In October 2026, a U.S. organization was targeted by the Anubis ransomware operation, which deployed a new custom backdoor named Lindnor. This backdoor disguised itself as legitimate Chrome and VMware components on Microsoft SQL Server machines. The attackers used multiple executables to terminate security services by exploiting five known vulnerable drivers via BYOVD techniques. They also installed the AnyDesk remote access tool with Safe Mode persistence to maintain access despite security software disruptions. Although the attackers established extensive persistence and evasion mechanisms, the ransomware encryption payload was blocked before it could execute. Anubis ransomware, operated by the Hawkmoth group as ransomware-as-a-service, has targeted numerous victims, predominantly in the United States.
AnyDesk versions prior to 8.0.3 contain a critical heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root on Linux systems without user approval. The flaw exists in the stream packet handler for mode 5 in the session protocol, where a payload length value is not properly validated.
A threat actor exploited a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2025-4632) in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server to gain unauthorized access to endpoints. They deployed a rogue AnyDesk remote access tool, created a local administrator account, and disabled Microsoft Defender protections. Instead of deploying a pre-compiled cryptominer, the actor compiled a Monero cryptominer directly on the compromised endpoint using multiple compilers and utilities. The miner connected to the C3Pool mining service and ran under explorer.exe with suspicious arguments. This on-endpoint compilation generated significant endpoint detection and response (EDR) telemetry, increasing detectability despite attempts at stealth.
In late August, an organization was compromised by INC ransomware affecting at least 175 endpoints. The attack unfolded over several weeks with a 17-day gap, indicating involvement of an initial access broker and a separate ransomware affiliate. Early activity included scheduled tasks with randomized names and lateral movement via RDP using compromised credentials. After the pause, attackers deployed AnyDesk for remote access, used Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques to disable security controls, and executed ransomware using Impacket tools. Two ransom notes were found: the standard ransom demand and a secondary data leak threat note listing stolen files and threatening to contact media, employees, and partners within 48 hours to pressure the victim.
CVE-2026-15682 is a medium severity vulnerability in AnyDesk affecting the Send Support Information feature. It allows a local attacker with low-privileged code execution to create junctions that lead to arbitrary file creation, resulting in a denial-of-service condition. No public exploits or cloud service involvement are reported.
CVE-2026-15681 is a medium severity vulnerability in AnyDesk that allows local attackers with low-privileged code execution to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition. The flaw involves improper handling of screen recording files where an attacker can create junctions to abuse the service and generate arbitrary files, leading to system disruption.
This vulnerability allows local attackers to create a denial-of-service condition on affected installations of AnyDesk. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The ZDI has assigned a CVSS rating of 4.7. The following CVEs are assigned: CVE-2026-15681.
GodDamn ransomware represents the third iteration of ransomware developed by Hyadina, following Monster (2022) and Beast (2024). A recent attack in June 2026 demonstrates sophisticated tactics including AnyDesk for remote access, NirSoft-based credential harvesting tools, and the PoisonX kernel driver for defense evasion. PoisonX is a malicious driver signed by Microsoft that terminates security processes at the kernel level. Attackers used PsExec for lateral movement, deployed comprehensive credential theft toolkits comprising 14 different tools, and disabled endpoint defenses before encrypting files. The encrypted files were renamed with victim organization names as extensions. The four-day dwell period allowed attackers to stage payloads and conduct reconnaissance before triggering encryption across at least 10 hosts within the targeted organization.
This vulnerability allows local attackers to create a denial-of-service condition on affected installations of AnyDesk. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The ZDI has assigned a CVSS rating of 4.7. The following CVEs are assigned: CVE-2026-15682.
Trigona ransomware affiliates have developed and deployed a custom exfiltration tool named uploader_client.exe, observed in attacks during March 2026. This tool uses parallel data streams, connection rotation, and file filtering to evade detection and streamline data theft. Attackers disable endpoint protections at the kernel level using multiple utilities before exfiltration. Remote access and credential theft are facilitated by AnyDesk and tools like Mimikatz. This represents a more technically sophisticated approach than typical ransomware affiliate operations.
