North Korean state-sponsored hackers have conducted a sophisticated social engineering campaign called FaceStealer, stealing over $400 million in cryptocurrency over 18 months. The attackers compromise legitimate accounts on platforms such as Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, and Discord to invite targets to fake Zoom or Teams meetings. These calls use stolen webcam footage of previous victims to create the illusion of legitimate participants. Attackers then trick victims into running malicious scripts that install cookie harvesters, keyloggers, screen capturers, and backdoors. The campaign targets cryptocurrency wallet holders, web3 workers, and open-source maintainers, sometimes waiting months or more before stealing funds.
A sophisticated global campaign targets software developers with fake job interviews via a fraudulent company called AccuraSoftHire. The attackers use legitimate job platforms and verified LinkedIn profiles to lure candidates, delivering malicious npm packages disguised as Tailwind CSS plugins in take-home coding assignments. These packages deploy loaders that fetch additional malware payloads using blockchain dead drops. The campaign also distributes a fake camera driver from the company's career site to deliver malware. Linked to North Korean threat actors, this operation has infected tens of thousands of machines and caused significant cryptocurrency theft, including the Binance breach exceeding six billion dollars.
A Lazarus group cyberespionage campaign targeted a Spanish aerospace company by impersonating Meta recruiters on LinkedIn and sending trojanized coding challenges. The attack used spearphishing via LinkedIn Messaging to deliver malicious executables disguised as C++ programming tests. The campaign deployed multiple malware tools including LightlessCan, a new backdoor with enhanced stealth and command capabilities, NickelLoader downloader, and miniBlindingCan variant. DLL side-loading was used to load payloads, and the attack aimed to steal aerospace technology and know-how, aligning with North Korean strategic interests.
Mirage Kitten, an APT group historically focused on the Middle East and Africa, has deployed two previously undocumented cross-platform remote access trojans: NodeRabbit (Node.js-based) and PollCat (JavaScript-based). Both malware families mark the group's first departure from native malware toward scripting languages compatible with Windows, Linux, and macOS. Operators deliver these tools through sophisticated social engineering campaigns involving fake recruiters on LinkedIn who distribute trojanized coding challenges via Amazon S3 buckets. The malicious projects contain backdoored npm packages that silently install persistent implants. NodeRabbit implements comprehensive command-and-control capabilities including file operations, process management, and proxy-aware C2 communications through Azure and Cloudflare infrastructure. PollCat provides similar RAT functionality with specialized developer persistence mechanisms targeting VS Code extensions and Git hooks. Targeted sectors include aviation, aerospa...
CVE-2026-81485 is a path traversal vulnerability in danielpopamd linkedin-ads-mcp version 1.0.0. The flaw exists in the fs.readFileSync function within the src/tools/campaign-management.ts file, specifically in the Media Upload component. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the filePath argument to access unauthorized files. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely. The issue was reported early to the project but no response or fix has been provided yet. Public exploit details have been disclosed.
It could soon become easier to identify AI-generated content, even if it's not the usual "It's Not X, it's Y" type of post you'd come across on LinkedIn and other socials. [...]
The miniOrange Social Login and Register (Discord, Google, Twitter, LinkedIn) WordPress plugin before 7.8.0 does not bind the one-time code used by its optional email-verification (Profile Completion) feature to the account it was issued for, allowing unauthenticated attackers to obtain a valid session for any account, including administrators, by requesting a code for an email address they control and replaying it against the victim's email address. Exploitation requires the Profile Completion feature to be enabled and social login to be configured.
The miniOrange Social Login and Register (Discord, Google, Twitter, LinkedIn) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass leading to account takeover in versions up to and including 7.7.0. This is due to the Profile Completion flow accepting an arbitrary email address via the 'email_field' POST parameter without verifying that the email belongs to the identity returned by the OAuth provider, combined with send_otp_token() returning the SHA-512(customer_key || otp) transaction hash to the client where the OTP space is only 99,000 values (wp_rand(1000, 99999)) and the customer_key is a static option (empty on unregistered installs). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trigger an OTP email to an arbitrary admin's address, crack the OTP offline from the leaked hash in under a second, and submit the cracked OTP to mo_openid_social_login_validate_otp(), which logs the attacker in as the user whose email was supplied — granting full administrator access.
A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming number of applications from potential employees. The website claims IRIS C2 is in the business of acquiring “zero-day exploits, individual primitives, partial chains, and full capabilities across all major platforms. Payouts range from $10,000 to $7 million depending on target, reliability, and operational value.” The government contracting portal g2exchange.com reports that irisc2[.]com is operated by a business based in Virginia called Calvexa Group LLC . The “contact” link on the website for Calvexa Group — calvexagroup[.]com — forwards visitors to irisc2[.]com. G2Exchange shows that while Calvexa Group LLC is registered as a federal contractor, it does not appear to be working on any direct government contracts. A search on the Arlington, Va. address listed in the incorporation records for Calvexa Group LLC finds the property is occupied by Jack Burkman , the 60-year-old founder and managing partner of the lobbying firm Burkman & Associates . When approached with questions about IRIS C2, Burkman referred further inquiries to his longtime associate, 28-year-old Jacob Wohl . Jack Burkman (left) and Jacob Wohl, at a press conference in August 2020. Image: Wikipedia. Burkman and Wohl have a storied history of creating fake intelligence companies and using them to spread false claims about and frame public figures, including fabricated sexual assault claims against then FBI director Robert Mueller , and Pete Buttigieg , then mayor of South Bend, Indiana and a Democratic candidate for the presidency. In 2019, Burkman and Wohl held press conferences falsely alleging extramarital affairs by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and then-2020 presidential candidate Kamala Harris . In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, Wohl and Burkman were prosecuted by multiple U.S. states for making thousands of robocalls to residents of battleground states and disseminating false claims about mail-in ballots. They were indicted in Cleveland on 15 felony counts of orchestrating a robocall scheme aimed at suppressing the black vote in Detroit, and were sentenced in late 2025 to probation after their appeals to dismiss the charges were rejected. In 2022, Wohl and Burkman both pleaded guilty to a single felony charge of telecommunications fraud in Ohio, and sentenced to a fine, probation, and community service. In March 2023, a judge in a New York civil case ruled that Wohl and Burkman had violated federal and state civil rights laws, and the two agreed to pay a $1 million settlement. In June 2023, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed a $5.1 million fine against Wohl and Burkman for their robocall campaigns, at the time the largest fine ever sought by the FCC under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Jacob “Jay” Wo…
A large-scale compromise of over 75,000 Fortinet device administrator credentials has been reported. The compromised credentials appear to be recent and include devices that are still online. The data was reportedly obtained from device configuration exports, containing sensitive information visible only from the devices themselves. This incident affects a significant portion of Fortinet firewall devices exposed to the internet, estimated at around 15% based on Shodan polling. The compromised devices include many with fairly recent patches. The source of this information is a Reddit post linking to a LinkedIn profile of a security researcher involved in the discovery.
