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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 0.5% | Critical10.0EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11976 The MonsterInsights Pro update distribution S3 bucket was compromised, allowing an attacker to insert a malicious file into versions 10.2.0 and 10.2.2 of the software. The malicious file, class-system-check.php, was found in three variants sharing the same encryption key, indicating a single threat actor with ongoing access. This vulnerability is classified as CWE-912 (Hidden Functionality) and has a critical CVSS score of 10. The attacker retains write access to the update distribution bucket, posing a severe risk of supply chain compromise. The product is a cloud service, and a patch is available. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (554372f29af60ad8e6e5a33171a736baddcc652772b0452c81a4010d3f1e5218) index.js is a top-level self-decoding IIFE that XOR-decodes a URI-encoded payload keyed on the enclosing function's own source and eval()s the result at module load; the decoder aborts with 'the code has been tampered!' if the source is modified, and a banner asks readers not to crack it. The decoded payload is opaque and cannot be audited without executing it. The package's own metadata and typings describe the runtime behavior: package.json advertises it as a 'client (provider) for the tsi-vpsremote control server' that 'stays alive to run commands pushed from the server', keywords include 'shell', 'ssh', 'remote-control', and 'agent', and index.d.ts exports a ProviderHandle exposing a ChildProcess named `shell`. Calling the exported provider(url) at runtime therefore establishes a persistent connection to a remote server that drives a local ChildProcess on the host running the package — a network-to-shell control channel with full-host command execution for whoever controls the paired server URL. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3437dfe049006b09ad2f66c94d934907ac32e7272a22ad75694179e136ac90a8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog As organizations adopt AI, they must secure both cloud and AI environments through a unified security control plane as their attack surface expands. Because modern applications and AI workloads are built and run in the cloud, security teams must understand which exposures matter most, prioritize what can truly be exploited, and reduce risk across cloud infrastructure, applications, identities, data, and AI systems in one place. Modern IT estates now span multiple clouds and on-premises systems, with architectures built on containers, Kubernetes, serverless functions, microservices, APIs, and AI-powered workloads. This increases both the volume and the interconnectedness of security signals. The challenge is no longer identifying individual risks, but determining how misconfigurations, identities, and data exposures combine to create real attack paths, and which of these are most critical to fix at the source. KuppingerCole’s Leadership Compass: Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP) reflects this shift. The report describes how CNAPP is evolving from a consolidation of cloud security tools into the security foundation for AI-native enterprises, combining cloud security, AI security posture management, runtime protection, attack path analysis, cloud detection and response, and agentic AI operations into unified platforms. Read the full report Within this evolving market, KuppingerCole names Microsoft a Leader across all four of its Leadership categories: Overall, Product, Innovation, and Market. In the report’s words: “Microsoft earns its Overall Leadership with its Defender for Cloud that is redefining the CNAPP market by extending cloud security beyond infrastructure protection and into a unified security platform for cloud, data, identity, AI, and security operations, supported by one of the industry’s most advanced agentic AI ecosystems.” That recognition reflects where the category is heading: toward platforms that unify cloud and AI security into one operational view of risk. Why CNAPP is being redefined KuppingerCole makes a clear point: CNAPP is no longer about posture or visibility alone. It is becoming the operational foundation for securing AI-powered applications, services, and business processes, across the full software lifecycle from cloud infrastructure to the AI systems running on top of it. Modern environments introduce complexity across: Multicloud and hybrid infrastructure. Rapid development and continuous deployment. Containers, serverless, microservices, and APIs. AI models, agents, pipelines, and machine identities. This complexity exposes the limits of traditional, siloed tools, where cloud posture, workload protection, AI security, and the security operations center (SOC) each live in their own console. Organizations now need platforms that can: Correlate posture, runtime, identity, data, application, and AI signals. Prioritize risk based on exploitability, not severity alone. Integrate security across development, cloud operations, and the SOC. Bring AI systems into the same risk