Search: a-resolver.com
154 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (27ba065e8759299d381ed1c7abd5e7721037b4ea969a384a9e70cfb6bb799e17) Package declares `scripts.preinstall`: `node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects hostname, username, home directory, INIT_CWD, local IPv4, public egress IP (via api.ipify.org, icanhazip.com, ifconfig.me), DNS resolver IP and client subnet (via o-o.myaddr.l.google.com), and the parent project's package.json fields (name, author, repository, homepage). The collected JSON is exfiltrated to the hardcoded callback host `da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcallbk1.oast.fun` (Interactsh/OAST) via DNS-chunked queries and HTTPS POST to `/poc/<uuid>`. The unscoped name is published at version 999.9.12 to defeat internal resolvers that fall back to the public npm registry, so any build referencing `fund-portfolio` without a private-registry pin will resolve to and execute this payload. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (ffad2f6c37441c2924e67b1d506d9c26dc9cb2fae325b74a596102ea5ed403bf) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'fund-portfolio' @ 999.9.12 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ff42d765d0c2f6af53e4be5a9cf26ef34b3a36accf199acfb7d53af40b8dc2a6) On npm install, the declared preinstall script runs index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, OS username, home directory, cwd (INIT_CWD of the consuming project), local IPv4 address, egress public IP (fetched from api.ipify.org, icanhazip.com, and ifconfig.me), DNS resolver information, and the parent project's package.json fields (name, author, repository, homepage). The collected data is transmitted to the hardcoded third-party callback host da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcalbk1.oast.fun via both DNS queries (hex-chunked subdomain lookups) and HTTPS POST to /poc/<uuid>. The package name and version pattern are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal scope; the beacon fires automatically at install time without any caller opt-in. Although the author metadata self-labels this as an authorized proof-of-concept, the code performs the full exploitation shape (auto-exec on install, installer-identifier collection, egress to an attacker-controlled callback) against anyone who resolves this public name. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (3ade0d327c85a937a9115a25153971f25b66eb6c838a6a82b171e054afc285c6) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'stillm4ddpocs-demo-gadget' @ 999.9.10 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.0 | Critical9.0GCVE Database A vulnerability in cap-primitives allows paths or symlinks ending with a slash to bypass sandbox restrictions. The resolver incorrectly re-adds a trailing slash before opening the last path component, causing the operating system to follow symlinks outside the sandbox. This affects operations like open, directory creation, removal, and renames outside the sandbox. The issue impacts cap-primitives versions before 3.4.6 and versions 4.0.0 up to but not including 4.0.3. A fix is available in versions 3.4.6 and 4.0.3. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-59940lxsmnsyc seroval · Deserialization of Untrusted Data Critical9.8EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59940 Seroval facilitates JS value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. Prior to 1.5.3, seroval.fromJSON() allows attacker-controlled JSON Promise control nodes to operate on values from the general deserialization reference table without verifying genuine internal Promise resolver records, causing deserialization side effects with plugins enabled and potentially unintended server-side invocation or remote code execution when downstream frameworks register callable wrappers. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.3. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General In May 2026, a cyber-espionage campaign by the Armored Likho group (also known as Eagle Werewolf) targeted private individuals and organizations across Russia, including major corporations, public sector entities, IT companies, and educational institutions. The attackers employed fake donation service applications as initial infection vectors. The campaign introduced the Still Toolkit, comprising two Rust-based components: Still Sync, which steals Telegram session data and leverages the Telegram API to extract chat logs and media files, and Still Audio, an implant that conducts covert audio surveillance by detecting speech patterns and recording conversations. The toolkit demonstrates sophisticated capabilities including Dead Drop Resolver techniques, RMS-based voice activity detection, and gRPC-based C2 communications. The campaign shows significant code overlap with previous Armored Likho operations, particularly from February 2026, including identical dropper architecture, encryption algorithms, and inf... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @jacksher/install-exec-poc contains malicious code that executes during installation. It performs DNS lookups and HTTPS requests to an attacker-controlled domain, leaking the installer's public IP and resolver metadata. It also uses execSync to run curl commands, establishing a shell-to-network primitive on the host. This behavior occurs unconditionally on install, compromising any system that installs the package. The package is labeled as a proof-of-concept but poses a real threat to consumers. Removal of the package does not guarantee full remediation due to potential persistent compromise. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-45004Openclaw cli: OpenClaw vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via attacker-controlled setup-api.js loaded from cwd High8.4EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-45004 OpenClaw CLI versions before 2026.4.23 contain a vulnerability where the bundled plugin setup resolver could execute arbitrary JavaScript from an attacker-controlled setup-api.js file located in the current working directory. This occurs when a user runs OpenClaw commands from a directory containing malicious setup files, leading to code execution under the user's privileges. The vulnerability requires user interaction and local access but does not depend on network exposure. The issue is fixed in version 2026.4.23 by restricting setup resolution to the canonical package root and excluding process.cwd(). | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 1.3 | EPSS 0.5% | Low1.3EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-54279 A vulnerability in aiohttp's CookieJar persistence causes host-only cookies saved to disk and later restored to lose their host-only status. This results in these cookies being sent to subdomains that should not receive them, potentially exposing sensitive cookie data. The issue affects versions from 6.1.0 up to but not including 6.3.0_2. A patch is available in version 6.3.0_2. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-72751misp cti-transmute · XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting' Medium5.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72751 CTI-Transmute is affected by a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the conversion graph used to visualise converted MISP and STIX content. Attacker-controlled values originating from converted CTI data were passed to multiple HTML-parsing sinks in the graph user interface without sufficient neutralisation. In particular, node labels, node sublabels, edge labels, node properties, edge properties, and node types could contain crafted HTML or JavaScript content. The Pivotick graph library renders some of these values through HTML-parsing operations. Consequently, a malicious value such as an HTML element containing an event handler could be interpreted as markup rather than displayed as plain text. The first remediation explicitly notes that Pivotick rendered node and edge labels as HTML and therefore introduced escaping before data was handed to the graph renderer. A separate vulnerable sink was present in the Open raw JSON functionality. The raw object associated with a graph node was inserted into a new document using document.write() and an interpolated HTML string. Crafted JSON content could therefore break out of the intended <pre> element and inject executable markup. The fix replaced this construction with DOM APIs and assigns the JSON using textContent. The initial correction did not cover all Pivotick rendering paths. A subsequent patch addressed additional XSS vectors in the graph properties panel. Values derived from the original CTI object—including property names, property values, hash algorithm names, child attributes, edge properties, and STIX object types—could still reach Pivotick's HTML resolver. According to the patch, Pivotick's tryResolveHTMLElement processes string values using template.innerHTML, allowing malicious markup to execute when a graph node is hovered over or selected. The complete remediation therefore: * HTML-escapes node labels, node sublabels, and edge labels before they are passed to Pivotick. * Restricts graph node type values to a safe identifier character set. * Wraps node and edge property values in DOM elements populated through textContent, preventing Pivotick from treating attacker-controlled strings as HTML. * Replaces the raw-JSON popup's interpolated document.write() with DOM construction and textContent. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-47249klever-go · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption High7.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-47249 Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.18, the P2P resolver request handling logic is vulnerable to hash-array amplification. A connected peer can send a compressed RequestDataType_HashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200,000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. The resolver's antiflood logic counts only a single logical message and the compressed wire size, and while Batch.Decompress() caps the decompressed byte size, it never limits the number of decoded repeated-field items. As a result, both TxResolver and TrieNodeResolver preallocate and iterate over the entire unchecked set of decoded hashes, causing remote memory and CPU amplification against any node that accepts P2P peer connections. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-5856Contiki-NG · Out-of-bounds Read High7.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-5856 CVE-2026-5856 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in Contiki-NG's DNS/mDNS resolver component. The flaw occurs in the skip_name() function, which processes DNS wire-format name labels without proper packet-boundary checks. An attacker can exploit this by sending specially crafted DNS or multicast DNS packets that cause the resolver to read beyond the UDP packet buffer, potentially disclosing memory contents or causing a crash. This vulnerability affects builds with RESOLV_CONF_SUPPORTS_MDNS enabled and standard DNS builds under certain conditions. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-71325Traefik · `allowCrossNamespace=false` bypass via `@kubernetescrd` TraefikService backendRef Medium4.