A multi-stage phishing campaign emerged in early May 2026, impersonating LinkedIn and Indeed through typosquatted domains to deliver malicious payloads. The attack chain begins with fake CAPTCHA pages distributed via Google Ads, leveraging the legacy Finger protocol and native Windows utilities. Victims are tricked into executing commands that deploy portable Python runtimes (CPython or IronPython), which then execute in-memory shellcode. The campaign delivers CastleLoader, a Malware-as-a-Service framework using ChaCha20 and RC4 encryption for C2 communications, followed by a Python-based remote access trojan. The RAT provides interactive shell control, in-memory payload execution, and persistence mechanisms. The campaign represents an evolution of browser-based social engineering, combining Living-off-the-Land binaries with Python-based delivery to maintain a fileless footprint and evade detection through legitimate system utilities.
JINX-0164, a financially motivated threat actor active since mid-2025, has been conducting sophisticated campaigns against cryptocurrency organizations. The actor employs LinkedIn-based social engineering, posing as recruiters or business partners to deliver custom macOS malware including AUDIOFIX (a Python-based infostealer and RAT) and MINIRAT (a lightweight Go backdoor). Their operations focus on compromising developer endpoints to steal cryptocurrency wallet credentials, cloud secrets, and GitHub tokens. The attackers then pivot to CI/CD infrastructure, injecting malicious code into repositories to enable lateral movement. In April 2026, they executed a supply chain attack by trojanizing the npm package @velora-dex/sdk. The group masks activity using VPN services and demonstrates advanced capabilities including credential harvesting from password managers, browser extensions, and development tools.
A sophisticated fake recruitment campaign named 'graphalgo' has been active since May 2025, targeting JavaScript and Python developers in the cryptocurrency sector. Attackers approach victims through LinkedIn, Facebook, and Reddit with fabricated job opportunities from fake blockchain companies like Veltrix Capital. The campaign uses malicious dependencies hidden in npm and PyPI packages, delivered through coding test repositories on GitHub. Notable is the bigmathutils package that accumulated over 10,000 downloads before its malicious version was released. The operation deploys a remote access trojan (RAT) with token-protected C2 communication, file manipulation capabilities, and functionality to detect the Metamask browser extension, indicating focus on cryptocurrency theft. The modular campaign design allows threat actors to maintain backend infrastructure while easily replacing compromised frontend elements.
A sophisticated phishing campaign targeting LinkedIn users has been identified. The attack uses fake LinkedIn message notifications to lure victims into clicking on malicious links. The emails closely mimic legitimate LinkedIn communications, including spoofed display names and formatting. Upon clicking, users are redirected to a convincing but fraudulent LinkedIn login page designed to steal credentials. The phishing page uses a deceptive domain name similar to 'LinkedIn' to further trick users. This campaign demonstrates the evolving tactics of cybercriminals in exploiting human trust and curiosity. The analysis emphasizes the importance of vigilance, source verification, and caution when interacting with seemingly routine notifications.
WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn's API response, without sanitization via `escapeshellarg()`. If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user. Version 26.0 contains a fix for the issue.
The Company Posts for LinkedIn plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.0. This is due to a missing capability check on the `linkedin_company_post_reset_handler()` function hooked to `admin_post_reset_linkedin_company_post`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete LinkedIn post data stored in the site's options table.
The npm package 'linkedin-ui' version 85.8.0 has been identified as containing malicious code. The package is flagged because it communicates with a domain linked to malicious activity. This behavior classifies the package as malware within the software supply chain.
LinkedIn is suing ProAPIs for allegedly creating and using one million fake accounts to scrape user data from its platform. This large-scale data scraping operation involved automated fake profiles designed to bypass LinkedIn's security measures and extract personal and professional information. Although no direct exploitation of vulnerabilities is reported, the use of fake accounts for scraping constitutes a significant privacy and security threat. European organizations and users on LinkedIn could be impacted by unauthorized data harvesting, potentially leading to privacy violations, targeted phishing, and reputational damage. Mitigation requires enhanced detection of fake accounts, stricter API access controls, and user awareness of phishing risks. Countries with high LinkedIn usage and significant professional networking activity, such as the UK, Germany, and France, are most likely to be affected. Given the scale and intent, the threat severity is assessed as high due to the potential confidentiality breach and the difficulty in fully preventing such scraping activities. Defenders should focus on proactive monitoring, legal actions, and user education to reduce impact.