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14 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Japanese media giant Nikkei disclosed breaches of two employee email accounts—one Google Workspace account accessed in July and one Microsoft 365 account accessed in September. The Google account breach exposed personal information of 1,646 employees and business partners but did not include reader or interviewee data. The Microsoft 365 breach was used to send 9,000 phishing emails targeting internal staff and interviewees. Nikkei changed passwords after discovering the breaches and has contacted affected individuals. No unauthorized logins have been detected since remediation. The company has not attributed the attacks to any specific threat actor or linked the two incidents. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-90284 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel firmware loader component could cause a use-after-free condition when handling completed sysfs fallback requests. This occurs because the fallback loading interface is published before the request is fully queued, allowing a userspace helper to complete the request prematurely. The flaw leads to a pointer to freed memory being retained, which can cause faults during subsequent fallback requests. The issue has been resolved by ensuring that completed requests are not re-queued or cause additional events. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-90074 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's fq_pie network scheduler component allows a signed integer overflow due to improper clamping of the default quantum value. This can cause an infinite loop and soft lockup when a device with an abnormally large MTU triggers the overflow. The issue requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges in a user namespace to exploit. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80983 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix socket refcount leak in smc_switch_conns() smc_switch_conns() takes a reference on the SMC socket before dropping lgr->conns_lock, so the connection stays alive while the CDC slot is fetched: sock_hold(&smc->sk); read_unlock_bh(&lgr->conns_lock); /* pre-fetch buffer outside of send_lock, might sleep */ rc = smc_cdc_get_free_slot(conn, to_lnk, &wr_buf, NULL, &pend); if (rc) goto err_out; The err_out label only drops the wr_tx link reference, so this early exit returns without the matching sock_put(). The second error exit is not affected, because sock_put() has already run by then. A leaked sk_refcnt means the smc_sock is never destroyed. Its send and receive buffers stay allocated, and for a user socket the reference held on the network namespace is never released, so the netns can no longer be torn down. smc_cdc_get_free_slot() fails when the target link goes down or when the connection has been killed while the switch is in progress. Both are reachable during the link failover this function implements, so the leak is triggered by the same hardware events that make smc_switch_conns() run in the first place. Restructure so there is a single sock_put() covering both outcomes, instead of adding a second one to the error path. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80973 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler() forwards a MIDI event using a length byte the device supplies, with no bound and no check that the transfer delivered that many bytes: if (!urb->status) { if (rt->receiver_buffer[0] == 0x10) /* midi in event */ if (midi_rt) midi_rt->in_received(midi_rt, rt->receiver_buffer + 2, rt->receiver_buffer[1]); } receiver_buffer is a 64-byte kzalloc() buffer (COMM_RECEIVER_BUFSIZE), so only 62 bytes follow the two-byte header. receiver_buffer[1] is a u8 the device chooses, so a device that answers with 0x10 and a length of 0xFF makes snd_rawmidi_receive() read 255 bytes starting two bytes into a 64-byte object. The bytes past the buffer are handed to userspace through the rawmidi read path. urb->actual_length is not consulted either, so a short transfer leaves both the type byte and the length byte at their previous values and the handler acts on stale data. The receiver URB is submitted from usb6fire_comm_init() at probe, so the read happens on plug with no user action; forwarding to userspace also needs a MIDI input substream open, since usb6fire_midi_in_received() only calls snd_rawmidi_receive() when rt->in is set. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), single packet from an emulated device: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snd_rawmidi_receive Read of size 255 at addr ffff000009f64682 by task bash/183 __asan_memcpy snd_rawmidi_receive usb6fire_midi_in_received [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler [snd_usb_6fire] Allocated by task 11: usb6fire_comm_init [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_chip_probe [snd_usb_6fire] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000009f64680, ffff000009f646c0) Reject the event when the length exceeds the bytes that follow the header, and require the transfer to have delivered the header plus that many bytes. The receiver URB is submitted with a 64-byte transfer_buffer_length, so a genuine device cannot deliver an event longer than those 62 bytes and nothing valid is dropped. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-89575Linux kernel · dm raid1: reserve space for NUL-terminator in build_constructor_string() MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-89575 A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Linux kernel's device mapper (dm) raid1 component was resolved by reserving space for a NUL-terminator in the build_constructor_string() function. This prevents overflow in sprintf() when formatting a long long value with up to 20 decimal digits. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.5% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-89656 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's libceph component allows malformed CRUSH maps with buckets having mismatched CRUSH ids to cause out-of-bounds writes in memory. This occurs because the bucket data is stored by array slot, but a malformed map can cause one bucket to reuse another bucket's workspace, leading to a write beyond the allocated buffer. The issue has been resolved by rejecting buckets whose encoded id does not match their array slot, restoring expected invariants without affecting valid maps. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-74547 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (adt7470) Fix busy-loop and I2C flooding in update thread When userspace configures 'auto_update_interval' to 0 via sysfs, the background kthread executes schedule_timeout_interruptible(0), which returns immediately. If 'num_temp_sensors' is concurrently or previously set to 0, the msleep_interruptible() delay inside adt7470_read_temperatures() also becomes 0. This combination forces the background thread into a tight, unbounded busy-loop, hogging the CPU and flooding the I2C bus with a continuous stream of transactions. Fix this vulnerability by raising the lower limit of the clamp_val in auto_update_interval_store() from 0 to 500 milliseconds. This guarantees a reasonable minimum sleep window between sensor updates, protecting the system from intentional or accidental I2C bus denial of service. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.2% | HighEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68132 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices do_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb->s_umount exclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping the last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which reacquires s_umount: do_thaw_all_callback(sb) super_lock_excl(sb) # holds sb->s_umount bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev) mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex) # bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -> 0 bd_holder_ops->thaw == fs_bdev_thaw get_bdev_super(bdev) bdev_super_lock(bdev, true) super_lock(sb, true) down_write(&sb->s_umount) # same task: deadlock The emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both s_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount, freeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device. [ 81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State [ 81.880140] task:kworker/0:1 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000 [ 81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all [ 81.886656] Call Trace: [ 81.887759] <TASK> [ 81.888763] __schedule+0x579/0x1420 [ 81.890372] schedule+0x3a/0x100 [ 81.891794] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 [ 81.893848] rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900 [ 81.895191] ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10 [ 81.896528] down_write+0xbd/0xc0 [ 81.897505] super_lock+0x91/0x180 [ 81.898457] ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140 [ 81.900748] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400 [ 81.902069] bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150 [ 81.903132] get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60 [ 81.904042] fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0 [ 81.904755] bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100 [ 81.905484] do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50 [ 81.906298] __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130 [ 81.907067] do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40 [ 81.907739] process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0 [ 81.908545] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0 [ 81.909339] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 81.910171] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 81.910799] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 81.911528] ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0 [ 81.912259] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 81.913010] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 81.913806] </TASK> bdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with lockdep_assert_not_held(&sb->s_umount). Acquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the bd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by bdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer freeze even when the recursive path isn't hit. Fix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin the superblock with an active reference instead as filesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the superblock from being shut down and so ->s_bdev stays valid without holding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by fs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as a regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles filesystem-level freezes as before. The emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or another for a long long time but the current exclusively-held shape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in thaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback(). | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.7% | High7.8EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64560 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race which can result in an UAF: sys_timer_delete() exec() posix_cpu_timer_del() // Observes old leader p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread() switch_leader(); release_task(old_leader) __exit_signal(old_leader) sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand); posix_cpu_timers*_exit(); sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader); sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL; unlock(sighand); (p->sighand == NULL) unlock(sh) return NULL; // Returns without action if(!sighand) return 0; free_posix_timer(); This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited. As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results in an UAF. There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is allocated on the stack. Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops to expire. While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem: posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr) __exit_signal(p) posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p); unhash_task(p); p->sighand = NULL; sh = lock_task_sighand(p) sighand = p->sighand; if (!sighand) return NULL; lock(sighand); if (!sh) WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr)); On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false positive. Solve these issues by: 1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release(). 2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path of lock_task_sighand(). 