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-71325 ## Summary There is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider. When `providers.kubernetesCRD.allowCrossNamespace` is disabled — the default — cross-namespace `@kubernetescrd` references are rejected for middlewares, TLS options and HTTP/TCP ServersTransports, but the same restriction was not applied to `TraefikService` backend references resolved by the service resolver. A tenant confined by RBAC to a single namespace can therefore bind its own router to a `TraefikService` owned by another namespace and expose or reroute that namespace's backend, defeating the namespace isolation `allowCrossNamespace=false` is meant to enforce. Traefik v2 releases and the unmaintained v3 minor lines below v3.6 are affected and will not receive a patch on their own line; the remedy for those users is upgrading to a maintained, patched release. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.54 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary When `providers.kubernetesCRD.allowCrossNamespace=false` (the default), Traefik correctly rejects cross-namespace `@kubernetescrd` references for middlewares, TLS options, and HTTP/TCP `ServersTransport`, but it does not apply the same restriction to service (`TraefikService`) backendRefs. As a result, a Kubernetes tenant who is confined by RBAC to their own namespace can bind their own router to a `TraefikService` owned by another namespace simply by referencing it as `<victim-namespace>-<name>@kubernetescrd`, defeating the namespace-isolation boundary that `allowCrossNamespace=false` is meant to enforce. This is the service-resolver sibling of the cross-namespace isolation family that Traefik has been fixing one resolver at a time (`df00d82f` / CVE-2026-41174 for Chain middlewares, and `67501cbe` for TCP `ServersTransport`, which shipped in v3.7.7 only four days before the analyzed commit). The `TraefikService` resolver in `configBuilder.nameAndService` was never given the guard its sibling resolvers received. ### Details ### Root cause `nameAndService` only performs the same-namespace check (`isNamespaceAllowed`) inside the branch that handles names without an `@` separator. For names that contain an `@` separator (that is, `@kubernetescrd` cross-namespace references) it applies only the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist check, and that check returns `true` by default because a `nil` allowlist means "unrestricted". It never applies the `!allowCrossNamespace && strings.HasSuffix(name, "@kubernetescrd")` rejection that the sibling resolvers all apply, so `allowCrossNamespace=false` is effectively never consulted for `@kubernetescrd` service references. ### Vulnerable code ```go // pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_http.go:662-695 — nameAndService (VULNERABLE) func (c configBuilder) nameAndService(ctx context.Context, parentNamespace string, service traefikv1alpha1.LoadBalancerSpec) (string, *dynamic.Service, error) { svcCtx := log.Ctx(ctx).With().Str(logs.ServiceName, service.Name).Logger().WithContext(ctx) if !strings.Contains(service.Name, providerNamespaceSeparator) { // 665: only names WITHOUT "@" service = *service.DeepCopy() service.Namespace = namespaceOrParentNamespace(service.Namespace, parentNamespace) if !isNamespaceAllowed(c.allowCrossNamespace, parentNamespace, service.Namespace) { // 669 return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("service %s/%s not in the parent resource namespace %s", ...) } } // 674: for "@"-names, the ONLY gate is crossProviderNamespaces, which defaults to allow-all (nil). if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(c.crossProviderNamespaces, parentNamespace) && strings.Contains(service.Name, providerNamespaceSeparator) { return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("service %q reference is not allowed: ...", service.Name) } // ^-- MISSING: no `!c.allowCrossNamespace && strings.HasSuffix(service.Name, "@"+ProviderName)` rejection. switch service.Kind { case "TraefikService": return fullServiceName(svcCtx, service, intstr.FromInt(0)), nil, nil // 690: returns the cross-namespace reference ... } } ``` For comparison, the sibling resolver used for middleware and TLS references does carry the guard: ```go // pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:1653-1668 — resolveReference (CORRECT) func resolveReference(ctx context.Context, parentNs, ns, name string, crossProviderNamespaces []string, allowCrossNamespace bool) (string, error) { if strings.Contains(name, providerNamespaceSeparator) { if !allowCrossNamespace && strings.HasSuffix(name, providerNamespaceSeparator+ProviderName) { return "", errors.New("when allowCrossNamespace is disabled, @kubernetescrd references are disallowed") // 1656 — THE GUARD } ... } ... } ``` | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 1.8% | CVE-2026-19022OpenHands · Command Injection Medium5.3EPSS 1.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19022 CVE-2026-19022 is a command injection vulnerability in OpenHands versions up to 0.62.0. It affects the function initialize_repo in the file OpenHands/resolver/send_pull_request.py. The vulnerable code path was removed in version 1.7.0. Remote exploitation is possible, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS score of 5.3. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently confirmed from the vendor. EPSS 1.8%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1ac9b6ff477d28984f8498e58ccc09c6addc4ecce2816fd46f25e5b4cfca49dc) On require of this package, index.js loads _bridge.js which auto-executes an init routine that fetches a platform-specific binary from runtime-assembled Cloudflare Workers hosts (assembled from split fragments joined with.join('') to hide the destination, resolving to oob-worker.cf10x-*.workers.dev). The binary is written under /var/tmp or %TEMP% with disguised names such as dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe or.cache_<rand>, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. A DNS-TXT fallback channel under *.dl.wel1.ru (resolver domains also assembled from split fragments) reads a count from c.<domain> TXT and iterates <n>.<domain> TXT records, base64-decoding the concatenation into an alternate payload delivery resilient to HTTP egress filtering. Destination hosts and resolver domains are obfuscated via string-split concatenation. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c59af5d56a9c3d1af7e4f4f942e01a23a353c1dd843393c7f3dd481cfe78aab0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5f65bcb53883eb5b3dcd6fe4d8b8ee61e24dad3323aa4ee4431a62b770e17f7a) On require(), _bridge.js downloads a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare workers.dev endpoints (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT chunked-transfer fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Host names and resolver domains are assembled from split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf100-416.worke','rs.dev'].join('')) to defeat static analysis. A flag file named /tmp/.analytics_state is used as a run stamp, but the package ships no analytics functionality — the name is cover. Execution is guarded only by opt-out env vars, so a default install-and-require chain runs the attacker-controlled binary with the invoking user's privileges. ## Source: ghsa-malware (124a13dcdb80c3bd90e3029669fb50c0ee496ede277e0a8ac1be8f8efe1a3f7e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7a6f956dc3e60442172279367aeb7cbfb758a853f844c53b3ff22a972f0bac5) On require('beaver-ui-popover-card'), _support.js downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers endpoints whose hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT fallback resolver chain across sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to a temp path under disguised names (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod 0o755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. No signature or hash verification is performed. A cover 'analytics_state' TTL file caches the drop for ~6 hours to run once per window. A second dropper of the same shape is bundled in lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) wrapped in a 'telemetry SDK' cover story, using runtime string concatenation to hide API names ('chmod'+'Sync', 'child_'+'process') and base64-decoded chunk reassembly. Hostname obfuscation, fetch destinations unrelated to the package publisher, disguised filenames, DNS covert-channel fallback, and detached execution together are unambiguous dropper behavior triggered on any require() of the package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8576ef2b39edb805a47435820b132a90d89fc93902e97cc279a334cc04d5fa8d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4a2a78be16248a4269fca22b39cf436f82f26818c797949af73eca331cc3a0f6) On require('beaver-ui-object-card'), index.js loads _ext.js which selects a platform-specific asset path and downloads an unsigned native binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers mirrors, with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback resolver, then writes the binary to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under deceptive names (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Destination hosts and resolver domains are reassembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf100-416.worker","s.de","v"].join("") and ['sdk.dl','.wel','1.r','u'].join("")) to defeat static analysis. A cover-story surrounds the dropper: an 'analytics_state' lock file, a DISABLE_TELEMETRY env gate that does not actually disable execution, a node-fetch/2.6 User-Agent, and an unreachable lib/telemetry.js presenting an 'Analytics SDK' facade. The delivered binary is attacker-controlled, unpinned, unsigned, mismatched to any documented package purpose, and executed detached on the installer's host at import time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e5933354eabc23202d7e993aa70f3cb868291f3c49bc4a83bf4576718191c852) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ad7aaa115c4d227fa01dd5a8b2e9f6945b21c65a7df4433ecf527ef69b3d0b40) On require(), index.js loads _adapter.js which fetches an unsigned, unhashed platform-specific executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and detached-spawns it via child_process.spawn on /bin/sh or cmd. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the loader falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel that reassembles base64-encoded chunks from resolver domains sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, reconstructs the binary, and executes it. Hostnames are assembled from split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.','cf100-41','6.workers.dev'].join('')), a.analytics_state stamp file is written, and environment variables named DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK frame the behavior as telemetry despite the payload being an executable binary. Package metadata is placeholder (empty dependencies, no repository/author) and the name impersonates an internal CI/GitLab tool. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6c356d83f79f184b78b1d19a8180dbda1f572e4845b9c9f5a1a9114b867075f8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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