The WPC Name Your Price for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized price alteration in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.9. This is due to the plugin not disabling the ability to name a custom price when it has been specifically disabled for a product. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to purchase products at prices less than they should be able to.
An example dag `example_dag_decorator` had non-validated parameter that allowed the UI user to redirect the example to a malicious server and execute code on worker. This however required that the example dags are enabled in production (not default) or the example dag code copied to build your own similar dag. If you used the `example_dag_decorator` please review it and apply the changes implemented in Airflow 3.0.5 accordingly.
This High severity Path Traversal (Arbitrary Write) vulnerability was introduced in versions: 9.12.0, 10.3.0 and remain present in 11.0.0 of Jira Software Data Center and Server. This Path Traversal (Arbitrary Write) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 8.7, allows an attacker to modify any filesystem path writable by the Jira JVM process. Atlassian recommends that Jira Software Data Center and Server customers upgrade to the latest version; if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:
Jira Software Data Center and Server 9.12: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 9.12.28
Jira Software Data Center and Server 10.3: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 10.3.12
Jira Software Data Center and Server 11.0: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 11.1.0
See the release notes. You can download the latest version of Jira Software Data Center and Server from the download center. This vulnerability was reported via our Atlassian (Internal) program.
This High severity DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability was introduced in version 2.0 of Confluence Data Center.
This DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 8.3, allows an attacker to cause a resource to be unavailable for its intended users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to a network.
Atlassian recommends that Confluence Data Center customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:
Confluence Data Center and Server 8.5: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 8.5.25
Confluence Data Center and Server 9.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 9.2.7
Confluence Data Center and Server 10.0: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 10.0.2
See the release notes ([https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-release-notes-327.html]). You can download the latest version of Confluence Data Center from the download center ([https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives]).
This vulnerability was reported via our Atlassian (Internal) program.
Nextcloud Tables allows you to create your own tables with individual columns. Prior 0.7.6, 0.8.8, and 0.9.5, when importing a table, a user was able to specify files on the server and when their format is supported by the used PhpSpreadsheet library they would be included and their content leaked to the user. It is recommended that the Nextcloud Tables app is upgraded to 0.7.6, 0.8.8 or 0.9.5.
Parse Javascript SDK provides access to the powerful Parse Server backend from your JavaScript app. Prior to 7.0.0, injection of malicious payload allows attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. ParseObject.fromJSON, ParseObject.pin, ParseObject.registerSubclass, ObjectStateMutations (internal), and encode/decode (internal) are affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.0.
A design flaw in HTTP/2 implementation used by Jenkins in Red Hat Product OCP Tools 4.14 OpenShift Jenkins allows a denial-of-service (DoS) attack known as "MadeYouReset" via HTTP/2 control frames. This vulnerability affects the Jenkins continuous integration server component and can disrupt job executions.
SMB Server might be susceptible to relay attacks depending on the configuration. An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could perform relay attacks and make the users subject to elevation of privilege attacks.
The SMB Server already supports mechanisms for hardening against relay attacks:
SMB Server signing
SMB Server Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA)
Microsoft is releasing this CVE to provide customers with audit capabilities to help them to assess their environment and to identify any potential device or software incompatibility issues before deploying SMB Server hardening measures that protect against relay attacks.
If you have not already enabled SMB Server hardening measures, we advise customers to take the following actions to be protected from these relay attacks:
Assess your environment by utilizing the audit capabilities that we are exposing in the September 2025 security updates. See Support for Audit Events to deploy SMB Server Hardening—SMB Server Signing & SMB Server EPA.
Adopt appropriate SMB Server hardening measures.
A flaw was found in Undertow where malformed client requests can trigger server-side stream resets without triggering abuse counters. This issue, referred to as the "MadeYouReset" attack, allows malicious clients to induce excessive server workload by repeatedly causing server-side stream aborts. While not a protocol bug, this highlights a common implementation weakness that can be exploited to cause a denial of service (DoS).
**TL;DR: Discovered an unpatched zero-day in TP-Link routers (AX10/AX1500) that allows remote code execution. Reported to TP-Link on May 11th, 2024 - still unpatched.4,247 vulnerable devices found online.**
# The Discovery
Used automated taint analysis to find a stack-based buffer overflow in TP-Link's CWMP (TR-069) implementation. The vulnerability exists in function `sub_1e294` that processes SOAP SetParameterValues messages.
**Key Technical Details:**
* Stack buffer: 3072 bytes
* PC register overwrite: 3112 bytes (payload: "A"\*3108 + "BBBB")
* Result: `pc = 0x42424242` (full control)
* Canary exploit mitigations
# Proof of Concept
// Vulnerable code pattern
char* result_2 = strstr(s, "cwmp:SetParameterValues");
// Size calculated from user input - BAD PRACTICE
strncpy(stack_buffer, user_data, calculated_size);
// OVERFLOW!
Exploitation requires setting a malicious CWMP server URL in router config, then device connects and gets pwned.
# Impact
**Affected Models:**
* TP-Link Archer AX10 (all hardware versions V1, V1.2, V2, V2.6)
* TP-Link Archer AX1500 (identical binary)
* Potentially: EX141, Archer VR400, TD-W9970
**Firmware Versions:** 1.3.2, 1.3.8, 1.3.9, 1.3.10 (all vulnerable)
**Internet Exposure:** 4,247 unique IPs confirmed vulnerable via Fofa search
# Why This Matters
Router security is often terrible - default passwords, weak configs, other vulns. Getting config access isn't that hard, and setting up a rogue CWMP server is trivial. Once you change the TR-069 server URL, the router connects to your malicious server and you get root.
