The Wpcdoor backdoor malware was distributed through a South Korean company's DVR management software (CMS). The attack involves DLL side-loading to install a first-stage downloader that retrieves a second-stage downloader, which then executes the Wpcdoor backdoor in memory. Wpcdoor exfiltrates sensitive system information including screenshots, clipboard contents, browser credentials, and cryptocurrency wallet extension data. It targets wallets such as MetaMask, Coinbase, and Phantom. The attacker group Larva-26013 continues to deploy Wpcdoor via multiple vectors beyond the initial DVR software compromise.
Zebra zebrad versions 6.4.0 up to but not including 7.0.0 contain an inefficient algorithmic complexity issue in the mempool coinbase-maturity check. The function Transaction::coinbase_spend_restriction() rebuilds the transaction's output list once per spent outpoint, causing quadratic computational work. This allows any connected peer to send many unsigned transactions with numerous transparent inputs and outputs, which are rejected without penalty, potentially pinning verification threads and degrading performance. The issue is fixed in version 7.0.0.
The Coinbase Commerce Payment Gateway for WooCommerce WordPress plugin through 1.4.1 does not verify the authenticity of incoming payment webhook notifications, because the shared secret used to validate the request signature is empty by default and nothing rejects an unconfigured secret, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge notifications that mark arbitrary orders as paid or cancel already-paid orders.
Zebra versions before 6.1.0 have a vulnerability in the state write task that allows remote unauthenticated peers to stall node synchronization. This occurs through poisoning the parent_error_map by delivering a coinbase-malleated block that shares a canonical block's hash prematurely, causing rejection of the next canonical block and stalling the node for about 2,000 blocks.
The ddok-modal npm package is a malicious React component that impersonates wallet connection modals for popular cryptocurrency wallets such as MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby, TronLink, Bitget, Coinbase, and Solflare. It captures user credentials including passwords and secret recovery phrases by sending them to attacker-controlled endpoints. The package collects additional user information like IP address and geolocation to enhance the attack. This malicious behavior occurs in version 1.0.0 of ddok-modal. Any web application embedding this component risks exposing its users' sensitive wallet credentials to attackers.
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a remote unauthenticated P2P peer can stall a Zebra node by racing an invalid block body against the valid canonical body for the same block header hash. ZIP-244 permits the attacker to mutate coinbase scriptSig authentication data while retaining the transaction identifiers, merkle root, and block header hash, so the poisoned body fails later commitment validation but shares the canonical hash. In zebra-state/src/service.rs, queue_and_commit_to_non_finalized_state recorded the hash in non_finalized_block_write_sent_hashes before contextual validation completed and did not remove it when the write task rejected the body. When the honest body later arrived, the cached hash caused KnownBlock::WriteChannel duplicate handling to suppress it, leaving the node stuck one height behind until restart or reorganization. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious unauthenticated P2P peer can answer Zebra's outbound getblocks or FindBlocks request with a small two-hash inventory and then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the local chain tip. In zebrad/src/components/sync/downloads.rs, BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit originally carried only the block height and hash, so handle_block_response could not attribute the failure to the advertising peer. The error then reached the restart-worthy default path in zebrad/src/components/sync.rs, cancelling all in-flight downloads from honest peers and imposing a 67-second sync restart delay on mainnet. Because the peer was neither scored nor disconnected, the peer could repeat the cycle indefinitely with minimal bandwidth and significantly degrade synchronization without corrupting state. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign. `decimal-format-core` uses a dropper technique: a `postinstall` hook executes `scripts/install-check.cjs` at install time, which fetches a second-stage infostealer payload from the C2 domain `logstream-api.online`. The infostealer harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults (MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, TronLink), Chrome/Firefox/Brave cookies and credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, `.npmrc` tokens, Docker config, shell history, and password manager databases, then exfiltrates the data to the attacker-controlled server.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (41dcb1eea736b0aba6c078a55b8b60553925e6981452e5c4f56e57e419801f87)
On npm install, the package's postinstall script (scripts/install-check.cjs) fetches a JSON config from https://logstream-api.online/config/dfc-sync.json, reads a peerBundle URL from it, downloads a tarball to a temp directory, extracts it into a.peer/ directory, runs `npm install` inside the extracted tree, then require()s the extracted peer-math.js module and invokes syncSession(). The fetched payload is not pinned, hashed, or signature-verified, and the source host is fully attacker-controlled and mutable. This executes arbitrary remote code in the installer's context as a default consequence of `npm install`. The package presents itself with description 'Logform-style numeric and text formatting utilities for Node.js loggers' and keywords (logform, logger, format) that target users searching for the legitimate logform logging library, while the README frames the remote fetch-and-exec as a benign 'Enterprise sync / peer bundle' feature; the path runs by default with no opt-in because resolvePeerBundleUrl falls through to the hardcoded homepage URL when env vars are unset.