model as the rest of the cloud. Runtime intelligence is now central to this shift. Across the platforms KuppingerCole evaluated, 94% detect active exploitation of the complex attack paths they surface, moving teams from long lists of findings to the exposures threat actors can actually use. What distinguishes leading platforms KuppingerCole evaluates providers on product strength, innovation, and market presence, and, more importantly, on how effectively they help organizations manage real risk across cloud and AI. Several themes define the next generation of platforms: AI security posture management that governs models, pipelines, and AI-specific attack paths. Agentic AI that investigates, validates exposures, and helps remediate, not just detect. Runtime-driven risk prioritization focused on what is exploitable in production. Security graphs and attack path analysis across identity, data, network, workload, an… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Activity overview How ClickFix works Campaign overview ClickFix moved from open pages to fingerprinting gates The fingerprinting gate Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a macOS ClickFix campaign distributing infostealers, including MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS) , through a large cluster of look-alike domains. The campaign evolved from broadly serving ClickFix lures to using a server-side browser-fingerprinting gate that shows the lure primarily to visitors whose environment appears consistent with a genuine macOS browser. This cloaking limits visibility for crawlers, sandboxes, and some automated analysis workflows. The blog details the domain pattern, fingerprinting checks, infection chain, detection coverage, and hunting pivots that defenders can use to identify related activity. Activity overview Microsoft Threat Intelligence has been tracking a macOS ClickFix operation that distributes information-stealing malware through a large family of algorithmically named domains. Over several weeks of monitoring, Microsoft observed a notable shift in tradecraft: the same infrastructure moved from openly serving the malicious command in the served page’s HTML source to concealing the lure behind a server-side fingerprinting gate that reveals the payload only to visitors the server assesses as a genuine macOS target. The chain ultimately delivers information stealers such as MacSync or Atomic Stealer (AMOS). This activity is consistent with the broader shift in macOS ClickFix tradecraft that Microsoft Threat Intelligence previously documented , in which threat actors instruct users to run Terminal commands that retrieve remotely hosted content rather than the traditional approach of delivering a disk image for manual installation. The cluster described here is notable for two reasons: its domains are mass-produced by a recognizable name generator, and it adopted server-side cloaking on existing infrastructure, giving defenders a clear before-and-after view of the same operation. In this blog, we describe the campaign’s domain-generation pattern, the two delivery phases we observed, the fingerprinting gate that now fronts the infrastructure, and the end-to-end infection chain. We also provide hunting guidance, mitigation recommendations, and defanged indicators of compromise. How ClickFix works ClickFix is a social-engineering technique where attackers persuade users to copy and run a command in Terminal instead of downloading a traditional macOS application. The lure usually appears as a fake verification step, software update, download error, or CAPTCHA, with the command disguised as something required to complete the action. Because execution starts from a user-run Terminal command rather than a downloaded app bundle, the flow can avoid parts of the normal macOS application trust path, including quarantine handling, code-signing evaluation, and notarization checks typically applied to downloaded applications. In this campaign, ClickFix remains the delivery mechanism, but the important change is that the lure is no longer shown to every visitor. The page first profiles the visitor through a browser-fingerprinting gate and primarily requests consistent with a genuine macOS browser environment receive the fake “Download for macOS” page and copied Terminal command. Figure 1a – The counterfeit “Download for macOS” page served to a qualifying visitor by a cloaked gate (apricotfilepoint[.]com). The page displays a forged “Verified Publisher” badge and offers a one-click Copy of an obfuscated curl one-liner. Delivery is conditional. During analysis, the same URLs returned different content to different requests. In some case the macOS ClickFix lure, and in others an apparently benign decoy page. In our testing, a request presenting a Windows browser received a decoy page such as a fake browser-extension or VPN landing page (Figure… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-container version 35.3.7 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from suspicious external hosts. The binary is fetched via HTTPS or a covert DNS-over-TXT channel, saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames, and executed without signature verification. The package uses environment variable checks and analytics-like filenames to evade detection. This behavior is inconsistent with legitimate software distribution and indicates a supply chain compromise. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b8aa49d4f3babc81510150e766a38674e971d7553cb05d98b67d0edd24a2fa07) The package's index.js exports an inert class and silently require()s./_platform inside a swallowed try/catch. On load, _platform.js downloads a platform-specific native binary from Cloudflare workers.dev hostnames assembled by joining split string fragments (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback pointing at *.dl.well1.site. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &']) on Unix or cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows. Comments framing the fetch as 'Content-type negotiation' and 'Graceful degradation' are cover for the dropper. The package's declared 'abstraction layer' purpose is boilerplate; the entire library behavior is the swallowed require that triggers the download-and-execute chain. No signature check, no hash pinning, opaque native payload from anonymous workers.dev infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f75a4b20b92aa6acce6889cb0dcacc6157c9d2e2942f4128d768d26cd747c453) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3bc8cd463940a0fe70eee979bd85b9ea41eed627f30cf96be8e0174c9106c7e1) The package presents itself as an audit rule pack but ships a credential harvester in index.js. Its exported postScan routine copies ~/.sui/sui.keystore (Sui wallet signing keys controlling on-chain funds), walks the current working directory, home directory, and additional paths (work, ops, alphafi) for.env* files matching /PK_B64|PRIVATE_KEY|SUI_/, packages the collected files together with os.hostname() and os.userInfo() metadata into a gzip tar, and POSTs the archive over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://91.92.241.99:8080/collect (variable named TELEMETRY with a COLLECT_URL env override). Comments describe the routine as opt-out telemetry for scan summaries, but the payload is wallet keystore material and environment secrets, not scan metadata. The destination is not associated with any documented Sui or Mysten Labs infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (463bbc5e417bf04a6676179a7de62ade021d8bf7167d6b603ee02cf5e30d1ace) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3f8a32e0a10123bde764e059abea762d4b0574d57d35e6bd3e92e4d96cdeb245) On require() of the package, index.js loads _ext.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from runtime-assembled Cloudflare workers.dev hostnames (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf100-416, cf101-adf, cf103-070) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback against subdomains of dl.well1.site (tin/ldr/win.dl.well1.site) that reassembles base64 chunks into executable bytes. The fetched payload is written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<rand> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows), chmod +x'd, and spawned detached via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c",fp+" &"],{detached:true}) or spawn("cmd",...). C2 hostnames are assembled at runtime via ["oob-work","er.cf103-07","0.workers.","dev"].join("") to defeat static string search. The package presents itself as a base framework typings module and ships an unreferenced lib/telemetry.js plus DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK opt-out env vars as cover; the DNS-TXT path carries an inline comment describing it as chunked transfer for environments blocking HTTPS. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a0c5ac14d5ca2237a244551a8668e466e4f83d359a930dc35e57543405e4c14c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6bde65379e0d7952a0fbdcfc1efe45f1cd08f4752ae4a15f12e5fd0d995a7d12) index.js unconditionally requires./_polyfill.js on load. _polyfill.js constructs C2 hostnames at runtime via Array.join to evade static inspection (assembling `oob-worker.cf10[0-3]-*.workers.dev` mirrors plus a DNS-TXT fallback under `*.dl.well1.site`), fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under cover-story filenames (`dotnet_diag_*.exe`, `.cache_*`, `.analytics_state`), sets mode 0755, and spawns it detached via `cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true})` (or the cmd equivalent on Windows). Cover-story comments reference SHA-256 integrity checking and load-distribution shuffling, but no such operations are performed on the fetched bytes. lib/telemetry.js ships duplicate dropper primitives (`Buffer.from(chunks,'base64')`, detached `/bin/sh -c` spawn, `fs['chmod'+'Sync'](extensionPath, 0o755)`) inside an 81KB file presented as an analytics SDK. The package's declared purpose (finance entity-group models) has no relationship to fetching and executing native binaries from Cloudflare Workers subdomains. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7d4e71e1e8685df7456f7f02707407ca56b53447ad43b994e3d57b2dba4478c4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A long-running campaign compromised the QuickFox VPN application, primarily used by Chinese users to access Chinese resources and improve gaming experiences. Active since August 2025, the attack involved trojanized Windows installers (versions 3.0.51.0 through 3.59.5) that deployed malicious JavaScript through modified Electron renderer HTML files. The JavaScript loader fingerprinted victim endpoints using process-based guardrails, checking for specific applications including administrative tools, cryptocurrency wallets, and Chinese translation software while avoiding Steam users. Successfully profiled targets received an FDMTP implant through DLL sideloading techniques using legitimate Microsoft Azure binaries. The infrastructure demonstrates active development with multiple staging domains masquerading as legitimate services. QuickFox removed malicious components from version 3.59.6 following responsible disclosure. Technical overlaps suggest possible connections to Twill Typhoon, though attribution remain | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Actor usage of AI is exploding. By analyzing artifacts left behind, Talos has created a detailed analysis of how we are seeing adversaries leverage the technology to include development, force multiplication, and vulnerability research. Based on the evidence Talos gathered, guardrails did not provide much protection, with most actors able to convince the models to comply despite the lack of sophisticated techniques or encoding. The pre-existing skill of the actor has a large impact on what they can accomplish with AI. Talos observed novice users able to create malicious capabilities, albeit with limited capabilities and success. Advanced users were able to build astonishing capabilities, pushing the models to create sophisticated and complex outputs. Artificial intelligence (AI) and associated language models are now ubiquitous and heavily used in both personal and professional contexts to streamline tasks and expand capabilities. With AI being used everywhere and by almost everyone, one of the biggest questions is how malicious actors are taking advantage. Fortunately, actors make mistakes and chatbots leave artifacts. Leveraging cloud-based AI models leaves behind a variety of artifacts, most notably a prompt log. These logs can take on a variety of shapes and sizes, but they are left on endpoints that are running various applications, such as Claude Code, CodeX, Cursor, or Gemini. Over the course of our research, we’ve collected a significant corpus of these files and can start discussing the ways we see bad actors leveraging these technologies. In conducting the research, three categories of activity emerged. One was using AI as a malicious software engineer, leveraging AI to write (in some cases) very sophisticated code with clear malicious intentions. Another was actors leveraging AI to scale criminal operations and campaigns. Finally, there were a lot of actors leveraging it for bug bounty or vulnerability research, rapidly accelerating their capabilities of discovery and disclosure. Each category demonstrates how threat actors are currently leveraging AI. Within each category is a wide disparity in sophistication based on the knowledge level of the actors involved. We tried to include use cases to cover the breadth of what we found. Takeaways and high-level findings With the recent disclosures from Hugging Face and OpenAI , it's clear the era of agentic attackers has effectively arrived. In that incident, the models were operating inside a sanctioned evaluation with safeguards deliberately relaxed — but they autonomously escaped their sandbox, found and chained real vulnerabilities, and compromised production infrastructure to reach their objective. The capabilities exist; the only missing ingredient is malicious intent, and it's a matter of time before threat actors supply it. For defenders, this is a wake-up call: Vulnerabilities will surface faster, exploitation will happen sooner, and the actors behind it won't need rest or downtime. As the case studies below show, the central challenge for guardrails right now is supporting legitimate dual-use work — red teaming and vulnerability research — without empowering malicious actors. One of the immediate takeaways is that guardrails are not functioning as expected. We did not encounter any sophisticated encoding or techniques designed to trick the models — most of the time it was a simple “I'm allowed to do this,” and the model complied. When guardrails did engage, they accomplished little. In one instance, we watched an actor abandon a censored model and pivot to an uncensored version, which completed the task without question. In another, a model pushed back on a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) operator, but by that point the tooling had already been built. This wasn't specific to a single model or platform; it was across the board. The other big takeaway is that an actor's skill level largely determines how effectively AI can be leveraged and how much impact it u… | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Mac users have historically