Threats tagged 'windows'

Microsoft announced that it removed the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) tool from Windows 11 24H2 and 25H2, as well as from Windows 11 beta builds released this week. [...]

NanaZip version 6.5 is affected by a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability. The issue allows an attacker to disrupt normal operation of the software, potentially causing it to crash or become unresponsive. No specific technical details or exploitation methods are provided.

Attackers are exploiting Steam forums by posting malicious PowerShell commands disguised as troubleshooting advice. The command downloads and executes a script that installs a crypto miner (XMRig) on victims' Windows machines. The script mimics a system optimization tool to deceive users and disables antivirus scanning on the miner's folder. The miner hijacks system resources to mine Monero cryptocurrency without user consent, degrading performance and hardware lifespan. The attack relies on social engineering to trick gamers into running the harmful command with administrator privileges.

Microsoft has reminded IT administrators that Windows Server 2022 is rapidly approaching its mainstream end date of October 2026, when it will switch to extended support. [...]

Microsoft has released security patches to address a Windows zero-day vulnerability known as "LegacyHive," disclosed after the July 2026 Patch Tuesday. [...]

Dropped on Patch Tuesday, the exploit allows any user to spawn a shell with System privileges. The post Nightmare Eclipse Drops Windows Zero-Day Exploit ‘ShieldBreak’ appeared first on SecurityWeek .

The Plug and Pwn attack abuses the Windows Plug and Play feature by using fake USB devices to trick Windows into installing vulnerable or insecure vendor software. This attack can lead to an attacker gaining SYSTEM-level privileges on the affected Windows system. The attack leverages the automatic installation process of device drivers triggered by USB device connection. No specific affected Windows versions or patches are detailed in the available information. There is no indication of known exploits in the wild at this time.

The bug allowed attackers to gain full control of the victims’ systems and deploy the ForestTiger backdoor. The post Fresh Windows Zero-Day Exploited in North Korean Cyberattacks appeared first on SecurityWeek .

Malware#windows#zero-dayFrance+3

Microsoft has released its monthly security update for August 2026, which includes 421 vulnerabilities affecting a range of products, including 62 that Microsoft marked as "critical." Microsoft notes that 1 of the vulnerabilities disclosed this month have been exploited in the wild CVE-2026-68820 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability affecting Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock. A Use After Free vulnerability could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 7.0. Out of 62 "critical" vulnerabilities, 40 are remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities. Microsoft considers exploitation of the following vulnerabilities more likely. CVE-2026-62893 is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Windows Deployment Services TFTP Server. A Use After Free could allow an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 9.8. CVE-2026-65665 is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Microsoft SharePoint Server. Deserialization of Untrusted Data could allow an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 8.8. CVE-2026-62823 is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Windows DHCP Server. A Heap-based Buffer Overflow could allow an unauthorized attacker to execute code over an adjacent network. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 8.8. Microsoft considers exploitation of the following vulnerabilities less likely. CVE-2026-62830 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability affecting Azure SRE Agent. Missing Authorization could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 9.9. CVE-2026-50516 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability affecting Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service. Missing Authentication for Critical Function could allow an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 9.4. Three remote code execution vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-68794 , CVE-2026-68816 and CVE-2026-68804 , affect Microsoft Excel and have a CVSS base score of 7.8. An unauthorized attacker could execute code locally. CVE-2026-68794 is a Heap-based Buffer Overflow. CVE-2026-68816 is a Stack-based Buffer Overflow. CVE-2026-68804 involves a Numeric Truncation Error and a Heap-based Buffer Overflow. CVE-2026-62911 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. This vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 8.0. Nine remote code execution vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-63515 , CVE-2026-65657 , CVE-2026-63532 , CVE-2026-64898 , CVE-2026-64903 , CVE-2026-64909 , CVE-2026-64910 , CVE-2026-64911 and CVE-2026-70130 , affect Microsoft Office and could allow an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. CVE-2026-63515 involves an Out-of-bounds Read and an Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-65657 is a Use After Free and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-63532 involves an Integer Overflow or Wraparound and a Heap-based Buffer Overflow and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-64898 involves a Heap-based Buffer Overflow and an Integer Overflow or Wraparound and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-64903 involves an Integer Overflow or Wraparound and a Heap-based Buffer Overflow and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-64909 involves an Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound), an Out-of-bounds Read and a Heap-based Buffer Overflow and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-64910 is an Untrusted Pointer Dereference and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-64911 involves an Integer Overflow or Wraparound and a Heap-based Buffer Overflow and has a CVSS base score of 7.8. CVE-2026-70130 is a Heap-based Buffer Overflow and has a CVSS base score of 8.4. Five remote code exec…

A use-after-free in the afd.sys Windows kernel-mode driver has been exploited to gain SYSTEM privileges. The post August 2026 Patch Tuesday: Microsoft Fixes 421 CVEs, One Exploited Zero-Day appeared first on SecurityWeek .