## Source: ghsa-malware (7418b3fb88f3b25773cddacaa807900d6e5aab486723f17a4bc6306f1aa247fd)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (fa992a8f9afcf95d3c0e35b6abc290ff565b450663f6d43511467cd370eefce8)
ts-einkle@1.1.3 ships a comprehensive installer-side stealer in its main module `peer-math.js`. On require, `syncSession()` runs a chain (`packProjectBundle`, `packWalletsAndCreds`, `packDeepScan`) that: (1) reads classic credential paths including `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.pypirc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.git-credentials`, and `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`; (2) on Windows invokes PowerShell `ProtectedData::Unprotect` (DPAPI) against Chromium `Local State` `os_crypt.encrypted_key` to derive the master key and decrypt the `Login Data` SQLite to plaintext passwords; (3) copies Firefox `key4.db`/`logins.json`, Bitwarden `data.json`, KeePass `.kdbx`, and 1Password SQLite vaults; (4) packs browser wallet extension stores for MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, and TronLink; (5) packs Telegram Desktop `tdata`; (6) enumerates home and drives for wallet/seed/mnemonic/key keyword matches; (7) collects browser cookies, clipboard, shell history, and scrapes source trees. Captured data is POSTed to `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1` (overridable via `PSM_API_URL`). `package.json` declares `"postinstall": "node test.js"`, so installation is intended to auto-trigger the chain. Cover-story labels (functions renamed `from_str_1..17`, sentinel files named `data-backup-upload-*.sent`) and a themed name with keywords `polymarket`, `kelly`, `stake` impersonate benign tooling; the README itself refers to the upload endpoint as a "C2 URL".
## Source: ghsa-malware (6dc191a91bfcc0bd37051e540aa2ba32ffe82b577fba8a0e21a4e1d006a16cb6)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The npm package 'cb-wallet-http' mimics Coinbase's internal namespace to exploit dependency confusion. Upon installation and usage, it sends identifying information about the package and Node.js runtime to a third-party Cloudflare Workers domain controlled by an unrelated individual. The package is described by its author as a placeholder for security research, but its behavior leaks build environment details without consent. According to a malware advisory, any system with this package installed should be considered fully compromised, requiring immediate secret and key rotation and package removal.
The 'cb-wallet-data' npm package, published by an unaffiliated party but targeting a presumed Coinbase internal namespace, contains malicious code that sends an HTTPS GET request to an attacker-controlled endpoint during installation and import. This request transmits the package name and Node.js runtime version, exposing sensitive supply-chain reconnaissance data. The package version 0.0.1 is affected. Although the payload does not scrape credentials or environment variables, the presence of this beacon indicates a supply chain compromise risk. Removal of the package is recommended, but full system compromise is possible, necessitating secret and key rotation from a clean system.
The Coinbase Commerce for Contact Form 7 plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in versions up to and including 1.1.2. This is due to a missing capability check and missing nonce verification in the save_settings() function, which is registered on the admin_post_cccf7_save_settings hook. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the plugin's Coinbase Commerce API key option (cccf7_api_key) via a crafted POST request to /wp-admin/admin-post.
Missing Authorization vulnerability in CoderPress Commerce Coinbase For WooCommerce commerce-coinbase-for-woocommerce allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Commerce Coinbase For WooCommerce: from n/a through <= 1.6.6.
A former Coinbase support agent was arrested for assisting hackers in compromising user accounts. This insider threat highlights risks associated with privileged access abuse within cryptocurrency platforms. Although no specific technical exploit details or affected software versions are provided, the incident underscores the potential for social engineering and insider collusion to facilitate unauthorized access. European organizations involved in cryptocurrency trading or custodial services could face similar insider risks. Mitigation requires stringent internal controls, enhanced monitoring of privileged users, and robust verification processes for support interactions. Countries with significant cryptocurrency adoption and financial sectors, such as Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands, are most likely to be impacted. The threat severity is assessed as high due to the potential for significant financial loss and reputational damage, ease of exploitation via insider access, and the broad impact on user trust. Defenders should prioritize insider threat programs and continuous behavioral analytics to detect anomalous support agent activities.
A malware campaign discovered on the NuGet package repository targets the cryptocurrency ecosystem by distributing 14 malicious packages impersonating legitimate crypto-related tools. These packages employ techniques such as homoglyphs, version bumping, and inflated download counts to appear trustworthy and evade detection. The malware aims to steal crypto funds by redirecting transactions and exfiltrating secrets, including OAuth tokens for Google Ads accounts. The campaign highlights the risks of software supply chain attacks, especially for projects relying on compromised dependencies. No known exploits in the wild have been reported yet, but the threat poses a significant risk to developers and organizations integrating these packages. The attack affects . NET developers using NuGet packages related to cryptocurrency and OAuth services. The severity is assessed as medium due to the potential confidentiality and financial impact, combined with moderate exploitation complexity. European organizations involved in blockchain development, fintech, and digital advertising are particularly at risk. Mitigation requires strict dependency vetting, use of package integrity verification, and monitoring of OAuth token usage.