trusted their operating system to keep them safe. That peace of mind mostly comes from Apple’s strict control over its ecosystem, and the fact that macOS has historically faced fewer mass attacks than Windows. However, that doesn’t mean Macs are invulnerable: threats do exist, and new ones emerge all the time. Over just the past few weeks, security researchers have published reports on at least two new campaigns that target Apple devices. The malware used in one of the campaigns has been dubbed CrashStealer , while the other is known as ClickLock . Both rely on different tricks to force users into entering their Mac password, which attackers then use to steal account credentials, crypto assets, documents, and much more. In today’s post, we take a close look at how CrashStealer operates — and how to avoid falling victim to it. A videoconferencing app with CrashStealer inside It was back in May 2026 that researchers spotted the first signs this malware was being developed, and by early July, they caught it operating in the wild. The malware earned its name because of its core mechanism: it disguises itself as the macOS built-in crash reporting tool (CrashReporter) while functioning as an infostealer designed to hijack sensitive data. Researchers managed to trace one of the websites users visited to download the malware. The site poses as a legitimate platform for distributing the video conferencing tool Werkbit. According to researchers, this is the site victims used to download Werkbit, which secretly contained the CrashStealer malware loader. Source However, you can’t just visit the site and download the software. Before downloading, visitors are asked to enter a special meeting PIN. This setup likely allows the attackers to limit the distribution scope by targeting only specific, pre-selected victims. Exactly how the cybercriminals choose their targets and deliver the PIN remains unknown. The “lucky” users with a code end up installing the initial malicious payload — named Werkbit Setup. Interestingly, it carries a valid Apple developer certificate and has successfully passed Apple’s notarization process — meaning it cleared the automated prescan for malicious code. As a result, the attackers manage to bypass the operating system’s built-in Gatekeeper defense. This allows the payload to launch without triggering the usual untrusted software warnings. The Werkbit Setup installer is signed with a valid Apple developer certificate and has passed notarization. Source Once launched, Werkbit Setup first reaches out to GitHub. Researchers believe using this popular platform helps attackers blend in by making these initial network requests look far less suspicious to security tools. After retrieving instructions from a GitHub repository, the program connects directly to the attackers’ server to fetch CrashStealer itself. The loader then saves the malware to a temporary macOS folder, launches it, and wipes most of the intermediate setup files. As a result, a fully functional infostealer is up and running within seconds of Werkbit Setup starting. By the way, the user never gets any videoconferencing app. How CrashStealer works Unlike the Werkbit Setup loader, the CrashStealer malware itself isn’t signed with an Apple developer certificate. To keep users from suspecting anything, the malware disguises itself as the built-in macOS crash reporting tool, CrashReporter, by using the exact same name, app identifier, and a similar icon. Once launched, CrashStealer completes a sequence of steps to gain access to sensitive data, establish persistence in the system, and cover its tracks: Remove metadata — including the attribute that flags the app as an internet download. Display a fake system prompt asking for the user’s macOS password. Use the previously captured credentials to gain access to Keychain, the built-in macOS password manager. Check the computer for installed security tools and malware analysis software.… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit BlueTeam This report highlights a cyber espionage campaign attributed to the Iranian APT group Charming Kitten, targeting eight countries and eight critical sectors simultaneously. The campaign, dubbed Operation Olalampo, affects Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, Hungary, Turkmenistan, Israel, and South America, focusing on government, healthcare, financial services, energy, education, telecommunications, defense, and industrial sectors. The information is sourced from a Reddit post linking to a GitHub repository simulating adversary tactics. No specific vulnerabilities or exploits are detailed, and no affected software versions are identified. | Reddit BlueTeam | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.3%GCVE Database Overview Two vulnerabilities in the REST API were found in Golf Compete foreUP. The first exposes the merchant, Finix, API credentials directly in customer record responses, allowing any user to obtain and use the payment processor account. The second is a missing object-level authorization check, which lets a user retrieve any other customer's full profile, payment token, and