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310 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 51b052a524af278366fb5527d4a5eee949b63f85168c37d4f97aefe3e73fe66a was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors in attacker activity between August 16 and September 4, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in China. The hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload, which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security tools to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | DeadLock ransomware: Breaking down a Rust-based encryptor with decentralized recovery infrastructure Microsoft Security Blog In this article Pre-encryption Encryption Post-encryption Defending against DeadLock ransomware Indicators of compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks DeadLock ransomware as an emerging financially motivated operation distinguished by its use of decentralized infrastructure to support victim communications and data leak operations. Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process. This architecture likely increases the resilience of portions of its communication, leak-hosting, and negotiation infrastructure, allowing DeadLock operators to recover from some disruption efforts while maintaining continuity for victims. Microsoft has observed DeadLock ransomware being deployed by multiple groups including an affiliate of the Lynx and INC ransomware ecosystems. First observed in July 2025, DeadLock operators employ double extortion tactics, encrypting victim environments while threatening to publicly release exfiltrated data. As of July 2026, the operators have published more than 80 compromised organizations on their data leak site, called the DeadLock blog, with more than half of the claimed victims in Europe. Microsoft identified DeadLock ransomware impacting organizations across information technology (IT), mining, transportation and logistics, manufacturing, hospitality, consumer goods, and other sectors in Europe, Asia, North America, South America, and Africa. The DeadLock encryptor includes a resource-aware throttling mechanism designed to maintain system responsiveness during encryption. In addition to its encryption capabilities, the ransomware also appears to implement language or country-based geofencing designed to avoid running in environments associated with former Soviet and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)-linked countries as well as select Middle Eastern countries, a pattern commonly observed among ransomware operators believed to operate from those regions. Together, these capabilities demonstrate how DeadLock combines established ransomware tradecraft with decentralized infrastructure designed to improve operational resilience. In this blog, we present a technical analysis of the DeadLock ransomware encryptor, covering its execution flow, defense evasion techniques, encryption design, and post-encryption behaviors, including a decentralized recovery chat system. We also provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), Microsoft Defender detections, and mitigation guidance to help organizations defend against this threat and similar ransomware activity. Pre-encryption Configuration parsing Before performing any malicious activity, the DeadLock encryptor decrypts an embedded configuration blob using XOR decoding with an 8-byte key. Below are the malware’s configuration fields and their values. Field Value Victim UID Malware public key 03bf50bbf97c4e951e66ff12b689a37a3ce675b4921e254eae76da77573843e4a9 Encryption rule 1000,05052429880,025124288000,010524288000,F991114288000 Language exclude list Geofencing language IDs (see Language geofencing ) Process stop list Processes to terminate (see Process and service termination ) Service stop list Services to stop and delete (see Process and service termination ) File exclude list Extensions and file names to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Directory exclude list Pre-traversal filter with directories to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Sub-path Exclude List Sub-paths to avoid encrypting during traversal (see Directory traversal ) Text ransom note Full text ransom note content (see Ransom notes deployment ) HTML recovery chat Full HTML/JS interactive chat page (see Recovery chat: Technical architecture ) Language geofencing As an early exit check, the malware queries the system’s default and user interface (UI) languages. If either language matches the exclude list in the configuration, the malware self-deletes immediately withou… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-16262 CVE-2026-16262 is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the Estatik Real Estate Plugin for WordPress before version 4.3.3. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to log a victim into an attacker-controlled account by exploiting the OAuth social login flow, which is not properly bound to the initiating user session. This causes the victim's subsequent activity to be associated with and accessible by the attacker. The vulnerability has a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 7.5. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer A recent wave of cyberattacks targeting hedge funds, private-equity firms, and other financial organizations has been linked to UNC6671, an extortion group reportedly associated with the BlackFile threat actors. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 848f1546a84dd92cce3c1463e3e964698533d93d6ea7be00e000db5efbb1d2f4 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors eight times between August 6 and August 11, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Chile (CL) and China (CN). There is no known exploit in the wild or vendor patch information available. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environment and threat intelligence feeds. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash f2291321df3b93aed41359a2f5f3fa22bf4a16da1a13343cc3daca9657fbac6c was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on August 6, 2026. This file was detected six times during attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was observed in Ethiopia, India, and Turkey. There is no known exploit in the wild or vendor patch information associated with this indicator. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environment and security feeds. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-7444 The Search Analytics for WP WordPress plugin up to version 1.4.16 is vulnerable to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) flaw. This vulnerability arises from missing or incorrect nonce validation in the process_bulk_action() function, allowing an attacker to trick an authenticated user with access to the plugin's dashboard into deleting arbitrary search-term records and associated search history via a forged request. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) Microsoft Defender XDR detections Advanced hunting queries Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud variant, a self-propagating credential-stealing worm delivered through a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload. The malware typically executes automatically through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook before package installation completes. Once executed, the malware searches developer workstations and continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments for npm, GitHub, cloud, and infrastructure credentials. It uses recovered identities to authenticate to npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, enabling it to enumerate packages, repositories, workflow secrets, cloud parameters, and secret-store values. Collected data is encrypted and transmitted through an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, with GitHub repositories serving as a fallback exfiltration channel. The payload’s most significant capability is automated propagation. After obtaining an npm publishing token, it enumerates packages available to the compromised identity, downloads their latest tarballs, inserts the malware and setup loader, adds a preinstall hook, increments the patch version, and republishes the modified packages. The malware can also use stolen GitHub credentials to inject Claude and Visual Studio Code configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence and creating an additional developer-to-developer infection path. In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this supply chain attack, along with protection, detection, amd hunting guidance. Organizations that installed an affected package with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the associated developer workstation or build runner as potentially compromised. Investigations should prioritize credentials accessible to the affected identity, unauthorized npm releases, unexpected repository or workflow modifications, suspicious cloud and secret-store access, and artifacts produced by affected build systems. Organizations should revoke and rotate exposed credentials from a known-clean environment and rebuild affected systems and downstream artifacts from trusted sources. Attack chain overview The campaign appeared as a rapid sequence of unauthorized patch releases across more than 400 npm packages maintained by otherwise unrelated publishers. Many malicious versions had no corresponding source-code commit, pull request, tag, or legitimate release, indicating that the attackers modified and published package tarballs directly rather than compromising each public source repository. Affected releases typically added a preinstall lifecycle script that launched a malicious file, setup.mjs, contained within the package, which launched the large, obfuscated Bun JavaScript bundle included in the package. Because npm runs preinstall scripts before installation completes, the payload could execute on developer workstations and build runners before application tests or conventional security checks began. After execution, the malware performs the following actions: Determines whether it is running on a developer workstation or in a CI/CD environment. On workstations, it detaches itself to continue after installation; on CI/CD systems, it remains in the active job to access workflow secrets, runner credentials, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing permissions. Both paths could support further package or repository propagation when suitable credentials are found. Collects credentials from local files, environment variables, command-line tools, and GitHub A… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash e4e6d77040f6a91d42292fe7b8fbf9e6ca5722c940097e21a345d03b522af43d was observed 95 times in attacker activity between August 4 and August 11, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and is linked to attacker infrastructure in multiple countries. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security feeds to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash ee86d4b3017ccb464b3d27332ceed33de1a9e3836e2cf55adced642d210bef7f was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on 2026-08-04. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the T1105 technique (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Israel. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to check this hash against their environments and security tools. No known exploits or threat actors are currently linked to this indicator. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 4af5a5c98ad132095c6fbe7b02c242153a190a01cc321e50a916a0ca46fbaa62 was observed 618 times in attacker activity between August 4 and August 11, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Germany. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security tools to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| Low | 2.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-65636ufirstgroup ymlr · CRLF Injection Low2.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-65636 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences vulnerability in ufirstgroup ymlr (Elixir.Ymlr module) allows attackers to inject arbitrary content into generated YAML documents through document comments. Ymlr.document!/2 interpolates each caller-supplied comment string into the output behind a single # prefix without validating it or escaping line breaks. Because a YAML comment is terminated by a line break, the first carriage return or line feed in the comment string ends the comment context and everything after it is emitted at column 0 of the document body. An attacker who controls text that the host application passes as a comment can forge top-level mapping keys, override values the application itself set, and emit --- or ... markers that split the output into additional documents. Downstream consumers of the generated YAML, such as configuration loaders, deployment manifests, CI pipelines and data importers, parse the injected content as legitimate data. The same clause backs Ymlr.document/2, Ymlr.documents!/2 and Ymlr.documents/2, so every document encoding entry point is affected. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ymlr.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Ymlr':document!/2, 'Elixir.Ymlr':documents!/2. This issue affects ymlr from 0.0.1 before 5.1.6. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | OffSeq Mirage A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash ab8d6adf1976431e290cc6d5991f0e23dfc450ee89463b0bcf8191601c0cc0c4 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors during attacker activity between July 30 and August 1, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in Germany. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security telemetry to detect potential compromise. | OffSeq Mirage | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog Every organization needs security that protects end to end with the speed and scale of AI. Microsoft’s vision is simple: security should be ambient and autonomous, just like the AI it protects. As organizations scale AI and expand across environments, security teams need protection that covers every surface. This month’s updates help security and IT teams secure their AI environments, use AI to defend at speed and scale, and strengthen the foundations that AI-powered operations depend on. Here’s what’s new: Project Perception brings agentic defense to security operations Project Perception , newly announced, is a coordinated system of specialized agents, cybersecurity-focused models, and enterprise-wide signals that transform how security operates. The agents work as a team: red team agents expose weaknesses, blue team agents investigate cyberthreats, and green agents harden what’s found. These multi-agent autonomous workflows work as a team to operate in continuous loops to execute end-to-end security workflows. Learn more about Project Perception Microsoft Defender secures the full AI attack surface, from inbox to cloud Expanded Microsoft Defender protections are designed to reduce risks associated with day-to-day AI interactions, from email inboxes to cloud agent environments. New prompt injection protection in Microsoft Defender, now in preview, identifies and isolates emails containing malicious AI instructions before delivery, reducing the risk of prompt injection attacks reaching the inbox. Unified Defender posture and runtime protection for cloud agents in Microsoft Agent 365 consolidates security posture assessment and runtime protection for Microsoft Foundry, Microsoft Copilot Studio, and third party-managed agents, helping teams reduce AI-specific risk across the agent estate. Accelerate detection, prioritization, and response with AI embedded in SecOps workflows Security teams can accelerate detection, prioritization, and response to cyberthreats with AI embedded directly into security operations (SecOps) workflows through Microsoft Defender. Threat intelligence enhancements, including Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence convergence and an enhanced Threat Intelligence Agent , bring more out-of-the-box intelligence and automation into the unified SecOps workflow, so teams can move from summary to action. Strengthen the cloud, code, and identity foundations AI depends on Microsoft Defender is strengthening the foundational protections that AI-era operations depend on across cloud, code, and identity. Cloud Security Posture Management extends coverage to serverless containers , giving teams visibility and continuous posture assessment across containerized workloads running on Azure Container Apps, Azure Container Instances, and Amazon Web Services Elastic Container Service (AWS ECS) on Fargate. New interconnected experiences between Defender and Microsoft Entra empower the security operations center (SOC) to disable compromised identities directly using a role-based access control (RBAC) mode that maintains least