Search: ag-360.ca
23 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 1.3% | CVE-2026-121608Qihoo 360 D603-2 · OS Command Injection Medium6.9EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-121608 CVE-2026-121608 is an OS command injection vulnerability in Qihoo 360 D603-2, D600-2, and D606-6 devices up to firmware version 6.3.2. The flaw exists in the on_push_message function of the /fs2/bin/iscm component, specifically in the Timezone Push Handler. Manipulating the tz argument remotely can lead to command injection. The vulnerability is fixed in firmware version 6.4.0, which introduces a validation check for the timezone parameter. EPSS 1.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The 'Iron Man System' is a commercial Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) operation that provides criminal buyers with a self-hosted phishing kit. It includes over 2,360 phishing templates impersonating trusted entities such as postal services, banks, and government agencies, targeting 130 countries. The system features a bilingual Chinese-English interface, a subscription licensing model tied to vendor-controlled authorization servers, and a build registry with 911 published versions. Resecurity, in collaboration with Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit and industry partners, mapped and disrupted this infrastructure. The kit was used to send approximately 1 billion phishing emails targeting 75,000 organizations, capturing around 17.4GB of telemetry data. Multiple domains associated with the infrastructure have been identified as indicators of compromise. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-72794siyuan · Insufficiently Protected Credentials Critical9.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72794 **CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72794](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72794). ### Summary `/api/system/getConf` returns `Conf.CookieKey`, the key used to sign the server's session cookies in its response body. The endpoint is registered with `CheckAuth` only, so the field reaches the publish `RoleReader` token and the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. The configuration-export endpoint in the same file strips this exact field before returning config, so the project already treats it as secret. The reader-facing masking path does not. ### Details | Item | Detail | |---|---| | Route | `kernel/api/router.go:70` `POST /api/system/getConf` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getConf` | | Middleware | `CheckAuth` only — no `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole` | | Leaked field | `AppConf.CookieKey`, serialized as `cookieKey` | | Purpose of the field | Signing key for the `siyuan` session cookie | **The field survives every stage of the masking chain.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` → `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) → `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) → the browser-side System-path strip. `CookieKey` is removed by none of them: - `GetMaskedConf` masks `UserData`, `MCPOAuth` and `AccessAuthCode` only. - `HideConfSecret` nulls `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables` and the System paths. It contains no reference to `CookieKey`. - `FilterConfByPublishIgnore` touches `UILayout` only. - The browser-side strip removes System paths only. **The key is live, not vestigial.** It is passed straight into the session store at startup: ``` cli/cmd/serve.go:67 go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey) kernel/server/serve.go:152 sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey)) kernel/server/serve.go:159 ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore)) ``` `gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is therefore signed with the value the endpoint hands out. An attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies that the server accepts as authentic. **Guarded sibling, in the same file.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration before returning it and explicitly clears both secrets: ``` kernel/api/system.go:360 clonedConf.CookieKey = "" clonedConf.NotebookCrypto = nil ``` The project has already classified `CookieKey` as a value that must not leave the server. The `getConf` masking path omits the same field. **Ceiling is environment-dependent, floor is not.** Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode`, which `GetMaskedConf` does mask or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is the disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party together with the cookie-forgery capability that follows from it. Rotating the key invalidates all existing sessions, so this is not a secret that can be quietly refreshed. ### Proof of Concept Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/getConf {} → 200 The response body's conf object contains a cookieKey field holding the server's session-signing key in cleartext. ``` Differential check against the endpoint that does strip it: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/exportConf → cookieKey is empty, notebookCrypto is null ``` The same value is withheld by one endpoint and returned by the other. ### Impact An anonymous reader in publish mode or any publish `RoleReader` obtains the server's session-cookie signing key. This is a persistent cryptographic secret whose disclosure cannot be remediated without invalidating every active session. Possession of the key permits forging and tampering with `siyuan` session cookies that the server will validate as authentic. On instances with no access-auth code configured, or where a forged session's contents otherwise satisfy the server's checks, this extends to authenticating as a privileged user. ### Suggested fix Clear `CookieKey` in `HideConfSecret` for all non-administrator responses. The more durable fix is to route non-administrator `getConf` through the `exportConf` cloner, which already handles `CookieKey`, `NotebookCrypto`, `Account`, `Stat`, `System.ID`, `Export.PandocBin` and the AI keys replacing the current blocklist, which fails open on every field nobody thought to add, with the allowlist-style cloner the project already maintains. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-72793siyuan · Insufficiently Protected Credentials Critical9.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72793 **CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72793). ### Summary `/api/system/getConf` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token, and anonymously when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers: | Field | JSON | What it is | Cleared by `exportConf` at | |---|---|---|---| | `Conf.CookieKey` | `cookieKey` | The session-cookie signing key | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | | `Conf.Export.PandocBin` | `export.pandocBin` | Absolute path embedding the OS username | `kernel/api/system.go:338` | | `Conf.NotebookCrypto` | `notebookCrypto` | Encrypted-notebook key material | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | The project has already classified all three as values that must not leave the server. The reader-facing path returns them. ### Details **Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:70` : `POST /api/system/getConf` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getConf`. No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. **The masking chain, and what each stage covers.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` → `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) → `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) → a browser-request path strip. - `GetMaskedConf`: `UserData`, `MCPOAuth`, `AccessAuthCode`. - `HideConfSecret`: `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables`, and the System paths. No reference to `CookieKey` or `Export.PandocBin`. - `FilterConfByPublishIgnore`: `UILayout` only. - Browser strip (`kernel/api/system.go:630-631`): System paths only. Each stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default. --- **1. `CookieKey`: the live session-signing key.** The value is passed straight into the session store at startup: ``` cli/cmd/serve.go:67 go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey) kernel/server/serve.go:152 sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey)) kernel/server/serve.go:159 ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore)) ``` `gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic. Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode` which *is* masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed. --- **2. `Export.PandocBin`: bypasses a shipped privacy control.** The field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction: ``` conf/export.go:35 PandocBin string `json:"pandocBin"` model/conf.go:430-431 if "" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath } util/pandoc.go:154 PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, "bin", "pandoc.exe") util/pandoc.go:134 tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, "pandoc") util/working.go:359 TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "temp") util/working.go:312 defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, "SiYuan") ``` → `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\temp\pandoc\bin\pandoc.exe` This one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. `kernel/api/system.go:630` adds, for browser requests: ```go if util.IsBrowserRequest(c) { maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = "" maskedConf.System.AppDir = "" maskedConf.System.ConfDir = "" maskedConf.System.DataDir = "" maskedConf.System.HomeDir = "" } // 避免泄露用户名等敏感信息 ``` The comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only `System.*` and misses `Export.PandocBin`, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while `export.pandocBin` passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure. --- **3. `NotebookCrypto`.** Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from `HideConfSecret` while `exportConf` sets it to `nil`. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together. --- **The root cause is the blocklist itself.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration and clears each secret before | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5 An issue in Unistal Systems Pvt. Ltd.Protegent 360 v2.0.0.4 allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via the sub_186f4 function | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5 An issue in Unistal Systems Pvt. Ltd.Protegent 360 v2.0.0.4 allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via the kernel driver pgsecdl.sys | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An internal security operations team identified a fraudulent GitHub page impersonating a cybersecurity vendor to target customers and the general public. The malicious page appeared legitimate by referencing authentic services and operational requirements. While the GitHub page itself contained non-malicious content, a disguised link led victims to download a ZIP archive containing malicious executables. The attack chain deployed BoryptGrab Stealer information-stealing malware through DLL side-loading techniques. Investigation revealed nearly 300 similar repositories impersonating well-known organizations including Malwarebytes, Bitdefender, and 360 Total Security, using SEO keywords to attract victims. The malicious page has been removed and detection capabilities have been enhanced. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | Medium6.9GCVE Database ### Summary The array multiplication operator (`array * integer`) in Scriban allocates a result whose size is the product of the attacker-controlled integer and the array length, with **no `LoopLimit` / `LimitToString` check and no overflow-safe arithmetic**. A ~40-byte template forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, producing a denial-of-service. This is the unguarded sibling of operations that *were* hardened against the same class of abuse: `string * integer` (gated by a `LimitToString` pre-check), `array.insert_at` (gated by `StepLoop`/`LoopLimit` — the **GHSA-24c8-4792-22hx** fix shipped in 7.2.0, scored 8.7 High), and the range/iteration paths covered by **GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc** ("Built-in operations bypass LoopLimit", fixed 7.0.0). The same `LoopLimit`-based hardening pattern was applied to those operations but never to `array * integer`. This can be observed directly in 7.0.0, the release where GHSA-c875 was patched: `(1..5) * 50000000` (and `1..N | array.size`) correctly throws `Exceeding number of iteration limit '1000'`, while `[1,2,3,4,5] * 50000000` allocates ~2 GB with no limit. The `LoopLimit` control is enforced on the iteration path but not on the `array * int` allocation path, side by side, in the same version. The bug has been present since the operator was introduced in **3.0.0**, survives all of the 6.6.0 / 7.0.0 / 7.2.0 DoS-hardening passes, and is still present in 7.2.0 (current) — i.e. it is both a missed sibling of GHSA-24c8 and an incomplete coverage of GHSA-c875's `LoopLimit` hardening. ### Details The `array * int` operator is handled in `ScriptArray<T>.TryEvaluate`: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Runtime/ScriptArray.cs:504-508 (Multiply case) var newArray = new ScriptArray<T>(intModifier * array.Count); for (int i = 0; i < intModifier; i++) { newArray.AddRange(array); } ``` `intModifier` is the attacker-supplied integer (`context.ToInt(...)`, `ScriptArray.cs:399`). Two problems: 1. **No resource limit.** Neither `new ScriptArray<T>(intModifier * array.Count)` nor the `AddRange` loop consults `LoopLimit`, `LimitToString`, or calls `context.StepLoop(...)`. A grep of the entire `TryEvaluate` method (`ScriptArray.cs:360-560`) finds no `StepLoop` / `LoopLimit` / `Limit` reference. `LoopLimit` (default 1000) is therefore not enforced: a template that requests 250,000,000 elements creates them all without any "iteration limit" error. 2. **Integer overflow in the capacity.** `intModifier * array.Count` is unchecked `int` arithmetic. The overflow-safe `long` cast used by the string sibling is absent here. The DoS-hardening passes guarded the two sibling operations but not this one: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:341 (string * int — GUARDED) if (context.LimitToString > 0 && value > 0 && leftText.Length > 0 && (long)leftText.Length * value > context.LimitToString) // long arithmetic, pre-check { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(spanMultiplier, $"String multiplication exceeds LimitToString `{context.LimitToString}`."); } ``` ```csharp // src/Scriban/Functions/ArrayFunctions.cs:414 (array.insert_at — GUARDED, GHSA-24c8 fix in 7.2.0) for (int i = array.Count; i < index; i++) { context.StepLoop(span, ref loopStep); // LoopLimit enforced array.Add(null); } ``` `array * int` (`ScriptArray.cs:504`) received neither guard. When the oversized allocation fails as a managed exception, it is wrapped by the binary-expression evaluator: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:241-243 catch (Exception ex) when (!(ex is ScriptRuntimeException)) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(span, ex.Message); } ``` So a host that wraps `Render()` in `try/catch` sees a `ScriptRuntimeException` carrying the original `OutOfMemoryException` message (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` on the integer-overflow path). ### PoC A single console project reproduces it on the released NuGet package. `poc.csproj`: ```xml <Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"> <PropertyGroup> <OutputType>Exe</OutputType> <TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework> <!-- If only the .NET 9 SDK is installed, change to net9.0. Behavior is identical. --> </PropertyGroup> <ItemGroup> <PackageReference Include="Scriban" Version="7.2.0" /> </ItemGroup> </Project> ``` `Program.cs`: ```csharp using Scriban; // ~41-byte template requests 5 * 200,000,000 = 1,000,000,000 elements string tpl = "{{ x = [1,2,3,4,5] * 200000000; x.size }}"; System.Console.WriteLine("Rendering..."); var sw = System.Diagnostics.Stopwatch.StartNew(); var result = Template.Parse(tpl).Render(); // allocates ~7.7 GB System.Console.WriteLine($"size={result.Trim()} peakWS=" + System.Diagnostics.Process.GetCurrentProcess().PeakWorkingSet64 / (1024 * 1024) + "MB elapsed=" + sw.ElapsedMilliseconds + "ms"); ``` Run: ```sh dotnet run -c Release ``` Measured peak working set on Scriban 7.2.0 (net8.0, .NET 9 runtime, Linux), varying only the multip | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57647 Contributor Local File Inclusion in Panorama Viewer – 360 Degree Image + Video Viewer <= 1.6.1 versions. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 2.3 | EPSS 0.3% | Low2.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-8668 A static credential embedded in Chef 360 prior to v1.7.0 permitted unauthenticated access to internal message queues. Queue messages contained tenant-specific identifiers. The credential has been rotated and replaced with per-tenant access in subsequent versions, eliminating this access method entirely. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The intercom-client npm package version 7.0.4 was compromised through a malicious GitHub account, introducing credential-stealing malware into a widely used Node.js SDK with approximately 360,000 weekly downloads. The attack deployed two malicious files: setup.mjs, executed via preinstall hook to download an unverified Bun binary, and router_runtime.js, an obfuscated 11.7 MB script targeting Kubernetes, Vault, and cloud credentials. Stolen data was encrypted and exfiltrated through GitHub API. The compromise resembles recent attacks on PyPI lightning package and SAP CAP packages, sharing technical patterns with TeamPCP-linked campaigns including GitHub-based exfiltration and CI/CD targeting. The attack was facilitated by compromised GitHub account nhur, which created malicious workflows and triggered automated CI publishing, affecting developers and CI/CD environments that installed the package. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-35455immich · Cross-site Scripting High7.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-35455 immich is a high performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 2.7.0, sStored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in the 360° panorama viewer allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of any other user who views the malicious panorama with the OCR overlay enabled. The attacker uploads an equirectangular image containing crafted text; OCR extracts it, and the panorama viewer renders it via innerHTML without sanitization. This enables session hijacking (via persistent API key creation), private photo exfiltration, and access to GPS location history and face biometric data. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-0563WP Google Street View (with 360° virtual tour) & Google maps + Local SEO · Cross-site Scripting Medium6.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0563 The WP Google Street View (with 360° virtual tour) & Google maps + Local SEO plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'wpgsv_map' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.8 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 1.0 | EPSS 0.3% | Low1.0EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-11644 A weakness has been identified in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component UART Interface. Executing manipulation can lead to insecure storage of sensitive information. The physical device can be targeted for the attack. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.8 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium4.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-11639 A vulnerability has been found in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file collect_logs.sh of the component Debug Log S3 Bucket Handler. The manipulation leads to insecure storage of sensitive information. An attack has to be approached locally. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-38677 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-boundary access in dnode page As Jiaming Zhang reported: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1c1/0x2a0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x17e/0x800 mm/kasan/report.c:480 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:593 data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3053 [inline] f2fs_data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3058 [inline] f2fs_get_dnode_of_data+0x1a09/0x1c40 fs/f2fs/node.c:855 f2fs_reserve_block+0x53/0x310 fs/f2fs/data.c:1195 prepare_write_begin fs/f2fs/data.c:3395 [inline] f2fs_write_begin+0xf39/0x2190 fs/f2fs/data.c:3594 generic_perform_write+0x2c7/0x910 mm/filemap.c:4112 f2fs_buffered_write_iter fs/f2fs/file.c:4988 [inline] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x1ec8/0x2410 fs/f2fs/file.c:5216 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x546/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x149/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The root cause is in the corrupted image, there is a dnode has the same node id w/ its inode, so during f2fs_get_dnode_of_data(), it tries to access block address in dnode at offset 934, however it parses the dnode as inode node, so that get_dnode_addr() returns 360, then it tries to access page address from 360 + 934 * 4 = 4096 w/ 4 bytes. To fix this issue, let's add sanity check for node id of all direct nodes during f2fs_get_dnode_of_data(). EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2025-9131Ogulo (WordPress plugin) · Cross-site Scripting Medium6.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-9131 The Ogulo – 360° Tour plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the ‘slug’ parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.11 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. | CVE Database V5 |
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