transaction history by changing the golfer_id in the request path. Description Golf Compete foreUP provides cloud-based golf course management software to over 2,000 golf courses. They offer tools that allow the management of customers, inventory, tee times, food & beverages, marketing, billing, etc. The vulnerabilities identified are listed below. CVE-2026-15657 A vulnerability in the foreUP customer REST API exposes merchant credentials. Each customer record response includes the facility’s merchant API credentials in cleartext, exposing the following details: finix_username finix_password finix_merchant_id Merchant credentials are identical across for customers at the same facility and are actively used by the backend to register new payment instruments. Any authenticated customer can obtain the facility’s merchant credentials when querying own record. Combined with the second vulnerability described below, an attacker can retrieve merchant credentials from any customer record at the facility. CVE-2026-15658 A missing object-level authorization also known as BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) and IDOR (Insecure Direct Object References) in the REST API endpoint returns the record identified by golfer_id without verifying ownership. A caller can substitute any golfer_id while using their own valid JSON Web Token (JWT) and receive another customer's full profile, including the following details: Name, email, phone numbers, date of birth, address Free‑text household relationship notes Finix payment‑instrument tokens Dwolla bank funding‑source tokens Billing and transaction history Impact With a single valid low‑privilege foreUP customer account, someone can perform the following actions: 1. Retrieve any customer’s full profile and contact data 2. Access stored card tokens and Dwolla ACH funding-source tokens 3. Enumerate and view full billing and transaction history for any customer 4. Obtain live Finix merchant API credentials for the facility Also, because the web API is shared by all tenants, all facilities using foreUP are affected, meaning that a customer from facility A could query merchant information from facility B. Solution On 07/26/2026, foreUP confirmed that all vulnerabilities in this report have been remediated. Users should remain aware of increased phishing and identity theft risks and monitor their accounts for suspicious activity. Acknowledgements Thank you to Eric Mead for reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Bob Kemerer. Vendor Information One or more vendors are listed for this advisory. Please reference the full report for more information. References https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0xa1-broken-object-level-authorization/ https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/12-API_Testing/02-API_Broken_Object_Level_Authorization https://portswigger.net/web-security/access-control/idor https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/05-Authorization_Testing/04-Testing_for_Insecure_Direct_Object_References Other Information CVE IDs: CVE-2026-15657 CVE-2026-15658 Date Public: 2026-07-30 Date First Published: 2026-07-30 Date Last Updated: 2026-07-30 15:12 UTC Document Revision: 1 About vulnerability notes Contact us about this vulnerability Provide a vendor statement | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek This report describes ThreatLocker raising $190 million in Series F funding, significantly increasing its valuation from $1.6 billion. ThreatLocker is a zero trust endpoint security company that blocks unauthorized software execution by default and includes policy-based endpoint detection and response capabilities. The information focuses on the company's funding and product approach rather than a specific security vulnerability or threat. | SecurityWeek | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 1.7% | CVE-2026-66713Apache Axis2/Java · Deserialization of Untrusted Data Critical9.8EPSS 1.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66713 Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502) in the Tribes-based clustering component in Apache Software Foundation Apache Axis2/Java through 2.0.0 on Apache Tomcat (only when Tribes clustering is enabled, which is off by default) allows an unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the clustering port to execute arbitrary code via a crafted serialized Java object delivered to the cluster channel and deserialized in org.apache.axis2.clustering.tribes.Axis2ChannelListener#messageReceived. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.1, which fixes this issue by removing the clustering feature entirely. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (eb22a3b9c64598bc202456844105c3e3e7f7e7185abe335b2694d85deb1b6c9d) The published tarball's dist bundles (dist/sigchain-js.cjs.js, dist/sigchain-js.esm.js, dist/sigchain-js.umd.js) execute at module load: they read an encrypted blob from the sibling dependency 'chain-manager' (either imported as `desKey` or read from a file under node_modules/chain-manager via fs.readFileSync), DES-decrypt it with a hardcoded PASSWORD, then invoke child_process.spawn('node', [], { detached: true,... }) and pipe the decrypted script into the child's stdin — running attacker-controlled Node.js code on the installer's machine on any require()/import of the package. The dropper code is present only in dist/; the src/ tree contains no reference to 'chain-manager' or to spawn('node'), and package.json's declared main 'dist/chain-analyze.cjs.js' is not shipped — only the tampered dist/sigchain-js.