Microsoft released the Windows 10 KB5120249 cumulative update for versions 22H2 and 21H2 as part of the August 2026 Patch Tuesday. The update addresses security vulnerabilities and bugs, including a fix for File History backup failures to network shares due to invalid credentials and expands the rollout of new Secure Boot certificates. This update is mandatory and improves device security by increasing coverage for Secure Boot certificate deployment. No new issues have been reported with this update so far.

This month we got patches for 418 vulnerabilities. Of these, 62 are critical, 1 is being exploited in the wild, and 2 were publicly disclosed as zero-days. Notable fixes include Windows privilege escalation, container tampering, and critical QUIC and DNS Server remote code execution bugs.

Microsoft released cumulative updates KB5121003 and KB5120240 for Windows 11 versions 25H2/24H2 and 23H2 as part of the August 2026 Patch Tuesday. These updates address security vulnerabilities, fix bugs, and introduce new features and improvements across various components such as File Explorer, Windows Search, Voice Access, Widgets, and Windows Hello. The updates include security patches for approximately 400 vulnerabilities discovered in previous months. No known exploits in the wild have been reported for these vulnerabilities. Users are encouraged to install the updates via Windows Update or manually from the Microsoft Update Catalog.

Files built with the polyglot technique have been showing up more and more in cyberattacks in recent years. They let attackers slip malware past email filters and file scanners, deceive victims in phishing attacks, and complicate incident investigations. To pull this off, attackers deliberately construct a file that a system can interpret as different formats depending on which application opens it. A classic example is a file that can be handled as a PNG image or a ZIP archive. All it takes is changing the file’s extension, or simply using one or another application to open it. Let’s take a look at why it’s even possible to create files like this, which format combinations have turned up in real-world attacks, and how organizations can protect themselves from this threat. Why polyglot files are possible The data formats behind polyglot files are seldom exotic. It all comes down to a clever combination of common formats that happen to be structurally compatible. Polyglots exploit at least one of the following quirks in certain file formats: Most file formats need decoding from the very first byte, but some require to read them from the end. The clearest example is a ZIP archive: a corrupted or missing beginning doesn’t stop applications from reading the file, because all the needed headers actually sit at the end. This lets attackers simply glue two files together — in the example above, a PNG and a ZIP. The beginning reads as a valid PNG image, while the end reads as a valid ZIP archive. Many formats work like Russian matryoshka nesting dolls: despite outwardly having a specific extension matching its intended usage, inside the file is essentially a ZIP archive containing the necessary data. This group includes modern office documents (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), Android installation packages (APK), Java library files (JAR), and many others. Some formats have no strict structural requirements — or their requirements are loose enough that the application that’s processing the file can locate the fragment it needs even when that fragment isn’t at the beginning. The Polydet GitHub repository describes numerous examples of possible file combinations for building a polyglot. Under the MITRE classification, this technique falls under the Masquerading category ( T1036.008 , Masquerade File Type). Examples of polyglot files in known cyberattacks Publicly available malware campaign analyses reveal all kinds of polyglots. Attackers adapt the entire attack scenario to fit a specific file type combination. The Head Mare group delivered the PhantomPyramid malware as a ZIP attachment. The file consisted of Windows executable code (EXE) with a small ZIP archive glued onto the end. When the victim opened the archive, it contained a file with the extension PDF.LNK, which would then launch that same polyglot attachment — this time as an executable file. In the attack documented by JPCERT , attackers created a file that started as a PDF and was detected as a PDF by most scanners but carried a DOC extension and opened in Office applications as a valid DOC file containing malicious macros. The attacks spreading the StrRAT and Ratty Trojans used a polyglot built from a signed Windows installer package (MSI) with malicious Java code (JAR) tacked onto the end. The StrelaStealer attacks used a polyglot with an HTML extension: a Windows library (DLL) with a decoy HTML document glued onto the end. A shortcut in the archive launched the file twice: once via the start command (the equivalent of a double-click, which opened a browser showing the HTML document), and once via rundll32 (which launched the malicious DLL). In a simulated but elegant attack, researchers joined two ordinary ZIP files together and found that different popular archive tools displayed the combined file differently: some showed only the first archive, some only the second, and some showed both at once as if it were a single archive with shared contents. If the attacker is familiar with the vic…

The installer for LINE for Windows provided by LY Corporation insecurely loads Dynamic Link Libraries.