privilege. Microsoft Defender Experts services are also expanding : Microsoft Defender Experts Threat Intelligence delivers human-led, curated insight into the cyberthreats most relevant to each organization, and Microsoft Defender Experts MDR extends expert-run detection and response beyond the Microsoft estate into third-party and multicloud signals through Microsoft Sentinel . Microsoft Entra strengthens identity across the AI-powered enterprise Strengthen identity foundations for AI-powered operations New capabilities in Microsoft Entra are designed to strengthen the identity foundations that AI-powered operations depend on. Tenant governance helps organizations discover, manage, and govern tenants across their environment with centralized policies and cross-tenant delegated administration. Microsoft Entra ID is making passkeys the default authentication experience , which helps reduce reliance on SMS… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1dcfb8ede925ca9e0cf7574c2ba3f81ced56682ef6c54439cc00ad5fc5b960fd) The package's preinstall lifecycle script runs automatically on `npm install`. It reads the installer's username (from USER/USERNAME environment variables) and the machine hostname (via os.hostname()), then embeds those identifiers along with the package name and a timestamp into both a DNS lookup and an HTTPS GET request directed at a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain, 4otph6fase1x2won0hrfzul2wt2qqge5.oastify.com. The package name and scope (@wbnr) and its self-description indicate a dependency-confusion payload targeting an internal organization scope; any environment that resolves @wbnr/design from public npm will leak installer host identifiers to the attacker-controlled out-of-band endpoint. The 'harmless bug bounty PoC' framing in the package description does not change the observable behavior: installer-owned identifiers leave the machine to a third-party OOB collector on install. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (dbd908eecacbb587e9534c244be33296e6fa11092200cba8428351bb66afe844) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@wbnr/design' @ 99.3.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-4648 Use of an insecure cryptographic algorithm in the cashless payment system using NFC wristbands from CasfID Servicios Tecnológicos S.L.U. (version used at Resurrection Fest 2025), which employs cards based on MIFARE Classic technology (FM11RF08S). The cryptographic weakness of the authentication algorithm allows an attacker to retrieve access keys using techniques known as Backdoored Nested Attack, read the wristband’s entire contents, and clone its credentials onto a compatible rewritable card. Exploitation of this vulnerability could enable the impersonation of other attendees, the fraudulent use of the balance associated with their wristbands, and financial losses for both the affected users and the event organizers. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-64649vercel next.js · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High8.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-64649 A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Next.js versions 14.1.1 through 15.5.20 and 16.0.0 through 16.2.10. The flaw allows an attacker to cause the server to send outbound requests to malicious hosts by controlling Host-associated headers when Server Actions forward or redirect requests. This affects applications where the incoming host header is not fixed to a trusted value, typically in custom server setups or deployments not behind a host-pinning proxy. Managed hosting and certain Next.js configurations from version 14.2 onward are not affected. The issue has been fixed in versions 15.5.21 and 16.2.11. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5dc8f9f53c05ecc2642ce82c3841e046025662c206f002b4c6da11ff0cbc763d) The package's postinstall lifecycle hook runs `node index.js`, which issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at `e0fumpwx24ddfmenzmg0izs2atgk4es3.oastify.com/dependency-confusion` with a User-Agent identifying it as a dependency-confusion probe. On any `npm install` that resolves this scoped name, the request fires automatically and discloses installer identity (source IP, DNS resolver, timing, request metadata) to a third-party out-of-band interaction server controlled by whoever provisioned the Collaborator instance. The package name uses a private-scope pattern (`@heartlandone-private/fontawesome-pro`) that mimics an internal artifact, consistent with a dependency-confusion attempt aimed at organizations whose internal `@heartlandone-private` scope is not reserved on the public registry. Whether the operator's intent is authorized red-team testing or opportunistic exploitation, any consumer whose install pipeline resolves this public package receives install-time code execution and outbound network signalling to an attacker-controlled callback. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (b5bd52805195c9e3575760b3eaf605a2b9cb0fcbdde2311b7075d2d8095c4900) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@heartlandone-private/fontawesome-pro' @ 6.3.3 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Shadow AI agents are proliferating within enterprise environments without the knowledge or oversight of IT and security teams. These autonomous AI entities can operate with unmanaged permissions, potentially leading to security risks if left unchecked. Organizations need to implement discovery, assessment, and governance strategies to manage these AI agents effectively and mitigate associated risks. | Bleeping Computer |
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