3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the task lookup and only if that fails it gives up. 4) Using that helper in the three affected functions. #1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() and the ones in unhash_task(). #3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand == NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios the subsequent lookup fails. When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible. The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader. commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Attackers have shifted from hiding from AI tools to running inside them. By poisoning the config files that govern AI coding assistants, a new worm class achieves silent persistence, evades AI-based scanners, and spreads across an organization's repositories through developers' own tools. Key takeaways AI coding assistant configuration files, such as settings.json hooks, .cursorrules Cursor MDC rules, and similar harness files, are now explicit targets in supply-chain attacks, not collateral damage. These files simultaneously sit at the intersection of three trust relationships: The developer trusts them as config, the integrated development environment (IDE) executes them automatically, and the large language model (LLM) treats them as authoritative instructions, making them a uniquely powerful persistence vector. Defenders should treat harness config files as code that requires mandatory reviews and hash pinning in the CI/CD pipeline; enforce --ignore-scripts on package installs; and flag AI scanner refusals as a suspicious signal rather than a clean result. While analyzing a recent Mini Shai-Hulud campaign and its other variants, Tenable made a discovery: The payload wasn’t just stealing tokens and exfiltrating credentials. It was rewriting the configuration files that tell AI coding assistants what to do every time a developer opens a project. The Mini Shai-Hulud worm, which targets npm, PyPI, and other third-party registries simultaneously, includes a dedicated module that scans the developer’s home directory for configuration files belonging to AI coding tools by name, such as Anthropic’s Claude Code, Google’s Gemini CLI, Microsoft’s GitHub Copilot, SpaceX’s Cursor, OpenAI’s ChatGPT Codex, Cline’s eponymous tool, the open-source tool Aider, and others. For each one it finds, it injects a hook command which helps the malware stay persistent. From that point forward, every time the developer starts an AI coding session, the malware runs silently and automatically, and with the same level of trust the developer placed in their own tools. This is a deliberate architectural choice: The attacker modeled the execution environment, identified the highest-privilege auto-run mechanism available on a developer’s machine, and built the attack specifically for it. Supply-chain attacks used to end at credential theft. Now the AI agent’s harness is both the target and the propagation vector. Why AI agent harness files are a uniquely attractive target For years, defenders have focused supply-chain security on the package itself: Inspect the preinstall script, scan the tarball, verify the checksum. That model assumes the malicious payload lives only inside the installed artifact. The threat described here breaks that assumption: The payload lands in a completely different place. AI coding assistants’ configuration files occupy a structural position unlike any other file in a developer’s working environment. They are simultaneously trusted as developer configuration, so they survive aggressive code reviews focused on business logic; are executed automatically by the IDE, so no user interaction is required after initial compromise; and are treated as authoritative instructions by the AI model itself, so the LLM will act on their content without prompting the user. No other file class has all three properties at once. A malicious package.json script requires execution. A malicious comment in source code requires a developer to act on it. A malicious hook in .claude/settings.json runs every time the developer opens a session. The attack surface is also nearly invisible to conventional scanning. These files are small, structured, and look identical to legitimate developer config. A poisoned settings.json with a malicious SessionStart hook has the same schema and structure as a clean one; the only difference is what the command field points to. Meanwhile, the files are rarely subject to the same review discipline as production code. They live… | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The Contagious Interview campaign, attributed to North Korea, continues to target software developers through fake recruitment schemes. A new technique in their arsenal leverages Microsoft Visual Studio Code task files to execute malicious code when a project is opened. The report documents observations of this vector, presents GitHub-based discovery methods, highlights findings including a new malicious NPM package, and outlines detection opportunities. The campaign exploits VS Code's Task feature, using the runOptions property to automatically execute malicious shell commands when a workspace is opened. Various obfuscation techniques are employed, including hiding commands with whitespace and masquerading payloads as image or font files. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | – | EPSS 3.8% | CVE-2024-45337Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.14.57 bug fix and security update CriticalEPSS 3.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-45337 This update for rclone fixes the following issues: Changes in rclone: - Update to version 1.73.5: * Version v1.73.5 * operations: add AuthRequired to operations/fsinfo to prevent backend creation CVE-2026-41179 * rc: snapshot NoAuth at startup to prevent runtime auth bypass CVE-2026-41176 * rc: add AuthRequired to options/set to prevent auth bypass CVE-2026-41176 * s3: fix empty delimiter parameter rejected by Archiware P5 server * azureblob/auth: add Microsoft Partner Network User-Agent prefix * drime: fix User.EntryPermissions JSON unmarshalling * filter: fix debug logs that fire before logger is configured - fixes #9291 * s3: fix TencentCOS CDN endpoint failing on bucket check * iclouddrive: fix 'directory not found' error when the directory contains accent marks * Start v1.73.5-DEV development - Update to version 1.73.4: * Version v1.73.4 * Update to go 1.25.9 to fix multiple CVEs * build: fix Denial of Service due to Panic in AWS SDK for Go v2 SDK EventStream Decoder * docs: fix markdown issues in mount docs * docs: fix header level for metadata option * fix(docs): Fix link to not be language specific * filen: update SDK version * build(deps): bump golang.org/x/image from 0.36.0 to 0.38.0 * docs: note macOS 10.15 (Catalina) support with version v1.70.3 * Start v1.73.4-DEV development - Update to version 