The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service program has rapidly expanded since mid-2025, claiming over 320 victims with 240 attacks occurring in early 2026. The service provides multi-platform lockers for Windows, Linux, NAS, BSD, and ESXi, enabling comprehensive coverage of corporate environments. During an incident response engagement, an affiliate deployed SystemBC proxy malware for covert tunneling and payload delivery. Analysis of the SystemBC command-and-control server revealed a botnet of over 1,570 victims, primarily corporate and organizational targets. The intrusion progressed from domain controller compromise through credential validation, remote execution via administrative shares, and deployment of Cobalt Strike payloads. Attackers disabled defenses, established persistence through scheduled tasks and services, and ultimately deployed ransomware via Group Policy. The operation demonstrates sophisticated lateral movement capabilities, defense evasion techniques, and integration of mature post-exploit...
A North Korean threat operation has published malicious packages across npm, PyPI, Go Modules, crates.io, and Packagist, impersonating legitimate developer tooling. The campaign uses GitHub aliases including golangorg and aokisasakidev to distribute staged malware loaders that contact actor-controlled infrastructure, retrieve payloads from Google Drive, and deliver platform-specific second-stage malware. The loaders are hidden behind normal-looking API functions in logging and utility libraries. Windows variants include full remote access trojans with capabilities for shell execution, keylogging, browser and wallet theft, sensitive file collection, and AnyDesk deployment. The operation demonstrates coordinated cross-ecosystem supply chain attacks with shared infrastructure patterns, reused extraction directories, and consistent staging logic across multiple programming languages.
Active since September 2025, Yurei is a double extortion ransomware campaign. The operators run their own Tor data leak site with a low number of victims listed at the time of writing. It is reportedly derived from Prince Ransomware, an open-source ransomware family written in Go. Check Point researchers noted that all samples were first submitted to VirusTotal from Morocco, and that one sample did not include a ticket ID, indicating that this could be a test build, possibly uploaded by the developer themselves. Yurei ransomware samples also contained a link to SatanLockv2, based on the presence of the PDB path string “D:\satanlockv2” present in the Yurei samples.
A threat actor gained initial access to a network via RDP using compromised credentials, likely obtained through an infostealer, data breach, or initial access broker. They quickly moved laterally to a domain controller, created multiple impersonation accounts with high privileges, and installed AnyDesk for persistence. Over nine days, the actor conducted extensive network reconnaissance using SoftPerfect NetScan and NetExec, mapped virtualization infrastructure, and browsed file shares. They exfiltrated sensitive data from multiple shares using temp.sh. On the final day, the actor connected to backup servers, deleted backup jobs, and deployed Lynx ransomware across multiple servers. The intrusion lasted 178 hours and leveraged compromised domain admin credentials throughout.
A critical vulnerability in Gladinet's Triofox file-sharing platform, CVE-2025-12480, allowed unauthenticated access to configuration pages, enabling arbitrary payload execution. Threat actor UNC6485 exploited this flaw as early as August 24, 2025, bypassing authentication and chaining it with anti-virus feature abuse for code execution. The vulnerability affected Triofox version 16.4.10317.56372 and was patched in version 16.7.10368.56560. Attackers created admin accounts, deployed remote access tools, conducted reconnaissance, and attempted privilege escalation. They used Zoho UEMS, Zoho Assist, and Anydesk for remote access, and set up encrypted tunnels for C2 communication. The exploit chain involved HTTP host header manipulation and abuse of the built-in anti-virus feature to execute malicious scripts.
The Kimsuky group has launched a sophisticated phishing attack disguised as a request for paper review from a professor. The attack involves a password-protected HWP document with a malicious OLE object, which creates six files upon opening. When executed, these files perform various malicious activities, including collecting system information, downloading additional files, and establishing remote access through AnyDesk. The threat actors use legitimate software and cloud storage services like Dropbox as part of their attack infrastructure. The malware hides its presence by concealing AnyDesk's interface, making detection difficult for users. This case highlights the evolving tactics of APT groups and the importance of cautious handling of files from unknown sources.
The initial access broker (IAB), whom Talos calls “ToyMaker” and assesses with medium confidence is a financially motivated threat actor, exploits vulnerable systems exposed to the internet. They deploy their custom-made backdoor we call “LAGTOY” and extract credentials from the victim enterprise. LAGTOY can be used to create reverse shells and execute commands on infected endpoints.