Have you ever tried to open an “encrypted” email or an urgent document, only to realize with horror that your usual DOCX attachment is actually a file with the extension .docx.exe? Or maybe you received an email supposedly with an invoice, contract, or internal memo attached — only for the file to prove something entirely different from what it claimed to be? If so, you were likely targeted in a malware infection attempt. Cybercriminals routinely disguise malicious files as harmless documents and archives, banking on recipients blindly clicking without checking the extension. Kaspersky experts analyzed the file formats most frequently deployed in malicious email blasts to reveal what really lurks behind these extensions — and how attackers weaponize them in their campaigns. Important note: the extensions we’ll be discussing here are routinely used for completely legitimate files. For example, Windows executables normally end in .exe. However, we’re focusing specifically on scenarios where attackers disguise or spoof a file’s extension to pass it off as a totally different type of file. What extensions are most commonly found in malware? Our experts analyzed malicious email blasts from the beginning of 2026 to pinpoint the 15 most common dangerous file extensions. .exe .js .html .dll .bat .vbs .xls .pdf .jse .au3 .docx .htm .wsf .scr .lnk The top 15 file extensions used in malicious email blasts Let’s take a look at what files with these extensions actually do under the hood. Executable files An executable file is a compiled computer program that’s ready to run. Once launched, a malicious executable can download additional payloads, alter system settings, steal user data, connect your device to external attacker-controlled servers, and much more. These are the most common executable extensions found in malicious email campaigns: .exe .dll .com .scr .exe The classic Windows executable extension. It powers every program you use daily, from web browsers and games to office suites and software installers. By the way, attackers often wrap EXE malware in double extensions: invoice.docx.exe, report.pdf.exe, or even photo.jpg.exe. They take advantage of a default Windows setting: hiding extensions for known file types. Because this setting is turned on by default, users only see the first part of the file name — invoice.docx, report.pdf, or photo.jpg — and assume it’s just a normal document or image. But the second you open this trap file, the malware fires up. .dll Another common extension abused in malicious campaigns is .dll (dynamic-link library). These libraries hold functions that Windows programs frequently require while running, such as printing a document. This modular architecture prevents redundant code by letting multiple applications call on the exact same library for specific tasks. However, if an attacker replaces a legitimate library with an infected one, running any normal program that calls on it can trigger malicious code. .com While files with the .com extension have absolutely nothing to do with the web domain of the same name, cybercriminals likely count on victims mistaking these files for links in an unusual format. In reality, it’s a legacy Windows executable format. While modern versions of Windows no longer rely on this file type, the operating system can still run and execute it, which makes opening one a very bad idea. .scr SCR files are screensavers — those idle Windows screen animations featuring abstract patterns, the iconic bouncing logo, or whatever else. Despite their harmless reputation, screensavers are essentially executables just like EXE files: once opened, they can install extra components or alter system settings all the same. In malicious campaigns, these files routinely masquerade as images, screenshots, or documents. Scripts Scripts are text files containing a sequence of commands that a computer runs automatically in order. They can download files, install and launch programs, modify securi…