1.73.3: (CVE-2026-33186 GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x) * Version v1.73.3 * build(deps): bump github.com/buger/jsonparser from 1.1.1 to 1.1.2 * docs/jottacloud: fix broken link * docs: clarify Filen password change requires updating both password and API key in rclone config * docs: note that Filen API key changes on password change * build(deps): bump google.golang.org/grpc from 1.79.1 to 1.79.3 * s3: add multi tenant support for Cubbit * lib/rest: fix URLPathEscapeAll breaking WebDAV servers (eg nzbdav) with strict path matching * list: fix nil pointer panic in Sorter when temp file creation fails * docs: update RELEASE procedure to avoid mistakes * docs: added text to the label showing version-introduced info * Start v1.73.3-DEV development * docs: update sponsors - Update to version 1.73.2: * Version v1.73.2 * Update to go 1.25.8 to fix multiple CVEs * build: update to golang.org/x/net v0.51.0 to fix CVE-2026-27141 #9220 * docs: fix new drive flag typo in changelog * webdav: add missing headers for CORS * docs: Document unsupported S3 object keys with double slashes * docs: note that --use-server-modtime only works on some backends * internxt: fix Entry doesn't belong in directory errors on windows * drime: fix chunk-uploaded files ignoring workspace ID * docs: Fix headers hierarchy for mount.md * webdav: escape reserved characters in URL path segments * bisync: add group Sync to the bisync command * archive: extract: strip "./" prefix from tar entry paths * docs: add instructions on how to update Go version * buid: update github.com/cloudflare/circl to v1.6.3 to fix CVE-2026-1229 * Start v1.73.2-DEV development - Update to version 1.73.1: * Version v1.73.1 * build: fix build using go 1.26.0 instead of go 1.25.7 * fs/march: fix runtime: program exceeds 10000-thread limit * accounting: fix missing server side stats from core/stats rc * pacer: re-read the sleep time as it may be stale * pacer: fix deadlock between pacer token and --max-connections * build: fix CVE-2025-68121 by updating go to 1.25.7 or later - fixes #9167 * drime: fix files and directories being created in the default workspace * docs: update sponsors * copyurl: Extend copyurl docs with an example of CSV FILENAMEs starting with a path. * internxt: implement re-login under refresh logic, improve retry logic - fixes #9174 * docs: add ExchangeRate-API as a sponsor * build: bump github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 from 5.2.3 to 5.2.5 to fix GO-2026-4316 * Set list_version to 2 for FileLu S3 configuration * filelu: add multipart upload support with configurable cutoff * filelu: add multipart init response type * filelu: add comment for response body wrapping * filelu: avoid buffering entire file in memory * docs: update sponsor logos * filen: fix potential panic in case of error during upload * filen: fix 32 bit targets not being able to list directories Fixes #9142 * Start v1.73.1-DEV development - Update to version 1.73.0: * Version v1.73.0 * drive: fix crash when trying to creating shortcut to a Google doc * azureblob,azurefiles: factor the common auth into a library * test: allow backends to return fs.ErrorCantListRoot to skip Root tests * build: add privatebeta Makefile target * docs: add Internxt as a sponsor * internxt: remove use of CVE laden github.com/disintegration/imaging * docs: fix Internxt docs after merge * docs: update making a new backend docs * docs: build overview page from the backend data * docs: add tiering to the documentation - fixes #8873 * docs: add data about ea | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-35995 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system memory accesses To align with ACPI 6.3+, since bit_width can be any 8-bit value, it cannot be depended on to be always on a clean 8b boundary. This was uncovered on the Cobalt 100 platform. SError Interrupt on CPU26, code 0xbe000011 -- SError CPU: 26 PID: 1510 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.2.1-13 #1 Hardware name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, BIOS MICROSOFT CORPORATION pstate: 62400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : cppc_get_perf_caps+0xec/0x410 lr : cppc_get_perf_caps+0xe8/0x410 sp : ffff8000155ab730 x29: ffff8000155ab730 x28: ffff0080139d0038 x27: ffff0080139d0078 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0080139d0058 x24: 00000000ffffffff x23: ffff0080139d0298 x22: ffff0080139d0278 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff00802b251910 x19: ffff0080139d0000 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffdc7e111bad04 x15: ffff00802b251008 x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: ffff013f1fd63300 x12: 0000000000000006 x11: ffffdc7e128f4420 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffdc7e111badec x8 : ffff00802b251980 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0080139d0028 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0080139d0018 x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff8000155ab7a0 x0 : 0000000000000000 Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt CPU: 26 PID: 1510 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.15.2.1-13 #1 Hardware name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, BIOS MICROSOFT CORPORATION Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 panic+0x16c/0x384 add_taint+0x0/0xc0 arm64_serror_panic+0x7c/0x90 arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror+0x34/0xa4 do_serror+0x50/0x6c el1h_64_error_handler+0x40/0x74 el1h_64_error+0x7c/0x80 cppc_get_perf_caps+0xec/0x410 cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init+0x74/0x400 [cppc_cpufreq] cpufreq_online+0x2dc/0xa30 cpufreq_add_dev+0xc0/0xd4 subsys_interface_register+0x134/0x14c cpufreq_register_driver+0x1b0/0x354 cppc_cpufreq_init+0x1a8/0x1000 [cppc_cpufreq] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x250 do_init_module+0x60/0x27c load_module+0x2300/0x2570 __do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x114 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x180/0x1a0 do_el0_svc+0x84/0xa0 el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Instead, use access_width to determine the size and use the offset and width to shift and mask the bits to read/write out. Make sure to add a check for system memory since pcc redefines the access_width to subspace id. If access_width is not set, then fall back to using bit_width. [ rjw: Subject and changelog edits, comment adjustments ] EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database |
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