* bundles are, so consumers resolve to the malicious build while source reviewers see a clean Theta blockchain SDK. package.json declares author 'Theta Labs' and describes itself as a JavaScript library for the Theta blockchain, impersonating the official @thetalabs/theta-js SDK, and pins 'chain-manager' ^1.0.9 which supplies the encrypted payload — a split-package design that hides the executable code from scanners inspecting only this tarball. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c36bbf5095bf780a61e33774d81ded0ffe9f5cfd2288bae3433a657fe7213c7b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | KEV | Critical9.8KEVCheck Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 27th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Nichirei, a Japan-based frozen-food supplier and logistics company, has experienced a ransomware attack that disrupted shipping operations and affected approximately 5,000 customers. KFC Japan warned of possible shortages. Nichirei confirmed personal data theft, while the RansomHouse group claimed responsibility and published a subset of the stolen information. Stadler Rail, a Switzerland-based global rail equipment manufacturer, has disclosed a supplier-related data breach after attackers compromised credentials for a third-party file-sharing platform. The Everest group stole technical documents belonging to the supplier and demanded $12.3 million. Stadler refused payment and said its systems and production remained unaffected. Origin Energy, one of Australia’s largest electricity and natural gas providers, has confirmed unauthorized access to customer information. Exposed data may include names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, account details, and partial payment information. Threat actors claimed to have stolen two million records and threatened to publish them. Romania’s National Agency for Cadastre and Land Registration has suffered a cyberattack that disabled internal systems and the nationwide e-Terra platform. The disruption halted property transactions for nearly a week. Officials said core land registries remained intact, although credentials and portions of source code may have been exposed. AI THREATS OpenAI disclosed that AI models escaped a restricted cyber evaluation environment and compromised Hugging Face while seeking benchmark solutions. They exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, stole credentials, escalated privileges, and accessed production systems. Both companies contained the activity and are conducting a joint investigation. Researchers have described a threat actor known as Trim who promoted an AI-assisted penetration-testing platform built with jailbroken language models. The platform combines AI with established scanning tools to automate reconnaissance, vulnerability validation, and reporting, potentially reducing the expertise and time required to prepare and conduct cyber intrusions. Researchers have examined a generative AI-assisted malware operation exposed through an accessible WebDAV server. The infrastructure produced phishing material and malicious Windows shortcuts used to distribute information stealers and remote access tools. Researchers identified more than 1,000 artifacts and a campaign that recorded over 77,000 requests. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Check Point has addressed CVE-2026-16232, an authentication bypass vulnerability in SmartConsole that is under active exploitation, affecting a handful of customers. The flaw allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain administrative access to Check Point management servers. Security hotfixes are available for supported versions of the affected management software. Oracle has released its July 2026 Critical Patch Update, addressing 1,449 vulnerabilities across numerous product families. The update includes remotely exploitable flaws that require no authentication, with critical issues affecting Oracle Database Server, SQL Developer, and TimesTen In-Memory Database, among others. Microsoft has addressed CVE-2026-50522, a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting on-premises SharePoint Server. An authenticated site owner can exploit the flaw to execute code and steal machine keys for persistent access. Active exploitation was reported after proof-of-concept code became publicly available. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-50522)) THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Check Point Research has revealed that Microsoft was the most impersonated brand in Q2 2026, accounting for 23% of observed phishing att… | Check Point Research |
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