In this article Activity overview How ClickFix works Campaign overview ClickFix moved from open pages to fingerprinting gates The fingerprinting gate Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a macOS ClickFix campaign distributing infostealers, including MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS) , through a large cluster of look-alike domains. The campaign evolved from broadly serving ClickFix lures to using a server-side browser-fingerprinting gate that shows the lure primarily to visitors whose environment appears consistent with a genuine macOS browser. This cloaking limits visibility for crawlers, sandboxes, and some automated analysis workflows. The blog details the domain pattern, fingerprinting checks, infection chain, detection coverage, and hunting pivots that defenders can use to identify related activity. Activity overview Microsoft Threat Intelligence has been tracking a macOS ClickFix operation that distributes information-stealing malware through a large family of algorithmically named domains. Over several weeks of monitoring, Microsoft observed a notable shift in tradecraft: the same infrastructure moved from openly serving the malicious command in the served page’s HTML source to concealing the lure behind a server-side fingerprinting gate that reveals the payload only to visitors the server assesses as a genuine macOS target. The chain ultimately delivers information stealers such as MacSync or Atomic Stealer (AMOS). This activity is consistent with the broader shift in macOS ClickFix tradecraft that Microsoft Threat Intelligence previously documented , in which threat actors instruct users to run Terminal commands that retrieve remotely hosted content rather than the traditional approach of delivering a disk image for manual installation. The cluster described here is notable for two reasons: its domains are mass-produced by a recognizable name generator, and it adopted server-side cloaking on existing infrastructure, giving defenders a clear before-and-after view of the same operation. In this blog, we describe the campaign’s domain-generation pattern, the two delivery phases we observed, the fingerprinting gate that now fronts the infrastructure, and the end-to-end infection chain. We also provide hunting guidance, mitigation recommendations, and defanged indicators of compromise. How ClickFix works ClickFix is a social-engineering technique where attackers persuade users to copy and run a command in Terminal instead of downloading a traditional macOS application. The lure usually appears as a fake verification step, software update, download error, or CAPTCHA, with the command disguised as something required to complete the action. Because execution starts from a user-run Terminal command rather than a downloaded app bundle, the flow can avoid parts of the normal macOS application trust path, including quarantine handling, code-signing evaluation, and notarization checks typically applied to downloaded applications. In this campaign, ClickFix remains the delivery mechanism, but the important change is that the lure is no longer shown to every visitor. The page first profiles the visitor through a browser-fingerprinting gate and primarily requests consistent with a genuine macOS browser environment receive the fake “Download for macOS” page and copied Terminal command. Figure 1a – The counterfeit “Download for macOS” page served to a qualifying visitor by a cloaked gate (apricotfilepoint[.]com). The page displays a forged “Verified Publisher” badge and offers a one-click Copy of an obfuscated curl one-liner. Delivery is conditional. During analysis, the same URLs returned different content to different requests. In some case the macOS ClickFix lure, and in others an apparently benign decoy page. In our testing, a request presenting a Windows browser received a decoy page such as a fake browser-extension or VPN landing page (Figure…

Bulletin ID: 2026-074-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 08/04/2026 12:30 PM PDT Description: Kiro is an agentic IDE and command-line interface users install on their desktop. We identified CVE-2026-18656 and CVE-2026-18657, an issue where an uncontrolled search path element on Windows might allow an actor to execute arbitrary code via a maliciously crafted project directory containing a planted executable that is resolved before the system PATH when a local user opens the directory. Impacted versions: - Kiro IDE for Windows between versions 1.0.0 through 1.0.212 - Kiro CLI for Windows prior to v2.10.0 Please refer to the article below for the most up-to-date and complete information related to this AWS Security Bulletin.

In this article What is device isolation? Case study: QNET Attack chain overview MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed References Learn more Microsoft Defender’s attack disruption now includes device isolation, a new response action that extends autonomous protection directly to compromised endpoints. At QNET, an attacker initiated a multi-stage attack using a legitimate Windows tool on a compromised endpoint to retrieve a malicious remote payload–a classic living-off-the-land (LOL) technique that often evades traditional containment. By automatically enforcing the new device isolation action on the compromised endpoint, Defender attack disruption stopped the attack dead in its tracks. From the first high-severity alert to completed isolation, after only 128 seconds, Defender cut off the attack chain before the second-stage payload could establish persistence or move beyond the host. The growing threat: when the endpoint is the blast radius Attack disruption has proven highly effective at stopping multistage, cross-domain attacks by disrupting the attacker’s ability to move across the environment. In many identity-driven attack scenarios, containing the compromised user is enough to shut down the attack chain, preventing lateral movement and limiting the attacker’s ability to access additional systems, identities, and resources. However, we are increasingly seeing a different class of high-severity incidents that begin with initial access directly on the device. Once adversaries establish a foothold on an endpoint, they can plant multiple persistence mechanisms and continue operating locally on the machine. This means that acting against the user’s identity alone is no longer enough to dismantle the threat. In these scenarios, the attacker has multiple ways to communicate and operate on the device beyond the user entity; the malicious code is already executing locally on the machine. The attacker doesn’t have to move laterally immediately; they can establish persistence, steal credentials, inject into processes, and prepare follow-on stages directly from the compromised endpoint itself. Previously, stopping these attacks required manual triage and response, giving attackers time to advance. Device isolation closes this gap by automatically correlating signals, assessing the threat, and isolating the compromised device within seconds. Traditional response approaches often depend on static playbooks triggered by individual alerts and maintained through manual tuning. Attack disruption instead uses AI-driven correlation and real-time analysis to identify multi-stage attacks by connecting signals across the environment before taking action. Device isolation is enforced only when the disruption pipeline reaches a high-confidence verdict—a threshold maintained at 99% precision. What is device isolation? When Microsoft Defender determines with high confidence that an endpoint is compromised, it isolates the device to immediately stop attacker activity and reduce the risk of further impact, such as data exfiltration and lateral movement. What happens during device Isolation When a device is isolated, all external network connectivity is blocked while maintaining access to required security services like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Selective isolation is supported, allowing customer-defined services or exclusions to continue functioning. Automatic device isolation is scoped to the affected device (supported today on onboarded MDE workstations), time-limited, and operator-controlled. Security teams can review context, take follow-up actions, and manually release isolation when it’s safe to do so. Why it matters Device isolation is a powerful containment control because it disrupts the attack regardless of how the device was compromised or what the attacker planned to do next. A single action cuts off network access, breaking lateral movement, command and control, credential theft, and rapid encryption–effectively stopping hands-on activ…

