HTTP::Session2 versions before 1.12 for Perl for Perl may generate weak session ids using the rand() function.
The HTTP::Session2 session id generator returns a SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand function, the epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand() function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
HTTP::Session2 after version 1.02 will attempt to use the /dev/urandom device to generate a session id, but if the device is unavailable (for example, under Windows), then it will revert to the insecure method described above.
Apache::SessionX versions through 2.01 for Perl create insecure session id.
Apache::SessionX generates session ids insecurely. The default session id generator in Apache::SessionX::Generate::MD5 returns a MD5 hash seeded with the built-in rand() function, the epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage. Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Smolder versions through 1.51 for Perl uses insecure rand() function for cryptographic functions.
Smolder 1.51 and earlier for Perl uses the rand() function as the default source of entropy, which is not cryptographically secure, for cryptographic functions.
Specifically Smolder::DB::Developer uses the Data::Random library which specifically states that it is "Useful mostly for test programs". Data::Random uses the rand() function.
Concierge::Sessions versions from 0.8.1 before 0.8.5 for Perl generate insecure session ids. The generate_session_id function in Concierge::Sessions::Base defaults to using the uuidgen command to generate a UUID, with a fallback to using Perl's built-in rand function. Neither of these methods are secure, and attackers are able to guess session_ids that can grant them access to systems. Specifically,
* There is no warning when uuidgen fails. The software can be quietly using the fallback rand() function with no warnings if the command fails for any reason.
* The uuidgen command will generate a time-based UUID if the system does not have a high-quality random number source, because the call does not explicitly specify the --random option. Note that the system time is shared in HTTP responses.
* UUIDs are identifiers whose mere possession grants access, as per RFC 9562.
* The output of the built-in rand() function is predictable and unsuitable for security applications.
Maypole versions from 2.10 through 2.13 for Perl generates session ids insecurely. The session id is seeded with the system time (which is available from HTTP response headers), a call to the built-in rand() function, and the PID.
WWW::OAuth 1.000 and earlier for Perl uses the rand() function as the default source of entropy, which is not cryptographically secure, for cryptographic functions.
CVE-2025-66630 is a critical vulnerability in the GoFiber web framework versions prior to 2.52.11, caused by the use of a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in UUID generation. The issue arises because the underlying crypto/rand package in Go versions before 1.24 can return errors when secure randomness is unavailable, but Fiber's UUID functions do not propagate these errors. This leads to predictable or low-entropy UUIDs being used in security-sensitive middleware components such as sessions, CSRF protection, rate limiting, and request ID generation. Exploitation could allow attackers to predict identifiers, potentially bypassing security controls or causing session fixation. The vulnerability has a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.2 (critical) and is fixed in Fiber version 2.
WBCE CMS is a content management system. Versions 1.6.4 and below use function GenerateRandomPassword() to create passwords using PHP's rand(). rand() is not cryptographically secure, which allows password sequences to be predicted or brute-forced. This can lead to user account compromise or privilege escalation if these passwords are used for new accounts or password resets. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.6.5.
Fiber Utils is a collection of common functions created for Fiber. In versions 2.0.0-rc.3 and below, when the system's cryptographic random number generator (crypto/rand) fails, both functions silently fall back to returning predictable UUID values, including the zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000". The vulnerability occurs through two related but distinct failure paths, both ultimately caused by crypto/rand.Read() failures, compromising the security of all Fiber applications using these functions for security-critical operations. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0-rc.4.
Apache Druid’s Kerberos authenticator uses a weak fallback secret when the `druid.auth.authenticator.kerberos.cookieSignatureSecret` configuration is not explicitly set. In this case, the secret is generated using `ThreadLocalRandom`,
which is not a crypto-graphically secure random number generator. This
may allow an attacker to predict or brute force the secret used to sign
authentication cookies, potentially enabling token forgery or
authentication bypass. Additionally, each process generates its own
fallback secret, resulting in inconsistent secrets across nodes. This
causes authentication failures in distributed or multi-broker
deployments, effectively leading to a incorrectly configured clusters. Users are
advised to configure a strong `druid.auth.authenticator.kerberos.cookieSignatureSecret`
This issue affects Apache Druid: through 34.0.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 35.0.0, which fixes the issue making it mandatory to set `druid.auth.authenticator.kerberos.cookieSignatureSecret` when using the Kerberos authenticator. Services will fail to come up if the secret is not set.
A vulnerability was identified in the password generation algorithm when accessing the debug-interface. An unauthenticated local attacker with knowledge of the password generation timeframe might be able to brute force the password in a timely manner and thus gain root access to the device if the debug interface is still enabled.
Starch versions 0.14 and earlier generate session ids insecurely.
The default session id generator returns a SHA-1 hash seeded with a counter, the epoch time, the built-in rand function, the PID, and internal Perl reference addresses. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Apache::AuthAny::Cookie v0.201 or earlier for Perl generates session ids insecurely.
Session ids are generated using an MD5 hash of the epoch time and a call to the built-in rand function. The epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Catalyst::Authentication::Credential::HTTP versions 1.018 and earlier for Perl generate nonces using the Perl Data::UUID library.
* Data::UUID does not use a strong cryptographic source for generating UUIDs.
* Data::UUID returns v3 UUIDs, which are generated from known information and are unsuitable for security, as per RFC 9562.
* The nonces should be generated from a strong cryptographic source, as per RFC 7616.
Vision UI is a collection of enterprise-grade, dependency-free modules for modern web projects. In versions 1.4.0 and below, the getSecureRandomInt function in security-kit versions prior to 3.5.0 (packaged in Vision-ui <= 1.4.0) contains a critical cryptographic weakness. Due to a silent 32-bit integer overflow in its internal masking logic, the function fails to produce a uniform distribution of random numbers when the requested range between min and max is larger than 2³². The root cause is the use of a 32-bit bitwise left-shift operation (<<) to generate a bitmask for the rejection sampling algorithm. This causes the mask to be incorrect for any range requiring 32 or more bits of entropy. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.0.
Catalyst::Plugin::Session before version 0.44 for Perl generates session ids insecurely.
The session id is generated from a (usually SHA-1) hash of a simple counter, the epoch time, the built-in rand function, the PID and the current Catalyst context. This information is of low entropy. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Authen::DigestMD5 versions 0.01 through 0.02 for Perl generate the cnonce insecurely.
The cnonce (client nonce) is generated from an MD5 hash of the PID, the epoch time and the built-in rand function. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
According to RFC 2831, "The cnonce-value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, and to provide mutual authentication. The security of the implementation depends on a good choice. It is RECOMMENDED that it contain at least 64 bits of entropy."
Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions 2.04 through 2.1800 for Perl generates the cnonce insecurely.
The cnonce (client nonce) is generated from an MD5 hash of the PID, the epoch time and the built-in rand function. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
According to RFC 2831, The cnonce-value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, and to provide mutual authentication. The security of the implementation
depends on a good choice. It is RECOMMENDED that it contain at least 64 bits of entropy.