# Timeline
* **Discovery:** January 2025 (automated analysis)
* **Vendor Notification:** May 11th, 2024
* **Current Status:** Probably Patched
* **Public Disclosure:** Now
CVE-2025-55163, known as the MadeYouReset vulnerability, is a logical flaw in the HTTP/2 protocol affecting io.netty:netty-codec-http2. It exploits malformed HTTP/2 control frames to bypass the max concurrent streams limit, causing resource exhaustion and denial of service. The attack triggers the server to reset streams prematurely, allowing an attacker to open an unbounded number of concurrent streams. This leads to CPU overload or memory exhaustion depending on the implementation. The vulnerability affects multiple versions of the Netty HTTP/2 codec and has a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 7.5. A patch is available in versions 4.2.4.Final, 4.1.124.Final, and 1.75.0.
Red Hat JBoss Web Server 6.1.2 addresses two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities in Apache Tomcat components. These include a general Apache Tomcat DoS (CVE-2025-52520) and a specific HTTP/2 "MadeYouReset" DoS attack via HTTP/2 control frames (CVE-2025-48989). The update replaces version 6.1.1 and is rated as having an Important security impact by Red Hat. The vulnerabilities affect Red Hat JBoss Web Server 6.1.0 up to but not including 6.1.2 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, 9, and 10. The advisory recommends applying the 6.1.2 update to remediate these issues.
On April 18th 2025, Microsoft announced Exchange Server Security Changes for Hybrid Deployments and accompanying non-security Hot Fix. Microsoft made these changes in the general interest of improving the security of hybrid Exchange deployments. Following further investigation, Microsoft identified specific security implications tied to the guidance and configuration steps outlined in the April announcement. Microsoft is issuing CVE-2025-53786 to document a vulnerability that is addressed by taking the steps documented with the April 18th announcement. Microsoft strongly recommends reading the information, installing the April 2025 (or later) Hot Fix and implementing the changes in your Exchange Server and hybrid environment.
Hi all,
I am a cybersecurity analyst with 1 year and 6 month experience. Im writing this for fun and to teach some people who maybe interested and are at a beginner level on detecting suspicious sign in activity.
In my example Im going to be using Entra ID, as this is the most common IAM solution and the one Im most familiar monitoring.
First step is analyzing the alert you received in the queue.
"Impossible travel time" or "Anomalous sign in activity" "sign in from bad IP" - These are the type of suspicious authentication logs that you will see in the SOC.
Gather all the information:
time generated (time of the sign in)
app that was logged into (ex officehome, msgraph)
username/email
IP address
device info (will normally be blank if its tuned properly, if its coming from managed trusted AD device it is a big indicator its benign so need to tune it to avoid FP for VPN usuage)
locationdetails (will be crucial to see which location logged from, will determine later if its physical location or location from VPN server)
user agent (crucial to detect what type of device it's coming from, potential spoofing as well)
Then you can run a query like this (will differ greatly based off your SIEM querying lanaguage, Im using Kusto MS Sentinel)
Signinlogs
| Summarize count by timegenerated, appname ,userprincipalname, IPaddress, tostring(locationdetails), tostring(deviceinfo), useragent
| where resulttype == 0 (filtering to see successful sign in attempts only)
\^ use a query like this to gather all crucial details, we can then use the time range to see 24 hours and then compare past previous sign ins from last 2-3 weeks to see a baseline, for location, IP address, device info, to see if they have accessed that app before.
Once you determine the sign in activity is indeed suspicious, its a combination of blank device details (non managed device), new IP address, new useragent or a suspicious useragent (potential spoofed), new app that's been used and potential impossible travel based off the last successful login). We need to analyze what type of IP address is being used, from either a VPN server or a ISP IP (will show approximate physical location of actual sign in).
NEVER just focus on the IP reputation, vast majority of the true positives I caught are all coming from clean IP reputations, threat actors are smart enough to know that if their IP address has been flagged and reported numerous times, their sign in activity will be blocked. Analyze the ISP info, a threat actor MAJORITY of the time will be using an IP address from a suspicious VPN server, you can do a ISP search for that VPN name and most of the time it will be something foreign.
Once you confirm the IP is coming from a suspicious entity such as a VPN server that is not authorized to be used in the company or its a VPN server with suspicious name, can confirm it's indeed malicious.
From there you can quickly check Auditlogs table to see any major changes to the users account. Most threat actors will remove and change the comprised users MFA, will remove the comprised user mobile device and probably add theirs.
From here, you can check the email logs and url click events on the suspicious link that was clicked for them to be comprised. Once you find that suspicious email you can plug that phishing URL into a interactive sandbox such as Browserling to confirm it. Some threat actors phishing sites are capable of detecting sandboxes and won't show their sign in page so be wary of that, but this isn't very common.
After detecting all these suspicious events, you can begin to lock the users account, resetting MFA settings and starting the IR process and doing some forensics on what the threat actor did.
Will have to look for:
\- Potential data exfiltration attempts. Can detect this from email logs or web traffic logs.
\- Potential lateral movement, the threat actor will likely send the same phishing email but this time from comprised users account to other internal users. Can detect this from email events as well.
\- File modifications - the threat actor could have modified a file, deleted a file, for this can check logs such as office activity (365 events)
This report details a cyberattack where threat actors gained initial access through a password spray attack on an exposed RDP server. They used Mimikatz and Nirsoft for credential harvesting, and employed living-off-the-land techniques along with tools like Advanced IP Scanner for network discovery. The attackers utilized Rclone for data exfiltration via SFTP and deployed RansomHub ransomware across the network using SMB and remote services. The intrusion lasted six days, culminating in widespread encryption and ransom demands. Key phases included initial access, lateral movement, credential theft, data exfiltration, and ransomware deployment, demonstrating a sophisticated and multi-staged attack methodology.