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3 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-96454tw93 Pake · Missing Authorization High8.2EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-96454 Pake turns a website into a desktop application built on Tauri. Every application it generates inherits two settings from the upstream template, and together they hand native functionality to untrusted web content. The first is in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json, which grants IPC access with "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] }. That wildcard tells Tauri to accept IPC from any HTTPS origin, not just the site the application was built to wrap. The second is "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which puts window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() in reach of ordinary page JavaScript. Tauri's access control list only checks plugin commands, the ones prefixed with plugin:. Commands the application registers itself through generate_handler!, known as app commands, are never checked against the ACL. So once an origin holds IPC access, it can call every app command with nothing else standing in the way. Pake registers download_file as an app command, and it does not appear in the permissions list because it does not need to. The practical effect is that any script running on any HTTPS page inside a Pake application can invoke the application's native commands. That includes third-party script the wrapped site loads on its own, such as analytics, advertising, or a compromised CDN. Anyone distributing their own Pake application gets the same access without asking for it. Chained with the path traversal in download_file that is tracked separately as CVE-2026-82635, this reaches arbitrary file write and persistent code execution. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (03e8f6925f88772bdb738b691a200f670aebecaef33c066a379d9424c7910a5a) The package is published under a name mimicking lodash but its manifest's main entry is dist/xelis-miner.browser.js, a Xelis Stratum cryptocurrency miner bundle with an embedded ~35 KB WebAssembly xelis-hash v3 engine. On require/import (or via the README-advertised CDN embed), the bundle auto-instantiates a XelisMiner web worker (XelisMiner.auto) that mines on the visitor's CPU. Pool and wallet configuration are not fixed in the bundle; the miner fetches them at runtime from a hardcoded author-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoint at https://analytics.baskirill-an.workers.dev/configs/boostydownloader (referred to in the README as "cloudflare-c2c"), which lets the operator rotate mining pool and wallet destinations at will. The bundle additionally contacts https://api.ipify.org?format=json to capture the visitor's public IP. Package metadata (description "lodash-js", keywords including xelis/stratum/miner/wasm) contradicts the lodash-shaped name — the sole shipped functionality is the miner, not any lodash API. Any site or application that installs this package believing it to be lodash will ship a browser cryptojacker to its end users, whose compute and electricity are redirected to the attacker's mining pool via the mutable c2 endpoint. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bfc85c0238f90672b0cc329cae3487061924ed5a6458644a97cd90a830ace807) index.js exports a getPlugin function that issues an HTTPS request to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at https://46.183.25.232:45000/icons/<n> and passes the response's `credits` field to `new Function('require','module',...,data.credits)`, invoking the returned function with a live `require`, `process`, and `Buffer` in scope. Any consumer that loads the package's default export executes attacker-supplied JavaScript with full Node privileges on the host. The C2 URL is assembled from split literals (protocol/separator/domain/path) alongside a decoy setDefaultModule that constructs cdnjs font-awesome URLs, disguising the traffic as icon-CDN requests, and the authorization header is spelled `bearrtoken` to further avoid casual inspection. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi for Windows DPAPI unwrap, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are consistent with follow-on wallet and browser-secret harvesting delivered by the remote payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d5d588d45a7677764b972a1892308e61160b2803021af65ba25b1d47534fa264) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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