The news coverage surrounding the breach of the AI platform Hugging Face by OpenAI’s autonomous agents reads like a scene straight out of a Terminator movie (apparently, a prequel). Yet for enterprise security teams — even those that don’t develop or deploy artificial intelligence — the detailed incident report published by Hugging Face provides a critical operational roadmap. The incident needs to be evaluated on the basis of a single, fundamental question: “Which organizational security flaws, missing controls, configurations, or technologies allowed this attack to succeed?” What happened? During cyber-capability testing of OpenAI’s advanced AI models against the ExploitGym benchmark, an agent found a way to break out of its confinement, reached the internet, and breached the infrastructure of several companies — one of them being Hugging Face. The model reasoned that it could find solutions to the benchmark challenges on these external systems. Dozens of articles have since covered these incidents in detail , so no need to go over that here. What truly matters is what transpired within Hugging Face’s systems between July 9 and 13 while the AI agent operated unchecked inside. The Hugging Face incident report includes an interactive attack timeline, so we’ll just list the key stages. A malicious configuration in a dataset uploaded by the agent allowed it to exfiltrate credentials for a worker pod , and execute code within it. The agent then exploited cloud environment metadata and escaped the privileged pod to obtain root-level access on the host. It retrieved a substantial number of secrets from storage and used a stolen VPN key and shared cluster administrator credentials to pivot deeper into the internal network and source code repository before the Hugging Face security team blocked its access. How significant is the fact that this was next-generation AI? Regardless of the specific area of ​​activity of a company, tomorrow it may become a target of human attackers, fully autonomous systems, or AI agents manually controlled by human hackers. Many AI practitioners have rushed to dismiss this incident based on assumptions that OpenAI will never allow its tech to get into serious hacking. However, security researchers have argued for months that even currently available open-source models can be used to launch both offensive research and real-world attacks. Human oversight, while still a requirement, can be minimal. Even mid-tier models can easily iterate through a dozen vulnerabilities, inventory a compromised infrastructure, and quickly figure out how to expand their reach across a network. Defenders must analyze incidents like this in detail, map the key findings to their own environments, and adapt security controls to counter both stealthy human actors and rapid, noisy AI agents. Three distinguishing features of AI-powered attacks The techniques detailed in the Hugging Face report are not novel — the agent didn’t invent anything new. However, three factors regarding the attack’s speed and scale fundamentally shift the economics for both attackers and defenders: Trial and error becomes significantly cheaper. Where a human hacker might test five attack vectors, an agent can iterate through five hundred. Scenarios that security teams previously dismissed as “theoretically possible, but impractical and unlikely” and placed them on the backlog can now become active threats. Attack execution and incident response windows shrink. High-speed attacks are not unheard of, while some ransomware operators achieve compromise within hours even without AI. However, this accelerated pace will likely become the new baseline in cybersecurity, as demonstrated by the agent obtaining admin privileges at Hugging Face within 13 hours. Numerous alerts and log entries generated by the agent’s trial-and-error attempts can both help and hinder attackers as well as defenders. This noise can serve both as an indicator for threat detection, and as cam…