives, etc. before use in the terminals or any node connected to these networks. * Never allow mobile devices that have connected to any other network besides the intended network to connect to the safety or control networks without proper sanitation. * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and systems and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet. * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. For more information refer to the Schneider Electric [Recommended Cybersecurity Best Practices](https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/7EN52-0390/) document. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.4 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-42812Apache Polaris · Incorrect Authorization Critical9.4EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42812 In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong to the table and which table version to read. `write.metadata.path` is an optional table property that tells Polaris where to write those metadata files. For a table already registered in a Polaris-managed catalog, changing only that property through an `ALTER TABLE`-style settings change (not a row-level `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `UPDATE`, or `DELETE`) bypasses the commit-time branch that is supposed to revalidate storage locations. The full persisted / credential-vending variant requires the affected catalog to have `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=true`, with `allowedLocations` broad enough to include the attacker-chosen target. `allowedLocations` is the admin-configured allowlist of storage paths that the catalog is allowed to use. Public project materials suggest that this flag is a real supported compatibility / layout mode, not just a contrived lab-only prerequisite. In that configuration, a user who can change table settings can cause Apache Polaris itself to write new table metadata to an attacker-chosen reachable storage location before the intended location-validation branch runs. If the later concrete-path validation also accepts that location, Polaris persists the resulting metadata path into stored table state. Later table-load and credential APIs can then return temporary cloud-storage credentials for the same location without revalidating it. In plain terms, Polaris can later hand out temporary storage access for the same attacker-chosen area. That attacker-chosen area does not need to be limited to the poisoned table's own files. If it is a broader storage prefix, another table's prefix, or, depending on configuration or provider behavior, even a bucket/container root, the resulting disclosure or corruption scope can extend to any data and metadata Polaris can reach there. The practical consequences are therefore similar to the staged-create credential-vending issue already discussed: data and metadata reachable in that storage scope can be exposed and, if write-capable credentials are later issued, modified, corrupted, or removed. Even before that later credential step, Polaris itself performs the metadata write to the unchecked location. So the core issue is not only later credential vending. The primary defect is that Polaris skips its intended location checks before performing a security- sensitive metadata write when only `write.metadata.path` changes. When `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=false`, current code review suggests the later `updateTableLike(...)` validation usually rejects out-of-tree metadata locations before the unsafe path is persisted. That may reduce the persisted / credential-vending variant, but it does not prevent the underlying defect: Polaris still skips the intended pre-write location check when only `write.metadata.path` changes. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure. `common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing. Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e769b4a4ea131df52366622b66d63dfbc7c1f5642ac8478c37f86d6c25477bb8) The package presents itself as a generic 'Common Telegram service for NestJS applications' but functions as one party's production application published as a library. Multiple installer-harming behaviors are present: 1. Authentication backdoor. AppModule registers AuthGuard as a global APP_GUARD. dist/guards/auth.guard.js line 84 accepts the literal string 'santoor' as a valid x-api-key (or apiKey query parameter) and grants access to any route. Any NestJS service that imports AppModule from this package exposes every endpoint to anyone who sends `x-api-key: santoor`. The same value is baked into the shipped Swagger UI as the default auth value. 2. Silent relay of consumer outbound HTTP. dist/utils/fetchWithTimeout.js (used package-wide) automatically POSTs the original request (URL, method, headers, body, params) to https://helper-thge.onrender.com/execute-request whenever an upstream call returns 403 or 495, unless the consumer overrides process.env.bypassURL. The relay endpoint is author-controlled and authenticated with the same 'santoor' shared secret, so the author can read every mirrored request — including any auth headers or bodies the consumer's service was sending to its own upstreams. 3. Default proxy and IP-management routing through author infrastructure. dist/components/Telegram/utils/generateTGConfig.js line 97 defaults PROXY_API_URL to https://cms.paidgirls.site/ip-management and PROXY_API_KEY to 'santoor'. With proxying enabled, all MTProto traffic for the consumer's Telegram sessions is routed through SOCKS5 proxies chosen by the author, who can intercept, drop, or correlate the consumer's Telegram identities. 4. Remote zip drop into the consumer's working directory. dist/cloudinary.js line 87 fetches https://cms.paidgirls.site/folders/<folderName>/files/download-all, writes the response to process.cwd()/temp.zip, and calls zip.extractAllTo(process.cwd(), true) — overwriting any files in the consumer's working directory with whatever the author's server returns. There is no hash check, signature, or version pinning, and the destination is mutable. If extracted files land where the consumer's process later loads code or config, this is full RCE in the consumer's environment. 5. Hardcoded couplings that are not disclosed. dist/guards/auth.guard.js lines 15-26 hardcode ALLOWED_IPS and ALLOWED_ORIGINS for paidgirls.site, zomcall.netlify.app, and tgchats.netlify.app, and the package wires logging notifications to specific Telegram channels owned by the author. Taken together, importing AppModule from this package gives the author master authentication on the consumer's API, a persistent traffic-mirroring channel, control of the consumer's Telegram proxy path, and an ability to write arbitrary files into the consumer's process CWD on demand. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3e16628ad8dc1e6a6c98044a97ae5b72aec56f8a5a5bbc5bdff50bdaf51d978e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.9EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-7598 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 2.3% | High7.5EPSS 2.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-61726 Red Hat has issued a security update for the opentelemetry-collector component in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9. The update addresses two vulnerabilities: a memory exhaustion issue in the Go net/url package (CVE-2025-61726) and an unexpected session resumption flaw in the crypto/tls package (CVE-2025-68121). These vulnerabilities could impact the stability and security of systems running the affected software. The update is rated as Important by Red Hat Product Security. Users of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 and its variants are advised to apply the update to mitigate these issues. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A campaign using fake Zoom and Google Meet pages to lure victims into fraudulent video calls has been identified. The attackers use these pages to deliver remote-access software. Multiple domains hosting identical fake meeting pages were discovered, with one domain previously linked to a ClickFix campaign. The fake interfaces show an active meeting with expected participants. When victims join, they are prompted to download a file disguised as a Zoom update. Various payloads were identified, including executables masquerading as meeting updates, MSI installers deploying legitimate remote support software, and commercial monitoring software configured for covert remote access. The campaign's goal appears to be establishing remote access using whichever tool is most effective. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated scam campaign is targeting users with a fake Zoom meeting website that automatically downloads and installs an unauthorized version of Teramind, a legitimate workforce monitoring solution. The attackers create a convincing imitation of a Zoom video call, complete with fake participants and audio, to lure victims. After a short delay, an 'Update Available' prompt appears, leading to the silent installation of the monitoring software. The altered Teramind installer is configured to run stealthily and avoid detection by security tools. This campaign is particularly dangerous as it misuses legitimate commercial software, making it difficult for traditional antivirus tools to detect. The attackers gain full surveillance capabilities over the victim's device, including keylogging, screen capture, and file monitoring. | AlienVault OTX General |
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